Political money as “happy money”: a study of spending patterns and non-economic meanings of vote buying money for Indonesian voters

The phenomenon of money politics in elections, referred to in the literature as vote buying, has become a major concern in the study of democratization in developing countries. This practice, which is explicitly prohibited in electoral regulations in almost all democratic countries, actually shows high prevalence rates, particularly in countries with unconsolidated democracies (Murugesan and Tyran, 2025). Indonesia, as the third-largest democracy in the world, occupies a significant position in the global map of vote buying practices. Muhtadi (2019) estimated that the proportion of voters involved in vote buying practices in the 2014 elections ranged from 25 to 33%, making Indonesia the country with the third-highest rate of vote buying in the world. A decade later, the situation shows no meaningful improvement. A national survey by Populix ahead of the 2024 elections found that most respondents had been offered money (50%) (Populix, 2024), and the Indonesian Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) identified 130 cases of alleged money politics occurring during the quiet period until polling day in the 2024 Regional Elections (Subarkah, 2024).

The 2024 Simultaneous Elections reconfirmed that vote buying is not merely a residual practice from the democratic transition, but has become an inseparable part of Indonesia's electoral landscape (Tawakkal, 2025). Reports from various regions indicate that this practice occurs massively and structurally. This phenomenon has even spawned new terms in everyday conversation such as “NPWP” (Nomer Piro, Wani Piro – what's your number, how much are you willing) and “golput” which has been reinterpreted as “Golongan Penerima Uang Tunai” (the group receiving cash) (Muhtadi, 2024). More concerningly, an exit poll survey by Indikator Politik on February 14, 2024, found that 46.9% of voters considered money politics as something “ordinary” (normal), while only 49.6% considered it unacceptable (Muhtadi, 2024). This figure shows a significant increase compared to the 2019 survey which recorded 32.1% of voters considering this practice acceptable. These findings confirm that vote buying is not only quantitatively widespread but has also been normalized in public consciousness.

Research by Djuyandi et al. (2025) in West Bandung Regency provides a more detailed picture of this normalization. Their study shows that nearly half of respondents rationalized vote buying practices, and almost all respondents who rationalized it expressed willingness to receive money from candidates. More interestingly, the majority of those willing to receive money still stated they would vote according to their conscience – not the will of the vote buyer – in the secret ballot booth. This finding challenges traditional reciprocity theory which assumes vote buying functions like a transaction for goods or services (Djuyandi et al., 2025). Money turns out not always to be directly converted into votes.

This paradox is the starting point of this research. If the money received does not automatically change political preferences, then what actually happens to the money? More fundamentally, how the money is spent reveals what kind of exchange vote buying really is. If recipients use the money for basic needs (food, health, education), this supports an economic logic: vote buying functions as informal redistribution that poor voters rationally accept to meet subsistence needs. But if recipients instead spend the money on enjoyment and social activities, this supports a social logic: the money operates as a gift or signal, not as compensation. Existing literature has not systematically examined spending patterns to adjudicate between these competing logics. This study does so.

The question of what recipients do with vote buying money has received almost no attention in the existing literature. Studies on vote buying have so far been dominated by three major orientations. First, studies focusing on the supply side, which investigate candidate and party strategies in distributing money, the networks used and their effectiveness in gaining votes (Tawakkal et al., 2020; Aspinall et al., 2017; Stokes et al., 2013). Tawakkal et al. (2020), for example, show that candidates in Indonesia use brokerage structures that exploit social networks to identify voters and distribute money. Second, studies focusing on the demand side, which examine factors that make voters willing to accept money, such as poverty, political distrust or apathy (Gherghina and Tap, 2024; Jensen and Justesen, 2014). Muhtadi (2024) found that women, young voters, the lower-middle class and Muslim respondents tend to be more receptive to vote buying. Young voters are more vulnerable due to economic dependence on parents and tendencies not to have strong political commitments. Third, studies focusing on the democratic consequences of vote buying, such as the erosion of accountability and the weakening of democratic quality (Bratton, 2008; González-Ocantos et al., 2014). The practice of “serangan fajar” (dawn attacks) is seen as endangering democratic values because it involves vote buying, where voters follow the political games of elites who only care about vote acquisition without regard for candidate capacity and capability (Djuyandi and Mahmuda, 2024).

The knowledge gap concerning the post-receipt phase of money becomes increasingly problematic given that efforts to eradicate money politics through voter education show limited results. Tawakkal et al. (2025) identified four main obstacles to the effectiveness of voter education: limited reach and accessibility, inadequate and unengaging educational materials, shortage of qualified facilitators and lack of contextual relevance to target audiences. Voter education that has so far relied on legal-moral approaches turns out to be insufficient because it does not understand the meaning of political money from the recipient's perspective.

The question of how vote buying money is spent has significant theoretical and practical implications that have been overlooked. Theoretically, spending patterns provide a behavioral trace of how recipients categorize the money – as compensation for a transaction or as a discretionary gift. If vote buying were a straightforward economic exchange, we would expect recipients to allocate the money to urgent needs (following the logic of revealed preference). If instead vote buying operates through social norms of reciprocity and signaling, we expect spending on enjoyment and social ties. Thus, spending patterns are not merely descriptive; they are diagnostic of competing theories of clientelism. If the money is spent on basic needs such as staple foods, health or education, then vote buying can be understood as an informal redistribution mechanism responding to structural poverty. In this logic, money has substantial economic value for recipients. This line of argument aligns with findings by Jensen and Justesen (2014) that poor voters become primary targets of vote buying in many countries because the utility gained from selling votes is higher.

However, research on spending behavior among low-income populations complicates any simple prediction. Studies have consistently shown that poor households, when receiving windfall cash transfers or unearned income, often spend significant portions on “temptation goods” such as tobacco, alcohol, snacks, and social events (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007; Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016). This pattern, sometimes attributed to present bias or the psychic benefits of immediate consumption, suggests that vote buying money might be spent on enjoyment regardless of its source. Thus, finding such spending does not automatically support a social-gift interpretation; it could simply reflect general poverty spending patterns. To distinguish these possibilities, this study compares spending patterns on vote buying money with how the same recipients report spending their regular income and analyzes whether recipients themselves explicitly differentiate political money from other windfalls.

This study aims to fill this knowledge gap by systematically investigating what recipients do with vote buying money in the 2024 Simultaneous Elections in Indonesia. Specifically, this study asks: is the money spent on basic needs, or is it spent on other needs? Using a phenomenological approach and in-depth interviews, this study seeks to understand not only spending patterns but also the meanings recipients attach to this money. The contribution of this research lies in three levels. First, theoretically, this study tests competing predictions derived from economic versus sociological models of vote buying, moving beyond description to adjudication. By shifting the unit of analysis from “does money change votes” to “how is money categorized and spent,” we provide evidence that challenges the prevailing rational-choice framework. Second, empirically, this study provides primary data on the spending behavior of vote buying money recipients that has so far been absent. Third, practically, understanding the meaning of money for recipients can inform the design of more effective counter-money politics strategies, which not only rely on legal-moral education but also touch social and cultural dimensions.

Vote buying has long been a central concept in the study of clientelistic politics and voter behavior in electoral contests. As a phenomenon, it represents the intersection of economic logic, power strategies and societal social dynamics (see Kozal et al., 2024). However, as warned by Nichter (2014) and Murugesan (2020), the use of this term in various literature often experiences what is called conceptual stretching – an excessive expansion of meaning that causes the concept to lose its analytical sharpness. When a term is used to cover too many different types of interactions, it risks becoming blurred and no longer useful for precise analysis. Therefore, the first crucial step in any serious research on this topic is to define the conceptual boundaries of vote buying strictly.

In this study, vote buying is specifically understood as a clientelistic practice in which a candidate or political party gives money, goods or services to voters individually with the expectation of directly influencing their electoral behavior. This definition is deliberately limited to distinguish it from other forms of clientelistic politics that may also involve material giving. The emphasis on the “individual” aspect and the “expectation of influencing behavior” is the key differentiator. This definition aligns with the formulation proposed by Murugesan and Tyran (2025) in the Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice, which explicitly defines cash-for-votes as a form of vote buying where candidates make direct payments to individuals as explicit compensation for their voting support. In other words, there is an informal agreement, albeit unspoken, that the gift has expected electoral consequences.

The importance of this strict definition becomes clearer when attempting to map the broader landscape of clientelism. Gans-Morse et al. (2014) make a significant contribution to this effort by developing a typology of clientelism variations based on two key dimensions. The first dimension is the timing of the reward, whether given before voting (pre-electoral) or after (post-electoral). The second dimension is the type of voter behavior targeted, whether to influence vote choice or merely to encourage participation in coming to the polling station (turnout). Using this two-dimensional framework, we can see that vote buying in the narrowest sense refers specifically to rewards given before the election and directly targeting the voter's vote choice. Meanwhile, the practice of giving pre-electoral rewards aimed at ensuring voters come to the polling station, without much concern for whom they will vote for, is called turnout buying. This typology helps researchers avoid conflating phenomena that are fundamentally different, enabling more accurate analysis of the effectiveness, motivations and consequences of each practice.

One of the greatest theoretical challenges in the study of vote buying arises from the classical economic perspective based on the assumption of actor rationality. Within the rational choice framework, a candidate will give money only if confident that their investment will yield returns, while a voter will accept the money and then vote according to their own wishes because their vote is secret. Herein lies the main puzzle: how can vote buying practices persist and even thrive in various democratic countries, when the secret ballot system should make it impossible for vote buyers to verify whether recipients actually keep their promise?

To address this paradox, contemporary literature has turned to behavioral and psychological factors, moving beyond narrow cost–benefit calculations. Murugesan and Tyran (2025) in their encyclopedia summarize that recent developments in experimental and behavioral literature highlight several alternative explanatory factors. Three of the most prominent are reciprocity, unsophisticated voting and inequality aversion. Empirical research by Finan and Schechter (2012) provides strong evidence for the importance of reciprocity. Through their research, they found that the effectiveness of vote buying depends heavily on the psychological characteristics of recipients. Voters with high reciprocity tendencies – those who naturally feel compelled to repay others' kindness – are far more likely to feel morally obligated after receiving money or goods from a candidate, subsequently voting for that candidate as a form of repayment.

Expanding this argument, Gans-Morse et al. (2014) themselves developed a more comprehensive theoretical framework. They argue that political machines do not rely solely on strict verification mechanisms, but cleverly exploit a range of psychological and social mechanisms that make clientelism effective. Political machines leverage existing social ties, such as kinship or friendship relationships, where reciprocity norms are already deeply embedded. They also use community pressure, where an individual's voting decision can be observed and known by neighbors or community leaders also involved in the giving network. Additionally, pre-electoral material giving creates expectations of future benefits; voters may support a candidate who gives now because they believe that candidate will continue to provide access or assistance if elected later. Thus, the effectiveness of vote buying lies not in a simple cash transaction, but in the complex web of social relations, norms and expectations in which the transaction is embedded.

Recent empirical findings from Indonesia further strengthen the view rejecting the pure transactional model. The study by Djuyandi et al. (2025) provides important support. They found that the majority of voters who received money from candidates actually stated they would still vote according to their conscience, not based on the gift. This finding explicitly challenges traditional reciprocity theory that might imply a more mechanical relationship between giving and support. Furthermore, data from exit polls conducted by Muhtadi (2024) reinforce this picture. The survey revealed that among those who consider vote buying a morally acceptable practice, the largest proportion (48.4%) stated that they would accept the money but ultimately vote according to their conscience. Only 35.1% stated they would accept the money and then vote for the candidate who gave it. The remainder may have other attitudes. This data indicate strong moral agency among voters; they are able to separate receiving material goods from determining political choices, significantly weakening the basic assumptions of the vote buying model as a simple purchase transaction.

Deeper criticism of the transactional model also comes from the tradition of political anthropology, which offers a different lens for understanding the meaning of money in the electoral context. Björkman (2013), through her in-depth ethnographic study of money circulation in the 2012 Mumbai elections, provides a rich illustration of this complexity. She shows that money circulating during the election period has diverse functions occurring simultaneously, irreducible to merely a medium of exchange for buying votes. First, of course, money is used conventionally as a medium of exchange to finance various campaign expenditures, such as banners, props and volunteer transportation. Second, and more importantly, money is productive and performative in building and maintaining socioeconomic networks. The money given helps strengthen ties between candidates and their constituents, ties expected to last long beyond polling day. Third, money becomes a sign or symbol of other, more abstract forms of knowledge and authority. The circulation of large amounts of money triggers intense speculation among citizens about who truly holds power, who has connections and how political alliances will form. Björkman's main argument is that electoral money should not be viewed narrowly as a form of “commodification” of votes, where votes are treated like merchandise. Instead, money acts as a symbolic force capable of mobilizing social networks, which in turn is vital for citizens to navigate the complexities of the city and signify who has access to power and resources. Interestingly, in her observations, direct and transactional attempts to buy votes with cash often failed. Political loyalty, in citizens' views, is something more complex and cannot simply be purchased with a sum of cash.

In the Indonesian context, Muhtadi's (2024) findings on the normalization of vote buying among Muslim voters are highly relevant to combine with this anthropological perspective. Muhtadi observes that many candidates actively reframe their material giving in positive religious terminology, such as “sodaqoh” (alms). More importantly, recipients often interpret the money within the same framework. In the Islamic tradition, sodaqoh is a praiseworthy act done with sincere intention to help those in need, without expecting worldly reward. By framing vote buying as sodaqoh, a kind of mutual “moral work” occurs between candidates and recipients. Both collectively attempt to neutralize the negative stigma usually attached to money politics practices. Givers can avoid the image of electoral corruptors, while recipients can accept money without feeling they have sold their vote or committed a sin. This is a perfect example of how the meaning of money is negotiated and constructed socially and culturally, not unilaterally determined by the initial intention of the gift.

To understand more deeply what recipients actually do with the money they receive from vote buying practices, we need to refer to the broader discussion in economic sociology about the meaning of money in social contexts. This tradition, pioneered mainly by the works of Zelizer (1989, 2021), has long criticized the classical view that regards money as a neutral, universal medium of exchange that tends to homogenize all values and social relations into a single quantitative measure. Zelizer, through her historical and sociological research, convincingly demonstrates that in everyday social practice, money is never truly neutral. Money is always “earmarked” – given specific meanings, functions and usage rules, depending on its social context, where the money comes from, and for what purpose it will be used (Gasiorowska and Zaleskiewicz, 2023; Morduch, 2017). Monthly salary money is treated differently from birthday gift money, which is also different from lottery winnings. Within this framework, Zelizer (1996) identifies three different social categories of monetary payments: gift, entitlement and compensation. Each of these categories is associated with different sets of social relations, moral expectations and meaning systems. Compensation is closely related to exchange in the labor market, entitlement relates to legal or moral claims based on citizenship or status, while gifts relate to personal relationships and reciprocity norms. If we try to place vote buying money within Zelizer's framework, it would be difficult to fit into the compensation category (because it is not related to explicit work or services) or the entitlement category (because it is not a legitimate legal or moral claim). It seems closer to the gift category. However, it is an ambiguous gift because it is given in an electoral context full of power interests, raising questions about its meaning and accompanying obligations.

The decision of recipients not to save vote buying money, but rather to spend it on daily consumption needs, can also be very well explained through the concept of “mental accounting” in behavioral economics (Antonides and Ranyard, 2017; Thaler, 1999). Thaler (1999) introduced this concept to explain how people tend to mentally categorize their money into different “accounts,” and then treat money in each account differently, even though economically it is all the same money. The rules differ for each account (Skwara, 2023). Within this framework, money mentally categorized as a “windfall gain” – money obtained outside expectations and outside routine effort – tends to be treated differently. This type of money is far more likely to be spent immediately, and often on more discretionary, enjoyable or consumptive things, compared to money obtained from routine work like monthly salary that must be allocated for bills and savings (Bradley and Martin, 2000; Abdel-Ghany et al., 1983). Experimental studies by Arkes et al. (1994) support this finding, showing that participants were more willing to spend unexpectedly obtained money on luxury goods or personal pleasures. This is a psychological mechanism very likely at work for vote buying money recipients.

In a similar vein, Kramon (2017), in his in-depth study of vote buying practices in Kenya, introduces a very useful concept: “signal money.” He argues that money given in the context of vote buying is not always intended exclusively to “buy” votes in the narrow transactional sense. Instead, the money functions to send a strong signal to voters. The signal is that the giving candidate is caring, generous and has resources to share. In other words, money functions as tangible proof or a proxy for the candidate's commitment to the future welfare of their constituents. If they care now and are willing to share, then they might continue to care and bring development if elected. Some scholars confirm it in other countries (Gadjanova, 2017; Muñoz, 2014). Within this framework, money has symbolic value as important as, or even more important than, its direct economic value. This signaling value then influences voter behavior, not its exchange value for buying votes.

Based on the synthesis of the rich and multidisciplinary literature review above, this study builds an integrated theoretical framework, combining three main perspectives to understand the phenomenon of vote buying, particularly from the recipient's side. First, this study adopts a behavioral perspective on vote buying. This perspective emphasizes that the relationship between giver and receiver in this practice is not merely transactional buying and selling. There are complex normative, social and psychological dimensions that also play a role in the dynamics of that interaction. Receiving a sum of money or goods does not automatically and mechanically change a person's political preferences, as evidenced by survey data in Indonesia. Second, this study integrates an anthropological perspective that views the money circulating in vote buying as being interpreted diversely and contextually by its recipients. This meaning is not unilaterally determined by the initial intention of the giver (for example, to buy votes), but is actively constructed, negotiated and reinterpreted in social interactions and the broader cultural framework in which recipients are situated. Third, this study uses the lens of economic sociology, particularly the concepts of earmarking and mental accounting. From this perspective, it is hypothesized that vote buying money likely enters a special category in recipients' mental accounting systems. This money is likely interpreted differently from other regular income money. It may be considered “bonus money,” “rezeki” (blessing) or “sedekah” (alms) – a category distinct from daily “income money” derived from hard work. This difference in mental categorization, in turn, is expected to have observable consequences for spending patterns and the use of that money.

From the synthesis above, we derive two competing theoretical models with opposing predictions about spending patterns:

• Prediction 1a: Recipients will allocate vote buying money primarily to basic needs (food, health, education).

• Prediction 1b: Recipients will treat vote buying money similarly to regular income money.

• Prediction 1c: Recipients will save at least a portion of the money, especially if the amount exceeds daily subsistence needs.

• Prediction 2a: Recipients will allocate vote buying money primarily to enjoyment and social needs.

• Prediction 2b: Recipients will categorize vote buying money qualitatively differently from regular income (as “bonus money” or “gift”), treating it as more discretionary than routine earnings.

• Prediction 2c: Recipients will not save the money, spending it quickly on discretionary items.

This study tests these competing predictions empirically. Finding support for Model 2 would challenge the dominant transactional framework in vote buying research and align with emerging anthropological and behavioral perspectives. The two models are treated as competing in the sense that they make opposing predictions about the primary allocation of vote buying money. We adopt the following decision rule: (a) if, for a majority of participants (more than 50%), enjoyment spending exceeds basic needs spending in both frequency and reported amount, and saving is absent or minimal, Model 2 is supported; (b) if, for a majority of participants, basic needs spending exceeds enjoyment spending and saving is present, Model 1 is supported; (c) if neither pattern clearly dominates, or if the sample is split roughly evenly, the findings are inconclusive. The presence of minor basic needs spending alongside dominant enjoyment spending does not automatically constitute a mixed pattern, as long as the qualitative emphasis and quantitative dominance favor enjoyment. This study uses the predominance of spending direction (e.g. “most” or “the largest portion”) as the criterion, recognizing that individuals may engage in both types of spending.

This study uses a qualitative approach with a phenomenological study design to deeply understand the subjective experiences of vote buying money recipients in interpreting and spending that money (Creswell and Poth, 2018). The phenomenological approach was chosen because the research focus is not on quantitative measurement, but on exploring the meaning and socio-economic logic behind recipients' spending behavior.

The research location was purposively determined in several areas in Java, Indonesia. Java was selected for three reasons. First, it contains 56.3% of Indonesia's voters and serves as the political epicenter where national electoral outcomes are shaped (Tamtomo, 2023). Second, previous vote buying studies have documented high prevalence rates in Java (e.g. Nurdin, 2014; Pradhanawati et al., 2019; Fardian, 2021; Romadhan and Sihidi, 2023; Djuyandi et al., 2025), making it an information-rich case for qualitative inquiry. Third, Java's internal variation – spanning urban, peri-urban and rural areas with diverse socioeconomic profiles (Firman, 2017) – allows for capturing a range of recipient experiences. Specific sites included peri-urban areas with mixed socioeconomic profiles, rural with high poverty rates and urban with informal sector dominance. Site selection also considered media reports and preliminary investigations indicating massive vote buying practices in the 2024 Simultaneous Elections.

Research subjects were voters who consciously received vote buying money in the 2024 Elections. Participants were recruited through snowball sampling techniques utilizing key informant networks at the community level, such as neighborhood heads (RT), youth leaders or traders in traditional markets. The number of participants was determined based on the principle of theoretical saturation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), which was reached at 70 people. Inclusion criteria included: (1) being registered voters, (2) admitting to receiving money from candidates or success teams in the 2024 Elections and (3) willing to be interviewed in-depth. Participants (N = 70) represented a lower-middle income population. The sample included 38 men and 32 women, ranging in age from 19 to 67 years (mean 38.4). Education levels varied from elementary schooling to university. Occupations included daily laborers, farmers, informal traders, homemakers and formal employees. Monthly household income for most participants was below IDR 3 million. Participants resided in urban, peri-urban and rural locations.

The main data collection technique was semi-structured in-depth interviews. The interview guide was designed to explore: (1) experiences of receiving money, (2) amounts received, (3) decision-making processes about money use, (4) details of expenditures made, (5) meanings attached to the money and (6) participants' socio-economic contexts. Interviews were conducted from January to March 2025, approximately two to four months after polling day, considering that experiences were still fresh in memory but allowed for calmer reflection. Each interview was recorded and noted with participant consent. In addition to interviews, researchers conducted limited participatory observation in participants' residential environments to understand their daily social and economic contexts. Documentation and field notes were used as supplementary data.

The semi-structured interview guide was organized into six domains, each linked to the theoretical framework: (1) receipt experience (e.g. “Can you tell me about a time you received money from a candidate during the 2024 election?”); (2) spending decisions (“What did you do with that money? Can you walk me through what you bought?”); (3) categorization of money (“How would you compare this money to the money you earn from work?”); (4) basic needs allocation (“Did you use any of this money for food, medicine, or school fees?”); (5) enjoyment and social spending (“Did you use any of this money for snacks, cigarettes, credit, or treating friends?”); (6) saving behavior (“Did you save any of this money? Why or why not?”). Probes such as “Can you give me an example?” and “How did you decide that?” were used to elicit narrative detail.

Data analysis followed the six-phase thematic analysis framework. We began by familiarizing ourselves with the transcripts (n = 70, average length 45 min), then combined inductive codes (e.g. “treating friends,” “spending on cigarettes”) with deductive codes derived from the theoretical framework (e.g. “basic needs,” “enjoyment,” “saving,” “bonus money categorization”). We then searched for themes by aggregating codes into candidate themes, reviewed these themes against coded extracts and full transcripts, and defined the final themes (spending categories, saving behavior, source-based categorization). Finally, we wrote up the findings with participant quotes. To assess reliability, a second coder independently analyzed 20% of transcripts (14 randomly selected), achieving 87% agreement. Disagreements were resolved through discussion.

This study reveals three main findings that collectively build a new understanding of the meaning of vote buying money for recipients. Below, we organize the findings around the competing predictions derived from the economic-compensation model (Model 1) and the social-gift model (Model 2). We first present evidence on saving behavior, then spending allocation and finally participants' own categorizations of the money. Prior to this, we confirm that participants received the funds.

Many participants reported receiving amounts ranging from IDR 100,000 to IDR 250,000 per person. This range varied depending on the region, the closeness of the relationship with the giver and the participant's position in the distribution network. This variation is consistent with findings by Aspinall et al. (2017) that money distribution practices in Indonesia use personal brokerage structures exploiting social networks, with the price per vote determined not only by personal resources but also by constituency size and competitor offers. This indicates quite significant variation in amounts, even within the same area.

What is interesting to note is the economic potential of these amounts. Based on tracking basic commodity prices in the research areas in early 2025, the amount of IDR 100,000 to IDR 250,000 was equivalent to the value of basic needs shopping for staple food consumption, side dishes and simple household needs for approximately one week for one person. In the context of voters with lower-middle economic backgrounds – the primary targets of vote buying in various developing countries (Jensen and Justesen, 2014) – this amount objectively has significant economic value and could function as a meaningful addition to purchasing power for meeting subsistence needs. Kramon (2017) in his study of Kenya shows that money given in vote buying is often large enough to affect recipients' short-term welfare, especially in areas with high poverty rates.

However, the interesting finding lies in what participants did not do with the money. The finding shows that participants did not save the money they received from vote buying. The money was spent quickly, generally within days to at most one week after receipt. Only 2 out of 70 participants reported saving any portion (both less than 10% of the amount received). Some participants referred to this money as “hot money” that is better spent immediately. One participant explained, “With salary money, you work hard for it, so you think first about what to do with it. With money from legislative candidates, well, just spend it right away.” This statement indicates a clear categorization difference between money from hard work and money obtained from political practices.

This finding can be understood through the framework of “earmarking” theory developed by Zelizer (1989, 2021). Zelizer shows that in social practice, money is not neutral; it is always “marked” based on its source, purpose and social context. People treat money from different sources differently. Salary money, gift money, found money, inheritance money and political money enter different mental categories and are therefore used for different purposes. Vote buying money, in participants' perspectives, clearly enters a different category from money from hard work. The decision not to save is also consistent with the “windfall effect” concept in behavioral economics. Arkes et al. (1994) show that people are more willing to spend unexpectedly obtained money on luxury goods or pleasures compared to money obtained from hard work. Vote buying money, which comes suddenly without effort, is clearly a windfall gain.

The second finding shows that only a minority of participants spent any portion of vote buying money on basic needs. Basic needs in this study include staple food consumption, health and education. From coding participants' expenditure narratives, 22 out of 70 participants reported using any of the money for basic needs. Among those who did, the amount was typically described as “a little extra” for daily shopping rather than the main source. For example, a housewife with three children explained: “I used about Rp20,000 of the Rp150,000 for extra vegetables. The rest … for other things. For routine basic needs shopping, I use my husband's money. The money from the legislative candidate is just extra.

The statement “just extra” indicates that vote buying money is positioned as a supplement, not as the main source of need fulfillment. It enters the household as “extra income” not planned in the routine budget, and therefore its allocation is discretionary. This differs from assumptions in much literature that vote buying targets poor voters who will use the money to meet urgent needs (Jensen and Justesen, 2014; Stokes et al., 2013). This finding instead supports Kramon's (2017) argument that money given in vote buying is often not intended as “wages” for votes, but as a “signal” about candidate commitment and generosity. Within the “informational theory” he develops, giving money or gifts serves to make candidates' campaign promises more credible in the eyes of poor voters. Money becomes proof that the candidate cares and will provide similar assistance if elected. Thus, money need not be used for subsistence needs because its primary function is not to meet needs, but to build trust.

The other finding, which is the most significant finding of this study, shows that the largest portion of vote buying money was spent on needs beyond basic necessities, which can be categorized as enjoyment needs and social needs. This category includes snacks or light food, packaged drinks, cigarettes, Internet credit, hanging out at coffee shops, treating friends or neighbors and contributing to community events. A 25-year-old male participant shared his experience of inviting friends to hang out at an angkringan (street-side food stall) and spending money on cigarettes and credit. He called it “uang tiban” (money falling from the sky). Another participant in Central Java contributed IDR 100,000 to a neighbor's celebration event, illustrating how the money also serves social functions beyond individual enjoyment.

Of the 70 participants, 63 reported spending money on enjoyment items (snacks, cigarettes, credit, hanging out, treating friends or contributing to community events). Within these 63, we distinguish two sub-patterns: 44 participants spent exclusively on enjoyment items, while 19 participants spent on both enjoyment and basic needs. Among these 19, all described the enjoyment portion as larger than the basic needs portion. For example, a participant who spent Rp20,000 on vegetables also spent Rp80,000 on credit and snacks. Conversely, only three participants spent exclusively on basic needs and four participants reported neither spending category (instead giving the money to family members or holding it unspent at the time of interview). Thus, the dominant pattern across the sample is enjoyment-oriented spending, either alone or alongside minor basic needs expenditures.

Enjoyment spending dominated for 63 of 70 participants, with 44 spending exclusively on enjoyment and 19 spending on both but with enjoyment exceeding basic needs in amount. Saving was reported by only two participants (both less than 10% of the amount received). Categorization as “bonus money” different from regular income was expressed by 58 of 70 participants. Thus, the preponderance of evidence supports Model 2 (social-gift/signal model) over Model 1 (economic-compensation model). The presence of three participants who spent exclusively on basic needs and four who neither spent nor saved does not overturn this conclusion, as they represent a minority of the sample.

This finding opens important insights into the social function of vote buying money. It is not only enjoyed individually but also redistributed within close social networks. By treating friends or contributing to social events, recipients not only gain personal enjoyment but also strengthen their position in social networks – as generous, not stingy or caring individuals. In other words, vote buying money becomes capital for building or maintaining social relations. Zelizer (1989, 2021) has long shown that money functions not only as an economic medium of exchange but also as a medium for creating, maintaining and expressing social relations. In this context, spending money on treating friends or contributing to social events is a way to “transform” money from merely a medium of exchange into a marker of social bonds. Money originally from morally ambiguous political practices, through specific spending processes, can be “cleansed” or at least “given new meaning” as a tool for sharing happiness with others.

This finding is also relevant to some scholars' (e.g. Björkman, 2013; Matloob et al., 2021) discussion that electoral money is productive and performative in building socio-economic networks that last long beyond polling day. Money given to brokers or distributed in social networks creates relationships that transcend polling day. In the Indonesian context, Muhtadi's (2024) findings on the normalization of vote buying among Muslim voters are also relevant. He notes that many candidates wrap their giving in religious terminology such as “sedekah,” and recipients interpret it similarly. By framing vote buying as sedekah, candidates and recipients together engage in “moral work” to neutralize the negative stigma of the practice.

The third and most fundamental finding is the perception among participants that vote buying money is “bonus money” qualitatively different from regular “income money.” The concept of “bonus money” emerged repeatedly in various expressions: “extra money,” “rezeki money” (blessed money), “uang tiban” (money falling from the sky), “small change money” or “additional money.” One participant explained quite clearly: “Salary money is income money. It has to be planned for monthly needs. Money from legislative candidates is bonus money. So it's for having fun.” This distinction between “income money” and “bonus money” is key to understanding the entire pattern of behavior outlined above. If money is categorized as income, it is treated carefully, its use planned, allocated to priority needs (especially basic needs) and perhaps partly saved for emergencies. Conversely, if money is categorized as a bonus or gift, it is treated differently: unplanned, unsaved and spent on discretionary and enjoyable things.

This categorization does not emerge arbitrarily. It is socially constructed based on several factors. First, the source of money. Money from “hard work” (salary, wages, business proceeds) automatically enters the income category. Money from “gifts” (gifts, donations, including political money) enters the bonus category. Second, expectations of recurrence. Income money is expected to come regularly (monthly, weekly), while bonus money comes unpredictably, occasionally, and cannot be relied upon. Third, moral meaning. There is an understanding that political money is morally “less clean” money, so it is not appropriate to mix with halal money from hard work. By spending it on enjoyment, it is as if it is “cleansed” or at least does not contaminate the main household budget.

However, a critical alternative explanation must be addressed: is vote buying money treated differently only because it is a windfall, or because it is political money? An alternative explanation, drawing on research on low-income spending patterns (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007; Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016), suggests that poor populations spend any windfall on enjoyment regardless of source. To test this, we examined whether participants who had also received government cash transfers (BLT/PKH) treated the two sources differently. Of the 70 participants, 19 reported having received BLT or PKH in the past year. Among these 19, a majority (14) spontaneously distinguished between the two in their interviews without prompting. As one such participant explained: “BLT money is for rice and cooking oil. The political money is for fun. BLT comes from the government—it's serious, for needs. Political money … it's almost like found money.” This suggests that while vote buying money is indeed a windfall, it carries a specific political and moral marking that distinguishes it from other windfalls. It is not merely unexpected cash; it is cash perceived as morally ambiguous – neither fully legitimate (like salary) nor fully legitimate as welfare (like BLT). This ambiguity enables discretionary, enjoyment-oriented spending without guilt. Thus, the study does not claim that vote buying money is unique among all windfalls, but rather that its political source adds a layer of meaning that shapes spending behavior beyond what would be predicted by windfall status alone.

This finding aligns with Zelizer's (1989, 2021) main argument that money is always “earmarked” based on the social meanings attached to it. Society does not treat all money equally; they actively distinguish money based on its source, purpose and context of use. Vote buying money, within this framework, receives a special mark as “bonus money” carrying a set of social rules about how it should be used. Furthermore, this finding is also consistent with Kramon's (2017) concept of “signal money.” If vote buying money functions as a signal about candidate commitment and generosity, it is natural that recipients do not use it for subsistence needs. Subsistence needs are the domain of individual and family responsibility, not an area that should be fulfilled by political signals.

This argument does not mean vote buying has no economic consequences at all. In aggregate, vote buying practices are proven to correlate negatively with the provision of public services favoring the poor. Khemani (2015) in her study of the Philippines and 33 African countries shows that in areas with more massive vote buying practices, public investment in basic health services for mothers and children is lower, and the percentage of malnourished children is higher. In other words, although individually vote buying money is not used for economic needs, collectively it contributes to a system that actually harms the fulfillment of poor communities' economic needs.

However, to understand why this practice continues despite being individually economically irrational (money does not change votes) and collectively harmful to the poor, we need to look at its social and symbolic functions. Vote buying money, from the recipient's perspective, is “happy money” giving them moments to have fun and share with others. It is part of the “season of money” anticipated in the election cycle (Muhtadi, 2024). And as long as it is still interpreted this way, anti-money politics campaigns relying solely on education about the dangers of corruption will not work. What is needed is a transformation of meaning: how to make society interpret political money not as “happy money” anymore, but as “forbidden money” that damages their own future.

Theoretically, this study enriches the vote buying literature by demonstrating the importance of attending to the post-receipt phase of money. So far, the literature has focused too much on the question of whether money changes votes, ignoring what happens to the money itself. Yet, spending patterns and the meanings attached to money can provide important insights into how vote buying practices are understood and experienced by their main actors: voters. This study also contributes to developing a theoretical framework integrating behavioral economics perspectives (mental accounting, windfall effect) with economic sociology perspectives (earmarking, social meaning of money). This integration enables a richer understanding of complex phenomena where economic and non-economic factors intertwine intricately. Practically, understanding that vote buying money is interpreted as “happy money” implies that anti-money-politics campaigns cannot rely solely on moral persuasion or legal deterrence. Effective strategies must address the social pleasure recipients derive from spending the money – for example, by reframing acceptance as shameful rather than enjoyable or by strengthening community monitoring that increases social costs.

This study started from a simple yet neglected question in vote buying literature: what do recipients do with the money they receive from vote buying practices? But the answer matters because it tests two competing models of vote buying – the economic-compensation model (which predicts spending on basic needs and saving) and the social-gift model (which predicts spending on enjoyment and no saving). Through in-depth interviews with 70 voters who received vote buying money in the 2024 Simultaneous Elections in Indonesia, this study finds consistent support for the social-gift model. Vote buying money, at least in the contemporary Indonesian context, is more appropriately understood as money with non-economic value – “happy money” – whose main function is to create momentary joy, strengthen social relations and signal candidate generosity, not as a tool for meeting material needs. This argument is reinforced by findings from other research that the majority of money recipients still vote according to their conscience, indicating they do not interpret receiving money as a morally binding contract (Djuyandi et al., 2025; Muhtadi, 2024).

This study contributes at three levels. First, theoretically, this study enriches the vote buying literature by shifting the unit of analysis from the question “does money change votes” to the question “what is done with the money after it is received.” This shift opens space to understand vote buying not merely as a transactional phenomenon but also as a social and cultural phenomenon. This study also integrates behavioral economics and economic sociology perspectives to produce a richer understanding of the complexity of money politics practices. Second, empirically, this study provides primary data on the spending behavior of vote buying money recipients that has so far been absent in the literature. This data show that common assumptions about vote buying – that money is used for subsistence needs, that recipients feel morally obligated, that money functions as a medium of exchange in vote transactions – need to be reconsidered in the Indonesian context. Third, practically, this study provides input for designing more effective counter-money politics strategies.

Although contributing theoretically, empirically and practically, this study has several limitations that need to be acknowledged. First, the findings are drawn from one electoral cycle (2024) in one island (Java, Indonesia). Whether the “happy money” pattern holds in other Indonesian islands (Sumatra, Sulawesi, Papua) or in other countries remains an open empirical question. Second, we relied on self-reported spending two to four months after the election; recall bias may affect accuracy, though we attempted to minimize this by asking for concrete, specific expenditures. Third, this study did not systematically compare vote buying money with other windfall sources (e.g. gambling wins, inheritance) in a controlled design; our comparison with government cash transfers involved only 19 participants and is therefore suggestive, not definitive. Fourth, our sample, while diverse within lower-middle income populations, does not include wealthier voters who might treat the money differently. Future research could use experimental vignettes, diary methods or real-time expenditure tracking to address these limitations.