The purpose of this study is to present a conceptual model investigating the moderating role of individuals’ ethical positions (idealism and relativism) in the relationship between dependence on artificial intelligence (AI) for decisions and moral disengagement.
Theoretical explanations and logical connections among the variables are developed within a propositional framework by integrating conservation of resources theory, social cognitive theory and ethics position theory, informed by research on algorithmic decision-making and moral disengagement.
This study proposes that dependence on AI for decisions is positively associated with moral disengagement. Idealism is expected to weaken this relationship, whereas relativism is expected to strengthen it where organisational performance demands favour accepting AI recommendations despite foreseeable stakeholder harm. The model concerns employees who retain meaningful discretion over AI-supported decisions.
Organisations should provide meaningful opportunities to question and escalate AI recommendations and examine whether performance expectations discourage ethical review. Training should address stakeholder harm and responsibility-displacing rationalisations.
This study distinguishes dependence on AI for decisions from general AI usage and restrictions on employee autonomy. It develops an explanation of how such dependence may facilitate moral disengagement and identifies idealism and relativism as distinct boundary conditions, specifying the context of the proposed strengthening effect of relativism.
