This book gives an account of the process leading up to the revision of the International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs), one of the four treaties administered by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). It covers the events leading to the non-signature of the treaty by a significant number of states, outlines possible consequences of that split between states and offers possible ways forward. As such, it is aimed at those dealing with international telecommunication policy and historical researchers.
It is important at the outset to provide the context for this book. It and the many other similar versions in articles and presentations by the author over the past year are, as other reviewers note, a kind of penance that he is performing for his role over a ten-year period to bring about the 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT-12) conference that the book covers. The author worked closely with the ITU Secretary-General and Russian representatives to bring about and shape the conference to craft a new treaty for all telecommunications and impose new regulatory norms. The book provides Mr. Hill's views on how and why the conference occurred, and on the benefits he and some supporters perceive. He also attempts to answer detractors. Much of this material was developed prior to and during the conference and subsequently refined in the chapters of the book.
The facts, however, are somewhat different from the rendition in the book. The new norms being created are both contained in the treaty, and look to ITU bodies going forward to produce a potentially unending stream of provisions – a key point ignored in the book. In fact, China in ITU-T meetings in the months following the WCIT-12 has reminded participants that the new texts being legislated are normative pursuant to the treaty. Most nations rejected the treaty. They refused to sign and walked out. Only three major telecommunication nations were among the signatories – China, Russia and South Korea. The result was, by any measure, the greatest failure in modern international telecommunication law, and during the months following the conference, participation in the ITU-T has dramatically declined so that largely it is a forum comprising China, South Korea and Russia. For that reason alone, the conference is noteworthy, and the author’s description of how it came about is significant historically.
I do have some appreciation for this work since, 25 years ago, I was the counsellor to the ITU Secretary-General who brought about the previous WCIT, and helped him write the provisions together with interested nations – primarily in the West. I was the Richard Hill of the 1988 WCIT. With one small exception, that treaty instrument was also a total failure even though it was signed by all the countries involved. The result was largely expected as the need for the provisions disappeared.
The exception in the 1988 provisions was the recognition of “alternative arrangements” in the provisioning of international services. It became in a sense, the global regulatory paradigm in the 1990s and beyond as national administrations withdrew from provisioning telecommunication services, and the private sector and the marketplace took over. With the exception of radio spectrum management, the ITU itself became irrelevant as a meeting place for Ministries of Posts and Telecommunication that disappeared.
Now, returning to the book and its analysis and conclusions, the author is accurate in his observations that many Western countries focused entirely on “the Internet” in their approaches to the conference, and much of the press coverage and political commentary was little more than rhetoric – much of which was patently inaccurate. The effects of the treaty were hardly limited to the Internet, as mobile communications were also impacted, and the mobile industry was equally strongly opposed to the provisions. It is worth noting, however, that there was disingenuous rhetoric on both sides of the debate over this conference, as well as rewriting of historical facts.
The analysis of the treaty provisions are, well, the author’s justifications for what occurred. From my perspective, his view on ITU history, and on the 1988 conference in particular, seem contorted to fit his justification for WCIT-12. But it is the book’s “conclusions and implications for national legislators and regulators” that are perhaps the most interesting aspect of the book. In seeking vindication in the future, the author asserts that “a persistent refusal by many countries to be bound by the 2012 ITRs might have undesirable consequences”. What he offers as reasons, however, are rather revisionist justifications, such as the “lack of treaty-level agreement regarding cooperation with respect to network security issues in effect favors the current practices of unilateral surveillance such as the USA Prism program…, and in effect makes it more difficult to combat spam, to control international roaming prices, and to mitigate e-waste. And lack of treaty-level agreement may make it more difficult for smaller countries (and their operators) to negotiate equitable financial arrangements”. These seem rather dubious assertions at best, and the rather obvious counterarguments are that such provisions would make it considerably more difficult to achieve these objectives because the technical talent and providers to pursue them no longer exist in the ITU but in numerous industry bodies populated by the providers and vendors.
Indeed, the primary motivation for WCIT-12, as seen by many analysts, was simply to assist in finding new ways to justify much of the ITU’s existence outside its radio domain –20 years after all the national administration telecommunication service providers had gone out of business, and their principal international meeting place at the ITU became irrelevant. This attempt at ITU life support seems not to have worked.
