Under the carbon cap-and-trade (CCT) policy, the supply chain is increasingly focused on carbon emissions reduction (CER), for which remanufacturing offers a promising pathway. However, independent remanufacturers (IRs) must first obtain remanufacturing authorization from the original equipment manufacturer, and such authorization can be granted to multiple IRs simultaneously. This setting creates a hybrid dynamic in which IRs both compete in the market and engage in cooperation to enhance CER. Therefore, it has theoretical and practical significance to study the coexistence of competition and cooperation in IRs.
This paper constructs a game-theoretic model to capture the coexistence of remanufacturing competition and CER cooperation between two IRs under different authorization models. The biform game, which integrates both non-cooperative and cooperative game stages, is applied to solve the optimal solutions and analyze the strategic interaction between competition in remanufacturing and collaboration in CER.
The results show that a remanufacturer with technological advantages has better performance in production and profitability but also leads to higher carbon emissions. In addition, compared with unit authorization, fixed authorization shows significant advantages in improving profit for IRs and promoting CER. It is also found that the enhancement of consumers' low-carbon preference and the increase of carbon price can effectively promote the growth of profit for IRs while reducing carbon emissions. However, when competition intensity and CER cost coefficient are high, the coalition shows poor profitability and sustainable development capability.
This paper has several limitations pointing to future research directions. First, the model uses deterministic assumptions for market demand and price, but real markets have uncertainties from random factors. Second, this paper only focuses on CCT, ignoring others like carbon tax. Finally, this paper only examines CER cooperation between two IRs. However, reality may have more members and diverse cooperation fields.
This study can effectively facilitate the development of IRs in both remanufacturing production and CER cooperation. This paper analyzes the complex interplay between cooperation and competition among IRs. With the guidance of research findings, IRs can gain a clearer understanding of the essential characteristics of the coexisting relationship between cooperation and competition, thereby making cooperation and competition decision-making processes more scientific.
Governments should regulate the market, guide IRs' CER cooperation via incentives, build platforms for stable coalitions and supervise carbon markets to avoid sharp price impacts. Remanufacturers should share technology and experience to boost efficiency and reduce carbon emissions. Coalitions need to explore sustainable paths and guide consumers to recognize remanufactured products.
This paper innovatively constructs a biform game model for the remanufacturing authorization supply chain to address remanufacturing competition and CER cooperation. This model provides a scientific decision-making basis for IRs to balance competition and cooperation in practical operations, realize optimal resource allocation and protect the interests of all parties. It further facilitates the collaborative development of the remanufacturing industry in enhancing production efficiency, meeting CER targets and safeguarding economic and environmental benefits, while opening up new ideas and methods for research and practice in related fields.
