This paper aims to test whether Western-style meritocratic principles function authentically in authoritarian contexts, examining Chan’s (2024) proposition that authoritarian leaders prioritise political loyalty over administrative competence.
A survey of 4,650 civil/public servants across 35 national agencies in Kazakhstan (2021–2023) uses logistic regression to examine relationships between perceived merit-based promotion and professional knowledge, work experience, political/personal connections, loyalty, ethnicity and gender.
Professional knowledge decreases promotion odds by 23% (p < 0.001), while personal connections increase odds by 36.5% (p < 0.001). Ethnic Kazakh identity confers a 30.6% advantage (p < 0.001) and male gender a 22.6% advantage (p < 0.01). Political loyalty shows no significant effect. The optimal promotion profile, an ethnically Kazakh male with strong personal networks but limited professional qualifications, inverts Weberian meritocracy.
Non-probability sampling limits generalisability, though sample diversity supports robustness. Findings reveal authoritarian control operates through identity-based trust and informal networks rather than explicit political loyalty, challenging Weberian universality.
Formal meritocratic structures function as legitimising symbols rather than operational mechanisms. Parallel meritocratic tracks in technical ministries may prove more viable than wholesale reform.
This study provides empirical evidence on Central Asian authoritarianism, demonstrating that meritocracy becomes a politically negotiated concept serving regime legitimacy rather than an objective selection mechanism.
