Resilience through performance auditing? Lessons from NASA's Faster, Better, Cheaper era

Recent international events, such as geopolitical conflicts, economic downturns, terrorist activities, the COVID-19 pandemic and environmental catastrophes, underscore the effect of crises and the importance of mechanisms employed in their management (Tucker and Alewine, 2025). These occurrences highlight the necessity for robust accountability frameworks that enable effective response strategies, mitigation efforts and long-term resilience planning within political, economic and social domains (Rana and Parker, 2023; Barbera et al., 2020). The imperative to cultivate resilience within the public sector has become increasingly pronounced, reflecting its essential role in ensuring institutional continuity, responsiveness and adaptability amid complex and evolving challenges. Government institutions are intended to serve as foundational pillars of societal stability, tasked with ensuring the continuity of essential public services (Bracci et al., 2015). In maintaining order, safeguarding public welfare and fostering economic and social resilience, these institutions seek to mitigate risks posed by economic downturns, health emergencies, natural disasters and geopolitical conflicts (Boin and Lodge, 2016). Moreover, their capacity to address emerging challenges reinforces their importance in maintaining effective governance and promoting long-term societal stability (Parker, 2024). However, their effectiveness in managing crises has been uneven, as demonstrated by the varied and often fragmented responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, which exposed limitations in coordination, trust-building, adaptive capacity and resilience across different national contexts (Capano et al., 2020).

Performance auditing (PA) can potentially strengthen the public sector responses by systematically identifying and assessing comprehensive organisational performance and management practices (Rana and Parker, 2023). By drawing on evaluative frameworks anchored in PA principles, this approach supports the development of adaptive governance mechanisms that strengthen institutional responsiveness to dynamic challenges. In doing so, it contributes to sustaining long-term operational stability across the public sector (Rana et al., 2022). Yet, despite its potential to guide and refine the development of resilient practices and strategic approaches, the role of PA in developing resilience remains relatively under-examined in accounting research (Bracci and Tallaki, 2021; Rana et al., 2022).

PA is instrumental in improving accountability and performance of public sector organisations (Rana et al., 2022) by identifying improvement in terms of what is often referred to as the “three E's”: economy – ensuring resources are acquired at the lowest possible cost without compromising quality; efficiency – evaluating how well resources are used to maximise output; and, effectiveness – measuring the extent to which objectives and intended outcomes are achieved (Guthrie and Parker, 1999; International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions, 2019; Rana et al., 2022). Prima facie, there appear to be notable conceptual and methodological parallels between PA principles and the “Faster, Better, Cheaper” (FBC) management philosophy adopted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the 1990s. Both approaches emphasise anticipatory governance, strategic foresight and the use of evaluative mechanisms to inform decision-making. This apparent convergence suggests a shared orientation towards enhancing institutional responsiveness, accountability and resilience in the face of evolving public sector challenges.

In broad terms, the FBC philosophy framed mission success as achieving core scientific and technical objectives while cutting costs, shortening development time and reducing programmatic complexity through smaller, more frequent missions and greater use of commercial technologies (Kaminski, 2013). Specifically, the adoption of FBC sought to make space missions more “successful” in terms of streamlining operations and cutting operational and project costs (reflecting an aspect of efficiency), streamlining and accelerating mission timelines (reflecting an aspect of effectiveness) and acquiring necessary resources at an optimal cost whilst maintaining project/program quality (reflecting an aspect of economy) (McCurdy, 2001). In addition to resonating with the concept of the three Es, as with PA (Rana et al., 2022), the FBC philosophy also demonstrated a propensity to reinforce resilience by requiring adaptive capacity and encouraging innovation (Hamaker, 1999) to cope with complexity whilst enabling sustained operations in a high-risk environment (Casler, 2014).

In this study, we situate NASA's FBC managerial philosophy within a case study framework, investigating both its alignment with PA principles and its impact on organisational resilience. This case study provides the foundation for examining how managerial styles embody mechanisms of accountability, efficiency and evaluation. In turn, situating FBC within the framework of PA enriches the analysis by demonstrating how managerial philosophies can function as embedded practices that contribute to organisational resilience. Without the managerial philosophy lens, the discussion of PA principles would remain abstract; without the PA perspective, the case study would lack evaluative depth. Taken together, this dual focus provides a contribution by comparing the extent to which the managerial ethos of FBC is consistent with PA principles, thereby offering a more integrated account of the ways in which organisational practices may be both philosophically driven and audit-like in their operation.

Our findings suggest that although FBC could not be construed as synonymous with PA, it selectively adopted certain PA-like logics, particularly those related to economy, efficiency and performance framing, while omitting the core PA features of independence, external scrutiny and effectiveness-oriented evaluation. However, PA-related concepts, even when selectively or incompletely applied, can nevertheless influence organisational resilience. The study extends PA scholarship into the under-examined domain of space sector governance and demonstrates how PA-informed logics operate in environments characterised by uncertainty, innovation pressures and mission-critical risk to foster organisational resilience while maintaining accountability.

The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The following section presents an overview of relevant studies on resilience and PA, and it introduces NASA's FBC philosophy as the study's research context. Then we describe the research design, our findings and their significance with implications. Finally, we conclude with the study's contributions and limitations, as well as a discussion of future research opportunities.

Resilience is especially critical for public sector organisations, which must continually adapt to diverse and complex challenges to maintain seamless service delivery. These services play a vital role in improving quality of life and upholding societal stability (Parker, 2024). Public sector agencies must cultivate resilience to effectively navigate a diverse range of crises, including wars and geopolitical instability (Lodge and Wegrich, 2012), economic slumps and the resulting austerity measures (Barbera et al., 2020; Bracci et al., 2015), medical and epidemiological challenges (Caffrey et al., 2019) and environmental disasters (Shaw, 2012; Shaw and Maythorne, 2013). Such crises can be substantial as well as wide-ranging, highlighting the need for public sector organisations to develop and maintain frameworks and their corresponding mechanisms that allow them to effectively plan for and respond to unexpected challenges and disruptions (Rana and Parker, 2023).

Although no one definitive understanding of organisational resilience has been agreed upon in the literature (Vakilzadeh and Haase, 2021), we adopt the perspective that resilience encompasses an organisation's capacity to foresee potential threats (Somers, 2009), effectively manage adverse events (Lengnick-Hall et al., 2011) and dynamically adjust to evolving circumstances (Teece et al., 1997), resulting in the organisation being ultimately restored to pre-crisis conditions or becoming stronger by effective learning from the crisis experience (Boin and Lodge, 2016; Duchek, 2020; Parker, 2024). This conceptualisation of resilience underscores the multidimensional nature of resilience, highlighting its role in both proactive risk anticipation and adaptive transformation in response to environmental uncertainties (Duchek, 2020, p. 220). Moreover, this broad conceptualisation incorporates the propensity for organisations to be resilient in addressing adversity if their actions lead to both a return to status quo operations and functionality in achieving their strategic objectives (i.e. “bouncing back”), as well as learning from these crises to develop new capabilities allowing for more effective management of future crises (i.e. “bouncing forward”) (Barbera et al., 2020; Bartuseviciene et al., 2024).

The literature has recently placed more emphasis on the ability to bounce forward as a major condition of achieving resilience (Boin et al., 2010; Shaw, 2012), suggesting that resilience also includes the creative ability to take advantage of adverse events to enable the organisation to emerge in a more robust position to achieve its current strategic objectives while developing and maintaining the organisational tools to handle future crises effectively (Ma et al., 2018). Moreover, research in this area has established characteristics and contextual factors that influence achieving organisational resilience (Parker, 2024). These factors include the financial resources available, as well as the human capital resources available, such as staff dedication towards the organisation (Duchek, 2020).

As with the concept of organisational resilience, accounting research does not provide a single, specific definition of PA (Parker et al., 2019). Yet, a defining characteristic of PA in the literature is its external and independent orientation, which serves as a signalling function to the public sector agency's stakeholders that the audit results and recommendations contain reliability and credibility (Hay and Cordery, 2018). An example of an entity that conducts performance audits is the supreme audit institution, typically found in democratic forms of government. They recognise that the enabling power of their legitimacy depends on their ability to function independently, which can lead to tension with their need to maintain relevance by producing suggestions in PA reports that government personnel deem politically acceptable to implement (Triantafillou, 2020).

PA can also be embodied within internal audit efforts, as noted by the Big 4 accounting firms (Smith and Strydom, 2013). Indeed, the academic literature has explored how internal auditing can be effective at enhancing performance outcomes in the public sector, ultimately adding value that may, for example, help stave off protests related to poor public service delivery. For example, Moodley et al. (2022) analysed the South African governmental effort to use internal audits aimed at improving service delivery by using audit outputs to enhance organisational performance management within the public sector (Pollitt, 2016). That management approach is grounded in the new public management perspective of injecting private sector management efforts into the public sector and improving outcomes related to the three E's, which PA principles focus on (Chowdhury and Shil, 2017). Thus, PA principles can also be present in internal audit applications that are well respected in the accounting profession. As long as professional standards of integrity are upheld in the proper conduct of internal audit functions, this creates a valuable opportunity for the literature to further consider an internal orientation within PA tasks as it explores how PA is utilised in the public sector. This exploration may lead to realisations that some internal audit functions, as well as management philosophies steering management decisions towards outcomes that align with PA objectives, may lead public sector entities to be considered closer to PA tenets than once realised. Such findings could be quite valuable, such as creating opportunities to further analyse candidate audit tasks and like-minded management philosophies that could apply the literature to help enhance those investigated tasks to achieve PA objectives more effectively.

Recent research has underscored the role of PA methods in advancing organisational resilience within complex institutional environments (Rana and Parker, 2023). These methods, in broad terms, aim to improve economic performance, boost operational efficiency and enhance the execution of tasks that support an entity's role in achieving strategic objectives within the public sector (INTOSAI, 2010; Rana et al., 2022). This emphasis forms one foundational focus of PA in what is commonly referred to as the “three Es” previously defined – economy, efficiency and effectiveness.

Research has noted that the three Es are not given equal priority in PA (Parker et al., 2019). Variations and shifts in priorities occur among the three Es in PA, depending on the public agency outputs offered across countries and over time (Rana et al., 2022). These shifts can lead to tensions between the Es, particularly between efficiency and effectiveness (Everett, 2003). Overall, empirical studies assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of PA remain relatively elusive (Weets, 2011). Further research into the interplay of the three Es within public administration initiatives and the specific contexts in which they operate would therefore significantly enrich the body of public sector accounting literature in this area.

Using the above general foundation, researchers highlight two main objectives of PA (Rana et al., 2022): promoting accountability by revealing how government agencies allocate and utilise their resources (Funnell, 2003) and helping stakeholders in management roles enhance the public sector entity's performance (Morin, 2001). Much of this extends PA beyond the managerial focus typically observed in management control systems research. For example, PA plays an essential role in political and public accountability. While PA influences on government employees are contingent on auditees' perceptions of the PA (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013), evidence shows that legislative politicians use information derived from PA to strengthen oversight of the executive branch (van Druenen and Keulen, 2026). PA has been shown to be constructive in resolving political quarrels across different branches of government when the public auditor is perceived to contain moral legitimacy (Funnell, 2015).

Studies also show PA functioning as an instrument of administrative reform and governance change, though its effectiveness in achieving meaningful change can be influenced by personal and political factors (Reichborn Kjennerud and Vabo, 2017). For example, Raudla et al. (2016) specify that recommendations stemming from PA reports are more likely to be implemented when lawmakers and media focus on PA. Also, survey data from Reichborn Kjennerud and Johnsen (2015) indicate that auditees can be persuaded to alter the status quo even when they disagree with the PA's evaluations and recommendations, though they are more likely to do so when the recommendations help them achieve their own goals. This instrumentation allows PA to serve as an evaluative focus on the effectiveness and impact of public programmes, even at the municipal and county levels of governance (Johnsen et al., 2001).

Researchers have questioned the substantive impact of PA outcomes, suggesting they may primarily serve as procedural verification frameworks rather than delivering meaningful results (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2014). In other words, PA risks being reduced to a set of perfunctory practices, arguably leading to processes that prioritise form over substance rather than substance over form (Johnsen et al., 2019). PA research (and society in general) would arguably benefit considerably from further inquiry to clarify these important questions and points of contention. PA has evolved to be necessarily pliable because it must adapt to various factors that may change over time and require adjustment to be effective (Guthrie and Parker, 1999). Such factors include social, political, cultural and institutional considerations, and the influence of these factors and the resulting necessary adaptations of PA to account for these factors will vary due to the diverse offerings of public sector entities and their settings (Everett, 2003; Parker et al., 2021; Rana et al., 2022; Tillema and ter Bogt, 2010, 2016).

Related to the societal necessity for PA to be adaptable, public-sector organisations must continually contend with highly complex, ambiguous challenges often referred to as wicked problems (Jacobs and Cuganesan, 2014). Such issues and crises can be more effectively addressed in public sector accounting research by embracing more theoretically pluralistic approaches when responding to research questions related to wicked problems in the public sector domain (Steccolini, 2019). Wicked problems within the public sector in a modern context cannot be divorced from the rapid advancement of technology and the resulting increasing interconnectedness of world affairs, creating an urgent need to pay closer attention to risk management considerations (Rana et al., 2022). However, as Rana et al. (2022) assert, the PA literature would benefit from further scholarly contributions to deepen understanding of PA's role in risk management within public sector agencies. This is especially important given the nature of wicked problems that prevail in public sector decision settings. Such research advances are likely to be integral in better understanding the relationship between PA and organisational resilience in the public sector because they offer insights into how governance mechanisms, auditing practices and strategic decision-making processes contribute to an entity's capacity to adapt, withstand and thrive amid changing conditions and external pressures. This study takes a step towards this relational understanding by next introducing the research context that has had its fair share of solving wicked problems in a public sector setting – the US' space agency NASA, and specifically, the FBC philosophy introduced in 1992 in response to budget constraints following the end of the Cold War.

The current study is situated within the institutional framework of NASA, widely regarded as one of the most prominent and influential public sector organisations of the modern era (Donahue and O'Leary, 2012). Established in 1958 in response to the growing need for a dedicated space agency, the US government created NASA primarily to advance space exploration and aeronautics research, particularly after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik 1 in 1957, marking the beginning of the “Space Race”. The agency was designed to ensure that space activities were conducted for peaceful purposes and to consolidate various space-related research efforts under one organisation. Since its founding, NASA has played a crucial role in scientific discovery and technological innovation, including human and non-human missions to the Moon, Mars and beyond (NASA, 2025a).

Prior to the introduction of the FBC initiative in the early 1990s, NASA's management philosophy was firmly rooted in the pursuit of large-scale, flagship missions that prioritised reliability, technological achievement and national prestige over cost efficiency (McCurdy, 1993). Shaped by the Cold War and the competitive pressures of the Space Race, the agency cultivated a culture in which risk minimisation and uncompromising standards of quality were paramount (Launius, 2010). Programs such as Mercury, Gemini, Apollo and later the Space Shuttle exemplified this approach: they were ambitious, resource-intensive undertakings designed to demonstrate American leadership in science and technology (McCurdy, 1993).

Decision-making during this period was highly centralised, reflecting both internal organisational structures and external political oversight (Logsdon, 2015). Success was measured not by efficiency or turnaround time, but by the achievement of bold milestones, and most notably the landing of humans on the Moon (Launius, 2019). This philosophy produced extraordinary accomplishments, yet it also fostered a pattern of escalating costs and extended timelines (McCurdy, 1993). As geopolitical circumstances shifted and budgetary constraints tightened in the post-Cold War era, the sustainability of this “big mission, big budget” paradigm came under increasing scrutiny, setting the stage for the reforms embodied in FBC (Handberg, 2003).

The catastrophic incidents of Apollo 1 (1967), the Challenger (1986) and Columbia (2003) space shuttle disasters, which collectively claimed the lives of 17 astronauts, alongside the narrowly averted tragedy of Apollo 13 in 1970, resulted in considerable institutional loss, intensified public scrutiny and posed very real challenges to the continuity of the US' space program. The potential discontinuation of the program bore significant consequences for the US' national prestige and collective identity, while also prompting rigorous debate concerning its technological capacity and economic fortitude. Nevertheless, NASA's ability to navigate these crises and successfully fulfil its ambitious objectives – widely regarded as among the most pivotal achievements in human history – demonstrated a prominent level of organisational resilience in the face of adversity (Tucker and Alewine, 2025). These incidents led to progressive changes in NASA's safety protocols (Logsdon, 2011), one of which was the FBC philosophy instituted in the early 1990s.

NASA's FBC philosophy, introduced under Administrator Dan Goldin (1992–2001), emerged as a strategic response to rising mission costs and prolonged development timelines (MacCormack, 2004). The philosophy aimed to optimise resource allocation by minimising expenses, expediting project timelines and increasing mission frequency while preserving scientific productivity (Ward, 2010).

Before implementing FBC, NASA's mission design philosophy was shaped largely by Apollo-era principles, which emphasised high reliability and prioritised mission success and crew safety over cost-effectiveness (McCurdy, 2001). This approach resulted in large-scale, complex and expensive missions. However, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, financial constraints and external pressures necessitated a shift towards a more efficient and adaptive operational framework. Introduced in 1992, the FBC philosophy was characterised by smaller, less expensive missions with shorter development cycles (Frank, 2019), greater reliance on commercial technology and private-sector partnerships (Paxton, 2007), a more decentralised decision-making structure that permitted project managers more flexibility (Hamaker, 1999) and an acceptance of higher risk with the understanding that some missions might fail (Ward, 2012).

Throughout the FBC era, 16 total missions were undertaken.  Appendix 1 provides mission summaries. Nine out of the first 10 missions (90%) succeeded; however, 5 of the last 6 failed (McCurdy, 2001). Although FBC's benefits were most visible in its early phase, as mission complexity grew, the limitations of the FBC approach became apparent. The early success rate reflected simpler missions, while later missions faced more complex demands, tighter budgets and higher expectations, leading to several high-profile failures. Nevertheless, the overall success rate of 63% was deemed unacceptably low despite all 16 missions combined costing less than the price of one traditional mission. For example, the total combined cost of all FBC projects was less than the Cassini mission launched to Saturn in 1997 (Ward, 2012). The FBC era was officially discontinued in 2001 (Eaton et al., 2022).

After abandoning the FBC initiative in the early 2000s, NASA's management philosophy underwent a significant recalibration. The agency shifted back towards larger, flagship missions that demanded longer development cycles and substantial investment, while simultaneously integrating lessons learned from the FBC era. The failures of the Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) and Mars Polar Lander (MPL) underscored the risks of compressed schedules and reduced oversight, prompting NASA to strengthen its emphasis on systems engineering discipline, risk management and accountability (MacCormack, 2004).

In this post-FBC environment, success was no longer measured primarily by cost and schedule performance but by the reliability and scientific return of missions. While NASA retained certain efficiencies introduced during FBC, such as leaner teams and selective use of commercial technologies, it embedded these within a more balanced framework that prioritised mission assurance and sustainability (Defense Technical Information Center, 2016). This hybrid philosophy reflected a pragmatic recognition that high-tech projects could not simultaneously maximise speed, quality and cost savings without trade-offs, and that long-term credibility required a renewed focus on reliability and scientific achievement (Patel et al., 2022).

Whilst the FBC philosophy allowed NASA to accelerate the frequency of its missions, critics argued that it compromised reliability and lacked clearly defined implementation protocols (McCurdy, 2001). The resulting challenges necessitated a reassessment of the approach, leading NASA to implement more rigorous oversight and enhanced risk mitigation strategies (Eaton et al., 2022). Despite producing mixed outcomes, FBC had a lasting influence on contemporary space exploration by promoting cost-effective mission planning and fostering commercial partnerships, principles now underpinning initiatives such as NASA's Artemis program and its collaborations with SpaceX (Frank, 2019).

However, notwithstanding the apparent integration of economy, efficiency and effectiveness principles as discussed above, the extent to which the FBC philosophy could be construed to be a form of PA, and the ways in which PA in this context enhanced NASA's resilience remain undetermined. The conceptual overlap between FBC and PA is a non-trivial question. Assessing the alignment between the FBC philosophy and PA principles is important because the philosophical assumptions embedded within an organisation shape the administrative doctrines and policy frameworks it develops (Ongaro, 2017). These frameworks, in turn, structure how resilience is defined and enacted, consistent with research showing that resilience in public administration is shaped by underlying governance logics and institutional design choices rather than being a neutral or uniform construct (Li et al., 2026). Given that space agencies and public sector institutions operate through highly formalised, rule-bound and policy-driven systems, policy frameworks function as the primary mechanism through which organisational philosophy becomes operational (Ongaro, 2017). Consequently, any alignment between FBC and PA principles will influence which risk practices, accountability mechanisms and learning processes become institutionally viable, echoing findings that different policy architectures embed distinct assumptions about risk, learning and system behaviour (Shimizu and Clark, 2019). This alignment ultimately conditions whether resilience is framed in terms of control and compliance or, alternatively, adaptation and organisational learning, reflecting the multiple resilience “narratives” identified in the public administration literature (Li et al., 2026). Highlighting this connection between the FBC philosophy and PA principles also addresses the potential consequences of misalignment, such as policy incoherence, friction or implementation resistance, which resilience governance research identifies as key barriers to effective institutional adaptation (Christensen et al., 2016).

Assessing the extent to which the FBC philosophy aligns with the principles of PA thus holds broad implications in terms of (1) the formulation of future policy design frameworks within space agencies and public sector institutions, (2) accountability and performance structures and (3) how such frameworks and structures may condition or shape resilience.

Assessing the degree of coherence between the philosophical foundations of FBC and PA principles invites reflection on how resilience-oriented strategies might be reconciled with mechanisms of accountability and oversight. Moreover, it underscores the need for PA methodologies to effectively address and accommodate the unique challenges posed by unconventional yet adaptive management approaches such as FBC. Consequently, further inquiry is warranted to assess (1) how implicit or explicit PA principles may have been incorporated within the FBC framework, and (2) how these principles may have influenced the development of organisational resilience as formally articulated in the following research question:

The following section outlines how we will examine this research question.

This study draws on archival sources, including three decades of NASA publications, academic literature and popular commentary, as well as academic research as it relates to the FBC philosophy, PA and organisational resilience in the public sector to investigate the research question. Framed as a historically informed investigation, the study aims to draw insights from commentary relating to accountability and auditing practices within NASA, with particular attention to how the FBC philosophy functioned as a tacit framework for PA. By examining the alignment of FBC principles through the lens of PA, the study seeks to illuminate how the FBC initiatives employed by NASA may have conditioned the agency's capacity for resilience in response to operational disruptions, technological uncertainties and institutional scrutiny.

Recognising the imperative to establish the credibility, authenticity and dependability of qualitative research (Parker, 2014), and adhering to established protocols in archival, historical and qualitative inquiry (Parker, 2012), this study follows the methodological framework articulated by Covaleski et al. (2017) to ensure the trustworthiness of its findings. Firstly, members of the research team independently analysed identical archival materials, subsequently engaging in discussions to resolve any interpretive discrepancies and achieve consensus on meaning. Secondly, whenever possible, multiple archival sources were examined to enhance the depth of insights into the phenomena under investigation. Finally, the research team pursued a literature review until thematic saturation was attained, ensuring that no novel patterns emerged in relation to the research question (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).

We employed a thematic approach to data analysis, aiming to identify underlying patterns of meaning through a rigorous, self-critical and reflexive process encompassing data familiarisation, and theme development and refinement (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011). The analysis was conducted independently by each member of the research team. Initially, all documents were systematically screened using the keywords “Performance Auditing”; “Economy”; “Efficiency”; “Effectiveness”; “Public Sector”; “NASA”; “Resilience”; “Faster, Better, Cheaper”; and “FBC”. Subsequently, each researcher examined the documents to assess the interrelationship between the FBC philosophy, PA and resilience.

Additionally, each researcher and then in collaboration, evaluated how these concepts were represented within the documents, focusing on the initiatives, management practices, accountability and control mechanisms, and evaluation of the three Es to ascertain under what circumstances, in what ways, and how they contributed to organisational resilience. Special attention was given to the role of FBC initiatives as they related to economy, efficiency and effectiveness in facilitating both “bouncing back” and “bouncing forward”, determining the extent to which such initiatives contributed to NASA's capacity not only to recover from operational disruptions but also to evolve institutionally through innovation, strategic learning and process refinement. Finally, a collaborative review and discussion of individual interpretations was undertaken to establish a consensus on emergent themes and meanings, ensuring that they appeared plausible in addressing the research question.

Following our analysis of the study's data, we present a summary that integrates the thematic connections between the foundational principles of PA and the ways in which FBC operated as an expression of PA in practice. Specifically, findings in Section 4.1 map specific FBC initiatives in relation to each of the “three E's”. In so doing, we explore the extent to which FBC corresponds with the foundational principles of PA. Section 4.2 details the limitations of considering FBC as an application of PA concepts. Section 4.3 explains how FBC contributed to building resilience in NASA. Section 4.4 identifies factors that led to the abandonment of the FBC initiative, offering a foundation for the subsequent examination in the Discussion section.

 Appendix 2 provides examples of FBC initiatives instituted over the “FBC era” from 1992 to 2001. This philosophy and the subsequent initiatives it gave rise to resonated with many of the underlying tenets of PA in terms of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Our findings provide evidence of audit tasks covering assessments of the initiatives summarised in  Appendix 2 and organised by their alignment with the three Es.

As part of the US' legislative branch's oversight of executive branch agencies, Congress received a semi-annual report from NASA's Office of Inspector General (NASA OIG, 1980). These reports included the many audit and oversight activities of the NASA OIG during the six-month period.

As an example of an IG report during the FBC era, NASA's OIG (1996) evaluated the effectiveness of NASA's oversight of its grants program, including findings from grants involving 6 NASA centres and 10 universities. Tasks included floor checks of grantees (e.g. on-site verification of facilities, equipment and deliverables to confirm that funded work was being carried out as described), interviewing personnel responsible for database management of grant information, and analysing financial and purchasing documents. Results were generally positive, with two main recommendations: better distinguishing between research and training grants (which have consequences for how they are managed) and having technical monitors better control grants through pre-award scrutiny and post-award evaluation.

Not all reports conveyed uniformly positive outcomes. In an effort to ensure that appropriated resources were used effectively and as directed, NASA's OIG (2000) conducted tests of controls over the processing of deobligations, which occurred when obligations on the books were removed due to revised or expired contracts. They found that 53% of their sample deobligation transactions lacked sufficient documentation, prompting a significant concern report to the Agency Internal Control Council and recommendations to clarify procedures and documentation requirements for recording deobligations.

Records indicate that audits were considerably diverse topically during the FBC era, including audits of Boeing's overhead allocations for a space station contract (NASA OIG, 1995), NASA's Moscow Liaison Office (NASA OIG, 1997) and NASA's assessment of Y2K date conversion issues (NASA OIG, 1998).

We explore below how NASA's FBC philosophy and management actions appeared to align closely with the PA principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, even if not explicitly framed in those terms.

These PA principles, while conceptually distinct, are operationally interdependent; enhancements in one area may either bolster or undermine performance in another. NASA's implementation of FBC underscores the necessity of viewing these criteria not as discrete metrics, but as dynamically interacting components within mission planning and execution. Indeed, the dimensions can overlap conceptually, as noted by the US Government Accountability Office's (GAO) guidance on considering the Es in PA: “These concepts may overlap. For example, efficiency may also be a component of effectiveness” (GAO, 2021, p. 5).

The agency's emphasis on Economy was reflected in its strategic efforts to curtail expenditures through the deployment of smaller spacecraft, the simplification of procurement processes and the integration of commercially available technologies. These initiatives sought to minimise resource inputs while preserving essential functionality and safety standards. Notably, missions such as Mars Pathfinder, NEAR and Deep Space 1 achieved success under constrained budgets. Conversely, the failures of MCO and MPL, attributed to reduced testing and oversight, illustrate the potential hazards of excessive cost containment.

Efficiency gains were pursued through the compression of development timelines and the adoption of modular design principles, enabling NASA to execute a greater number of missions within fixed budgetary parameters. The Mars Pathfinder mission serves as a paradigmatic example of how lean management and agile development can yield innovative outcomes. However, the acceleration of development cycles occasionally introduced technical vulnerabilities, revealing the trade-offs inherent in streamlining operational processes.

Effectiveness was evaluated based on the degree to which missions achieved their intended scientific and exploratory objectives. While several FBC missions generated significant scientific returns and advanced technological capabilities, others failed to meet their goals, thereby demonstrating that cost reduction and expedited timelines do not inherently ensure mission success. Effectiveness, in this context, is contingent upon the fulfilment of broader strategic aims, including mission continuity and scientific advancement.

Collectively, these findings reinforce a foundational principle of PA: the need to balance economy, efficiency and effectiveness rather than to privilege one at the expense of the others. NASA's experience with FBC exemplifies the importance of maintaining this equilibrium, ensuring that fiscal prudence and operational agility are aligned with the overarching imperatives of mission reliability and long-term strategic value.

A closer examination of NASA's FBC initiative reveals that, despite its rhetorical alignment with the language of PA, it cannot be categorically regarded as a system of PA. While FBC invoked themes commonly associated with PA, particularly efficiency, cost containment and enhanced mission outcomes, these similarities were largely superficial and, in important respects, incomplete in execution. PA, as established in the comparative public administration and accounting literature, is defined by a set of methodological and institutional requirements: formal evaluative criteria, explicit and measurable indicators, robust documentation and audit trails, and systematic, risk-based assessment procedures (Pollitt et al., 1999; Lonsdale et al., 2011). These elements constitute the epistemic and procedural infrastructure that enables PA to function as a credible mechanism of accountability, learning and control (Van Druenen and Keulen, 2026).

By contrast, FBC lacked this infrastructure in several fundamental respects. Studies evaluating FBC consistently highlight its informal evaluative culture (McCurdy, 2001), limited documentation (Sarsfield, 1998) and highly variable risk practices (Bearden, 2003), all of which diverge sharply from the methodological rigour expected of PA systems. Analyses of FBC's implementation show that the initiative relied heavily on managerial discretion and post-hoc interpretations of success, rather than on standardised performance criteria or measurable indicators (Hamaker, 1999). Research on FBC's risk posture further demonstrates that risk assessment processes were inconsistent and often subordinated to the programme's cultural emphasis on speed and cost reduction (Paxton, 2007). Evaluations underscore how FBC's lack of structured evaluative mechanisms contributed to divergent perceptions of mission failures and organisational learning deficits (McCurdy, 2001).

In particular, four principal barriers prevented FBC from approximating a genuine PA regime. Firstly, the initiative did not establish formalised audit criteria capable of guiding consistent evaluative judgments. FBC articulated aspirational goals, accelerated development cycles, reduced costs and improved mission performance, but (arguably) these remained at the level of aspirational managerial rhetoric rather than being operationalised into standardised benchmarks. Without such criteria, evaluative judgments were inherently discretionary, undermining the comparability and objectivity that PA requires. We must note, importantly, that assessments from NASA OIG, such as those presented earlier, were generally reactive in nature rather than the proactive approach normally expected in systemic PA regimes. In addition, McCurdy (2001) indicates that accountability became so decentralised that traditional checks and balances could be circumvented more easily. A NASA task force report (Young et al., 2000) echoes this sentiment of eroded checks and balances, suggesting that this occurred due to the expectation of aggressively achieving goals related to cost efficiencies and faster mission cadences. Also, NASA's Independent Verification and Validation (IVandV) facility (for software) and external contract audits existed, but these were limited in scope and primarily concerned with contractual compliance, cost control or technical verification (see McCurdy, 2001; NASA, 2000a).

The substance of NASA OIG reports, such as the “floor checks” at grantee facilities, contains routine internal oversight mechanisms rather than the independent evaluations expected of PA. They did not provide the broader, system-level evaluative scrutiny characteristic of PA, nor did they carry the signalling function of an external assurance body. Thus, many of NASA's assessment activities, such as contract audits and procurement checks, likely served as internal or quasi-internal control mechanisms rather than independent performance audits. This lack of PA extends to reports from the government's legislative branch investigative agency, the GAO, which is arguably more independent than the NASA OIG. Their reports focused more narrowly on NASA's contract management and procurement operations (GAO, 1999). Building on the 1999 analysis, the 2001 report (GAO, 2001) prioritised benchmarking and cost considerations while offering only limited engagement with the FBC framework. It stopped short of a substantive PA assessment, noting simply that NASA's goals and evaluations did not address the effectiveness of FBC implementation.

Secondly, FBC failed to develop or apply measurable performance indicators systematically. PA depends on quantifiable metrics that allow auditors to assess performance across programmes and over time. FBC, however, relied heavily on qualitative assessments and retrospective narratives of success or failure (Bearden, 2003). This absence of stable indicators meant that performance could not be reliably tracked, let alone audited. Studies of FBC projects repeatedly note the difficulty of comparing outcomes across missions due to inconsistent measurement practices (Hamaker, 1999; McCurdy, 2001).

Thirdly, the initiative lacked the documentation and audit trails necessary for independent verification. PA systems rely on rigorous record-keeping to ensure transparency, replicability and accountability. FBC's documentation practices were uneven and often subordinated to managerial discretion, leaving limited scope for external scrutiny. The resulting opacity made it difficult to reconstruct decision processes or evaluate whether claimed efficiencies were achieved through genuine improvements or through risk-laden shortcuts. Engineering management assessments of FBC emphasise the variability and incompleteness of project documentation (Hamaker, 1999).

Fourthly, FBC did not incorporate an institutionalised, risk-based assessment framework, a core feature of PA. Risk analysis in PA is not incidental; it structures the scope, depth and frequency of audits (Lonsdale et al., 2011). Under FBC, risk considerations were applied ad hoc and inconsistently, frequently overshadowed by the initiative's cultural emphasis on speed and cost reduction (McCurdy, 2001). Research on NASA's risk management under FBC shows that this lack of systematic risk assessment contributed to mission failures and organisational instability (Paxton, 2007).

Taken together, these barriers demonstrate that FBC's resemblance to PA was often rhetorical rather than substantive. The initiative promoted a discourse of efficiency and discipline but did not embed the methodological rigour or institutional architecture that define PA as a governance mechanism. In this sense, FBC exemplifies a broader pattern in public sector reform in which managerial innovations adopt the language of audit and accountability without incorporating the procedural safeguards that make such systems effective. The result is a form of “audit-lite” governance – symbolically resonant but operationally thin – whose limitations become most visible when organisational pressures intensify or when failures occur.

As articulated in the preceding subsection, NASA's FBC philosophy may be construed as a practical albeit selective expression of PA logics. Through its emphasis on economy, efficiency and effectiveness, FBC noted that deliberate resource allocation, procedural efficiency and outcome-oriented effectiveness should serve as integral determinants of mission performance. In addition, the FBC philosophy's emphasis on the three Es, if executed correctly, should foster adaptive capabilities within NASA's operational frameworks, thereby contributing to the development of organisational resilience in the face of shifting constraints and technological uncertainties. Consistent with the perspective we have adopted in viewing resilience as an organisation's capacity to foresee potential threats, effectively manage adverse events, and dynamically adapt and adjust to evolving circumstances, we present in Table 1 key instances in which specific FBC adaptive capabilities contributed to NASA fostering resilience throughout the agency.

Table 1 underscores NASA's engagement with the FBC philosophy as indicative of resilience conceived within a complex adaptive framework. This resilience emerges as a downstream result of efforts that adhere to both intentional design choices, strategic collaborative mechanisms and a continuously evolving organisational ethos, each contributing to the emergence of a resilient organisational ethos marked by gradual evolution and the collective development of adaptive capacity. We also note where the attempts to enhance resilience did not live up to their full potential due to the FBC era's divergence from PA practices.

At the core of this resilience was a commitment to stronger risk management, where enhanced testing, validation and oversight procedures were implemented to proactively identify threats and embed safeguards into mission architectures (Paxton, 2007). This recalibration of risk protocols may have helped lay the groundwork for greater operational stability over time, but its success was limited due to the lack of evaluative criteria and robust audit trails (Hamaker, 1999). Resilience was further reinforced by strategic flexibility, which allowed NASA to pivot between high-risk exploratory missions and lower-risk, data-driven initiatives. This diversification ensured a maintained scientific yield while insulating the organisation against widespread disruption (Eaton et al., 2022). This adaptive capability was limited by FBC's lack of an institutionalised, risk-based assessment framework (Paxton, 2007). Flexibility extended to governance mechanisms that enabled dynamic resource reallocation in response to evolving mission demands. To sustain resilience under fiscal constraints, NASA embraced balanced cost efficiency, shifting from indiscriminate budget cuts to strategic simplification of mission design. This enabled the agency to maintain quality and performance without compromising feasibility, demonstrating that resource efficiency can coexist with innovation and reliability (Ward, 2010), but overall, FBC objectives were undercut by too much focus on short-term efficiency demands (Paxton, 2007).

The strategic use of public–private partnerships further supported organisational resilience. By collaborating with private-sector actors such as Raytheon STX and Swales Aerospace, NASA gained access to agile technologies and operational models, strengthening its capacity to innovate under external pressures while preserving core standards (Dumas and Walton, 2000).

NASA's focus on technology and sustainability attempted to embed resilience. Developing modular, adaptable technologies and endeavouring to institutionalise sustainable practices laid a foundation for long-term flexibility across mission cycles (NASA, 2000a). Technological advancement enhances resilience by increasing organisational adaptability, improving responses to failures, redesigning systems and learning from experiences. In space exploration, technology is more than an operational tool; it is a resilience resource for recovery, redundancy and innovation after disruptions. Sustainability ensures the ongoing viability of practices, resources and risk management, encompassing environmental concerns and the long-term sustainability of processes, skills and oversight. However, short-term efficiency priorities, like those observed during the FBC era, undermined resilience by sacrificing the capabilities for sustainability.

Central to NASA's resilient posture was its enhanced response agility in developing the ability to respond to perturbations while maintaining overall coherence and stability. Investments in extensible mission systems, coupled with cultural shifts towards responsive governance, allowed the organisation to dynamically reorient when confronted with uncertainty (Woods, 2018). These efforts would have been even more successful with a more formal evaluative culture (McCurdy, 2001).

Finally, the “anchor” of organisational resilience lay in organisational learning. NASA's institutional openness to post-failure reflection, codified learning protocols and iterative knowledge sharing fostered a resilient culture (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). Insights from failures were transformed into design improvements and governance reforms (Huber, 1991), demonstrating how adaptive learning mechanisms can convert setbacks into strategic advantage (Ward, 2010, 2012).

The examples outlined in Table 1 lend support to the claim that the FBC philosophy underpinned resilience development and was less a serendipitous outcome and more the product of purposeful, adaptive mechanisms that emerged from a convergence of strategic foresight, institutional adaptation and continuous learning. However, resilience gains were not as robust as what was possible when the agency did not formalise techniques that would aid in realising entrenched resilience gains. Nevertheless, evidence indicated some efforts to embed responsive frameworks across risk, technology, partnerships and governance. In those instances, NASA, through FBC, not only recovered from setbacks but transformed them into catalysts for innovation.

While FBC achieved early successes by lowering costs and expediting mission timelines, its operationalisation also introduced a series of trade-offs that arguably became increasingly difficult to manage. In particular, the way PA-inspired principles were implemented within FBC generated heightened technical vulnerabilities and insufficient programmatic oversight (Eaton et al., 2022). These vulnerabilities were not inherent to PA concepts themselves; rather, they likely emerged because PA logics were applied without adequate compensatory governance mechanisms in a highly complex engineering environment.

NASA ultimately discontinued FBC in response to a succession of high-profile mission failures (Johnson, 2008) and escalating concerns regarding reliability and risk management (McCurdy, 2001). The consecutive failures of the MCO and MPL in 1999 underscored fundamental deficiencies in the way FBC practices were implemented, as both missions were lost due to preventable engineering and communication errors (Launius and McCurdy, 2007). These incidents prompted a reassessment of the agency's operational framework towards more cautious, risk-averse engineering methodologies (Jones, 2015).

Although the FBC philosophy championed project effectiveness and operational efficiency, its implementation in practice sometimes displaced or weakened the institutional mechanisms that traditionally safeguarded quality and safety. This is the sense in which FBC – and, by extension, the PA logics embedded within it – could compromise essential quality and safety standards (Dillon and Madsen, 2001). The issue, therefore, was not that PA is inherently incompatible with such standards, but that the specific configuration adopted by NASA at that time may have lacked the technical discipline, oversight capacity and domain-specific safeguards needed to balance efficiency with resilience.

NASA's subsequent shift towards a more balanced framework reflected an effort to retain the innovative aspirations of FBC while reinstating rigorous technical discipline and program integrity (Casler, 2014). These developments not only marked the end of the FBC era but also catalysed broader institutional reflection on the role of adaptability in complex project environments (Chaplain, 2006). The implications of this shift for NASA's organisational resilience will be examined more fully in the ensuing section.

Our findings suggest two key insights. Firstly, FBC reflects a tension between alignment and non-alignment with PA, shaping its ability to achieve strategic objectives. Secondly, its selective mobilisation of PA principles contributed to organisational resilience by enhancing judgement, procedural clarity and awareness of trade-offs, but lacked the independent, rigorous evaluative structures central to PA. This partial adoption generated vulnerabilities that at times constrained resilience. Sections 5.1–5.3 examine implications for PA, organisational resilience and public sector practice.

Our findings highlight a central tension in how NASA's FBC management philosophy might be viewed through the lens of PA: while the initiative aligns with PA principles, it also departs from PA in several fundamental respects. Table 2 presents a comparative assessment of this tension.

Many of the actions documented in the FBC era that helped achieve what the literature would consider PA outcomes do not make FBC PA itself. For example, practices in the FBC era of management providing clear communication of strategies and including leadership involvement to help achieve the three Es are considered more outputs from management responsibilities and have more relations with management control systems, despite aiding in producing institutional PA outcomes. Also, audits with limited scopes, such as contractual compliance and technical verifications (see McCurdy, 2001; NASA, 2000a), are indeed considered audit-like techniques, but they lack the consistent, holistic external and independent attributes that PA scholars consider necessary for PA regimes to be present and effective.

Therefore, on one hand, FBC's emphasis on efficiency, cost discipline and mission outcomes resonates with the core concerns of PA and appears, at least rhetorically, to embody the logic of audit-driven performance improvement. On the other hand, the initiative's methodological looseness, absence of formal evaluative structures and inconsistent risk practices place it at odds with the institutional architecture that defines PA as a systematic governance mechanism.

The findings presented above, therefore, invite a more nuanced interpretation of how FBC relates to PA, not as a straightforward instance of audit-based reform (to be clear, NASA management never claimed FBC was PA), but as a hybrid configuration that mirrors certain audit ideals while lacking the procedural foundations necessary for genuine audit equivalence. This duality is analytically significant because it highlights a decoupling between FBC's performative audit discourse and the substantive mechanisms that constitute the conditions under which performance-oriented reforms can meaningfully approximate the discipline of PA.

At the same time, this analysis enables us to extend prevailing understandings of what “counts” as PA. Much of the PA literature focuses on formal audits characterised by explicit criteria, documented processes and institutionalised independence. Yet our findings suggest that PA principles can also be embedded informally, through cultural norms, managerial expectations and operational routines that shape behaviour in audit-like ways even in the absence of formal audit structures. In this sense, FBC demonstrates that audit functions may emerge diffusely within organisational practice, not solely through codified audit procedures but through the implicit adoption of evaluative logics that discipline decision-making and orient actors towards performance concerns.

Recognising these informal, culturally embedded manifestations of PA broadens the theoretical boundaries of the field. It suggests that PA should not be conceptualised exclusively as a formal institutional apparatus, but also as a set of governing rationalities that can be mobilised selectively, unevenly and sometimes unintentionally, within organisational systems. This reconceptualisation offers a meaningful contribution to PA scholarship by illuminating how audit-like oversight can arise in hybrid or non-audit settings, and by highlighting the conditions under which such informal audit logics strengthen or, as in the case of FBC, sometimes undermine organisational outcomes.

In sum, our argument is not that FBC was PA, but that examining FBC through the conceptual lens of PA concepts reveals important lessons about governance, accountability and organisational resilience. For space agencies and other high-risk public organisations, the analysis underscores the dangers of embracing audit-style efficiency pressures without embedding the corresponding evaluative and oversight mechanisms that ensure such pressures enhance, rather than erode, organisational robustness.

This study's findings also provide insights into how organisational learning was a significant factor in NASA building organisational resilience in the FBC era, despite NASA's efforts being considered a selective use of PA logics. The literature indicates the importance of organisational learning in entities bouncing forward after adversity (Barbera et al., 2020; Bartuseviciene et al., 2024). The resilience literature, however, did not begin to focus on bouncing forward as a major component of organisational resilience until after the FBC era (see Boin et al., 2010; Shaw, 2012). Yet NASA's organisational learning in the 1990s and early 2000s reflects attempts to bounce forward before the literature began focusing in earnest on this concept.

During the FBC era, NASA focused its organisational learning on matters related to the “faster, better, cheaper” mantra. This manifested in a couple of ways. The increased mission frequency and simpler mission designs enabled shorter learning cycles, enhancing NASA personnel's experiences that could be utilised within the timeframes of their careers. This was not always possible to use effectively within the space agency historically due to very lengthy mission times. Because of this new mission cadence, mission successes provided confidence and knowledge, and mission failures also offered learning opportunities that could be quickly applied to the near-term mission pipeline. This faster adaptability enabled NASA to be better prepared for changes in its operating environment and in managing adverse events. Thus, the increased mission cadence enhanced organisational resilience (Paxton, 2007).

The FBC mantra also resulted in a number of formal documents dedicated to organisational learning. For example, at the beginning of the FBC era in 1992, a six-month study focused on improving project program management to be more timely, cost-efficient and less technically risky. This study led to the identification of factors for NASA to focus on to achieve these objectives, such as funding volatility, misused cost estimates, mission creep on projects and a lack of cost discipline with agency acquisitions. The end result was the development and clarification of project management policy outputs that helped achieve priorities under the FBC philosophy (National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA, 2026).

In another example, following the failed MCO mission in 1999, NASA formed the Mishap Investigation Board to identify the cause and recommend improvements. The MCO, intended as Mars' first weather satellite and a communications relay for the upcoming MPL, lost its signal due to a software error – imperial units were used instead of metric, causing propulsion miscalculations. The Board urged stricter unit verification, software audits and contingency planning. Despite lessons from MCO, the MPL also failed due to its touchdown sensor activating prematurely (NASA, 1999). The subsequent investigation covered system-wide issues and failure modes, offering targeted recommendations for the 2001 Lander mission. Although that mission was cancelled, the lander was later used for the successful 2008 Phoenix mission, incorporating improvements from earlier failures. These cases demonstrate NASA's evolving ability to learn from setbacks and enhance organisational resilience.

Although the FBC approach contained deficiencies as previously discussed, evidence suggests that reactions to the philosophy's associated setbacks helped foster NASA's capacity to absorb shocks, adapt to change and continue functioning effectively under uncertainty through reflective learning and adaptive reform. This informed NASA's post-FBC learning approach and a propensity to build a knowledge base that helped them respond more effectively to future disruptions in at least four ways.

Firstly, the agency's renewed emphasis on systems engineering and technical oversight created structural buffers against future failures. These mechanisms improved NASA's ability to detect early warning signs, manage complexity and maintain mission integrity under pressure (Robins, 2007). By embedding redundancy and cross-checks into project lifecycles, NASA increased its capacity to respond to unforeseen challenges without experiencing widespread failures (Hamaker, 1999).

Secondly, the cultural shift towards psychological safety and reflective practice in effect reframed failure as a learning opportunity by enhancing the organisation's adaptive capacity. As Johnson (2008) notes, this cultural evolution enabled teams to identify problems earlier, share lessons more openly and refine processes more effectively. These are hallmarks of resilient organisations, which thrive not by avoiding failure altogether but by learning and evolving through it (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007).

Thirdly, the institutionalisation of knowledge management was demonstrated through the establishment of the Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS) in the mid-1990s. The LLIS was a centralised, searchable repository designed to systematically capture, curate and disseminate experiential knowledge derived from NASA's missions, projects and agency-wide operations (NASA, 2025b), contributing to resilience by preserving organisational memory. This allowed NASA to avoid repeating past mistakes and to transfer critical insights across projects and generations of personnel (MacCormack, 2004). This evolution in organisational practice corresponds to what the resilience literature defines as adaptive capacity – the ability to reconfigure resources and strategies in response to shifting environmental demands (Lengnick-Hall et al., 2011).

Finally, lessons from the FBC experience instilled a more balanced approach to innovation and risk, enabling NASA to pursue ambitious goals while maintaining operational stability. Maintaining equilibrium between exploratory and exploitative activities constitutes a core principle underpinning resilient performance in high-reliability organisations (Hollnagel et al., 2006). Together, these post-FBC adaptations reflect a critical evolution in NASA's organisational mindset – one that viewed failure not as a setback, but as a springboard for system-wide improvement. In so doing, NASA transformed adversity into a foundation for sustained resilience by institutionalising learning as an integral component of its organisational processes.

The analysis of NASA's FBC experience yields several lessons directly relevant to other public sector entities operating under similar pressures of fiscal constraint, political scrutiny and technological risk, particularly space agencies. These lessons are derived from the conclusion that although NASA indeed enhanced resilience during the FBC era through some of its actions and reactions as discussed previously, that analysis alone would not capture the complete resilience picture. The setbacks analysed in this study signalled a pattern of deficient procedures and their operationalisation, culminating in consequences of what we suggest is the selective implementation of PA logics, whose incompleteness resulted in quality and safety compromises (Dillon and Madsen, 2001).

Firstly, the findings underscore the importance of recognising the difference between invoking PA principles and institutionalising them. Agencies may be tempted to adopt the language of efficiency, discipline and accountability without embedding the evaluative structures that make such commitments operationally meaningful. The FBC case demonstrates that this form of rhetorical adoption, absent formal criteria, documentation and independent oversight, can generate organisational brittleness rather than resilience.

Secondly, the study highlights the value of maintaining balance across the classic PA triad of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Space agencies facing pressure to accelerate delivery or reduce costs may inadvertently privilege one dimension at the expense of others, thereby undermining mission reliability and long-term capability. FBC illustrates how over-emphasising speed and cost control, without corresponding attention to evaluative robustness, can erode organisational learning and risk management capacity.

Thirdly, the findings suggest that PA principles can be embedded informally through cultural norms, managerial expectations and operational routines, even in the absence of formal audit structures. This expands the conceptual boundaries of what may “count” as PA and offers agencies a broader repertoire of governance tools. However, the FBC case also shows that informal audit logics must be complemented by institutional safeguards if they are to enhance rather than weaken organisational resilience. Agencies that have established such informal and cultural norms are unlikely to need to “start from scratch” when considering more robust, formally evaluative techniques that the PA literature deems essential for ensuring successful PA outcomes.

This study's findings have several implications for practitioners in public sector organisations, particularly those operating in high-risk, technologically complex and resource-constrained environments such as in space agencies. Firstly, the study's analysis demonstrates the importance of recognising and managing the informal dimensions of governance. The FBC case illustrates that managerial philosophies, cultural expectations and operational norms can generate audit-like effects even in the absence of formal oversight mechanisms. For practitioners, this underscores the need to attend to the cultural and behavioural foundations of performance management. Formal systems alone are insufficient; organisational leaders must also cultivate cultures that reinforce clarity of purpose, shared expectations and disciplined decision-making.

Secondly, the study highlights the value of integrating informal and formal accountability mechanisms. While FBC's informal oversight contributed to agility and innovation, its lack of formalised evaluative structures ultimately limited its sustainability. Practitioners should therefore seek to balance flexibility with structured review processes. This may involve embedding lightweight evaluative checkpoints, establishing clear performance criteria or developing hybrid oversight models that preserve adaptability while ensuring adequate risk management and organisational learning.

Thirdly, the findings have implications for the design and implementation of managerial reforms. The FBC experience demonstrates that reform philosophies can have far-reaching effects on organisational behaviour, shaping not only technical processes but also cultural norms and expectations. Practitioners should therefore approach reform initiatives with an awareness of their potential to create both intended and unintended consequences. Reform strategies should be accompanied by mechanisms for monitoring cultural shifts, assessing behavioural impacts and adjusting managerial expectations as conditions evolve.

Fourthly, the study offers insights for practitioners concerned with organisational resilience. The analysis shows that resilience is not solely a function of technical redundancy or formal risk protocols; it is also shaped by governance choices, managerial orientations and cultural dynamics. Practitioners should therefore consider resilience as a multidimensional construct that requires attention to organisational culture, learning processes and adaptive capacity. This may involve fostering environments that encourage experimentation, support decentralised decision-making and institutionalise learning from failure.

Finally, the findings suggest that public sector organisations should adopt a more holistic approach to performance governance. Rather than relying exclusively on formal audits or managerial discretion, organisations may benefit from integrated systems that combine cultural reinforcement, managerial philosophy and structured oversight. Such an approach can enhance both performance and resilience, particularly in contexts characterised by uncertainty, complexity and political scrutiny.

This study set out to examine the ways in which NASA's FBC management philosophy might be regarded as a form of PA, and to the extent to which it might have contributed to organisational resilience. Our analysis has demonstrated that FBC functioned not merely as a managerial reform initiative but as an informal, imperfect, culturally embedded mechanism of performance oversight. In doing so, the research has advanced theoretical debates in multiple fields and provided a more nuanced interpretation of the FBC era than is commonly presented in existing scholarship.

Our study makes five contributions to PA, organisational resilience and accountability research. The first major contribution lies in the study's conceptual integration of FBC and PA. These two domains have traditionally been treated as analytically distinct: FBC is typically examined within the context of engineering management, innovation studies and project execution, whereas PA is situated within public administration, accountability theory and governance research. By bringing these literatures into dialogue, the study has shown that FBC embodied many of the evaluative principles associated with PA, particularly economy, efficiency and effectiveness, even though it lacked the formal structures, explicit criteria and institutionalised procedures that characterise conventional audit practice. This finding challenges the prevailing assumption that PA concepts are necessarily operationalised as formal, institutionalised and procedurally codified. Instead, the analysis demonstrates that audit-like functions can emerge informally through managerial expectations, cultural norms and operational routines. This insight expands the conceptual boundaries of PA and contributes to emerging scholarship on “soft” controls, behavioural governance and the role of organisational culture in shaping performance and accountability.

A second contribution concerns the theoretical development of PA as a construct. Our study argues that PA should not be understood solely as a formal evaluative mechanism but also as a set of practices and expectations that can be embedded within organisational life. The FBC case illustrates how managerial philosophies can generate audit-like effects by shaping behaviour, influencing decision-making and establishing implicit performance criteria. This reconceptualisation has implications for how PA is theorised in accounting research. It suggests that research investigating PA should attend not only to formal audit institutions but also to the informal, culturally mediated processes through which performance is monitored, assessed and reinforced. This broader conceptualisation opens new avenues for research on the interplay between formal and informal accountability mechanisms in public organisations.

The third major contribution of the study lies in its analysis of organisational resilience. While resilience scholarship has traditionally focused on technical systems, redundancy, risk management protocols and crisis response, this study demonstrates that managerial philosophies can also play a significant role in shaping an organisation's adaptive capacity. FBC fostered agility, resourcefulness and learning, qualities that enhanced NASA's ability to operate under conditions of uncertainty and constraint. The FBC philosophy encouraged experimentation, decentralised decision-making and post-failure learning, all of which contributed to resilience. At the same time, the absence of formal oversight mechanisms and the reliance on informal cultural expectations created vulnerabilities that ultimately undermined the approach's sustainability. This duality underscores the complex relationship between innovation, oversight and resilience. It also highlights the importance of examining how governance choices and managerial orientations influence organisational capacity to adapt, recover and learn.

A fourth contribution concerns the historical interpretation of the FBC era. Much of the existing literature presents FBC in binary terms: either as a bold and successful innovation that enabled NASA to achieve unprecedented efficiencies, or as a flawed cost-reduction strategy that contributed to mission failures. This study offers a more balanced and conceptually grounded interpretation. It demonstrates that FBC simultaneously aligned with PA principles, diverged from formal auditability and influenced organisational resilience in complex and sometimes contradictory ways. This multidimensional perspective enriches historical understandings of the FBC period and provides a more analytically rigorous account of its organisational effects.

Finally, this study offers a conceptual basis that can be applied to future studies of public sector innovation, performance governance and organisational learning. By articulating the relationships between managerial philosophy, informal accountability mechanisms and resilience, the study provides a foundation for analysing other reform initiatives that blend innovation with performance oversight. This frame of reference has potential applicability beyond NASA, particularly in public organisations that operate under conditions of resource constraint, political scrutiny and technological complexity.

As with qualitative archival and retrospective studies, this research faces limitations such as incomplete data, interpretive subjectivity and historical bias. Findings may reflect researcher and source biases and lack comprehensive perspectives, particularly without access to internal audits or interviews.

Despite these limitations, however, this study's findings open several avenues for future research and present lessons in addressing contemporary challenges by learning from past successes and failures, helping contextualise current events and offering perspectives on how historical trends influence present-day decisions. Further empirical work could examine informal audit-like mechanisms across public organisations, comparing contexts to identify when such oversight is effective. Research should also explore how PA principles are embedded through organisational culture, including the roles of leadership and norms. The link between managerial philosophy and organisational resilience warrants deeper, especially longitudinal, analysis. Finally, methodological innovation, such as ethnographic and behavioural approaches, could better capture the informal dynamics of governance often missed by traditional audit research.