The purpose of this paper is to examine critically the accuracy of expert judgment, drawing on empirical evidence and theory from multiple disciplines. It suggests that counsel offered with confidence by experts might, under certain circumstances, be without merit, and presents approaches to assessing the accuracy of such counsel.
The paper synthesizes research findings on expert judgment drawn from multiple fields, including psychology, criminal justice, political science, and decision analysis. It examines internal and external factors affecting the veracity of what experts may judge to be matters of common sense, using a semiotic structure.
In multiple domains, including management, expert accuracy is, in general, no better than chance. Increased experience, however, is often accompanied by an unjustified increase in self‐confidence.
While the dynamic nature of decision making in organizations renders the development of a codified, reliable knowledge base potentially unachievable, there is value in recognizing these limitations, and employing tactics to explore more thoroughly both problem and solutions spaces
The paper's originality lies in its integration of recent, multiple‐disciplinary research as a basis for persuading decision makers of the perils of accepting expert advice without skepticism.
