Against the background of the enormous economic transition China is undertaking, government intervention over corporate behavior is a frequent and, arguably, necessary measure. Among the most serious problems facing China, economically and reputationally, are environmental issues. So, how is the government intervening in the environmental performance of Chinese enterprises? And how are Chinese enterprises responding? These are the questions to be answered in this study.
This paper sampled listed companies on China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The data were collected from the HeXun corporate social responsibility report, CSMAR and WIND databases. A Tobit model was used to conduct the main 2SLS regression analysis, and the robustness tests followed the propensity score matching method.
The analysis shows that environmental performance is positively related to the government subsidies a company receives. The “Eight-point Regulation of the Centre” crack-down on social corruption introduced in 2012 has weakened rent-seeking overall, but rent-seeking behavior through the cloak of corporate environmental performance has become more serious. As a result, non-polluting and state-owned enterprises are significantly less concerned about their environmental performance, while polluting and private enterprises are more motivated to become good environmental citizens.
This research provides a greater understanding of the drivers behind environmentally-responsible behavior in Chinese companies. These insights can be used by policymakers and environmental regulators to incentivize a more widespread ground-swell of change across the gamut of Chinese business.
Environmental policy and practice informed by research-driven recommendations can not only make valuable contributions to the health and well-being of Chinese society but also, as a significant contributor to climate change, environmental reforms have global benefits.
This study explores the motivations behind rent-seeking associated with environmental investment. The findings expand the research horizon of relevant literature on corporate political rent-seeking and deepen the understandings of the economic consequences of corporate investment into environmental practice. The results provide empirical evidence for the Chinese government to implement environmental regulations based on incentives beyond simple profit-making.
