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Purpose

This study aims to examine the antecedents and consequences of a cooperative norm in exporter‐importer relationships. Moreover, it seeks to investigates the impact of the past economic performance of the venture on the effectiveness of interfirm cooperation.

Design/methodology/approach

A survey was conducted among a sample of French exporters. Data on 283 exporter‐importer relationships were analyzed using structural equations modeling.

Findings

Trust and continuity expectations foster the development of a cooperative norm, which in turn enhances importers' distributive performance. The study also shows that the effectiveness of cooperation increases in a low‐performance context.

Practical implications

Exporters can improve the performance of their cross‐border business relationships by fostering the development of behavioral norms. The findings suggest that a norm of cooperation helps coordinate partners' behaviors in an international exchange. The effectiveness of such a norm increases in bad times, which supports the notion that cooperation can be viewed as a tool to turn around failing export ventures.

Originality/value

Unlike previous studies on exporter‐importer relationships, this study conceptualizes and operationalizes cooperation as a behavioral norm. This new conceptualization of cooperation makes it possible to assess its influence on the importer's distributive performance, which conditions the success of the export venture. Another distinguishing feature of this study is that it evaluates the effect of past performance on the effectiveness of cooperation. It is shown that cooperation can be used to improve failing business relationships. Thus, cooperation can be an alternative to costly formal governance mechanisms and time‐consuming searches for new foreign representatives to replace terminated ventures.

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