“Always out-gun your enemy”: conventional firearms, right-wing extremism and the challenge to contemporary policing

It is widely recognised that the extreme right wing (XRW) has used conventional firearms in violent operations, spanning extreme violence and terrorism (Bjørgo and Ravndal, 2019). On 12 December 2022, a trio of right-wing premillennial extremists attacked four Queensland Police officers at their remote property in Wieambilla, using conventional firearms. They killed two young officers and a civilian, while the others escaped. This was declared an act of terrorism, synthesising extreme right-wing ideology, religious beliefs and conventional firearms. It has considerable precedent. The Nationalist and Racist Violent Extremism (NRVE) motivated attacks in El Paso by Patrick Crusius and Poway by John T Ernest, are just two examples of terror attacks using conventional firearms. Right-wing terrorist attacks by Australian Brenton Tarrant in New Zealand, and Anders Breivik in Norway, further demonstrate the scale of casualties achievable through conventional firearms. These terrorists disseminated manifestos in tandem with their attacks, which provided guidance on the use of firearms, adding to a growing body of extremist literature. To date, however, the instructional guidance in right-wing extremist documents has been underexamined (see Table 1).

Around the world, and especially Australia, police forces are unearthing larger illicit caches of conventional firearms, owned by individuals associated with extreme right-wing ideology. Conventional firearms, as defined here, as “a weapon that fulfils the characteristic of the definition in the Firearms Protocol, Article 3a. Technically, the firearm is characterized by the action of an explosive gas or powder to expel a projectile through the barrel (United Nations ODC, 2025). Our use of the term “conventional” refers to firearms constructed by authorised producers (including modular firearms), but excluding rudimentary, improvised, privately made or 3D printed firearms. The purpose of this article is to better understand the instructional guidance in right-wing extremist documents pertaining to conventional firearms to better enhance police preparedness and officer safety. In doing so, we articulate a specific challenge to contemporary policing practice. First, we undertook two literature reviews: one from terrorism studies and one from policing studies. Then, we identified eleven extreme right documents, which were subject to a weapons intelligence analysis, to assess instructional guidance. This was considered alongside a preliminary dataset on the possession or use of conventional firearms by XRW individuals in Australia. We then considered the implications for contemporary policing.

“Never hesitate to use your most powerful weapons. When the shooting starts, don’t hold back. Go for the jugular. Always out-gun your enemy,” advises one extremist. This instruction resonates with our key findings. First, we found that technical accuracy in extreme right-wing instructional documents varied. Extremists typically advocated a “bigger is better” logic to firearms selection and acquisition, but overlooked key operational factors in doing so. Another outcome was that of hyperbole, with authors prone to exaggeration, underestimation, over-confidence and a lack of technical knowledge of their chosen firearms. Second, our Australian case study demonstrated that while the threat is underwhelming in Australia – a strict legislative context – it was nevertheless present and unpredictable. In many of the identified cases, the individuals were associated with extreme right organisations, possessing an array of imitation firearms, pistols, rifles and shotguns, and facing court for a variety of different charges, ranging from serious terrorism act offences to more minor offences. Overall, we suggest that the variable accuracy of extremist guidance increases, rather than decreases, the threat posed to officer safety, especially due to its emphasis on overmatch. Our research therefore emphasises the importance of police training and preparedness in responding to firearms in the hands of right-wing extremists.

XRW terrorist attacks have demonstrated tragic lethality in recent years, many using conventional firearms and explaining their firearm choice and providing guidance in their manifestos. The instructional nature of extremist manifestos is well established, especially relating to jihadi materials (Conway, 2017; Conway et al., 2017; Kaldor, 2021; Kenney, 2010; Reed and Ingram, 2017; Zekulin, 2021). Kenney’s (2010) study examined the techne (abstract technical knowledge) and Metis (practical experiential knowledge) of jihadist instructional content to suggest that substantial techne is shared in the content, while Metis is limited by terrorist experience. For XRW instructional content, Macklin and Bjørgo (2021) provide a rare perspective, examining the impact of Breivik’s manifesto on Tarrant, through a review of the modus operandi.

Extant research has shown that lone actors are prevalent in the right-wing extremist milieu, but that their limited access to resources significantly diminishes their lethality (Schuurman et al., 2019; Spaaij, 2012). The cause of this reduced lethality may result from a disconnect between intentions and skills (Spaaij, 2012). Concerningly, the online subculture synonymous with right-wing extremism (Conway et al., 2019; Crawford et al., 2020; Macklin, 2019) provides platforms for the wide dissemination of instructional material. The Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019 (2020, p. 197) states the following:

Similarly, several attackers have since referenced the Christchurch manifesto in their own material. This is also recognised outside of academia, with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security suggesting that manifestos may inspire subsequent attacks or copycat attacks (Ware, 2020). The consumption of manifestos may provide right-wing extremists with information and instruction, enabling lone actors to increase capability while maintaining operational security. This is problematic as police officers are on the frontlines combatting XRW terrorism around the world, and especially in Australia in the wake of Wieambilla. It is therefore imperative that the instructional guidance disseminated by right-wing terrorists is analysed to better understand the threat posed to police and the community.

Terrorists’ use of firearms has been researched since the late 1990s (Drake, 1998; Mariani, 1998). Beyond isolated studies (Asal et al., 2009; Jackson and Frelinger, 2008; Nesser, 2008), there was a surge of interest after 2013 (Bunker, 2015; Capellan, 2015; Lankford, 2013, 2015; van Dongen, 2014), but interest has renewed significantly since 2017 with dozens of new studies emerging from the terrorism studies field. These studies have largely focused on attack behaviours, geographical and jurisdictional contexts, and perpetrator type with special focus on lone actors.

The acquisition, training, and use of firearms are noted in terrorist pre-attack and attack behaviours. Between 2002 and 2016, firearms were used in fewer than 10% of terrorist attacks, but accounted for 55% of fatalities (Tessler et al., 2017). Indeed, Demir et al. (2022) suggest that the use of firearms “significantly increased the odds of successful terrorism by four times” (p. 15). Paradoxically, Marone (2021) suggests that firearms have been replaced with more primitive weapons such as knives, with terrorism becoming less technologically advanced. In establishing a complexity index, Van Dongen (2014) suggested that weapon selection, such as firearms, was an aspect of attack complexity. Tellingly, Ilardi et al. (2024) listed the acquisition of firearms as a proximal warning behaviour indicating a pathway to violence using TRAP. They suggest that Brenton Tarrant demonstrated a preoccupation with firearms, motivated by operational necessity, “indications of obsessiveness”, fascination, pride in firearms possession and an aspect of his constructed “soldier/warrior” identity. Koehler-Derrick and Milton (2019) suggest that the choice to use firearms relates more to the organisational resources of terrorist groups, due to the higher risk, precision required and access to ready replacement recruits. The use of firearms is “inherently riskier”, which emphasises the strategic and resource considerations of firearms selection by organisations. Earlier research by Nesser (2008) had emphasised the importance of firearms training in jihadist terrorism, where Al Qaeda recruits often receive a three-week training course in firearms usage. Al Qaeda sympathisers in the West, however, are encouraged to legally train with firearms to gain the necessary experience without arousing suspicion.

Spaaij (2010) highlighted the relevance of geography and jurisdiction, suggesting that firearms are one of the most common weapons among lone actor terrorists, which can be linked to the comparative accessibility of firearms in the United States (p. 864). Hamm and Spaaij (2015) indicate that the relaxation of firearm laws in the United States was consistent with the elevated use of firearms by lone actor terrorists. Harris-Hogan (2023b) considered firearms usage in terrorism in New Zealand from 1996 to 2020, suggesting that 7% of incidents involved firearms. In his sibling study on terrorism in Australia (Harris-Hogan, 2023a), he also noted there were 13 incidents of firearms usage in terror attacks, or 7%, killing 2 people. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) provides further data on firearms use by country (Carson and Turner, 2024). In Jordan, Gråtrud (2023) suggested firearms remained the weapon of choice, using GTD data (51%). Tessler et al. (2017) used the GTD to consider the impact of jurisdiction, reviewing the United States, European countries and Australia–New Zealand. They found 9.2% of Australian and New Zealand attacks during that timeframe used firearms (n = 4). Bures and Burilkov (2023) used the GTD to review over 70,000 terrorist attacks where firearms were involved. They suggest that the availability of firearms and incidence of firearm-based terrorism are strongly related. Accordingly, terrorism in stable, democratic countries was more likely to involve firearms, with strict firearm control only “slightly” alleviating the overall risk of terror.

Research into terrorist weapon adoption often considers the issue in association with perpetrator type, such as whether the terrorists are part of an organisational context or are lone actors. Capellan (2015) suggests that 97% of ideologically motivated lone actors in the United States were familiar with firearms, and more likely to use firearms in attacks. Gruenewald (2011) considered homicide by right-wing extremists in the United States, suggesting that they primarily use firearms to commit homicides, but suggests that this is an under-reliance when considering the wide availability of firearms in the country. In assessing pre-attack behaviours between groups and lone actors, Lindekilde et al. (2019) also emphasise firearms as the weapon of choice for lone actors, suggesting 47% of autonomous lone actors acquired firearms specifically for an attack.

Looking at organisational contexts, Mariani (1998) identifies militia interest in firearms is due to focus on firearm rights and oppositions to regulation. Jackson and Frelinger (2008) suggest that firearms are valued by terrorist organisations for their versatility and use in operational contexts (such as kidnapping, assassination, etc.). Alakoc (2017) considered firearms while comparing the lethality of terrorist organisations and lone actors, arguing that the data on weaponry was not conclusive. Altay et al. (2022) identified that over 81% of lone actors used firearms pre-9/11, which decreased to 53% post-9/11. They suggest that these attacks prove more deadly than attacks with other weapons. Contrarily, Phillips (2017) uses data from 15 countries to suggest terrorist attacks by lone actors using firearms are “less lethal than non-gun attacks in the fifteen country sample, but more lethal than non-firearm attacks in the United States” (p. 544). Hemmingby (2017) indicated that lone actors were more likely to use firearms than groups (p.35), which was also the case in Australia and Canada, where Harris-Hogan et al. (2020) found that half of their lone actor dataset (n = 8) used low-calibre firearms. Australia, we may conclude, is therefore a valid case study in the use of firearms by right-wing extremists.

This research involved several steps. First, we gained ethical approval through the Human Research Ethics Committee [approval number: KC03181]. This is because we were collecting data about or produced by people, even though that data are open source and publicly available. We gained a waiver of consent to access and analyse the self-published extremist documents without written consent from the authors. This waiver was obtained due to the inaccessibility, risk to researchers, legal restrictions and the intended purpose of the documentation. As part of this approval, we cannot share the datasets publicly, but they may be available upon request by relevant identified authorities.

Then, we undertook a literature review examining the juncture of firearms and terrorism, using predetermined search strings and directly targeting prominent terrorism journals, to understand extant scholarship. We then undertook a specific policing literature review, using those same search strings, aimed at prominent policing journals. This confirmed the gap in academic scholarship. From there, we selected eleven extreme right-wing documents that contained instructional content on conventional firearms. A purposive sample was selected, with inclusion criteria for the manifesto being: authored by a right-wing extremist/terrorist, representative of extreme right-wing views and containing instructional content on firearms. Definitional criteria on the extreme right were drawn from Bjørgo and Ravndal (2019), Carter (2018), and Mudde (2000).

The eleven documents varied from three pages to over a thousand, published between 1990 and 2022. These documents are often publicly available, shared on either open websites or shared across encrypted extremist channels. Author (if known), publication date, title, and firearms-related content were extracted and tabled. We noted if the manifesto was linked to a specific attack, and what conventional firearm/s were used. We closely read the documents, which were coded as technical or non-technical. The technical documents were then subjected to a weapons intelligence assessment (WIA), which involved assessing technical statements in association with firearms, weapons systems and specifications, limits and capacities of ammunition natures, terminal effects and ballistic characteristics where possible. These documents were given a rating as accurate, inaccurate or variable accuracy. This provided insight into the accuracy of instructional guidance. Only four documents were ultimately included, and upon these we based our findings.

To anchor the guidance in a real-world context, we developed a preliminary dataset on XRW possession or attempted possession of conventional firearms (including imitation firearms). Deliberative search strings were deployed to Jade.IO and open-source media to identify potential cases of conventional firearm possession/use by possible extremists in Australia for inclusion in the dataset from 2004 to 2024, spanning twenty years. The search strings included firearm*, terror*, extreme*. A secondary search including firearm* and right wing* was also undertaken. The search results were sorted to remove false hits on jihadist terrorism. The results were reviewed individually, and those associated with XRW ideology were included in the preliminary dataset of twenty-six cases. These were coded as conventional firearms or homemade (including improvised) firearms. Imitation firearms were coded as conventional unless there was some indication that they were homemade. The conventional firearm cases were examined for this article, while homemade firearms form part of another paper (Campion et al., 2025). These three data points were analysed collectively to determine any prominent patterns or trends (Braun and Clarke, 2022).

Our aim was to inform contemporary policing preparedness and officer safety and contribute to a busy intersection in the literature.

First, we address RQ 1: How is the threat of conventional firearms and right-wing extremism understood in policing scholarship? Understanding extremist guidance on firearms is important in Australia, given the potential of future right-wing extremist attacks utilising firearms (Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, 2024). This was exemplified by Brenton Tarrant’s terrorist attack in New Zealand, using six conventional firearms (Young and Caine, 2019, p. 40). The terrorist claimed he undertook his attack in New Zealand, rather than Australia, because of the firearms context.

In Australia, extremist groups are surveilled and investigated by several parties, including ASIO (under the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 [Cth]) and Joint Counter-Terrorism Teams made up of federal, state and territory police, intelligence organisations and international law enforcement (Australian Federal Police, 2024). State and territory police are typically the first responders to terrorist attacks (Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, 2024). While counter-terrorism measures typically include normal legislative levers (Australian Federal Police, 2024; “Firearms Act, 2024 - Referral to Standing Committee on Legislation”, 2025), jurisdictional firearms legislation may also be utilised to remove firearms and constrain future offending (Australian Federal Police, 2024). This was the case in NSW in April 2023, where members of a neo-Nazi group were issued with Firearms Prohibition Orders (FPOs) and Weapons Prohibition Orders (WPOs) in accordance with NSW legislation. FPOs prevent the acquisition, possession and utilisation of firearms, their parts and ammunition by listed members (Firearms Act 1996 (NSW)), while WPOs prevent the acquisition, possession and utilisation of weapons, including certain knives, military style weapons and other items such as ballistic vests or handcuffs (Weapons Prohibition Act 1998 (NSW)).

In Australia, it is an offence to plan, prepare or commit a terrorist act and to possess things, such as firearms, connected with that act (Criminal Code Act, 1995 [Cth]). The country’s firearm control legislation is also said to be one of the most stringent in the world (Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, 2016b). This is aided by a predominantly “closed” illicit firearms market based on geographical separation from international criminal firearms networks, which renders the sale and purchase of unlawful weapons reliant on systems of trust (Bright et al., 2023). Australian firearms regulation is largely the responsibility of states and territories; however, two significant national reforms also occurred in the late 1990s. The first followed the 1996 Port Arthur massacre, killing 35 people and injuring 18 by a lone gunman. National legislation was subsequently enacted which, among other measures, required the registration and tracking of all firearms and the licensing of individual firearm use based on specific criteria (Firearms Act 1996 [Cth]). The legislation bans automatic weapons and limits access to semi-automatics (Council of Australian Governments, 2017). The firearms laws were coupled with a national amnesty and compensation buyback scheme enacted through the Firearm Implementation Act 1996 [Cth], which led to the surrender of 720,000 firearms within the first 12 months (Bricknell et al., 2020). The second was the National Handgun Control Agreement (2002) in response to the Monash University shooting in 2002, and a subsequent review of handgun regulations, restricting the import, accessibility and use of handguns (Bricknell et al., 2020).

Despite these initiatives, a senate review of Australian law enforcement’s ability to eliminate firearms-related violence found that a lack of data and inconsistent regulatory standards hampered the ability to identify, discover, seize and trace firearms country-wide (Senate and Constitutional Affairs Reference Committee, 2015). Policing authorities could not determine the size of black and grey firearms markets (grey market referring to those unaccounted for since the 1996 legislation) (Broadhurst et al., 2021). The Senate and Constitutional Affairs Reference Committee (2015) made 14 recommendations. Among them: (1) improve data collection and reporting, (2) revision to the National Firearms Agreement to ensure consistent national regulation of firearms, their parts and accessories, ammunition and the storage, (3) the creation of a national firearms interface to track the movement of firearms from manufacture or import to destruction or export and (4) the implementation of a permanent nation-wide firearm amnesty. The latter (4) was implemented in 2020 (Department of Home Affairs, 2021), while the Australian Firearms Information Network is now an interface for policing jurisdictions regarding the registration, licensing and movement of firearms (Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, 2023b).

Other recommendations remain outstanding. Data reporting continues to be inconsistent (Gun Control Australia, 2025). The most recent national report into illicit firearms was published in 2016, and while calls have continued for the “introduction of a national, cross-jurisdictional database of registered firearms and firearms licence holders” (Victoria State Government, 2024, p. 27), data has largely remained siloed. It is primarily accessible via the annual reports of the policing agencies (Chollet et al., 2025). The implementation of a National Firearms Register in July 2024 may bridge this gap in relation to registered firearms when data provisions become available in 2028 (Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, 2025). The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (2023a) estimates there are around 200,000 illegal firearms in domestic circulation nationally. This is 60,000 less than the estimate in 2016 (Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, 2016a); however, a significant number of firearms remain unaccounted for. Notwithstanding calls for greater regulation (Senate and Constitutional Affairs Reference Committee, 2015), the policing of firearms remains under the remit of individual Australian states and territories, albeit shaped by the National Firearms Agreement (Department of Home Affairs, 2021). Western Australia is the only jurisdiction to cap the number of firearms individuals can own. It also requires mandatory safety regulations and health assessments (Firearms Act 2024 [WA]). Jurisdictional differences in the bodies consulted about firearms policy continue (Chollet et al., 2025). These variations are likely challenging for law enforcement tasked with tracking illicit firearms in Australia, and this is concerning given the connection between illicit firearms and incidents of terrorism or targeted violence (Paoli et al., 2017).

While the policing of firearms in Australia continues to evolve, there are practical challenges in policing extremists’ access to firearms. First, accessing intelligence on extremist operations is complex. In 2024, ASIO reported nine attacks or suspected incidents of terrorism in Australia, involving lone actors or small groups (Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, 2024, p. 13). A combination of tight firearms regulations in Australia, and joint criminal enterprise laws, render those who supply firearms prosecutable for any crime they are used for (Hulley et al., 2019), which may have displaced attacks overseas and pushed the illicit firearms market further underground (Bright et al., 2023). The resulting cautiousness of criminal players has encouraged a “reliance on intimate connections to access guns” and increased the number derived from theft, which has constrained law enforcement attempts to gain reliable intelligence on firearm access routes (Bright et al., 2023, p. 684). Unlike many other jurisdictions in the world, Australia is in a unique geographical position, which affords it some protections (Lemieux et al., 2022); however, given continuing gaps in firearm information exchange, state-based variations in laws and regulations and the practical complexities of policing extremist access to firearms, significant potential remains for an extremist shooting to occur. To end on the evidence of ASIO, “That is going to be a hard day. I don’t think that day’s too far away” (Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, 2024, p. 104).

This day arrived on 14 December 2025, when Australia experienced its first mass casualty terrorist attack at Bondi Beach, perpetrated by jihadist terrorists. Armed with conventional firearms, they killed fifteen people and injured forty. The federal Albanese Government, with the support of the state governments, has promised a review of Australian firearms legislation, with major reforms proposed.

Having established the firearms context in Australia, we now turn to RQ2: How might we understand the instructional guidance on conventional firearms in extreme right-wing manifestos? Is this guidance accurate? Of the eleven manifestos reviewed, only four contained sufficient instructional guidance on conventional firearms to assess their accuracy. Two of those four were associated with successful right-wing terrorist attacks, one was associated with a WASR-10 semi-automatic rifle (an AK-47 variant), and the other with a Ruger mini-14 rifle and a Glock 34 (a popular competition and law enforcement firearm, respectively). Each manifesto was assigned a rating based on accuracy, ranging from inaccurate, variable accuracy, and accurate. Two manifestos were noted to be inaccurate, and two were of variable accuracy. We now discuss those outcomes collectively.

The primary outcome of the weapons intelligence analysis was the propensity for manifesto authors to exaggerate, generalise or fall into Hollywood-style hyperbole while discussing conventional firearms. This hyperbole, we suggest, demonstrated a paucity of understanding. For example, in one instance, an author waxes lyrical about the lethality of a weapon, suggesting “basketball-sized” holes would be the result. In the context of that discussion, it was a sensational and inaccurate claim. Along the same vein, one author suggests aiming at the eye socket when using a 0.22 LR cartridge as they believe it would not penetrate a human skull. In another instance, the author/s erroneously suggest that shotguns and 0.22LR cartridges thwart forensic investigations. Forensic investigations appeared to be a concern exhibited by some authors, despite the tactical advice that preceded it, which rarely, if ever, considered the concealment of the firearm. In another hyperbolic claim, one author confidently states that a 0.50 BMG is capable of penetrating heavy vehicle armour, potentially conflating (light) armoured police vehicles with heavily armoured military platforms, while another suggests that a 7.62 mm assault rifle is capable of puncturing body armour with lead bullets. Other language around firing from “the hip” with “both eyes open” is suggestive of the Hollywoodisation permeating these documents.

The documents demonstrated shallow technical understandings of conventional firearms, tending to favour larger calibres, exhibiting a “bigger is better” attitude, rather than considering overall ballistic effect. For example, authors did not appear to consider other factors such as velocity, target specifications, range, and concealment when providing instructional guidance. This is despite the precedent for terrorist success using smaller calibre; for example, the successful assassination of King Umberto I of Italy was undertaken by a left-wing terrorist bearing a small calibre 0.32 revolver. In some cases, firearm selection appears to be guided more by the availability of ammunition than by type, calibre, or operational needs. For instance, one author/s emphatically stated that sniper rifles must be “no less than 22”, despite the presence of service weapons used for sniping of varying barrel lengths. Other instructions about firearms merely reflected the author’s preference and made little technical sense. Ballistic effects were often exaggerated, and weapons systems were often misunderstood.

In some documents, the instructional guidance was simply inaccurate. For example, one author demonstrates limited awareness of modes of operation, singling out only two modes as the only viable options (when there were many). Attempting to exhibit technical expertise, another manifesto demonstrates concerns about the overheating aspect of the WASR-10 (a Romanian copy of the AK-47), underestimating the firearm’s capability and system design. In another case, an author incorrectly suggests that the spread of shotgun ammunition is dictated by the type of ammunition rather than the length of the barrel and/or distance from the target. One author claims that the 0.50 BMG has a lethal range of 4 miles (6.4 km), which exceeds the world record several times over, and 0.22 LR cartridges were suggested to be subsonic and lacking lethality. In another case, the M1 carbine is referred to incorrectly as an assault rifle (missing the point that carbine refers simply to the length of the weapon). Bullpups are misunderstood, and “assault pistols” seemingly invented, and laser aimers seemingly restricted to only SMGs. Even the definition of an assault rifle by one author was highly flawed.

Of course, some of the instructional guidance was correct. For example, comments about handguns in close range were correct. In addition, comments regarding the functionality of revolvers (relating to jamming) were accurate. For security purposes, we will not elaborate on the correct advice provided in these manifestos but simply note that some details were correct. In sum, we suggest that the instructional guidance in extreme right manifestos is of variable inaccuracy, reflecting shallow or amateur understandings of conventional firearms and their weapon systems. Instead, the guidance is Hollywoodized and hyperbolic, favouring a “bigger is better” and availability over task requirements. This preference for larger, more readily available firearms and ammunition poses a clear risk to officer safety and preparedness, given that most police officers in Australia carry a variety of Glock. It also has a greater impact beyond Australia, in jurisdictions where high-powered firearms may be more readily available, or where police officers may be lesser equipped – or in some cases, unarmed.

The threat posed by the possession of conventional firearms by right-wing extremists in Australia is unpredictable but not quantitatively overwhelming. In the past twenty years, there has only been one instance of a fatal firearms attack by right-wing extremists, which was the ambush and executions of law enforcement officers and a civilian in Queensland in 2022. This was a singular event, and it has come under coronial scrutiny with a non-publication order in effect. It nevertheless aimed to understand the circumstances that led to the shootings, in addition to the type of firearms used by the perpetrators, and whether the firearms were obtained lawfully.

Of the twenty-seven events captured in the preliminary dataset, involving the use or possession of firearms in association with extreme right-wing ideology, nineteen related to conventional firearms. This number is unlikely to be representative due to deficits in data availability; hence, it is a preliminary indication only. The remainder related to homemade (improvised, printed, etc.) firearms and are therefore the focus of a parallel study. Of these nineteen cases over a twenty-year period, five cases related to imitation firearms (in four instances, gel blasters). Gel blasters are often considered a recreational item or even a toy. However, under some Australian state laws, they are considered firearms and require a licence in the same manner as paintball markers. This is because, under the Australian Capital Territory Firearms Act 1996, a firearm is:

• Gun, or other weapon, that is, or at any time was, capable of propelling a projectile by means of explosive force, however caused; and

• Includes:

  • (i)

    A blank fire firearm; and

  • (ii)

    An airgun; and

  • (iii)

    A paintball marker; and

  • (iv)

    Something declared to be a firearm under section 31; and

  • (v)

    A modified item; and

  • (vi)

    A firearm frame or firearm receiver that does not form part of a firearm.

We acknowledge that this legislation is stricter than found in other comparable jurisdictions, but it sheds light on the Australian context. A further three cases indicated the individuals held an interest in obtaining firearms, but no actual possession was recorded. The cohort for this was unusual. Two were young people, described as teenagers and referred to only by a pseudonym, both of whom threatened or attempted to acquire firearms in association with terrorism act offences. The third was an adult with a known history of engagement with white supremacist organisations, and with knowledge and capability regarding firearms. Actual possession of firearms was recorded in the remaining eleven cases. These firearms, where it was detailed, ranged from pistols to rifles (including 0.22 rifles modified with shortened stock and barrel – a possible circumvention of pistol legislation), to shotguns, including pump action (illegal in Australia), bolt action (not common in Australia), and break action (very common).

The offences noted across the cases ranged in severity. The most severe was homicide, as associated with the well-publicised case of the Wieambilla shootings, through to terrorism act offences, threatening death, drug offences, proceeds of crime and, of course, firearms offences. In most cases, firearms offences were in addition to other charges. Not all charges resulted in convictions, with at least two cases where the individuals were found not guilty based on mental impairment, while some cases were ongoing or had no known outcome. Eight of the cases related to individuals who had noted engagement with extremist organisations, primarily of a white supremacist nature, such as Antipodean Resistance, Blood and Honour, Right Wing Resistance and Reclaim Australia. None of these organisations is in the Listed Terrorist Groups in Australia (Government, 2023). The remainder appeared to act alone, although there were cases of engagement online with non-listed groups, such as the National Socialist Network. The ideologies associated with the individual actors ranged from traditional neo-Nazi and white supremacist beliefs, through to manosphere/male supremacist beliefs, sovereign ideology, nationalism, anti-Islam and the Christian extreme right. There was no clear trend or pattern identifiable across these beliefs; however, this was a point of data scarcity in the source material (acknowledging that it is legal in Australia to hold such beliefs and that such beliefs were not the focus of the judgment summaries, except where in association with terrorism act offences).

We conclude that the number and diversity of cases make the possession of conventional firearms by right-wing extremists an unpredictable threat, but not numerically overwhelming. This sits almost counterintuitively against the severe and fatal consequences it can produce. The Australian case is relevant elsewhere because of its restrictive firearms context, but it has generalisability to other contexts. This is because the extremist documents are not limited to Australia, but are available online and via encrypted extremist chats on social media. The implication of these documents, as a result, extends beyond Australia to any jurisdiction where they can be obtained online by ideologically motivated individuals.

This study attempts to address a gap in the body of scholarship around extreme right instructional guidance on conventional firearms, with reference to contemporary policing. The literature reviews, spanning terrorism literature and policing literature, largely established that this was a gap in knowledge and one that potentially jeopardises officer safety in Australia and elsewhere. It is often noted in the terrorism studies research community that manifestos can include instructional detail on firearms, whether conventional or improvised, but do not consider what threat is posed and to whom. Macklin and Bjørgo (2021), for example, examined the impact of the Oslo terrorist’s manifesto on the Christchurch terrorist through a review of the modus operandi, including the acquisition of firearms. Indeed, there is little consensus as to whether firearms are unsophisticated weapons, as some suggest they are “simple” (Lindekilde et al., 2019), or weapons of medium sophistication (Alakoc, 2017). Adjacent to this has been a debate on censorship and terrorist manifestos, due in part to authorities such as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security noting that manifestos may inspire subsequent attacks. This notion of inspiration is especially relevant, given the accessibility of these extremist documents across the open and deep Internet. Ideologically motivated individuals seeking guidance on attacks may well find these documents in the course of their search.

As stated earlier, the threat to contemporary policing is difficult to calibrate based on the available data. The possession of firearms by an extremist community, as noted above, can appear in conjunction with acts in preparation to commit terrorism offences, with crime including drug trafficking, and in isolated circumstances. And yet, the killings of law enforcement officers and a civilian at Wieambilla are stark evidence of the tragedy that can occur, even when possession of firearms is legal/in association with a current firearms permit. The preliminary dataset also highlighted the array of firearm types – from the gel blasters through to pistols, rifles and shotguns. This impacts the spectrum of outcomes that confront police officers: from relative safety, through to injury, fatality, to mass casualty. This wide array of circumstances and outcomes can complicate police officer training, preparedness, and safety.

Based on our weapons technical analysis, we suggest that extremist guidance is Hollywoodized, hyperbolic and of variable accuracy, but this increases, rather than decreases, the threat posed to officer safety. With extremists advocating a “bigger is better” guidance logic, it is possible that followers may seek to acquire larger and more readily available firearms, to “out-gun” police. This poses an obvious threat to officer safety. The concept of overmatch, defined by the Cambridge Dictionary as “to be larger in number, stronger, better, etc. than someone or something”, is seen in the literature associated with the army rather than policing. In the context of “bigger is better” guidance, however, overmatch from the police becomes an important consideration when responding to right-wing extremists in possession of conventional firearms. The Wieambilla shooting showcases this implication. In many jurisdictions, frontline police are armed with Glock pistols at best. In the case of England and New Zealand, they are not armed with a firearm at all (Evans and Farmer, 2021). While some police forces have moved to higher calibre weapons (for example, Queensland Police Service; Morrison, 2017), most other jurisdictions have limited, if any, access to high-calibre rifles. Noting the effective range of rifles is significantly further than that of pistols in conjunction with the increasing number of right-wing attacks targeting police (Ahmed, 2018; Hamm and Spaaij, 2015), this finding illuminates implications for police forces regarding the choice of accoutrements and access to higher calibre weaponry in order to protect frontline police and the community. While the incidence may be rare, the casualty counts can be high.

The unpredictability of right-wing terrorist attacks using conventional firearms presents another significant threat to frontline police. Being confronted with the threat of any firearm in the hands of a suspect is not an incident police in Australia regularly deal with. Theft, assault, and family violence incident reports are significantly more common than other offence types (see, for example, Crime Statistics Agency, 2025; NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2025). As a result of the number of these types of reports, it is expected that the response of frontline police officers to these matters is effective and efficient. In contrast, the dataset produced here reveals that ideologically motivated terrorism incidents, including firearms, are far less common, making up only 27 incidents in Australia between 2005 and 2024. Extant policing theory suggests that police performance improves with practice that imitates the operational environment (Baldwin et al., 2022), highlighting a training requirement to equip frontline police with the necessary skills to effectively deal with terrorist incidents. While it could be argued that terrorism incidents with firearms are so rare that more training is not warranted, we suggest that the potential outcomes of such an event are so serious that police must be adequately trained and resourced. High-profile international examples such as Oslo, Christchurch, and El Paso emphasise how quickly attacks using firearms can result in a high number of casualties, and underscore the necessity of sufficient training for police to intervene to save lives. This sentiment echoes academic discourse on police training for active shooter incidents (see, for example, Hodgins and Saliba, 2015). Police must be equipped with the necessary training, confidence and tools to enable them to effectively respond to unpredictable incidents such as these.

The preliminary dataset demonstrates that in some cases, firearms were lawfully owned by the perpetrator. Importantly, Schuurman et al.’s (2018) study highlights that in most cases (just over half) involving lone actors, a firearm was obtained for a reason other than perpetrating an attack, but the perpetrator subsequently decided to conduct an act of terrorism. These facts illuminate concerns regarding the stringency of the process of obtaining a firearm lawfully. Notably, in the Western Australian Parliament Legislative Council’s motion to enquire and report into the Firearms Act 2024 (WA), the Honourable Matthew Swinbourn commented, “the important point is that every major shooting in recent years involved a legal firearm, including the worst mass murder in this country since the Port Arthur massacre” (Swinbourn, 2025). As previously highlighted, extreme beliefs are not illegal, but incidents such as Wieambilla raise questions over how the community can be protected from those who may act on those beliefs. Moreover, despite laws empowering the Commissioner of Police to revoke a licence if they are “of the opinion that the licensee is no longer a fit and proper person to hold a licence” (see, for example, s24 Firearms Act 1996 (NSW)), our preliminary dataset shows three incidents where firearms were held lawfully by right-wing extremists. This reinforces the unpredictability of the threat and demonstrates the complexity police deal with when investigating these types of incidents.

More recently, Australia has seen a synthesis of organised crime and violent extremist ideology, evident in outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCG), such as the Fourth Reich. In the context of Bright et al.’s (2023) commentary that illicit firearms are transferred through a system of earned trust in a primarily “closed” illicit firearms market, this poses concerns for frontline policing. Police raids on the Fourth Reich OMCG in 2018 and 2023 uncovered illicit firearms, exemplifying this threat (Burfitt, 2023; Hart and Clifford, 2018). Terrorist organisations are also largely more lethal than lone actors, with research indicating that on average, group actor terrorist incidents cause 1.6 deaths compared to lone actor 0.62 deaths (Spaaij, 2012). Our dataset confirms that in eight of the cases, there were organisational affiliations. Access to conventional firearms as well as the accessibility of ideological and instructional material underpins a fusion of right-wing extremist and organised criminal groups such as OMCGs, highlighting serious implications for those on the frontline policing these threats. This threat is not just limited to Australia: these extremist documents are available online, and obtainable by ideologically motivated individuals via sharing platforms or social media channels. The Australia case study serves to highlight the impact and threat of an internationally networked extremist community. This threat therefore also exists in similar legal and linguistic (English-speaking) jurisdictions around the world.

While the analysis of the right-wing instructional documents suggests that manifestos are of variable accuracy, the reality is that there are some accuracies. While we are unwilling to elaborate on the accuracies for security purposes, adding to the complexity of the threat is the unknown number of conventional firearms available to the extreme right-wing milieu. Again, focusing on the “bigger is better” advice within the instructional material, the availability of longarms in the black market (those imported or manufactured illegally) and grey market (those not surrendered post-1996 legislative changes) is a concern for frontline police. With obvious difficulties in establishing an exact number, estimates suggest there are somewhere in the vicinity of 200,000 unregistered firearms in Australia (Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC), 2023a). The ACIC (2023a) suggests that of those 200,000 firearms, approximately 190,000 are suspected to be longarms and the remainder handguns. Given Bures and Burilkov’s (2023) research finding that greater availability of firearms is correlated with firearm-based terrorism, this highlights yet another concern for contemporary policing. Furthermore, within our preliminary dataset, eight cases involved longarms, and three cases involved handguns, with another three cases involving both. These statistics are largely consistent with the estimates by the ACIC (2023a) and emphasise the importance of both overmatch and the necessity of police training and preparedness in responding to firearms in the hands of right-wing extremists.

The security challenge posed by extremist instructions relating to, and possession of, conventional firearms is ongoing. This article has attempted to address this challenge in a small way, using Australia as a relatively contained case study. As stated earlier, this approach has limitations for countries with dissimilar legislative contexts for firearms possession, such as the United States. This does not, however, undercut the validity of the assessment of firearms instructions and their prominence in the transnational, online extreme right-wing community. This is especially meaningful with reference to how right-wing extremists may seek to overcome skills or proficiency deficits when they anticipate armed conflict with a more skilled and trained opponent (such as police). While this research has aimed to better illuminate the validity of the instructions and the challenge they pose, proposing solutions is beyond the scope of this article. Future research may well draw upon instructional literature from across extremist contexts (right wing, left wing, religious, etc) to provide more geographically or legislatively transferable solutions across threat natures for officer preparedness and training.

In conclusion, the instructional guidance in right-wing extremist manifestos is often hyperbolic, demonstrating a paucity of technical knowledge and a tendency towards exaggeration, overestimations and underestimations, and generalisations. They often favoured a “bigger is better” logic to weapons selection, regardless of operational specifications such as task requirements and firearms concealment. This guidance, however variable, encourages an overmatch. The concept of overmatch strategically positions right-wing extremists to engage in (potentially lethal) firefight with the police and other frontline officers. We suggest that extremist guidance on overmatching policing authorities may increase the chance of them selecting larger calibre weapons. This, in turn, increases the risk to officer safety. Notably, this risk exists even in countries with limited access to firearms, such as Australia. The Australian case study demonstrated the unpredictability of the threat nature, but also the types of conventional firearms that alleged right-wing extremists have thus acquired. This provides an indication of availability in the context of firearms austerity. This further establishes the reality of the threat posed to law enforcement, which will, of course, differ across geographically boundaries and legal jurisdictions. To better prioritise officer safety, we emphasise the necessity of police training and preparedness when engaging with this particular threat.