... Limited must be obtained for commercial re-use. International environmental agreements coalition formation minimum participation rule transfers heterogeneous countries C72 Q50 In reality, countries are asymmetric in terms of abatement benefits and abatement costs of pollution...

... The mackerel crisis game theory stable coalitions Q22 C72 C61 Between 1999 and 2009, the European Union (the EU), Norway (NO) and the Faroe Islands (the FI) had an agreement on the size and distribution of a total allowable catch (TAC) for the mackerel fishery in the Northeast Atlantic Sea...

... experiments public goods C72 C92 H41 Q50 In this paper, we explore how coalition formation rates are affected by individual preferences over payoff inequality. Inequality aversion is potentially important in the analysis of coalition formation and endogenous institutions in general because...

... demand Climate damage International trade Asymmetry Stability Grand coalition C72 F18 Q50 Q58 The reduction of global carbon emissions necessary to stabilize the world climate at safe levels requires a broad and deep international environmental agreement (IEA), that is, an IEA...

... or subsidies within OPEC do not alter the findings of our previous analysis. Carbon leakage Oil market OPEC behaviour C72 Q41 Q54 A major drawback associated with unilateral climate policies is the risk of carbon leakage: price changes in international markets for fossil fuels and energy...

... to 2^˚C compared to per-industrial levels. C72 F18 Q58 Strategic environmental policy International trade Self-enforcing international agreements Horizontal product differentiation Taste for variety © 2018 M. Finus and A. Al Khourdajie 2018 Emerald Publishing...

.... Zetland Licensed re-use rights only Voluntary contribution mechanism in-group/out-group comparisons public goods free-riding C72 C92 D71 H41 Q56 How do you get thousands of college students to use less water in the middle of a drought when they pay nothing for it? In 2014...

..., such as the utilization of agricultural lime in lakes, ponds and soil. Perfectly coalition-proof equilibrium Overlapping coalitions Climate change Correlated pollutants International environmental agreements. C72 D62 D78 H41 H77 Several nations are simultaneously signatories of different types...

... pays most of the private cost. (5) π ~ = V ( w , p ; y , A , h , g ( S ) ) − r A − v h − S , taking as given its choices of A and h. The first-order condition with respect to S is dn dg . . K42 C72 D72 Q15 (9b) ( 1 + α ) α...

... with fundamental equity considerations. International environmental agreements Coalition game Emissions trading Allocation scheme C72 Q54 H41 As a common result, the early models of coalition stability that draw on non-cooperative game theory find that a global climate agreement can only...

... Belief-distorted Nash equilibrium Self-verification of beliefs C72 D83 D84 C61 Q20 Q56 Exploitation of common or interdependent renewable resources is one of the greatest challenges of contemporaneity. This issue encompasses a large variety of problems, among others high-seas...

.... Gaudet and H. Lohoues 2014 H. Benchekroun, G. Gaudet and H. Lohoues Licensed re-use rights only Cost asymmetries Renewable resource Common pool oligopoly Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium Q20 C72 C73 In the next section, we characterize a MPNE for this noncooperative...

... and subsidy rates, in a game played by two polluting duopolists and a regulator. C72 D62 H23 Q55 Pollution control inventive R8D absorptive capacity taxes and subsidies first best © 2014 S. Ben Youssef and G. Zaccour 2014 S. Ben Youssef and G. Zaccour Licensed re-use rights only...

... environmental agreements Matching agreement Game theory Self-enforcement C72 H23 Q54 One remarkable feature of transboundary environmental problems is that no organization has the supranational power to control anthropogenic pollutants. Hence, to develop measures to protect the environment...

... as the financial support by the Finnish Government Scholarship Pool, Centre for International Mobility, grant KM-07-4674, and by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology. Risk management harvest control rule precautionary approach game theory fisheries agreement north sea herring C72...

.... Gordon for their comments on an earlier version. © 2013 M. Lindroos and G. Munro 2013 M. Lindroos and G. Munro Licensed re-use rights only Noncooperative and cooperative solutions North-East Arctic cod climate change C61 C72 Q22 This paper considers a deterministic model...

... Curie research fellow. © 2012 M. Heugues 2012 M. Heugues Licensed re-use rights only Climate change non-cooperative game global pollution strategic interactions endogenous timing supermodular game theory C72 H41 Q54 Figure 2 displays the strategic form...