International agreements are necessary for exclusion of non-cooperative behavior. We parameterized an age-structured model for the North Sea herring fishery. The reference points of the current harvest control rule operationalize the precautionary approach. Applying the precautionary approach by the grand coalition adds the net present value of the fishery compared to another management approach, a fixed fishing mortality rate strategy. The fishing strategy and costs have a strong impact on the stability of the coalitions. Adopting a precautionary harvest control rule has potential to stabilize multilateral fishing agreements provided that fishing costs are not identical among countries. If they are identical, there will always be incentive for free riding.
Stability of International Fisheries Agreements Using Precautionary Bioeconomic Harvesting Strategies* Available to Purchase
This study was funded by the Finnish Academy Project #121695. The research leading to these results also received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) under grant agreement no. 244706/ECOKNOWS project. However, the paper does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission (EC), and in no way anticipates the Commission’s future policy in the area.We acknowledge the input of the two anonymous referees whose comments improved the quality of the paper.
Corresponding author. Fisheries and Environmental Management Group, Department of Environmental Sciences, University of Helsinki, Viikinkaari 2, P.O. Box 65, FI-00014, Finland; mika.rahikainen@helsinki.fi.
Rahikainen M, Lindroos M, Kaitala V (2013), "Stability of International Fisheries Agreements Using Precautionary Bioeconomic Harvesting Strategies*". Strategic Behavior and the Environment, Vol. 3 No. 1-2 pp. 97–120, doi: https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000025
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