This study aims to explore the challenges faced by third-party agencies as quality assurance (QA) bodies for higher education in Yunnan Province, China.
This qualitative case study included 10 respondents – six experts from a higher education evaluation center and four directors from two private undergraduate colleges (PUCs). Semi-structured and in-depth interviews were conducted with ethical considerations, from topic selection to references. The data were analyzed using thematic and inductive methods.
Third-party agencies primarily function as administrative tools affiliated with the government and face deficits in trust and autonomy. They lack formal legislation, legal status, authority and independence and face shortages of experts, expertise, accountability mechanisms and market-oriented service structures.
This study may not be generalizable to the country’s landscape and other higher education institutions. Future research should explore these issues using quantitative or mixed methods in different provinces and institutions.
Insights from experts in evaluation centers and PUC management provide empirical evidence for policymakers on QA reform, advance knowledge on QA governance and extend resource dependence theory. Under a centralized system, China’s context mirrors provincial challenges, offering a foundation for addressing similar issues.
The study fills the gap in current research by providing empirical knowledge on the obstacles faced by third-party agencies as QA bodies. This could lead to policymaking or legislation formulation to empower these agencies as legal and independent evaluation bodies, promoting the development of higher education and economic prosperity.
1. Introduction
With the diversification of universities, higher education in China has transformed into a highly professional sector. As the administrative education department lacks human, financial and physical resources to organize and govern this expanding sector directly, administrative entrustment partially transferred evaluation authority to professional educational evaluation agencies (Liu, 2020). Third-party evaluation, a critical component of modern higher education quality assurance (QA), plays a pivotal role in the modernization of China’s higher education evaluation system (Dong and Xin, 2022). Third-party agencies provide objective recommendations to higher education institutions (HEIs), while alleviating the government’s administrative burden (Yang and Qi, 2019).
Currently, four types of evaluation agencies operate in China. The first category comprises government-affiliated agencies, such as the higher education evaluation center (HEEC) of the Ministry of Education (MOE) and Shanghai Education Evaluation Institute, functioning as administrative units (Liu, 2020). The second comprises professional institutes focused on academic evaluation, such as HEEC of Yunnan Province, with directors and experts affiliated with universities, such as Yunnan University (p. 34). The third comprises market-oriented evaluation institutes, such as the Jiangxi HEEC. Finally, the fourth type comprises social industry evaluation organizations, such as the Shanghai Education Evaluation Association, which consists of representatives from various industries (Wang and Zhang, 2019), and market-oriented evaluation institutes, such as the Jiangxi HEEC (Li, 2013).
Despite their importance, third-party QA agencies face significant obstacles, including the absence of legal status and lack of operational independence (Liu, 2023). Regarding funding, most third-party evaluation agencies rely heavily on government financial support or service procurement, exposing them to potential government interference in their evaluation activities. These agencies often feel compelled to align with government preferences to secure more evaluation projects and maintain daily operations (Wang et al., 2021a, 2021b). The resource dependency theory (Delke, 2015) elucidates this phenomenon by positing that organizations are not autonomous entities pursuing their goals freely; rather, their environment constrains their behavior based on their degree of resource dependence (Wang and Yao, 2016).
Considering the centralized system, the challenges faced by third-party agencies are largely uniform across provinces and cities, although they are pronounced in regions, such as Yunnan, which demonstrate unique socioeconomic and infrastructural constraints (Wang and Cui, 2021). Located in southwestern China, Yunnan is known for its diverse ethnic composition and strategic position as a borderland region. The province is home to nine private undergraduate colleges (PUCs), which are facing numerous challenges, including lower-performing students than their public counterparts, insufficient teacher training mechanisms and inadequate infrastructure development (Qiao, 2017).
Third-party agencies in Yunnan are affiliated to universities or the government, undermining their operational independence. The MOE, or the Department of Education in Yunnan Province, primarily conducts evaluations, whereas third-party agencies offer consultancy services to PUCs or public HEIs (Kang, 2020). In addition, the resources of these agencies are obtained primarily from government funding or universities seeking evaluation consultancy (Zhao, 2021).
However, empirical studies investigating the challenges faced by third-party agencies in QA for PUCs in Yunnan are scarce, particularly those that use the resource dependency theory perspective (Zhao, 2021). This study aims to fill this gap by providing evidence for policymakers and researchers to legalize and strengthen the role of third-party agencies in QA, improve the quality of their evaluations and promote the advancement and quality of higher education.
2. Literature review
2.1 a. Theoretical background
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) propose the resource dependence theory, which suggests that organizations must obtain external resources to exist and thrive. During the resource exchange process, organizations develop specific ties with other entities, thereby mutually influencing organizational behavior (Yan, 2006). The theory further posits that specific organizations hold greater power than others because of their unique interdependencies and positions within the social structure. Consequently, acquiring external resources is critical to an organization’s strategic and tactical management. However, the availability of these resources depends on environmental factors, such as complexity, dynamism and richness. Organizations face significant challenges (Mwai et al., 2014) in resource-scarce environments. The relationship among third-party agencies, PUCs and the government aligns with the principles of the resource dependence theory.
In the wake of economic growth and globalization, higher education reforms in China have advanced incrementally. Owing to limited public resources, the central government could not fully meet market demand; therefore, it decentralized authority to local governments (Qian and Vrhoeven, 2004). Along with the massification and marketization of higher education, PUCs began to evolve, particularly after the 2000s. PUCs align with the trends and requirements of national and market development in China, helping the government alleviate the pressure of higher education enrollment and financial constraints, while meeting the needs of millions of families (Xu, 2003). In this sense, third-party agencies, such as QA bodies, appeared to ensure the quality of universities’ operations (Song, 2014).
Third-party agencies in China primarily receive government resources. Government-based or quasi-governmental organizations lack independence (Mo, 2019) and legislative authorization (Wang and Zhang, 2019; Zhao, 2014) and account for the majority of third-party agencies in China. Their relatively weak social connections, competitive environment, limited funding sources and lack of policy support render them noncompetitive. Government-led or quasi-governmental agencies evaluate HEIs with government approval, while simultaneously offering consultancy services (Su, 2014; Wang and Zhang, 2019). For example, most provincial higher-education evaluation agencies are affiliated with public universities. Third-party agencies receive government-funded evaluation projects to ensure financial stability and lower the risk of failure (Qin, 2018). Newer agencies often rely on self-financing through evaluation projects or consultancy services for governments and PUCs. Simultaneously, these agencies must actively seek information, policy support and funding from the government, PUCs and the public (Liu, 2017; Qin, 2018). However, nongovernmental third-party agencies often struggle to compete with government-led or semi-official evaluation agencies, attributable to their narrow operational scope and limited resources (Li, 2021). Most third-party agencies maintain close relationships with the government and HEIs, including PUCs, to secure additional resources (Ou et al., 2010).
2.2 b. Challenges experienced by third-party agencies in China
Third-party evaluation of higher education refers to that by professional evaluation organizations, which are distinct from the government and universities, commissioned by evaluators to independently conduct research and assessment activities in higher education (Tang and Jing, 2019). Zhao (2015) highlights the critical characteristics of third-party evaluation: evaluation entities function as intermediaries, operate independently, use impartial and objective evaluation criteria and demonstrate professionalism and authority.
As mentioned earlier, third-party agencies in China face several challenges. Currently, the MOE conducts most evaluations, with insufficient participation from other organizations. Existing evaluation standards prioritize uniformity and standardization, focusing predominantly on managing HEIs while overlooking the teaching process and differentiated evaluation approaches. Administrative evaluations dominate the system and lack a diversified and comprehensive framework (Li, 2013; Liu, 2020). Despite the significance of third-party agency participation, they struggle with a lack of cultural identity in higher education, ambiguity in legal status, inadequate government support and deficiencies in industry standards (Yuan, 2023).
Furthermore, third-party evaluation of higher education in China faces significant developmental obstacles. These include skepticism regarding the legitimacy of evaluation institutions, limited binding power of evaluation practices, low reliability of evaluation data, constraints on the rationality of evaluation indicators, restricted scope of evaluation, biases in service delivery, weak supervision of evaluation results and ineffective utilization of those results (Dong and Xin, 2022; Xu and Sun, 2022). Government influence and administrative interference exacerbate these challenges, limiting the autonomy of third-party evaluation agencies (Qin, 2018). Despite the importance of addressing these issues, empirical studies examining the obstacles faced by third-party agencies, serving as QA bodies in higher education in Yunnan, are lacking.
3. Methods
The researchers adopted a qualitative case study approach, using semi-structured and in-depth interviews as primary data collection instruments. Thematic and inductive approaches were used to analyze the data. Purposeful and convenient sampling methods were used to select respondents based on their exceptional experience and professional perspectives on QA. The study involved six experts from a HEEC (Organization A) and four directors from PUCs in Yunnan (Colleges B and C). The directors represented the Employment Department and Academic Teaching Affairs Office. Teachers, other stakeholders and individuals aged <18 years were excluded from the study.
The selected respondents received an invitation letter, research protocol with detailed study information and questions and ethical approval documents. After obtaining consent, we conducted interviews, each lasting approximately 30 min, between December 2022 and February 2023. We used the Tencent Platform for this purpose.
Following data collection, a back translation method was used to ensure transcription accuracy. The data were subsequently processed using NVivo 1.7.1 for Mac, following these sequential steps: coding, categorizing, thematizing and writing. To ensure the reliability and validity of the findings, the researchers used triangulation, a methodological approach that incorporates multiple methods, data sources, theories and investigators.
Ethical considerations were integral to every stage of the research process, from selecting the research topic to collecting and analyzing data and disseminating the findings (Halkoaho and Health Management, 2020). In addition, the ethics committee at the institution of one of the researchers reviewed and approved this study under the protocol code USM/JEPeM 22040276.
4. Results
The role of third-party evaluation agencies has been extensively debated by researchers, particularly considering the various challenges faced by these agencies in China.
4.1 a. Administrative tools
Because of the rise of quality assurance, these people suddenly realize that the outside people want to control and check us. They are very dissatisfied, and all the people inside the universities have to pay attention to meet the standards. (P-A-5)
In the last century, China’s higher education has been characterized by limited autonomy and a perception of social isolation. However, the introduction of external quality assessment (EQA), primarily through third-party evaluations, marked a significant shift toward prioritizing quality and incorporating external perspectives. EQA has encouraged universities to align themselves with established standards and focus on student satisfaction, thereby enhancing the overall quality of higher education. Nevertheless, as higher education continues to evolve, the dynamics of EQA and its role are also expected to change:
In the process of higher education development in foreign countries, the rise of a third party is the absence of strong administrative guidance, which is a very natural name for the public to supervise the running of higher education. (P-A-3)
Most third-party agencies, whether directly affiliated with the government or universities, operate as semi-official or semi-academic entities. Even those associated with universities often serve as administrative evaluation tools for PUCs, rather than as fully independent organizations:
The third-party agency has not been involved in this. The administrators come and go to evaluate them. You just need to administer private colleges and universities. The administration of private colleges and universities is terrible. (P-A-1)
Consequently, the evaluation process in higher education has been heavily influenced by administrative forces, including third-party agencies, compromising independence. This has created a hierarchical relationship between the government and universities, prioritizing compliance with government directives over autonomy (Wu, 2022).
4.2 b. Standards
EQA significantly affects PUCs by requiring them to meet minimum standards set by the government. This is aimed at ensuring that HEIs maintain a certain level of quality and adhere to established criteria regardless of the specific governing body conducting the evaluation:
If there is no such supervision, evaluation is an act of voluntary and conscientious work. However, when passively or actively accepting such supervision, it can meet some standards immediately, while it may be challenging to meet some standards even after its efforts. (P-A-4)
When internal demand drives evaluation, some PUCs may strive to meet or exceed standards. However, a few voluntarily participate in the evaluation process, primarily driven by their interests and benefits. In this context, the administrative nature of third-party agencies serves as a coercive force that compels PUCs to meet the required standards. Consequently, the evaluation process becomes a passive endeavor for PUCs, which are driven more by compliance than by active engagement.
4.3 c. Affiliated to the government
Most third-party evaluation agencies have been officially recognized as government-run organizations. Even when an agency establishes itself within a university, people often perceive it as a hybrid unit with official and academic affiliations, given that its experts are either from the government or university’s academic staff. Therefore, academic evaluation centers, typically entrusted by the government and established within universities, are considered semi-official and semi-academic entities:
However, if it is evaluated by a third-party, the leaders in the college are nervous, and they passively do it, hoping to pass. (P-A-2)
Government-affiliated third-party agencies are typically mandated to evaluate PUCs. Consequently, PUCs often feel apprehensive and pressured to perceive third-party agencies’ involvement as administrative control:
The evaluation cannot be dominated by the government anymore. You cannot evaluate your team, and this is a vicious circle again; you are judging yourself; you are a referee as well as an athlete. (P-A-4)
The lack of genuine autonomy among third-party agencies in evaluating PUCs is significant. No independent body is responsible for evaluating third-party agencies’ performance; rather, the government formulates policies, trains evaluation panels and experts, evaluates PUCs and provides recommendations. Government involvement encompasses the entire process, with all actions and outcomes ultimately determined by its authority:
We do not have that in our country right now, and then there is a lack of trust. If there is no trust, it will be challenging to implement this. Then, it must be your organization or the government that believes it. (P-B-1)
China’s current centralized system lacks fully autonomous third-party evaluation agencies, as the government is hesitant to grant these agencies complete authority or independence. Furthermore, the public generally trusts government entities. Consequently, third-party evaluation agencies struggle to attract professional experts and secure the necessary funding for their operations, which hinders their ability to sustain themselves and thrive:
These evaluation agencies are led by the government. The government pays the remuneration for these experts. The second type is academic, and the other type exists solely for evaluation. They have a very difficult life. They cannot run the program if they do not have resources. (P-A-2)
Non-profit agencies, including official and academic representative agencies, hold a certain social standing and their experts may receive government remuneration. By contrast, for-profit evaluation agencies must generate revenue to sustain themselves. While maintaining a close relationship with the government may help ensure their survival, their authority does not match that of the other two agencies. Accordingly, they may struggle to maintain independence:
Because he had no way to build an index system. First of all, his power was limited because he could not obtain some real data. What did they say? (P-A-6)
Third-party agencies also face hindrances in accessing PUC data without government authorization. PUCs are often reluctant to disclose these data, amid concerns of potential harm to their institutions. In some cases, PUCs may submit false data to the government. This lack of reliable data exacerbates the challenges faced by for-profit third-party agencies and weakens the argument for their independence:
But now, the spontaneous organization based on the market may possess relatively low recognition, so its survival rate will be small. It is still necessary to establish several professional quality assurances for this kind of consulting agency. (P-B-2)
Private third-party agencies face significant challenges in gaining recognition and ensuring their survival because of the lack of government support and resources. Without mandatory administrative orders, obtaining necessary data from PUCs becomes challenging. However, given the market demand, establishing multiple third-party agencies remains essential:
Even if they entrust us, because we have to be entrusted to evaluate private colleges, otherwise there is no legal basis. Do you know that in China, you cannot do it without this kind of administrative permission and basis from the government? (P-A-6)
No legislation mandates the independent evaluation of HEIs by third-party agencies or associations and colleges often hesitate to accept evaluations conducted by these agencies. In the absence of explicit administrative orders from the government, evaluations of PUCs carry limited significance, as third-party agencies lack inherent authority over these institutions and depend entirely on government endorsement for their mandate.
4.4 d. Lack of experts and expertise
The purpose and responsibilities of higher education evaluation shape its professional and technical nature. Conducting effective evaluations requires personnel with expertise in pedagogy, management and related system sciences, as well as a thorough understanding of the subject under evaluation. This highlights the need for a multidisciplinary team of experts from diverse fields and industries to competently execute the evaluation tasks (Yuan, 2023):
The degree of specialization of the third-party evaluation agency is as weak as the current trend of concentration of human resources in the country. It is very difficult to obtain high-quality professional and full-time evaluators in the market of third-party organizations. (P-A-3)
The history of third-party evaluation agencies in China is relatively brief, although their numbers continue to increase. However, these agencies face numerous challenges, particularly regarding the expertise and qualifications of professionals in the field. Identifying highly-skilled and experienced experts or full-time evaluators with the necessary knowledge and practical evaluation capabilities remains challenging:
A typical evaluation company would do well to recruit students with a master's degree at most. However, these students have not been working in the evaluation field for a long time, and are not even familiar with the whole management system of higher education. (P-A-5)
Most personnel in third-party evaluation agencies are recent graduates (primarily postgraduates), often lacking specialized expertise in evaluation and having a limited understanding of higher education management and systems. Considering the significance of evaluation, entrusting such critical tasks to young staff members with insufficient work experience is challenging:
At present, I think this kind of external quality training of the third-party evaluation agency is of low quality, the second is that the management is not standardized. The third is that many things are not very market-oriented. (P-C-1)
The current management and quality evaluation practices of third-party agencies are suboptimal. They face issues, such as irrational personnel composition and disorganized internal management. Furthermore, they are not market-oriented and remain primarily associated with the government, limiting their ability to operate independently.
4.5 e. Autonomy
Excessive administrative power stifles the vitality of HEIs and third-party agencies, preventing them from fully leveraging their strengths. This increases the workload and reduces the effectiveness of the government administrative system:
The government needs to weaken the administrative power that undermines external quality assurance and weaken the regulatory power of EQA over universities, especially the power to propose standards. You should let the college sign a quality framework with its industry peers rather than allowing external parties to judge its quality. (P-A-2)
Administrative measures constrain the growth of third-party agencies, preventing them from developing evaluation standards and QA frameworks. These agencies must be granted autonomy and independent legal rights to enable them to compete with other agencies and, ultimately, provide the best services to PUCs:
Does China have such a quality assurance system for private undergraduate education? Is there a market-oriented quality assurance agreement that everyone can jointly sign and confirm? So, from an international comparative perspective, we still have a long way to go regarding our quality assurance. (P-A-1)
Third-party agencies should have the autonomy to operate as associations and establish themselves through the consensus of peer colleges and universities. They could adopt a framework agreement similar to that of Ivy League’s PUCs. Such associations should involve the participation of industries and other key stakeholders including parents, students and the general public:
I believe that its legitimacy should be guaranteed, and there should be a standardized framework in place. Currently, any institution, professional, semi-professional, or even non-professional, can conduct evaluations, disclose information, draw conclusions, and even circulate their findings through social media. (P-A-3)
Legislation is necessary to define third-party agencies’ legal responsibilities and authority, enabling them to compete on a level-playing field. This allows market forces to determine their success or failure:
If there is such an evaluation, we can also view it from different angles. From the perspectives of students, of course construction, and of the ability level of employment workers. (P-C-2)
Diversifying evaluation standards is essential to enhance the effectiveness of third-party evaluations in higher education. Given the differences in educational positioning, industry engagement, developmental stages, academic disciplines and institutional characteristics, applying a uniform set of evaluation criteria and indicators to various universities or academic programs could lead to incomplete or inaccurate outcomes. China should actively learn about diversifying evaluation standards from the experiences of countries, such as the USA, UK and other European nations (Romanowski, 2022; Sin et al., 2017; Kaiser et al., 2022). By adopting a classification-based evaluation approach, China can develop a diversified, targeted and flexible third-party evaluation standard tailored to the specific needs of different types of educational institutions.
4.6 f. Market-oriented agency
Third-party agencies should adopt a market-oriented approach, focusing on providing services to their customers, while ensuring various stakeholders’ participation in the evaluation process. The administrative system should prioritize serving the public by offering support and implementing comprehensive legislation for third-party agencies and HEIs. Third-party agencies must also deliver services and recommendations tailored to the needs of HEIs:
In the future, third-party evaluation will become the most mainstream factor. Additionally, most of the demands are from parents, students, and the public. We can even call it the purchase of higher education services. These evaluations can serve as a kind of favorable reference. (P-A-3)
Third-party agencies should function as service-oriented entities, independent of government control. They should not be subject to administrative oversight; rather, the government should delegate power and authority to these agencies. Additionally, involving various stakeholders is essential because the public is the primary consumer of higher education services. Therefore, third-party agencies should focus on delivering service-oriented solutions:
The third-party agency should provide services and act as a bridge between the government and the university rather than acting as the government’s hand to hold private colleges accountable. You should not grab the private college by the neck from afar. (P-A-2)
Third-party agencies are intermediaries between the government and PUCs that provide both parties with unbiased and professional evaluation results. However, if an agency becomes an administrative tool for the government, it risks losing its impartiality and transforming into a mere instrument of the government’s agenda that deviates from market-oriented needs:
This third-party force must involve parents, that is, stakeholders, and must include parents and students, and there are many technical issues to be solved. (P-A-6)
Stakeholders, including parents, students, experts and industry representatives, are expected to participate in the evaluation process of third-party agencies:
In addition, with most of the demands from parents, students, and the public, he must hope to obtain an objective understanding of the school through objective external evaluation. (P-A-3)
In addition, third-party agencies should understand the diverse demands of stakeholders, such as the needs of parents and students. Through agency evaluations, these stakeholders can gain insight into the quality of higher education. Therefore, the evaluation process must be objective to ensure the inclusion of all stakeholder opinions:
I hope I can find a professional organization outside to look at it. Then, give me advice. I do not want to go to the government. The government cannot help me much. (P-B-2)
As a service-providing agency, a third-party organization must prioritize the expertise of its panel members to ensure that their comments and suggestions remain impartial and rooted in scientific objectivity. The agency should maintain independence from the government and avoid relying solely on government support.
4.7 g. Evaluate third-party agencies
Owing to their affiliation with the government, alternatives for evaluating third-party agencies are lacking, resulting in a deficiency in legal authority and independence:
The third-party, or at least the model, like foreign countries, is certified, and to be endorsed, also needs to be evaluated and tracked slowly. If our agency is better, it can transition to all third-party agencies. (P-B-1)
The market lacks qualified third-party agencies. To address this, these agencies should undergo evaluation and be endorsed by professional institutions that can serve as accreditation organizations:
Even in other countries, the rise of a third party is absent in strong administrative guidance. The rise of a third-party is a very natural name for the public to supervise higher education running. (P-B-2)
The government should refrain from supervising third-party agencies, allowing them to operate independently, although the public should be authorized to oversee their activities. It is also essential to involve various stakeholders and establish an agency responsible for evaluating the performance of third-party organizations:
If it is a government-organized evaluation, there must be a mechanism for accountability. For example, if we use the financial system or the building system, you, as the expert, the team leader, and the evaluation expert, have to be responsible for the results of the assessment for a lifetime. (P-A-3)
The government typically holds the highest authority over third-party agencies and lacks effective checks and balances, thereby lacking an effective accountability system. Despite widespread respect for experts, the government ultimately controls all aspects of the process. Nevertheless, establishing an accountability system for third-party evaluation agencies is crucial. Third-party agencies should be regularly re-evaluated and held accountable for their evaluation results.
5. Discussion
This study aimed to explore the obstacles faced by third-party agencies in QA in higher education in China. Using one of the HEECs and two PUCs in Yunnan as case studies, the study reveals critical obstacles in the system.
The findings align with the resource-dependent theory, which propounds that organizations are established to obtain essential resources for survival and growth. Organizations that control critical resources hold a position of influence, whereas those that rely on others for these resources are more vulnerable to external control (Malatesta and Smith, 2014). This theory suggests that fewer available resources result in a concentration of power, increased interdependence and heightened uncertainty (Nienhüser, 2008).
China’s highly centralized governance structure has further compounded these challenges. The government determines the fate of all HEIs and third-party agencies. It grants PUCs operational rights, allocates land and establishes student enrollment quotas through QA mechanisms (Liu and Luo, 2021). However, limited governmental resources and a significant number of HEIs necessitate reliance on administrative tools, such as policies and regulations, to exert control. These tools are perceived to be the most efficient means of governance. Third-party agencies often compromise on this administrative authority as no legislation establishes their legal status (Yuan, 2023). Participation in QA depends entirely on the government’s administrative approval.
From the perspective of the resource dependence theory, the government controls limited resources and retains absolute power, complicating the relationship between the government, third-party agencies and PUCs. The government relies on third-party agencies as supplementary human resources to monitor PUC quality. Simultaneously, third-party agencies depend on resources from both, the government and PUCs, to sustain their operations. By contrast, PUCs seek guidance from these agencies to meet government standards and continue to operate. In centralized systems, organizations and individuals often conform to administrative regulations (Dean, 2024). Consequently, third-party agencies primarily enforce compliance with standardized QA frameworks for PUCs. Weak internal QA systems in PUCs exacerbate this situation, as their failure to meet minimum standards prevents them from securing enrollment quotas that are essential for recruiting students and ensuring financial stability.
Third-party agencies function as government agents overseeing PUCs to sustain operations and gain resources. Their reliance on government distribution of resources results in a lack of professional autonomy and expert panels (Dong and Xin, 2022; Xu and Sun, 2022). These agencies cannot evaluate PUCs independently and must maintain close ties with the government. Essentially, the government acts as the manager, judge and evaluator in the higher education system, which stifles market dynamics.
China’s third-party agency system is relatively nascent, whereas PUCs differ significantly from public universities, highlighting the urgent need for governments to empower third-party agencies and PUCs. Policies should prioritize legitimizing third-party agencies and empowering them to formulate QA frameworks and standards tailored to PUCs. These measures could foster economic growth, enhance graduate employability and ensure social stability.
A defining feature of centralized governance is that power and resource control is consolidated with a limited elite group (Reuter, 2021). This structure compels organizations to maintain close relationships with these elites, whereas allowing governing authorities to exert control. Thus, the affiliation between third-party agencies and the government is readily explained.
Funding for third-party agencies primarily comes from government allocations, which are insufficient for establishing comprehensive expert databases. As noted in the literature and supported by resource dependence theory, the government’s organization of QA experts does not extend to non- or quasi-governmental third-party agencies, which struggle to attract highly qualified experts because of their lack of legal status and inadequate funding (Hu and Ghasemy, 2024).
Autonomy is critical for organizational development, particularly in higher education. It allows third-party agencies to innovate and revitalize QA processes, including developing tailored standards for diverse HEIs and drawing on international best practices (Puaca, 2021; Hoecht, 2006). Without autonomy, these agencies remain constrained by administrative controls and limited resources, which hinders their effectiveness (Wang, 2010).
Although third-party agencies should ideally be market-oriented, because of the current structure of QA mechanisms, wherein the government conducts institutional and program evaluations, these agencies remain aligned with the government rather than the market. Consequently, third-party agencies and PUCs often prioritize their relationship with the government over engaging with other stakeholders, limiting the role of market forces in QA processes.
According to resource dependence theory, organizations controlling resources hold decision-making power (Klein and Pereira, 2016; Casciaro and Piskorski, 2016; Wang et al., 2021a, 2021b). In this context, the government acts as a judge, organizer and manager, creating an imbalance among PUCs, third-party agencies and itself. The absence of meta-evaluation mechanisms exacerbates this imbalance, hindering systemic improvements.
This study integrates respondents’ perspectives, including those of experts from evaluation centers and management of PUCs, providing policymakers with empirical evidence to guide QA reform. In addition, it contributes to knowledge creation in the governance of QA and extends the application of the resource dependence theory. Through this theoretical framework, this study identifies obstacles third-party agencies face in Yunnan. China operates under a centralized system; therefore, the findings largely reflect the common challenges encountered in other provinces. These insights provide a deeper understanding of the observed phenomena within the Chinese context and lay the foundation for addressing similar issues in different regions.
6. Recommendations
Based on the findings, we propose some recommendations that could help improve QA. First, we propose a legislation to guarantee the legal status and autonomy of third-party evaluation agencies, ensuring that these agencies operate independently of the government.
Second, third-party agencies should establish databases and provide professional training for their experts, who should represent diverse disciplines, regions, provinces and countries. In addition, information about these experts should be transparent and subject to public supervision.
Third, we suggest implementing accountability mechanisms, including the establishment of an independently operating meta-evaluation agency to accredit third-party agencies. Accountability mechanisms must hold third-party agencies responsible for the consequences of evaluations, particularly when the evaluation results lead to harmful outcomes, in accordance with established legislation and regulations.
Finally, we advocate that third-party agencies develop QA frameworks and standards specifically for different types of HEIs. These agencies can collaborate with public universities, industries and other stakeholders. All third-party agencies should compete in domestic or international markets without government interference.
7. Limitations and future research
This study used a qualitative approach, suggesting that future research should consider using quantitative or mixed methods. This study focused on Yunnan Province, a less-developed region of China. Consequently, the results may not represent all provinces, particularly those that are economically advanced. Therefore, further studies are necessary to compare varying situations across China. Finally, the case-study approach further hinders generalization.
8. Conclusion
Third-party agencies are crucial for QA in higher education. However, empirical research on the obstacles faced as QA bodies, particularly from the perspective of resource dependence theory, remains limited. This study adopted a qualitative case study approach, examining one HEEC and two PUCs in Yunnan. Through thematic and inductive analyses of empirical interview data, the study identified vital obstacles faced by third-party agencies.
Resource dependence theory reveals that a government’s control over limited resources significantly shapes the behavior of other organizations. Combined with China’s administrative system, third-party agencies have become effective administrative tools for the government. To secure resources and ensure survival, all third-party agencies adopt uniform standards to evaluate all types of HEIs, rendering them affiliated with the government, rather than independent entities. The findings revealed a lack of experts and expertise within these agencies, a lack of autonomy owing to the absence of legal safeguards and limited stakeholder participation in the market. Consequently, through QA mechanisms, the government acts as the judge, organizer and manager of PUCs.
This study aligns with prior research and is supported by the resource dependence theory, offering profound insights into the phenomena observed in Yunnan. Based on these findings, we proposed recommendations that focus on legislation, accountability mechanisms, expert team development, QA frameworks, stakeholder participation and on fostering market-oriented services. Future research could employ quantitative or mixed methods and expand to other provinces in China to further explore these issues.
This paper is based on the PhD thesis titled “The obstacles of third-party agency as quality assurance body in higher education in Yunnan, China”, which was completed by Xiaoling Hu at the National Higher Education Research Institute (IPPTN), Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), also guided and supported by her supervisors, Diego Castro Ceacero, and David Rodríguez-Gómez from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.
Data availability statement: The specific interview data and quotes referred to in the empirical section of the paper can be made available upon request to the corresponding author.
Declaration of conflicting interests: No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Ethical issues: The performed procedures were in accordance with the ethical standards and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards. This research study was reviewed by the ethical committee of the Universiti Sains Malaysia and was approved under the study protocol code of USM/JEPeM 22040276.
