This paper examines why disaster risk management (DRM) capacity remains difficult to sustain in Lebanon despite repeated crises and proposes an institutional model capable of strengthening preparedness within the constraints of the country's confessional political economy.
The study employs an exploratory qualitative design combining document analysis with semi-structured elite interviews. Nine senior practitioners from central government, local government, civil society and emergency services were interviewed across three rounds conducted between December 2024 and April 2026. The analysis examined experiences from the 2020 Beirut Port explosion, the 2023–2024 Lebanon–Israel conflict and the ongoing 2026 war. Findings were developed through an inductive and abductive process informed by hybrid governance theory and Lebanese public utility law.
The study finds that recurring weaknesses in Lebanon's DRM system stem from institutional discontinuity. No standing organisation possesses the authority, resources or permanence required to sustain preparedness functions between crises. Preparedness receives limited political attention because confessional incentives favour visible response activities. While institutional learning occurs, it remains largely person-dependent and is rarely embedded within durable structures. The findings support the creation of a hybrid autonomous preparedness institution insulated from confessional capture and supported by international equity participation.
The paper introduces institutional discontinuity as a mechanism explaining DRM challenges in fragile states and proposes a replicable institutional template for patronage-based and confessional systems facing similar preparedness deficits.
