... Limited must be obtained for commercial re-use. International environmental agreements coalition formation minimum participation rule transfers heterogeneous countries C72 Q50 Transboundary pollutant problems, such as global warming, are caused by human activity in each country...

... experiments public goods C72 C92 H41 Q50 The equilibrium coalition size in the simultaneous-choice version of this game is called a self-enforcing coalition. A self-enforcing coalition is one that is internally and externally stable in the sense that no member wishes to leave and no non-member...

... and A. Smilgins 2020 J. L. Hougaard, F. Jensen and A. Smilgins Licensed re-use rights only The mackerel crisis game theory stable coalitions Q22 C72 C61 In this paper, we assume that the social optimum, where a grand coalition is formed, is identical to a long-run steady-state...

... or subsidies within OPEC do not alter the findings of our previous analysis. © 2018 C. Böhringer, K. E. Rosendahl and J. Schneider 2018 C. Böhringer, K. E. Rosendahl and J. Schneider Licensed re-use rights only Carbon leakage Oil market OPEC behaviour C72 Q41 Q54 A major drawback...

... T. Eichner & R. Pethig 2018 T. Eichner & R. Pethig Licensed re-use rights only Fuel demand Climate damage International trade Asymmetry Stability Grand coalition C72 F18 Q50 Q58 The reduction of global carbon emissions necessary to stabilize the world climate...

... differentiation Taste for variety C72 F18 Q58 Reaching a meaningful international agreement on climate change has proved difficult over the last three decades. The Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1998, could not even stop the trend of a continuous increase of greenhouse gas emissions world-wide...

... mistakes are mine. © 2017 D. Zetland 2017 D. Zetland Licensed re-use rights only Voluntary contribution mechanism in-group/out-group comparisons public goods free-riding C72 C92 D71 H41 Q56 How do you get thousands of college students to use less water in the middle...

... agreements. C72 D62 D78 H41 H77 BPW (p. 6) defines self-enforceability and coalition-proofness recursively as follows Definition 2. (i) In a single player game Γ , s* ∈ S is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium if and only if s* maximizes u;₁(s). (ii...

... M. E. Oliver and J. F. Shogren 2015 M. E. Oliver and J. F. Shogren Licensed re-use rights only Public sector corruption Common agency Contest theory Resource conversion K42 C72 D72 Q15 Economists know at least two things about how corruption affects natural resources...

... with fundamental equity considerations. International environmental agreements Coalition game Emissions trading Allocation scheme C72 Q54 H41 As a common result, the early models of coalition stability that draw on non-cooperative game theory find that a global climate agreement can only...

... Belief-distorted Nash equilibrium Self-verification of beliefs C72 D83 D84 C61 Q20 Q56 Exploitation of common or interdependent renewable resources is one of the greatest challenges of contemporaneity. This issue encompasses a large variety of problems, among others high-seas...

... resource Common pool oligopoly Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium Q20 C72 C73 It is not unusual for studies of the economic dynamics of common pool resource exploitation to assume that the economic agents exploiting the resource are all identical. Yet, in many situations, the heterogeneity...

... in the Appendix. Pollution control inventive R8D absorptive capacity taxes and subsidies first best C72 D62 H23 Q55 Consequently, the total emissions for firm i are given by E i ( q i , x i o , x i a , x j o ) = [ 1 − x i o − ( β...

... j − C ( x i ) , Transboundary pollution International environmental agreements Matching agreement Game theory Self-enforcement C72 H23 Q54 Rübbelke (2006) is the first study that applies matching schemes to environmental problems. He extends Guttman (1978 ,1987...

... north sea herring C72 Q22 The seminal fisheries economics model by Gordon (1954) and Schaefer (1957) demonstrates that economically sound management of a fish stock is also biologically sound. It would cause little trouble to find quite a range of studies verifying their result...

... V. Gordon for their comments on an earlier version. © 2013 M. Lindroos and G. Munro 2013 M. Lindroos and G. Munro Licensed re-use rights only Noncooperative and cooperative solutions North-East Arctic cod climate change C61 C72 Q22 This paper considers...

... change non-cooperative game global pollution strategic interactions endogenous timing supermodular game theory C72 H41 Q54 Since the “Earth Summit” of Rio de Janeiro in 1992, almost all countries of the world are part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change...