The impact of soft power diplomacy on Sino–Japanese rivalry in the Gulf region from 2013 to 2026

The Gulf region is witnessing an escalating competition for influence between China and Japan, involving a diverse array of strategic tools. Foremost among these is soft power, which relies on attraction, persuasion and fostering closer ties with the peoples of the Gulf to establish a model for emulation. This influence is conducted through cultural appeal, distinctive political values and foreign policies anchored in economic partnerships and knowledge transfer, particularly in the sectors of renewable energy and infrastructure.

China's soft power is based on the Beijing Consensus Model, which links economic prosperity to the promotion of political and developmental stability through a strong centralized state. This approach largely avoids interference in the internal affairs of other countries, promoting democratic values or human rights norms. Furthermore, it seeks to strengthen relations with various states through economic partnerships across multiple sectors. To achieve this, China employs several tools, most notably promoting the Chinese language through Confucius Institutes and investing in educational infrastructure. It also leverages its growing influence in the video game industry and utilizes media channels that portray China as a reliable development partner. Through these mechanisms, China presents itself as an attractive developmental model to the governments and societies of Gulf countries, emphasizing respect for sovereignty and non-interference.

In contrast, Japan relies on projecting the “Cool Japan” image, which is based on the development of contemporary popular culture, including video games, anime and intellectual content. This is coupled with strategic investments in renewable energy projects, the transfer of knowledge, technology and human capacity building. Furthermore, Japan's emphasis on peace-building and mediation reflects its endeavor to offer a developmental model that empowers nations and fosters peace, notably without pursuing an overt or conditional political agenda.

Both parties seek to attain full-fledged partnerships with Gulf States through cultural, economic and technological attractiveness as a superior model. However, they differ in their soft power strategies and tools. Japan relies on the “Cool Japan” strategy and the Kono Principles, which aim to strengthen cultural connections with Gulf societies by disseminating anime and manga culture, as well as through high-quality corporate practices, capacity-building initiatives and investment in human development. Meanwhile, China focuses on promoting its language and development model, alongside extensive investment in various projects.

This paper seeks to address a central question: To what extent has the soft power diplomacy of Japan and China contributed to bolstering their regional influence in the Gulf, and what are the boundaries of this competitive impact? The study's timeframe begins in 2013, marking the launch of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It traces subsequent Chinese efforts to consolidate influence in the Gulf states, alongside Japan's strategic countermeasures to cope with this growing presence.

This study, from an operational standpoint, does not conceptualize the Gulf states as a monolithic bloc or fully homogeneous unit of analysis. Instead, it acknowledges their substantial variations in strategic orientations, developmental priorities and foreign policies. Certain countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, exhibit rapid, institutionalized integration with soft power instruments, namely through the localization of language in educational curricula, digital transformation and gaming. Meanwhile, other countries, such as Qatar and the Sultanate of Oman, focus on targeted, qualitative partnerships in logistics, ports and mediation, maintaining a high degree of leverage over expertise and technology.

The study adopts a comparative approach, based on two case studies: the first is the Chinese soft power model in the Arabian Gulf states, while the second is the Japanese soft power model in the same region over the period from 2013 to 2026. This comparison helps identify the similarities and differences between the two models in terms of their impact and their ability to enhance influence in the region (Nye, 21 February 2017).

The study relies primarily on the theoretical framework of soft power as formulated by Joseph Nye, who defines soft power as “the ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction and persuasion rather than military coercion or financial inducement.” Furthermore, soft power emanates from three primary sources: culture, political values and foreign policy. These are categorized into three indicators for measurement and analysis, each with established assessment tools that rely on qualitative analysis while taking into account the cultural and value-based specificities of each state (Hongtao et al., 2017).

This indicator constitutes one of the most important primary sources of soft power. It encompasses a set of values and practices that attract other societies, particularly literature, arts, history, education, language and popular culture regarding films, music and sports. It is assessed through four sub-indicators: the attractiveness of high culture related to intellectual and artistic production that transcends national borders, such as the spread of artistic and literary works (LAI, 2019), the appeal of popular culture, including entertainment and media products that align with local societal preferences, the effectiveness of cultural and educational exchanges, particularly the spread of language and educational programs through cultural centers or various forms of investment (Gauttama et al., 2023), and digital and media outreach, related to the dissemination of local culture and the promotion of a positive image of the state within the local societies of other countries (Singh and MacDonald, 2017).

This indicator primarily measures the extent of states' commitment to implementing their political values both locally and internationally by comparing official political discourse with actual domestic practices (Joseph S. Nye, June 8, 2021). Given the divergence of the Chinese and Japanese models from the political values of Nye's framework, this study introduces two innovative sub-indicators for measurement. The first assesses the effectiveness of boosting political values through public diplomacy. This diplomacy encompasses international initiatives, media and public rhetoric, evaluating their success in promoting its model to attract both populations and governments (Vyas, 2010). The second pertains to the extent of influence, reflected in positive speaking about the state that promotes its values or in other countries’ attempts to adopt its model (Lai, 2019).

This indicator represents a fundamental source of soft power for states, as it measures their ability to present themselves as international partners bound by shared interests that can be achieved through legitimate means. It is assessed through three sub-indicators: the ability to build alliances and partnerships with other states without coercion, the contribution of foreign policy to global issues and shared interests, such as climate change and direct and indirect influence in shaping the international agenda, particularly through the promotion of a culture of peace or the resolution of political disputes via mediation (Cevik and Padilha, 2024).

To measure the effectiveness of soft power in enhancing the regional influence of both China and Japan, the study proposes three principal indicators to evaluate regional influence through a soft power perspective:

1. Educational Attraction: This indicator is operationalized and measured through the proliferation of Chinese and Japanese language instruction and educational institutions within the formal education systems of the Gulf states. It also encompasses student exchange programs and the number of students engaged with the culture of both countries. These initiatives contribute to cultivating future elites who may subsequently shape political decisions.

2. Public Opinion Formation: Through the reach and volume of digital networks and platforms across the Gulf states, alongside field data and public opinion surveys. These data elucidate the appeal of the Chinese developmental model relative to the popular and affective affinity for Japanese culture.

3. Bilateral Partnerships: Encompassing collaborations between individual Gulf states and both China and Japan in technology and infrastructure investment areas that rely fundamentally on soft power mechanisms of attraction and persuasion within both the Chinese and Japanese models.

China adopts a conceptualization of soft power primarily rooted in promoting an economic developmental model, prioritizing economic growth over the dissemination of democratic political values or human rights. Consequently, its approach emphasizes economic development at the expense of liberal democracy. In its foreign policy, China adheres to the principle of non-interference, striving to strengthen bilateral relations through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and provide economic assistance (Obaidullah and Hossain, 2025). Furthermore, China promotes its ancient traditional culture as a common denominator among human civilizations. In spreading its soft power, it relies on Confucius Institutes to teach the Chinese language and culture and to enhance educational opportunities, supporting the “Peaceful Rise of China” Theory and improving its global image (Pan, 2022).

In this context, China announced the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, a mega-project that has become one of the largest infrastructure development initiatives globally. Through the ambitious plans embedded within this initiative, China seeks to strengthen its economic power and reshape the global balance of power. To achieve this, China utilizes a broad concept of soft power that encompasses non-security elements, including investment mechanisms and foreign aid, making this strategy an effective tool for robust engagement across the Middle East. Furthermore, China develops a wide range of infrastructure and construction projects within and around the region, framing them as integral components of its soft power strategies (Sharma, 2023).

The Chinese application of soft power targets various social strata to garner satisfaction with the political and economic system and support for the Party. Some advocate employing soft power in relations with neighboring countries to reassure them regarding China's resurgence. From the Chinese perspective, the collapse of the Soviet Union was attributed to a weakness in soft power. Accordingly, China utilizes soft power to counter the “China Threat” narrative and skepticism regarding its strategic intentions, as well as doubts surrounding its policies. China can project its positive and promising policy, rooted in a civilizational legacy and traditions spanning thousands of years, through the economy, culture and its soft power. Unlike Western models, Chinese soft power is not predicated on a colonial legacy; instead, China competes in the era of globalization to shape international norms, principles and procedures through soft power rather than power strategy (H.N.K., 2017).

Culture serves as a pivotal source of China's soft power, projected globally through Confucius Institutes. These institutions aim to teach the Chinese language, thereby bolstering the state's status and fostering communication with other nations. Estimates suggest that approximately 30 million people worldwide are learning Chinese, with nearly 2,500 universities in over 100 countries offering Chinese language courses. The number of Confucius Institutes has reached approximately 548 across 154 countries (A.M., 2023).

Furthermore, China employs economic diplomacy and investments, committing tens of billions to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It has also launched global initiatives, such as the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) (Akbarzadeh and Saba, 2025).

Besides, China launched the “Beijing Consensus” or the “China Model” of development. This political-economic model emphasizes rapid growth while maintaining social stability and a strong centralized state, without the necessity for democratization or full economic liberalization. Coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo in 2004, the term illustrates how China achieved monumental economic growth while maintaining political control (Ramo, 2004).

In this context, China leverages its soft power to consolidate its standing within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Its strategic objectives focus on building a positive image as a reliable developmental partner that respects national sovereignty and focuses on economic development, mutual respect and strengthening cultural communication with the peoples of the Gulf region. It also promotes values associated with a strong state and social stability. Public opinion surveys in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates indicate a highly positive perception of China's role in the region, coupled with significant interest in the Chinese economic model and calls for economic and political cooperation with it. The Gulf States increasingly view the Chinese political system as an attractive model for emulation. For instance, field studies indicate that 82% of Saudis and 74% of Emiratis believe the Chinese developmental model is the ideal path for their national resurgence. Politically, 80% of Saudi and 69% of Emirati participants expressed admiration for the Chinese political model, which links economic development to democratic transformation and disregards traditional liberal thought. Culturally, this is evidenced by the integration of Mandarin (Chinese) into public curricula in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, with the latter mandating it as a compulsory subject in all secondary schools (Akbarzadeh and Saba, 2025).

Cultural and educational diplomacy constitutes a central component of China's soft power strategy toward the Arabian Gulf states. It focuses on strengthening cultural ties with the peoples of the region through the promotion of the Chinese language, the expansion of academic and educational exchanges, the organization of joint cultural festivals, the implementation of exchange programs for Chinese and Arab students and artists, the encouragement of publishing Chinese and Arabic literary works, the expansion of scholarships and artistic awards, and the promotion of tourism cooperation to foster mutual cultural understanding. These principles were primarily outlined in China's Policy Paper toward the Arab States (Republic, 2016).

In this context, Confucius Institutes serve as the principal instrument for projecting a positive image of China among the Arabian Gulf societies while simultaneously promoting Chinese culture through language instruction and cultural activities, such as Chinese festivals and traditional arts. Their number has reached approximately 27 institutes across the Middle East and North Africa. They are present in all Arabian Gulf states, particularly in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, except the Sultanate of Oman. These institutes also organize Chinese New Year celebrations and provide scholarship programs (Carroll, 2025).

On 28 November 2024, the Sultanate of Oman and China signed a cooperation plan in the field of Chinese language education, under which Chinese would be offered as an elective subject in four public schools. Saudi Arabia has also incorporated Chinese into its educational curriculum as its second official foreign language. Notably, Chinese universities host Saudi teachers in one-year training programs for teaching the Chinese language. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates launched a project to teach Chinese in two hundred schools (Yi, 2024).

During the first China-GCC Summit in late 2022, China announced plans to establish 300 universities and schools to teach the Chinese language and create 300 smart classrooms dedicated to learning the Chinese language in the Gulf States. This initiative integrates Chinese technology into educational systems. China also pledged to provide 3,000 opportunities for students to participate in summer and winter camps called “Chinese Language Bridge”, consisting of educational and cultural visits to China. Additional measures included establishing specialized Chinese language learning centers, proficiency testing facilities, online classrooms and a bilingual library to enhance cultural exchange and mutual learning (China Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2022).

China also offers government scholarships for learning the Chinese language, partly due to the professional opportunities associated with learning Chinese in sectors, such as technology, trade and energy, especially given the strong commercial and investment ties between Gulf States and China. Furthermore, Chinese culture, with its rich heritage and long history, has attracted growing interest among Gulf populations, particularly in light of recent Gulf policies promoting cultural and social openness. The number of students enrolled in Chinese language programs in the Gulf States reached approximately 100,000 in 2023. In Saudi Arabia, many students are motivated to study Chinese because of China's successful economic model, while some regard Chinese as the language of the new world. This reflects a significant success for Chinese soft power in the Gulf region (S.H., 2023).

China also promotes its culture through film festivals. In 2025, it screened the major Chinese animated film Ne Zha 2, which attracted audiences from several Gulf countries due to its emphasis on human emotions. The film was presented in Chinese with English and Arabic subtitles. Its story is derived from the beloved mythological figure Ne Zha, a protective deity held in high esteem. The screenplay draws upon the sixteenth-century literary classic “Investiture of the Gods,” one of the earliest major works to integrate Taoist and Buddhist concepts of gods and demons (Cui, 2025).

The current study indicates that this film reinforced China's positive image among children and adolescents, thereby facilitating future acceptance of economic and cultural cooperation with China. Moreover, the use of Arabic and specifically Gulf dialects, in dubbing reflects a sophisticated use of soft power, projecting China as a state seeking cultural rapprochement rather than imposing its culture on others.

In a related context, China has launched joint cultural awards concerning translation and artistic exchange to promote closer cultural ties with the Arabian Gulf states. Foremost among these is the Prince Mohammed bin Salman Award for Cultural Cooperation between Saudi Arabia and China, which encourages translation between Arabic and Chinese and provides support for artistic, creative and academic works in cultural fields (A.L., 2025).

Economic and developmental partnerships constitute a cornerstone of China's soft power strategy toward the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. In this regard, China employs its geo-economic instruments to strike a balance between expanding its global influence and addressing the developmental needs of the region's states. These relations are not confined to conventional trade exchanges or securing energy supplies; rather, they extend to framing Chinese soft power through infrastructure projects and comprehensive strategic partnerships under the umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Al Shidhani and Baig, 2024).

This strategy relies primarily on marketing the Chinese developmental model, often termed the “Beijing Consensus”, which is notably devoid of the political or ideological conditions typically mandated by Western nations, such as democratization, human rights, or specific governmental reforms. China emphasizes the principle of common development without infringing upon or threatening state sovereignty, with an increasing focus on investing in smart technology, renewable energy and smart infrastructure (Michel, 2023).

This model is built upon several key pillars:

1. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI):

Launched by China in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) serves as the core foundation of the Sino-Gulf partnership. The initiative has significantly reshaped the paradigm of bilateral economic relations, transforming them from a transactional model almost entirely reliant on oil and energy into a comprehensive strategic developmental partnership. This cooperation extends beyond conventional investments into renewable energy, the digital economy and advanced infrastructure. Consequently, the BRI is no longer merely a tool for linking trade routes and logistics services; rather, it has evolved into a primary platform for exercising soft power and deepening mutual economic interdependence. This is reflected in the rise of total Chinese contracts and investments across the region (Qian and Fulton, 2017).

By 2025, total Chinese contracts and investments reached approximately $213.5 billion (GeoCoded, 2025). Saudi Arabia emerged as a primary beneficiary of mutual green energy investments, for about $5.2 billion, alongside major infrastructure partnerships, such as the modernization of Jeddah and King Abdullah ports, the Riyadh Metro and the establishment of special economic zones (Wang, 2026).

1. Investment in Technological Infrastructure and New Energy

Recent growth in Chinese investments in Gulf renewable energy projects has bolstered China's image as a developmental partner. This period also witnessed reciprocal Gulf investments in Chinese renewable energy sectors. Joint ventures have included partnerships with Chinese tech giants Huawei and Alibaba in AI, smart cities, electric vehicles and robotics (Zhang, 2016). In 2025, Saudi Arabia secured Chinese construction contracts worth $19.8 billion, including gas-fired power plants and renewable energy projects, alongside agreements in green hydrogen and AI (Alghannam, 2025). Similarly, the UAE benefited from large-scale energy storage projects, featuring the world's largest battery system and initiatives linking ports to industrial zones (Ali, 2025). In Oman, China invested $10.7 billion across 35 projects, including solar energy equipment manufacturing and others (Marks, 2025), while in Qatar, investments concentrated on railway projects, logistics, Hamad Port and major strategic water reservoirs.

Media represents a vital instrument of Chinese soft power in the Gulf. China utilizes various media platforms to promote a positive narrative of itself as a responsible power and a developmental partner that respects nations' cultures and seeks development without interfering in internal affairs. This is often coupled with implicit critiques of Western policies, which are portrayed as unreliable or intrusive (Experts, 2022). CGTN Arabic is considered the most prominent Chinese media channel, broadcasting in Arabic to reach a regional audience. Its Dubai-based regional office has been instrumental in projecting China's image and communicating its core strategic messages (Al Tamimi, 2018).

China has capitalized on the widespread popularity of e-games in the Gulf to foster engagement with the youth. Moving beyond traditional cultural symbols, such as Opera and Kung Fu, China has pivoted toward digital diplomacy through e-games and e-sports, leveraging its global dominance in this sector (Zhang, 2024).

Chinese games successfully captured over 40% of the regional market share in 2022. By 2024, Saudi Arabia was among the top 10 overseas markets for Chinese games, with over 37 Chinese companies currently among the top 100 most profitable gaming firms in the Kingdom. Plans are underway for the world's first mixed-use gaming and e-sports district in Saudi Arabia, while the UAE is implementing a $1 billion e-sports island project, further strengthening the connectivity between China and the Gulf (Consultancy, 2025).

In light of the aforementioned, it is evident that the Chinese presence in the Gulf has transcended the security of oil flows, exceeding 3.35 million barrels per day by the end of 2025. Instead, it has expanded into the shaping of a new Gulf collective consciousness that views the “Beijing Model” as an attractive developmental alternative aligned with the region's aspirations for stability and technological resurgence. This soft Chinese penetration is manifested in Mandarin language education, multi-billion-dollar e-gaming cooperation and the integration of Chinese technology into critical infrastructure under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) framework, supplemented by the proliferation of Chinese literature and media that reinforce a positive national image in the region.

Douglas McGray was the first to highlight Japanese soft power and its sources in his well-known article Japan's Gross National Cool, published in Foreign Policy in 2002. McGray coined the term Gross National Cool, arguing that Japan's influence was no longer limited to exporting automobiles or electronic devices but rather stemmed from the global penetration of Japanese “Cool Culture,” including anime, manga, cuisine and video games. Despite Japan's economic stagnation at the time, it was acquiring unprecedented soft power, leading many young people around the world to emulate Japanese lifestyles. This vision was later adopted by the Japanese government in what became known as the “Cool Japan” project (McGray, 2009).

Japanese soft power focuses on three principal dimensions: namely, the traditional use of popular cultural assets abroad, such as manga (comic books), anime (animation) and Cosplay; adherence to international norms, such as freedom of navigation and combating climate change; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief diplomacy. These were reflected in the appointment of Doraemon as Anime Ambassador in 2008, the appointment of Kawaii Ambassadors in 2009, the launch of the “Cool Japan” initiative in 2010 and the participation of Shinzo Abe in Super Mario Cosplay during the Rio Olympics 2016; (Heng, 2017).

Japan's commitment to global standards was further demonstrated in Abe's 2014 statements concerning the protection of global commons, as well as in Japan’s 2013 National Security Strategy, which emphasized a rules-based international order. Additional examples include the ReCAAP agreement against piracy in Southeast Asia, the hydrogen society and Cool Earth initiatives to address climate change, and the use of robotics, such as Paro, to assist the elderly. Japan has also utilized its military in humanitarian and disaster-relief operations, including the deployment of the largest Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) contingent after Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013. It has also participated in the Pacific Partnership exercises since 2007, providing medical aid, teaching traditional arts, such as kendo and conducting joint training and capacity-building programs with countries, such as the Philippines and Vietnam (Heng, 2017).

Japan has also sought to deepen its relations with Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, to capitalize on Japanese expertise in technology and infrastructure. This has been pursued through a form of soft economic diplomacy focused primarily on investment in specialized sectors, such as renewable energy, energy transition, scientific and technological cooperation and long-term economic development in the Gulf. This approach was clearly reflected in the 2023 visit of Fumio Kishida, during which Japan signed a series of bilateral and corporate agreements in key sectors, including semiconductors, space, advanced technology, critical minerals and supply chain resilience. This engagement continued through the Fifth Japan–Arab Economic Forum, reinforcing Japan's intention to act as a development partner for the Gulf region. Saudi Aramco, SABIC and the Institute of Energy Economics in Japan, for example, entered into a partnership to build a supply network for low-carbon energy technologies, such as hydrogen and blue ammonia (Dell’Era, 2025). Therefore, Japanese soft power toward the Gulf States is based on several major pillars, including the following:

Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe spearheaded the establishment of numerous comprehensive partnerships with the Gulf States, leveraging high-level diplomatic visits to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman and Qatar. Consequently, the traditional relationships between the two sides evolved into multidimensional partnerships encompassing economy, technology, culture, education and sports. This strategic trajectory has been maintained under the leadership of Prime Ministers Fumio Kishida and Shigeru Ishiba. At the forefront of these initiatives is the Saudi-Japanese Vision, launched in 2017 during Abe's visit and based on a 2016 agreement between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister Abe. This framework aligns the Saudi Vision 2030 with Japan's “Society 5.0” concept. It is based on three main pillars, including establishing a diversified and sustainable economy, enhancing competitiveness through technology and innovation and reinvigorating cultural and social values with a focus on education, sports, entertainment and culture to empower Saudi youth (Times, 2017).

By 2025, this vision witnessed significant expansion, with the number of joint projects increasing from 31 to 81. These projects prioritize renewable energy, particularly solar power and ammonia, as well as advanced technology, space, agriculture, competitive industries, high-quality infrastructure, entertainment, media, food security and healthcare (Bakshi, 2025).

In the UAE, Japan established a comprehensive partnership in 2018 covering education, technology, science and culture. By 2026, both nations concluded negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, which bolstered trade and investment in advanced technology, cyber-security, healthcare, and education. Notably, this cooperation included the launch of the KhalifaSat satellite from Japan's Tanegashima Space Centre, as well as deepened collaboration in advanced robotics, artificial intelligence and renewable energy (News, 2026). Similarly, Qatar, Oman and other Gulf states signed several agreements with Japan in sectors, such as semiconductors, space, healthcare, and tourism, reinforcing Japan's image as a reliable strategic partner (Japan, Government of, 2023).

Furthermore, Japan and the GCC signed a Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation and Strategic Dialogue in 2012, subsequently developing the Joint Action Plan 2024–2028. This plan expanded the partnership into the digital economy, technological innovation, clean energy, food security and advanced healthcare. Additionally, MoUs were signed with major Japanese corporations to develop Green Hydrogen and Blue Ammonia projects in the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, supporting the global transition toward Net Zero emissions by mid-century (Al Arabia, GCCSG, 2025).

In 2013, the Japanese government launched the Cool Japan strategy, which aimed to strengthen Japan's soft power through the export of Japanese popular culture, including anime, manga, video games, music and food. The program is administered by the Japanese Cabinet Office and financed through the Cool Japan Fund, which supports international projects. It set an ambitious target of exporting content worth 20 trillion Japanese yen (approximately $130 billion) by 2033 (Yokogao, n.d.). In the Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, this culture has become a key component of youth entertainment and enforcement of bilateral cultural exchange.

Anime and manga culture have spread widely across the Gulf. In Saudi Arabia, dubbed anime series, such as Grendizer, Detective Conan and Captain Majid, are highly popular. Reports indicate that approximately 30–31% of respondents watch anime daily, while more than 21% spend over 2,000 Saudi riyals on anime merchandise. Additionally, over 50% play video games inspired by anime franchises (Alturki, 2025).

In the United Arab Emirates, anime content and Japanese pop culture have witnessed significant growth in popularity, reflecting broader trends across the Middle East. Streaming platforms, such as Netflix, Crunchyroll, Yango and YouTube, have played a central role in bringing anime to mainstream audiences. These platforms helped overcome language barriers and facilitated access to officially subtitled and dubbed content. Furthermore, the UAE's strong emphasis on technology and digital media has accelerated the spread of anime through social media networks (Abbas, 2026).

In March 2026, Manga Productions, affiliated with the Mohammed bin Salman Foundation and Manga Arabia, affiliated with Saudi Research and Media Group (SRMG), received recognition through the Cool Japan public-private partnership platform organized by the Japanese Cabinet Office. This recognition reflected the distinguished achievements of both companies in promoting the global presence of Saudi content while strengthening cultural ties with Japan. Manga Productions has committed itself to exporting stories inspired by local Saudi culture to global audiences through strategic partnerships with major Japanese production companies in anime, video games and comics. Its content has generated more than 1.6 billion views across 100 streaming platforms, more than 15 million manga reads and one million mobile game downloads. Meanwhile, Manga Arabia has established strategic partnerships with 7 of Japan's largest publishing houses, producing original content from its headquarters in Riyadh. Its free magazines are distributed to nearly 8,000 schools across the Kingdom. This represents a notable success of Japanese soft power in Saudi Arabia (Arab News Japan, 2026).

The Kono Principles are among the most significant pillars of Japan's policy toward the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Launched by former Foreign Minister Taro Kono during the Shinzo Abe administration and announced at the Arab–Japan Political Dialogue, these principles underscore the urgent contribution to peace and stability in the Middle East, specifically the Gulf region (Matsuda and Koga, 2023). This is achieved through the transfer of Japanese developmental knowledge and expertise, with a core focus on cultural, academic and humanitarian cooperation. Key objectives include human capacity building through education, training and cultural exchange, as well as an increased Japanese role in peace processes, dialogue and peace building (Badawi, 2023).

A prominent example of grassroots exchange is the Ship for World Youth program, organized by the Cabinet Office of Japan. This program brings together youth from around the globe, including the Arabian Gulf, for an intensive 40-day cultural exchange and leadership development voyage. Regular participation from Gulf youth has demonstrated the program's effectiveness in cultivating leadership skills and fostering cross-cultural understanding (Farah, 2020).

In a related context, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has expanded its programs in the Gulf to include capacity building and investments in sustainable agriculture, water management and healthcare. These initiatives emphasize institutional capacity building and the transfer of Japanese expertise in sustainable development (JICA, 2022). Furthermore, these efforts enhance Japan's positive image as a nation that aids humanity without colonial ambitions, supported by experts and volunteers within the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers initiative (Lamont, 2022).

Regarding peace operations and political stability, Japan has actively engaged in mediation diplomacy. For instance, former Prime Minister Abe undertook mediation efforts in the Gulf between mid-2019 and early 2020 following heightened regional tensions. Japan also works to promote stability and peace building in Yemen owing to its strategic proximity to the Arabian Gulf. In December 2023, the Japanese government provided $3 million to support the peace process and humanitarian response in Yemen (Matsuda and Koga, 2023).

It can be concluded that the relationship between the Arabian Gulf states and Japan has evolved into a comprehensive strategic partnership, driven by Japan's effective utilization of its soft power across diplomatic, economic and political spheres. This is embodied in bilateral agreements concerning infrastructure and renewable energy, as well as Japan's commitment to knowledge transfer to bolster its national image. Coupled with the widespread appeal of “Cool Japan”, largely driven by anime and manga and its dedication to human capability development and regional stability, Japan has successfully solidified its position as a reliable developmental partner, transcending its traditional role as a mere importer of energy resources.

Relations between China and Japan are characterized by persistent political tension and strategic rivalry, driven by historical grievances due to Japan's occupation of Chinese territory, as well as recurring sovereignty disputes, particularly over the island chain known as Diaoyu in China and Senkaku in Japan. These disputes have been accompanied by rising nationalist sentiments and increasingly sharp political rhetoric on both sides. In addition, China has criticized Japanese positions on regional security issues, including its position on the possibility of military intervention involving Taiwan. China has also imposed restrictions on Japanese dual-use exports affecting vital Japanese industries, such as drone manufacturing, measures that Japan has considered unacceptable (IBB Press, 2023).

This rivalry has extended to the Gulf States, where both China and Japan seek to strengthen their strategic presence in this important region. Each country has employed various soft-power tools based on attraction and persuasion to expand its influence there. However, these tools differ according to the distinct cultural and developmental models adopted by each state. Accordingly, this study relies on three indicators to compare the extent to which both countries have penetrated the Arabian Gulf region.

This indicator assesses the appeal of a nation's cultural assets, including language proficiency, educational quality and the global reach of its popular entertainment, such as cinema, music, video games, arts and cultural heritage. These elements collectively shape a state's public image among foreign populations. In this context, China relies on direct and institutionalized cultural and educational diplomacy. A primary vehicle for this is the expansion of Confucius Institutes, which facilitate Mandarin language acquisition and integrate Chinese technology into Gulf educational systems. By 2025, the number of these institutes reached approximately 27, with branches in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. These institutes focus on language instruction, organizing cultural events, such as Chinese New Year celebrations and implementing technology-linked educational programs, such as smart classrooms (Carroll, 2025).

Furthermore, China strategically links language learning to future economic opportunities by offering scholarships and vocational programs that qualify Gulf students for careers within major Chinese corporations, thereby framing the Chinese language as a gateway to developmental prospects.

However, Japan adopts an indirect and grassroots strategy through its “Cool Japan” initiative. This approach leverages the promotion of anime and manga, which have become integral to the daily cultural consumption of Gulf societies. This influence is further bolstered by the proliferation of Japanese art festivals, notably the Middle East Film and Comic Con in the UAE. This study highlights a Chinese edge in institutional and educational influence, contrasted by Japanese superiority in grassroots, emotional and cultural appeal.

This indicator refers to a state's ability to attract others and shape their preferences through the appeal of its political system, governance model and core governing principles. In this sense, other states may view that country and its political system as a model to emulate. Gulf States, in particular, have shown interest in developmental models that can be adapted to their own circumstances.

In this context, China promotes the Beijing Consensus Model in the Arabian Gulf region, which emphasizes social stability values and a state-led developmental model. China links its economic rise to the presence of a strong and centralized political system, distinct from traditional Western liberalism. This model is based on three core principles: economic development, social stability and a strong centralized state. It has found considerable resonance in the Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Therefore, it does not require interference in domestic affairs, nor does it impose Western political or human rights standards. Public opinion surveys indicate significant appreciation of this model in Gulf States as a successful alternative that supports economic diversification while preserving national sovereignty.

Meanwhile, Japan presents a model based on the values associated with a rules-based international order, multilateralism and global responsibility. It also relies on Kono Diplomacy, which emphasizes the transfer of knowledge and human capacity-building without imposing a political model. This approach portrays Japan as a trustworthy, ethical and technical partner that contributes to sustainable development and regional stability through constructive cooperation and mutual respect.

This study suggests that the Chinese model appears more attractive among segments of Gulf societies that prioritize development first and reject external interference in domestic affairs. Meanwhile, the Japanese model enjoys greater acceptance among elites seeking expertise transfer and citizen capacity-building without political conditionality.

This indicator measures a state's ability to attract others through its external behavior and international initiatives. It achieves its purpose when other states perceive that country's foreign policy as attractive, credible and beneficial to others. In this context, China employs the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) according to its foreign policy to strengthen ties with various countries, including the Gulf States. This initiative has evolved from traditional infrastructure investments into more advanced sectors, such as the digital economy, artificial intelligence and e-gaming. Soft power here derives from the scale of investments and structural integration into Gulf infrastructure networks, thereby supporting economic diversification agendas in states, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates without imposing political conditions. This approach is viewed as a mechanism for creating long-term shared interests, reinforcing interdependence and positioning China as an indispensable strategic partner in Gulf development visions.

On the other hand, Japan adopts a qualitative approach based on the Kono Principles, which emphasize high standards in jointly implemented economic projects, together with the transfer of advanced technical knowledge, environmental sustainability, project lifecycle efficiency and social and governance considerations. Japan's role is not limited to the economic sphere; it also exercises political soft power through mediation diplomacy and support for peace-building and regional stability initiatives. This approach reinforces Japan's image as a guarantor of stability and a trusted partner in addressing common global challenges, such as climate change and the transition toward net-zero emissions.

The study suggests that China may retain an advantage regarding the quantity of investments and projects, particularly in scale and speed. Japan, however, appears to outperform in terms of quality, depth, sustainability and long-term trust.

The findings of the present study regarding the measurement of impact and regional influence for both China and Japan point to the success of the historic Chinese-mediated reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023. This is attributed to the “Beijing Consensus” model and diplomacy grounded in non-interference in domestic affairs, which signifies a strategic acceptance by the Gulf states of China as a neutral and reliable political and security guarantor operating free from Western conditionality. Regarding Japan, the “Kono” principles have successfully fostered Gulf–Japanese alignment and coordination in international forums. This is evidenced by maritime security issues, votes favoring peace resolutions and direct partnerships aligned with carbon neutrality and green hydrogen strategies.

Concerning societal and institutional behavioral impacts, Chinese cultural influence has expanded beyond material engagement to drive structural policy shifts within the Gulf educational systems. Chinese language has become an official, mandatory subject in schools across Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, enrolling over 100,000 students and fostering new Gulf elite fluent in Chinese and aimed at Asian technological and employment markets. Conversely, Japan's soft power has witnessed an evolution in public affinity for “Cool Japan” and anime, transforming from passive entertainment consumption into creative economy integration and joint investment flows. This is demonstrated by major co-production partnerships forged between Gulf entities, such as Manga Productions and Manga Arabia and prominent Japanese publishing and production houses to generate globally-oriented cultural content, reflecting the scale and nature of each party's influence.

With regard to economic and technological interdependence, China has interpreted its developmental soft power into the consolidation of sovereign technological reliance. These initiatives have culminated in the integration of Chinese digital infrastructure, such as Huawei's 5G networks, artificial intelligence and smart city management, into major Gulf mega-projects, driving cumulative Chinese investments and contracts to approximately $213.5 billion by 2025.

Table 1 summarizes and compares the main soft power mechanisms and the effectiveness of the Chinese and Japanese models in the Gulf states, based on the three key indicators discussed above.

Consequently, it can be argued that the Sino–Japanese rivalry is no longer confined to territorial disputes in East Asia or historical grievances; rather, it has evolved into a strategic soft power rivalry in the Arabian Gulf. Regarding effectiveness, the findings of this study suggest that Chinese soft power is highly effective in the short and medium terms, as it addresses immediate needs for rapid development and political stability without imposing preconditions. However, it demonstrates greater long-term efficacy by fostering emotional resonance with Gulf populations and bolstering institutional trust through human capital development and the comprehensive transfer of expertise. While China projects itself as a model of rapid development, Japan positions itself as a model of sustainability. Nevertheless, data show that China is now advancing in performing comprehensive societal penetration in the Gulf, whereas Japan maintains a qualitative advantage in building strategic trust and long-term bilateral relations.

This study concludes that soft power is no longer merely a supplementary tool in the foreign policies of China and Japan; rather, it has become a strategic pillar in managing international competition in the Arabian Gulf region. The study demonstrates the existence of two distinct models. China adopts an institutional and developmental model that links economic prosperity to political stability without liberal conditionality. This makes it an ideal partner for Gulf regimes seeking rapid growth. Japan, by contrast, relies on a normative and ethical model that invests in human capital development and the transfer of advanced technology, drawing upon a cultural legacy, particularly anime and manga, which has generated emotional affinity among younger generations.

At the same time, Beijing has succeeded in embedding its soft power tools within the educational and digital infrastructure of Gulf States, such as incorporating the Chinese language into curricula and cooperating in the electronic gaming sector. This has transformed soft power from a mere matter of “mental image” into an “institutional reality” connected to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Despite China's substantial financial commitments, Japan has retained a competitive advantage in the quality of life and the transfer of deep human expertise through the Kono Principles. The Japanese model is widely perceived as a benchmark of technological excellence and human-centered values that do not seek political domination.

Ultimately, the study demonstrates that the Gulf States were not merely an arena of competition. Rather, they successfully exercised strategic autonomy by leveraging this Asian–Asian rivalry to advance their national visions, such as “Vision 2030”, and transform their relationships from simple energy exchange into comprehensive technological and cultural partnerships.