Mastering disruptive business models: lessons from cross-industry case vignettes Open Access

Disruptive business models (DBM) hold great potential in facing the unprecedented competition and volatile business landscape of recent years (Marchese et al., 2023; Si et al., 2021; Teece, 2010). To effectively implement these DBMs without threatening their existing business, incumbents often adopt ambidextrous structures that balance the exploitation of existing BMs with the exploration of disruptive ones (Lavie et al., 2010; March, 1991). Ambidexterity theory proposes structural, temporal, and contextual solutions to manage this balance (Markides, 2013; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996), supporting the integration of a new DBM alongside a “traditional, established logic of value creation and value capture” (Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu, 2013, p. 465). Consequently, ambidexterity facilitates the coexistence of what we refer to hereafter as “traditional” and “disruptive” BMs.

While the concept of ambidexterity is widely recognized and valued in both academic discourse and practical application (e.g. Kranz et al., 2016; O’Reilly et al., 2009), current discussions often overlook the complexities involved in applying ambidextrous structures to implement DBMs (Stoiber et al., 2023). In particular, internal obstacles—including unequal resource allocation, differing cultural needs, rigid cognitive patterns, limited innovation competencies, and structural barriers—make developing a DBM within the existing business an arduous journey for incumbent companies (Schindler et al., 2024). For example, Klöckner & Co, a German steel and metals distributor, was constrained by its rigid organizational structures, which prevented it from leveraging the disruptive opportunities of digitizing the steel and metals supply chain (Klöckner & Co SE, 2020). The company, therefore, relies on a structural approach to ambidexterity that offers separate structures for the DBM that promote a distinctly agile environment. In contrast, introducing an online MBA program at Imperial College London requires a structurally ambidextrous solution that fosters deep integration within the existing range of programs (i.e. business model) to overcome cultural constraints while enabling sharing of critical human resources and IT capabilities (Imperial College Business School, 2019). These examples illustrate that, in practice, ambidexterity extends beyond the classic structural, temporal, and contextual frameworks, revealing more nuanced approaches to addressing the internal obstacles at hand (Schindler et al., 2024; Stoiber et al., 2023). This raises the question of how incumbents can navigate these nuances to select an ambidextrous structure suited to their specific obstacles.

To address this, we first outline the inherent obstacles that impede incumbents from pursuing a DBM as suggested by Stoiber et al. (2023). Second, we examine the nuanced ambidextrous structures of seven disruptors across industries. Third, drawing on these cross-industry case vignettes, we offer a structured roadmap to guide managers and industry practitioners in selecting the most appropriate ambidextrous configuration from a refined set of approaches.

Our study contributes to ongoing efforts to managing the complexities involved in applying ambidextrous structures (e.g. Schindler et al., 2024; Turner et al., 2013) to respond to disruptive dynamics. Specifically, we offer a structured roadmap to navigate the nuanced approaches to ambidextrous structures as proposed by Stoiber et al. (2023). This roadmap systematically guides incumbents through three steps: (1) identifying core organizational obstacles, (2) configuring integration or separation features, and (3) applying ambidexterity at structural, temporal, or contextual levels. Through targeted questions, it equips managers and practitioners to identify ambidextrous configurations that address their unique organizational obstacles. In doing so, our roadmap addresses the often-overlooked practical complexities inherent in implementing DBMs alongside existing businesses and assists to systematize the path forward.

A company’s traditional BM is anchored in a long-standing business logic of creating, delivering, and capturing value that focuses on optimizing and incrementally improving established processes, while emphasizing efficiency and customer retention (Baden-Fuller and Haefliger, 2013; Teece, 2010). In contrast, DBMs–which are necessary for realizing the commercial potential of disruptive innovations–propose new paradigms for value creation and delivery along a new performance trajectory that fundamentally change the industry landscape by addressing unmet needs (Christensen, 1997; Christensen and Raynor, 2003; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004), thereby leapfrogging competitors or even creating new markets (Christensen et al., 2018). To that end, DBMs enable incumbents to lead industry change and “out-innovate the innovators” in today’s volatile and competitive markets (Hamel, 1999, p. 72; Teece, 2010). However, exploring a trajectory that creates, delivers, and captures disruptive value is inherently at odds with an incumbent’s traditional business logic since the mechanism of disruption is, by definition, destructive to established models.

Managing the co-existence of conflicting BMs can thus create internal obstacles for incumbents (Mueller-Saegebrecht, 2024; Qin, 2023), potentially impeding progress on two fronts: the initial implementation of the disruptive model and, once implemented, the exploration of its disruptive potential (Si et al., 2021). From an incumbent’s perspective, understanding and overcoming these obstacles is essential to capitalize on ambidexterity and drive DBMs (Stoiber et al., 2023). Following closely the recent study by Stoiber et al. (2023), we adopt the authors’ categorization of obstacles into five general themes: resource allocation, organizational culture, cognitive patterns, managerial competencies, and organizational structure (Chen et al., 2021; Kammerlander et al., 2018; Prange and Schlegelmilch, 2018) (see Figure 1).

Incumbents often face difficulty in balancing resource allocation between disruptive and traditional BMs (Prange and Schlegelmilch, 2018). In particular, resource dependence and structured routines prevent sufficient resources from being allocated to the DBM (Kammerlander et al., 2018). Resource dependence, on the one hand, ties incumbents to the business in which they have previously accumulated resources. Consequently, incumbents are reluctant to provide their resources to a riskier business with lower margins (O’Reilly and Binns, 2019). Structured routines, on the other hand, affect resource allocation by evaluating disruptive and traditional projects according to established criteria. These often result in resources being devoted to the most profitable uses, benefitting the established business (Chen et al., 2021; Kammerlander et al., 2018).

The long-established culture of an established company is based on deeply ingrained values, such as efficiency and stability, that can stifle potential innovation (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). Incumbents that aim to stay at the forefront of innovation should adapt their culture to foster creativity, experimentation, risk-taking, and flexibility instead (Marchese et al., 2023; Schindler et al., 2024; Velu and Stiles, 2013). Therefore, it is critical to understand these different cultural requirements to pursue disruptive versus traditional BMs. Otherwise, cultural inertia may limit the ability to overcome deeply ingrained values and thus prevent incumbents from capitalizing on disruptive opportunities.

An incumbent’s established routines and proven processes and structures can create rigid cognitive patterns or heuristics (Norris et al., 2020) that tie them to their existing business (Kammerlander et al., 2018). This adherence to a dominant BM is explained by path dependence, a phenomenon in which incumbents tend to continue a successful trajectory rather than exploring risky opportunities that diverge from their established routines and practices (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; DaSilva et al., 2013). Consequently, rigid cognitive patterns affect risk willingness (Mueller-Saegebrecht, 2024), ultimately preventing companies from pursuing DBMs.

Managers are often trained in conventional programs to operate firms that serve established markets (Sengupta et al., 2022). Furthermore, strict, conservative incentive schemes tend to deter executives from taking risks on new ventures that may not show immediate returns (Yu and Hang, 2010). Simultaneously managing traditional and disruptive BMs, however, demands managerial competencies in ambidextrous thinking and know-how of disruptive innovation dynamics to effectively enter new markets. In this context, it is essential for managers to distinguish between different forms of innovation and, specifically, to understand disruptive processes, the potential of DBMs, as well as their cannibalizing characteristics to effectively manage the trade-off between disruptive and traditional BMs (Prange and Schlegelmilch, 2018). Thus, gaining management support for potentially cannibalizing BMs is challenging due to a lack of innovation competence.

Large, long-established companies are often characterized by rigidity due to their hierarchical structures as well as their size (Christensen and Raynor, 2003). While these existing structures are designed for the exploitation and efficiency of traditional BMs, creativity, innovation, and flexibility are often structurally neglected. Additionally, rigid structures lead to inflexibility, inertia, and insufficient autonomy of business units (Kammerlander et al., 2018; Yu and Hang, 2010). A new, disruptive business, however, requires freedom and flexibility to establish its unique culture, strategy, and processes independent of the main business (Marchese et al., 2023). Consequently, incumbents must provide the disruptive unit with sufficient autonomy and independence (Schindler et al., 2024); otherwise, rigid structures threaten to become structural impediments to the development of DBMs.

Exploiting an existing business emphasizes refinement and efficiency, while exploring a disruptive business requires experimentation, risk-taking, and innovation—two essential yet competing strategies (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; March, 1991). Ambidexterity theory promises to manage this complexity of conflicting business models by facilitating parallel exploration and exploitation through organizational design (Asif, 2017; March, 1991). In this context, the literature discusses three forms of ambidexterity: balancing explorative and exploitative activities by structure, time, or context (Markides, 2013; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2011; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). While structural ambidexterity manages explorative and exploitative activities through separate structures (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004), temporal ambidexterity switches between exploitation and exploration over time (Nickerson and Zenger, 2002; Thelisson et al., 2019), and contextual ambidexterity adapts the organization’s context to both activities (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004).

Yet, as incumbents face increasing complexity (Mueller-Saegebrecht, 2024; Qin, 2023), ambidexterity as a universal solution may not suffice to accommodate a DBM (Kunisch et al., 2019). Rather, recent work (e.g. Egelhoff, 2020; Schindler et al., 2024; Zahoor et al., 2024) suggests a more nuanced stance on ambidexterity that “involves orchestrating the alignment of people and processes, the reconfiguration of resources, and the embracement of an innovative culture” (Stoiber et al., 2023, p. 1445). We thus argue that there are far more approaches to ambidexterity in practice. In addition to structural, temporal, or contextual ambidexterity, forms of ambidexterity can be distinguished by the following set of features as highlighted by Stoiber et al. (2023):

1. Processes: integrating both BMs into existing routine-based processes (DaSilva et al., 2013) versus setting up separate processes fostering search and innovation (Asif, 2017; Markides, 2013);

2. Leadership: integrating both BMs into existing hierarchies and leadership versus introducing a separate leadership team with specialized innovation expertise and ambidexterity capacity (Kuntz et al., 2023; Lavie et al., 2010);

3. Incentives: integrating both BMs into the existing incentive system versus setting up separate incentives to encourage exploration of a DBM and increase tolerance for failure (Markides, 2013);

4. Resources: integrating both BMs into existing resource allocation systems to share important resources across BMs (Govindarajan and Trimble, 2005) versus separating resources (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000);

5. Structure: integrating traditional and disruptive BMs within an incumbent’s existing structure versus structurally separating both BMs to ensure autonomy (Asif, 2017; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004);

6. Organizational values: integrating both BMs into existing company values favoring short-term returns and risk aversion (Christensen and Raynor, 2003) versus establishing separate values appreciating long-term growth through innovation (Dobni and Sand, 2018);

7. Culture: integrating both BMs into the existing corporate culture versus establishing a separate entrepreneurial culture (Marchese et al., 2023; Schindler et al., 2024).

Approaches to ambidexterity differ in terms of this set of features through which incumbents can surmount inherent organizational obstacles (Schindler et al., 2024; Stoiber et al., 2023). We therefore acknowledge the heterogeneity of the ambidexterity concept (Zahoor et al., 2024) and comprehend ambidexterity as a set of nuanced approaches to reconcile conflicting BMs. We build on the work by Stoiber et al. (2023), which offers more refined approaches to structural, temporal, and contextual ambidexterity by delineating seven distinct concepts identified through a systematic review of ambidexterity literature. Specifically, we provide practical examples for these seven concepts to illustrate the nuances of ambidexterity in practice.

In line with previous work (e.g. Balmer, 2009; Bıçakcıoğlu-Peynirci and Morgan, 2023; McLean et al., 2010; O’Brien and Meadows, 2003), we use case vignettes as representative examples of incumbents that navigated the set of nuanced approaches to ambidextrous structures and successfully implemented DBMs. Rather than gaining a deep understanding of incumbents’ nuanced ambidextrous configurations (as empirical case studies would; see Cepeda and Martin, 2005), these vignettes combine practical examples with theoretical insights from Stoiber et al.’s (2023) conceptual framework. In doing so, we aim not only to demonstrate its practical relevance (Elsahn et al., 2020; Siggelkow, 2007), but also illustrate the framework’s broader transferability by drawing actionable lessons from the vignettes.

We have identified seven case vignettes using purposive sampling based on three selection criteria: (1) firms recognized as incumbents due to their established position in the market; (2) firms adopting BMs that are considered disruptive; and (3) firms employing approaches to ambidexterity according to the framework identified by Stoiber et al. (2023). We gathered secondary data on the seven selected global corporations (Voith, Klöckner & Co, Imperial College London, Ericsson, Flutter Entertainment, Allianz, and Haier) from corporate websites, financial statements, and other information-rich secondary sources like press releases, news articles, and case study material for educational purposes (see Bıçakcıoğlu-Peynirci and Morgan, 2023). To capture the fine nuances of each incumbent’s approach to ambidexterity, our analysis focused on evidence of their organizational structure. Specifically, we assessed whether the seven ambidextrous features—processes, leadership, incentives, resources, structure, organizational values, and culture—were configured as integrated or separate across traditional and disruptive BMs. We further reviewed financial statements over time, tracing structural shifts to determine if changes appeared in cases of temporally aligned ambidextrous structures (see Prange and Schlegelmilch, 2018). In Table 1, we illustrate the nuanced approaches to ambidexterity of the seven incumbent disruptors and highlight the features through which they were able to surmount inherent obstacles to DBMs. The table also contrasts each incumbent’s traditional and disruptive BM for clarity.

Voith, a German multinational company in mechanical and plant engineering, launched the structurally separate division Voith Digital Ventures (VDV) in 2016. Serving as an in-house incubator, VDV drives the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) by offering interconnected, intelligent, and scalable digital network solutions potentially disruptive to industrial competitors (Trummer, 2019; Voith, 2020). However, the introduction of VDV was not without challenges. First, Voith faced inefficient resource allocation. Initially, the decentralized, small “start-up” teams were too isolated from the traditional divisions, hindering their access to critical resources of the Group. Second, VDV required a cultural adaption, shifting a traditional engineering culture to one that embraced entrepreneurial values. Third, entrenched cognitive patterns impeded the adoption of agile practices and slowed innovation.

To overcome these obstacles and manage the balance between its traditional business operations with the disruptive digital BM of VDV, Voith employed structural ambidexterity. This refers to the simultaneous operation of both BMs by separate business units that are integrated within top management (e.g. Govindarajan and Trimble, 2005; Gupta et al., 2006; Markides, 2013; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004, 2008). Recognizing that VDV needed greater integration rather than greater separation (Förster, 2019), the structurally separate division was integrated into the established hierarchy to share key resources and IT competencies from the traditional divisions of hydropower, paper machines, and drive technology, and to guarantee shared values for better collaboration (Voith, 2018). VDV remained separate from the traditional business, with distinct innovation processes, an incentive system to promote digital capabilities, and an entrepreneurial culture. By addressing these obstacles through structural ambidexterity, Voith has managed to effectively integrate its DBM within the larger corporate structure. A detailed examination of the ambidextrous features at Voith is summarized in Table 1, which outlines its capability to be disruptive while maintaining the strengths of its traditional business operations.

Klöckner & Co, a German steel and metals distributor, has established a separate business unit, kloeckner.i, which operates as an internal startup, driving digital transformation of the supply and service chain and disrupting the traditional BM in the steel trading industry (Klöckner & Co SE, 2020). Introducing a DBM within a traditional company structure presented Klöckner & Co with several challenges. First, Klöckner faced cultural resistance, as the traditional culture of the steel industry, which is generally risk-averse and efficiency-oriented, experienced significant opposition to the adoption of a startup culture promoting risk-taking and failure. Second, kloeckner.i was caught up in traditional cognitive patterns that that were not conducive to the agile, flexible processes needed for digital transformation. Third, the leadership at Klöckner & Co initially lacked the necessary innovation competencies to manage kloeckner.i effectively. Fourth, the initial structural proximity of the innovation group to the parent company led to structural inflexibility.

To address these obstacles and balance disruptive and traditional BMs, Klöckner & Co implemented a separation strategy. This approach separated both models at the business unit level while keeping the disruptive unit loosely coupled with the parent company (e.g. Christensen et al., 2018; Christensen and Overdorf, 2000; Markides and Charitou, 2004). Klöckner & Co established the separate disruptive unit kloeckner.i, which operates with a high degree of independence. This is supported by an autonomous structure and its own culture, values, and incentives that encourage innovation. Further, kloeckner.i adopted distinct, agile processes incorporating a lean start-up approach. This separation allows kloeckner.i to act as an internal startup while maintaining strategic connections to the parent company for resource sharing.

Accordingly, Klöckner & Co. introduced the “Digital Experience” program that enables the parent company to strengthen its digital and innovative competencies. As part of this exchange program, employees from the parent participate in digital projects at kloeckner.i for two to three months, gaining valuable digital competencies, and return to the parent as digital ambassadors (Klöckner & Co SE, 2020). As a result, kloeckner.i maintains a creative distance from Klöckner & Co, yet both benefit from each other’s knowledge, experience, and access to clients and suppliers. By addressing cognitive and structural rigidities through its separation strategy (see Table 1), Klöckner & Co has successfully integrated a DBM, with kloeckner.i being one of the company’s most profitable and fastest growing units (Kloeckner.i, 2022; Knitterscheidt, 2020).

Imperial College London introduced the “Global Online MBA,” an entirely online MBA program, which coexists with its traditional on-site MBA offerings. The business school’s online-only format MBA proves disruption relative to its traditional in-class MBA (Frangoul, 2018; Osiyevskyy and Dewald, 2015).

The launch of the Global Online MBA was met with several obstacles. On the one hand, it presented a resource allocation challenge as both programs competed for the same pool of HR and IT resources. On the other hand, the transition from traditional classroom-based to fully online learning formats required significant changes in teaching practices and digital content delivery, necessitating different competencies from faculty and administrative staff. In response, Imperial College London adopted an integrative approach to ambidexterity, which structurally aligns conflicting BMs by integrating the disruptive business of the online MBA into the university’s existing BM (e.g. Osiyevskyy and Dewald, 2015). Despite its disruptive nature, the Global Online MBA was fully embedded into the business school’s existing program and faculty structure, sharing the same HR and IT resources across programs (Moules, 2015). To ensure that the online MBA could coexist seamlessly with existing programs, the university established its own online learning platform and adapted university-wide learning processes by blending in-class and online learning formats (Imperial College Business School, 2019).

In addition, Imperial College London adapted its culture and common values accordingly toward “embracing online” to keep pace with digital innovation (Frangoul, 2018; Imperial College Business School, 2019). Further, both in-class and online students can track their progress digitally on the shared platform and compare their performance with that of peers, offering an updated incentive system (Moules, 2015). Imperial College London has successfully navigated the integration of the disruptive online format MBA within its traditional educational framework (see Table 1). This integrative approach to ambidexterity has enabled the university to serve the market for traditional classroom-taught programs while simultaneously offering online teaching, positioning it as a pioneer in innovative higher education (Financial Times, 2022; Imperial College Business School, 2019).

Ericsson, a multinational networking and telecommunications provider in the business-to-business telecommunication market, alternated between centralizing and decentralizing its innovation activities to respond to the emergence of cloud computing, which proved disruptive to its traditional BM (Khanagha et al., 2018). This included the initial decentralized organizational structure through the 2010s, which was followed by a centralization to address cloud technologies within a dedicated cross-functional team. This was followed by another round of decentralization by dissolving the cross-functional team and incorporating it into the major business unit, and centralization through cross-functional activities followed. In 2014, Ericsson decentralized all cloud activities, establishing a separate business unit, before centralizing cloud technologies for exploitation in 2017 (Ericsson, 2015, 2019). Finally, in 2017/2018, Ericsson decentralized its innovation activities within the new segment, “Technologies and New Businesses,” to explore new opportunities focusing on IoT, 5G, and AI (Ericsson, 2019, 2021, 2022; Khanagha et al., 2018).

To date, Ericsson remains decentralized, having experienced phases of sequential centralization and decentralization over eight years. Temporally alternating between centralizing and decentralizing a DBM alongside the traditional business has presented several obstacles. In phases of centralization of innovation activities, efficiency goals, and reliance on established customer relationships discouraged the exploration of disruptive technologies, reflecting a broader issue of rigid cognitive patterns and path dependency (DaSilva et al., 2013; Khanagha et al., 2018). In addition, the centralization efforts led to significant resource dependencies and administrative problems. During phases of decentralization of innovation activities, Ericsson experienced little executive support for cloud computing technology due to increasing performance and revenue pressures as well as established incentive systems (Khanagha et al., 2018; Yu and Hang, 2010). Ericsson applied the concept of temporal ambidexterity to dynamically address these obstacles.

Temporal ambidexterity is characterized by temporary dual structures, alternating between decentralization and centralization of innovation activities (Gupta et al., 2006; Nickerson and Zenger, 2002; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008; Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003). Accordingly, Ericsson has temporarily separated its processes, incentives, and organizational structure to match the different stages of exploiting and exploring the disruptive potential of new technologies. Moreover, Ericsson underwent a company-wide cultural transformation to align its values with innovation, experimentation, and agility (Kerber, 2020). At all phases, the temporary units and cross-functional teams were fully integrated into corporate hierarchies, ensuring a broad access to resources across the company to leverage synergies (see Table 1). Finally, temporally alternating between centralization and decentralization of its DBM enabled Ericsson to dynamically adapt to emerging rigidities, lack of management support, and resource dependencies.

Flutter Entertainment, based on the 2016 merger of the Irish bookmaker Paddy Power and the British online betting exchange Betfair, operates two conflicting BMs (Paddy Power Betfair, 2017). Flutter initially set up its online business as a separate unit as the order-driven BM of the online betting exchange platform proves disruptive to the quota-driven BM of the traditional bookmaker system (Endres et al., 2019). In 2019, Flutter reorganized its structure by integrating the online business into its existing divisions, enabling the incumbent to exploit online activities (Flutter Entertainment, 2020, 2021).

Flutter faced several challenges in managing and integrating its traditional and DBM. The online betting exchange platform required a cultural alignment to operate in a start-up culture that emphasized flexibility, innovation, and rapid decision-making, separate from the traditional bookmaker system. This also required the alignment of common organizational values to accommodate both BMs. In addition, preparing for the subsequent reintegration of the disruptive business challenged leaders to develop innovation capabilities to differentiate the needs of the potentially cannibalizing BMs (Schindler et al., 2024). Addressing these obstacles, Flutter Entertainment temporarily coordinated traditional and disruptive BMs using a phased integration approach (Paddy Power Betfair, 2017). This approach to ambidexterity is characterized by an initial separation of conflicting BMs using dual structures followed by an eventual reintegration of the disruptive business to scale it up (e.g. Markides, 2013; Markides and Charitou, 2004; Velu and Stiles, 2013). The separate online business was characterized by a unique start-up culture and distinct processes and control mechanisms, ensuring a certain degree of autonomy. Yet, the unit was not fully separated. Although the unit was integrated into senior management and shared resources and expertise across all operating divisions, the online business was integrated into Flutter’s technology platform and infrastructure. Further, Flutter Entertainment implemented a “Management Development Program” to train leaders’ innovation capabilities across all divisions and embed new shared values, preparing the online business for eventual reintegration (Paddy Power Betfair, 2017). By exploring the disruptive online betting exchange platform and subsequently integrating the disruptive business into the bookmaker system for exploitation, Flutter Entertainment became the world’s leading online sports betting provider (Flutter, 2022).

The multinational financial services company Allianz established the Global Digital Factory (GDF) in 2016, consisting of centralized teams of global specialists with a start-up spirit, to drive digital transformation across the Allianz Group (Allianz, 2017; Vaske, 2017). GDF’s dynamic approach allowed space for developing digital, customer-centric BMs potentially disruptive to the core business of insurance and asset management. Developing a digital, customer-centric BM presented several obstacles for Allianz. First, Allianz faced challenges related to structured routines and resource dependencies that prevented the insurer from quickly adapting to changing customers (Global Digital Factory, 2022). Second, GDF required a cultural adjustment to embrace the spirit of change and innovation. Third, the development of disruptive, digital solutions required specialized competencies outside of Allianz’ traditional segments. To address the obstacles in integrating traditional and disruptive BMs, Allianz adopted a dynamic approach to ambidexterity. By sourcing digital experts and centralizing them in interdisciplinary specialist teams at GDF, the insurer was able to dynamically coordinate existing and disruptive projects (Kranz et al., 2016). This ambidextrous structure promoted cross-functional teamwork with a minimum of hierarchy and a maximum of flexibility (Stöger, 2020). In fact, GDF remains integrated into the senior management of Allianz and works closely with Allianz companies globally to leverage existing network structures (Global Digital Factory, 2022). Thus, Allianz can share valuable resources and capabilities across the company, resulting in increased competitive advantages and firm performance. Additionally, GDF’s agile teams are characterized by decentralized decision-making, lean processes, and separate control mechanisms supporting innovative ways of working. GDF is driven by a unique culture and values (Marchese et al., 2023), which embrace the spirit of change, innovation, and customer-centricity (Global Digital Factory, 2022; Stöger, 2020). This approach of dynamically coordinating existing and disruptive projects within centralized teams at GDF has helped Allianz overcome resource dependencies, cultural inertia, and lack of innovation capabilities to bring customer experiences into the digital age.

Haier, the world’s largest appliance manufacturer, started to transform the company from a manufacturing enterprise into an open entrepreneurial platform in 2010 (De Smet et al., 2021; Kanter and Dai, 2018). To do so, Haier reorganized its linear structure into platforms of entrepreneurs consisting of many small, autonomous work units called micro-enterprises (ME). Through this transformation, Haier has become widely recognized for several DBMs, such as its solid-state thermoelectric refrigerators, which are disrupting the white goods industry and, in some cases, even cannibalizing its own businesses (Campbell and Dopico, 2017; Kanter and Dai, 2018; Zhang et al., 2019).

The transformation involved significant challenges. The transition from centralized resource management to giving autonomy to MEs required establishing new frameworks for resource competition and allocation among teams. In addition, Haier suffered from bureaucracy due to cognitive rigidities and structural inflexibility resulting from its original linear structure, which was ill-suited for rapid innovation and responsiveness to market changes (De Smet et al., 2021; Kanter and Dai, 2018).

To tackle these challenges, Haier implemented contextual ambidexterity, which is characterized by an organizational context that enables individuals to balance exploitation and exploration (De Smet et al., 2021). The ability to exploit existing BMs and explore new, disruptive ones simultaneously lies at the individual level of the company (e.g. Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; Markides, 2013). Haier created this context by establishing MEs, formed by self-managed, autonomous teams of entrepreneurs capable of responding better and faster to consumer demands (Kanter and Dai, 2018). The teams allocated resources independently but were integrated into global sourcing to achieve economies of scale (Kanter and Dai, 2018; Zhang et al., 2019). Haier provided initial funding to ensure MEs growth is consistent with its strategy and corporate values. Furthermore, each ME tracks its revenues, costs, and profits, and competes with the other teams for internal financial and human resources (Campbell and Dopico, 2017).

As an additional incentive, employees are compensated based on their team’s performance rather than on the company’s performance. In this way, Haier incorporated an entrepreneurial culture that encouraged employees to become entrepreneurs with a high degree of autonomy (Frynas et al., 2018; Kanter and Dai, 2018). Haier created a context that overcame the bureaucracy and inflexibility by allowing individuals to decide independently when to pursue activities that support traditional business operations and when to explore disruptive opportunities (De Smet et al., 2021).

Our case insights highlight the need for incumbents to adopt nuanced approaches to ambidexterity extending beyond the common view of a one-size-fits-all solution. By recognizing ambidexterity as a set of nuanced approaches to reconciling conflicting BMs (Schindler et al., 2024; Stoiber et al., 2023; Zahoor et al., 2024) we address the practical complexities often inherent in implementing DBMs alongside existing ones. Our study contributes to ongoing efforts to manage these complexities (e.g. Schindler et al., 2024; Turner et al., 2013) by providing systematic guidance on how to effectively navigate this set. To this end, we offer a structured, three-step roadmap that assists practitioners in identifying the ambidextrous structure best suited to address specific internal obstacles. Figure 2 provides an overview of the three steps.

• Step 1: Identifying organizational obstacles

The first step involves a critical evaluation of inherent organizational obstacles that impede the adoption of a DBM. These questions should explore areas such as resource allocation, cultural alignment, existing cognitive patterns, leadership capabilities, and structural adaptability (see Figure 2). By scrutinizing these areas of potential conflict, incumbents can uncover subtle yet significant impediments to their DBMs. Imperial College London faced a resource allocation challenge when introducing its Global Online MBA, which competed for HR and IT resources with its traditional on-site MBA. A guiding question such as, “Does your company have sufficient resources available to devote to a riskier business with lower margins?” helps identify misalignments in resource allocation that may favor traditional operations over innovative ventures like the online MBA. Another example, Flutter Entertainment, faced cultural obstacles in integrating its online betting exchange. Asking, “What values and habits are rooted in your company? How might you adapt them to avoid an inert culture?” might have revealed upfront that the quota-driven business would require an entrepreneurial culture different from that of the traditional bookmaking business. By systematically applying these guiding questions, incumbents can identify obstacles to which they can tailor their ambidextrous structures.

• Step 2: Configuring features for integration or separation

As our case vignettes demonstrate, all approaches to ambidexterity are characterized by a delicate balance between integration and separation of processes, leadership, incentives, resources, structure, organizational values, and culture. Consequently, the second step is to determine the optimal configuration of these features, strategically choosing which ones should be shared or separated to reconcile traditional and disruptive BMs (see Figure 2).

Integration, to a greater or lesser extent, is required to exploit synergies and obtain support from the parent company (Mueller-Saegebrecht, 2024). Voith, as a case in point, had initially formed decentralized start-up teams that were too isolated from the traditional divisions to take advantage of the extensive resources – a situation that could only be resolved through greater integration. However, a certain degree of separation is necessary to protect the disruptive business from business-as-usual, inertia, and dependencies, thereby increasing autonomy and flexibility (Kammerlander et al., 2018; Schindler et al., 2024). This was the case at Klöckner & Co, whose innovation group was initially too entrenched in old structures due to its proximity to the parent company. Klöckner & Co structurally separated its independent unit and was therefore able to maintain a creative distance from the parent company.

• Step 3: Applying ambidexterity at a structural, temporal, or contextual level

The third step in this roadmap involves selecting the level at which features can be separated to implement ambidexterity: structurally, through independent units, as seen with Voith’s independent VDV unit; temporally, like Ericsson’s cycles between exploring and exploiting cloud technology; or contextually, such as Haier’s open entrepreneurial platform context that enabled simultaneous exploration and exploitation within its MEs.

Following the three steps outlined in Figure 2 may guide industry practitioners in selecting an appropriate ambidextrous structure by determining (1) what obstacles need to be addressed, (2) what features should be integrated or separated, and (3) at what level these separations should occur.

Building on these practical insights, future research could advance debates on managing the complexities involved in applying ambidextrous structures by offering richer, context-specific insights through primary data case studies. Moreover, while our study explores nuanced ambidexterity approaches across industries, further studies could deliver more tailored guidance for practitioners facing unique, industry-specific obstacles in implementing disruptive business models.

DBMs hold great potential to face today’s unprecedented competition and volatile business landscape. However, various inherent obstacles make developing DBMs alongside the existing business an arduous journey for incumbent companies: Unequal resource allocation, different cultural requirements, dependencies due to rigid cognitive patterns, lack of innovation competencies, and structural barriers are factors that keep incumbents tethered to their current business rather than exploring disruptive opportunities. Critical to overcoming these obstacles is an incumbent’s ability to strike a trade-off between exploiting the existing business and exploring a disruptive one. Ambidexterity theory promises to facilitate such parallel exploration of a DBM and exploitation of the traditional BM. In this study, we explored how ambidextrous structures enable seven disruptors to stay at the forefront of innovation. Their approaches to ambidexterity differ in terms of features regarding an incumbent’s processes, leadership, incentives, resources, structure, organizational values, and culture through which they can surmount inherent obstacles. Our insights from seven cross-industry case vignettes propose moving beyond a generic understanding of ambidexterity as a one-approach-fits-all solution. We instead encourage managers to consider which structure best addresses an incumbent’s inherent obstacles. Finally, we provide guidance to industry practitioners on the selection of appropriate ambidextrous structures by offering a three-step roadmap. In doing so, we paint a more comprehensive picture of the nuanced set of ambidextrous structures available for incumbents.

Kristina Stoiber gratefully acknowledges the financial support of this project through a scholarship of the University of Innsbruck.