This paper aims to explore how using non-standardized relational interfaces in traditional public procurement of professional services leads to relational frictions among actors. It also examines coping strategies and how these frictions are distributed.
This paper conducted a nested case study of a public organization in a developing country, analyzing three public procurement cases. These cases illustrate efforts to procure research services interactively within a standardized procurement system. The study involved in-depth interviews with informants within the public organization and key suppliers from each project, as well as analyzing relevant documents.
The study explains how relational frictions arise from shifts in relational interfaces and manifest as misalignments in activity links, disruptions in resource ties and tensions in actor bonds within a system accustomed to standardized exchanges. The findings also highlight how actors use coping activities and how relational frictions spread directly and indirectly to other relational interfaces.
This research helps public organizations understand the emergence of frictions as challenges in adopting innovative approaches within traditional procurement systems. It offers strategies to manage these frictions and enhance value creation.
This research introduces relational friction at the actor level, conceptualizes its emergence and distribution due to changes in established relational interfaces, and examines coping activities for its management.
Introduction
High annual spending on public procurement has attracted significant attention for its strategic use to achieve different public values (Grandia and Meehan, 2017). Public procurement has traditionally prioritized efficiency and cost control. However, modern practices seek to achieve a wider range of value-driven outcomes, including fostering innovation (Malacina et al., 2022; Melander and Arvidsson, 2020). Despite many successful examples of achieving innovation using public procurement (Kundu et al., 2020), some research suggests that efforts to implement novel public procurement practices for value-based outcomes may struggle to transcend traditional cost-focused results (Meehan et al., 2017). These complexities arise from specific aspects of public procurement, such as a predominant focus on cost (Malacina et al., 2022), excessive bureaucracy (Neumann et al., 2019) and a lack of stakeholder engagement (Cabral et al., 2019). Therefore, using a complex and traditional system such as public procurement as an innovation tool may create certain values while potentially undermining others.
This challenge arises from the inherent characteristics of public procurement systems. Public procurement systems are generally designed to facilitate standardized exchanges between public organizations and suppliers (Axelsson and Torvatn, 2017; Håkansson and Axelsson, 2020). This standardized approach is traditionally promoted to uphold key values such as equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency (Malacina et al., 2022). However, prioritizing standardization can restrict interactions and hinder innovation (Axelsson and Torvatn, 2017; Torvatn and de Boer, 2017), particularly in the procurement of professional services, where subjective relationships between buyers and suppliers play a crucial role (D’Antone and Santos, 2016; Pemer and Skjolsvik, 2015). Thus, fostering innovation through public procurement requires understanding how public organizations enable interaction within this structured framework and the resulting implications.
The Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) community has explored interactions in public procurement, presenting two different viewpoints based on the concept of interfaces. Drawing on Araujo et al. (1999), they use the concept of relational interfaces (i.e. standardized, specified, translational and interactive) based on the resources exchanged in public buyer and supplier relationships. One perspective suggests that public procurement does not inherently support innovation and is only effective for standardized interfaces, as these allow all transactions to be managed within a single contract (Håkansson and Axelsson, 2020). This view holds that public procurement regulations are based on a traditional free-market philosophy and may hinder innovation by requiring competitive tendering too early in the development process (Waluszewski and Wagrell, 2013). In contrast, other perspective suggests that increasing interactions within legal limits can support translational and interactive interfaces, fostering innovation (Axelsson and Torvatn, 2017; Torvatn and de Boer, 2017). For example, market dialogues and pre-tender interactions between public buyers and suppliers help create interactive episodes in public procurement (Holma et al., 2022). However, this perspective also points out the challenges of adopting interactive interfaces within a traditional system and calls for further investigation into these challenges (Melander and Arvidsson, 2020; Torvatn and de Boer, 2017).
This research explores the challenges of integrating interactions into a system structured around standardized interfaces, focusing on cases where public organizations adopt more interactive relational interfaces to procure professional services. Introducing innovative processes within an established structure creates frictions, which arise from destabilizing forces or shifts in interconnected relations (Håkansson and Waluszewski, 2002b). Frictions are integral to any change process within a complex network (Mattila, 2017), as they can both hinder and facilitate change within existing relationships (Håkansson and Waluszewski, 2002a). The concept of friction has been applied to analyzing topics such as product innovation and technological transformation processes (Fremont et al., 2019; Hauke-Lopes et al., 2023; Hoholm and Olsen, 2012). Coping with this friction, as highlighted by Hauke-Lopes et al. (2023), results in the co-creation of some values and the co-destruction of others.
While these challenges have been acknowledged, there is still limited understanding of how shifts in relational interfaces themselves generate frictions. Much of the existing literature on friction focuses on resource-level tensions at the interface of physical or technological resources (Prenkert et al., 2022). This study addresses this gap by examining friction as a result of misalignment within relational interfaces – such as between actors, activities and procedural expectations – and by analyzing the coping activities and distribution patterns that follow.
Building on this gap, this study examines how friction emerges when public organizations transition from standardized to interactive exchanges in procuring professional services within a heavily standardized environment in a developing country. We were particularly interested in settings where standardized practices have become institutionalized, even though legal space for interaction exists. While such dynamics may occur in different countries, prior research shows that developing countries are especially prone to rigid routines and gaps between formal policies and actual practices (Jooriyan et al., 2024; Sepehri and Qadiri, 2018). Unlike developed countries, which often have frameworks such as the European Union’s innovative procurement acts that facilitate interactions (Torvatn and de Boer, 2017), developing countries must often work within inflexible procedures to pursue innovation. Consequently, strategies that have proven successful in developed countries may not be directly applicable in the unique contexts of developing countries (Kattel and Lember, 2010). This environment provides a distinctive lens to explore how public procurement processes adapt – or struggle to adapt – to a more interactive interface within a standardized framework.
In this environment, we conducted a nested case study approach (Thomas, 2021), examining a public organization that attempted to use interactive and translation interfaces for procuring professional services in three innovative projects. The shift from traditional standardized relational interfaces to more interactive ones creates friction in the relational interfaces between actors – a phenomenon we term relational friction. We conceptualize how these interfaces generate relational frictions, how such frictions are managed and how they are distributed.
The nested case organization in this study operates in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector and was undergoing transformation in response to rapid technological advancements. Consequently, it actively procured various policy research services to inform its decision-making. However, due to the complexity of these services, they could not be accommodated within traditional procurement processes. As a result, the organization adopted more innovative procurement processes beyond standard procedures. Within this nested case, we focused on three projects where the organization, referred to as Alpha and its suppliers used informal agreements alongside formal contracts to create an environment that supported both interactive and translation interfaces while still operating within the framework of standardized interfaces. We conducted interviews with informants from the public organization involved in these projects as well as with suppliers.
The research questions guiding this study are as follows:
How are relational frictions generated when actors incorporate non-standardized relational interfaces into standardized public procurement processes?
What coping activities do actors adopt to address these relational frictions?
How are relational frictions distributed because of these coping activities?
The findings conceptualize relational friction as a result of changes in relational interfaces, manifesting as activity misalignments, resource tie disruptions and actor bond tensions. The findings also categorize three approaches to coping with frictions and discuss both the direct and indirect distribution of relational frictions.
This research contributes by conceptualizing frictions from an actor’s perspective, which goes beyond traditional IMP research on resource frictions and has been called for in previous studies (Prenkert et al., 2022). In this way, the research also contributes by providing a framework for explaining the challenges of adopting interactive and translation interfaces in standardized public procurement – challenges that have been raised in past research (Håkansson and Axelsson, 2020). Practically, it provides public organizations – especially in developing countries with traditional procurement systems – with insights into understanding the generation and distribution of frictions when integrating innovative procurement practices into standardized frameworks, as well as insights into implementing coping activities.
Research background
This section outlines the research background and analytical framework by explaining the unit of observation (empirical unit) and the unit of analysis (analytical unit) (Thomas, 2021). First, we review literature on relational interfaces to highlight differences between public and private procurement interactions. Next, we introduce the unit of analysis – the concept of relational friction – and discuss its generation, coping activities and distribution, drawing on existing research in the IMP community (Håkansson and Snehota, 1995) and concepts related to frictions (Mattila, 2017; Prenkert et al., 2022).
Public procurement, value creation and innovation
Public organizations aim to create public value, whether through tactical purchasing or strategic endeavors aimed at innovation, sustainability and other value components (Grandia and Meehan, 2017). Value creation in public procurement refers to dynamic processes of creating public value involving collaboration among different stakeholders (Uyarra et al., 2020). Scholars have emphasized the integral role of collaboration in the public procurement process, recognizing that value cannot be created solely by public buyers but rather emerges through the combination of information, resources, activities and capabilities with other stakeholders (Bryson et al., 2015). Hence, there is a need to comprehend what affects the multifaceted nature of public procurement’s value creation, enabling procurement professionals to consider the value implications of their practices (Malacina et al., 2022; Purchase et al., 2009).
Innovation has increasingly become a central societal goal, and public procurement can potentially play a role as a policy tool in achieving this objective. Through its strategic use, public procurement can go beyond its traditional functions and serve as a driver for innovation by leveraging its significant annual spending to promote new solutions and approaches (Uyarra et al., 2020). Innovation within public organizations can be examined at the organizational level, where it is understood as the “development and/or use of new ideas or behaviors,” encompassing new products, services, markets, administrative structures, processes or systems (Walker, 2006). Strategic use of public procurement for innovation involves pursuing more innovative solutions and exploring novel procurement processes (Holma et al., 2022).
However, recent research has also highlighted challenges in effectively leveraging public procurement to foster innovation value (Kundu et al., 2020). Some argue it may not inherently support or may even hinder innovation (Håkansson and Axelsson, 2020; Waluszewski and Wagrell, 2013). This is especially true for professional services, where it is difficult to assess quality and provider qualifications – both before procurement, as service needs vary, and after, as responsibilities in co-produced services are unclear (Wynstra et al., 2018). Professional services also rely on subjective factors and contain a lot of relational uncertainties (Pemer et al., 2018). The challenge lies in balancing the need for interaction and flexibility within the rigid, standardized structure of public procurement.
Drawing on the insights of Torvatn and de Boer (2017), we argue that while constant interactions with suppliers are often a strategic choice in the private sector, public organizations face regulatory constraints that limit such relationships. Strict regulations affect supplier selection in public procurement to ensure compliance and fairness, while the private sector enjoys more flexibility in choosing the suppliers (Pemer et al., 2014). Public procurement also often limits flexibility in supplier interactions to specific phases of the process, requiring a delicate balance between standardization and engagement (Holma et al., 2022). In contrast, the private sector benefits from flexible long-term supplier relationships and more adaptable processes (Ford et al., 2017; Gadde and Snehota, 2019). Therefore, to foster innovation in public procurement, public organizations must address the challenges of managing standardization and interaction simultaneously.
Therefore, previous research has called for further exploration of collaboration aspects in value creation among stakeholders in public procurement (Cabral et al., 2019; Malacina et al., 2022). Building on this, our research examines the challenges of implementing innovative public procurement practices within traditional contexts and the reasons these challenges lead to only partial achievement of value objectives, particularly from the perspective of interactions.
Relational interfaces in public procurement
We adopt the concept of relational interfaces to examine the challenges of interactions between public actors and suppliers within public procurement processes. Relational interfaces refer to the touchpoints through which the resource bases of buyers and suppliers are interconnected via exchange activities (Araujo et al., 1999). These interfaces represent different levels of knowledge sharing, resource adaptation and collaboration between the parties involved (Gadde and Snehota, 2000). Araujo et al.’s (1999) framework also underscores how different interfaces align with various productivity and innovation goals, a concept that has been shown by numerous studies since its introduction (Andersen and Gadde, 2019; Araujo et al., 2016; Baptista et al., 2022; Gadde and Wynstra, 2017). Understanding these interfaces is crucial for buyers to manage them in an effective purchasing process, organizing practices and development strategies (Araujo et al., 2016; Lind and Melander, 2019). While our research emphasizes the term “relational interface,” used in studies like Baptista et al. (2022) and Eriksson et al. (2021), it is noteworthy that the literature referencing Araujo et al. (1999) often uses different concepts, such as the buyer–supplier interface (Holma et al., 2022), supplier interfaces (Ferreira and Lind, 2023) and organizational interfaces (Sundquist and Melander, 2021), to describe similar interconnections in various contexts.
Araujo et al. (1999) classify four distinct relational interfaces: standardized, specified, translational and interactive. These interfaces differ across several key aspects, including the type of relationship, the aim (innovation or efficiency), the type of service exchange, the linking of activities in service exchange and the organizing principle between actors (Araujo et al., 1999, 2016; Lind and Melander, 2019).
Standardized interfaces correspond to arm’s length relationships (Sundquist and Melander, 2021), where transactions involve standardized products and services with minimal collaboration. The use and production of knowledge are disconnected, meaning neither the buyer nor the supplier needs insight into each other’s contexts or resources (Araujo et al., 1999). These interfaces are efficiency-driven, allowing the buyer to benefit from the supplier’s economies of scale and broad experience with other clients (Andersen and Gadde, 2019).
Specified interfaces align with traditional subcontracting (Le Dain et al., 2011), where the buyer requires customized offerings and specifies the product or service characteristics in detail. The buyer dictates precise requirements, leaving suppliers with restricted possibilities for independent development (Araujo et al., 1999). This approach facilitates efficiency but limits flexibility, as the supplier’s ability to apply its prior experience is constrained (Andersen and Gadde, 2019).
Translational interfaces emerge in delegated design relationships, where the buyer focuses on defining functional characteristics rather than detailed specifications. The supplier is responsible for translating these functional needs into a tangible solution, allowing for greater flexibility in the development process (Araujo et al., 1999). This structure fosters indirect learning (Andersen and Gadde, 2019), as the supplier’s expertise plays a crucial role in shaping the final product. Compared to standardized and specified interfaces, translational interactions require a more cross-functional approach, ensuring alignment between the buyer’s needs and the supplier’s capabilities (Araujo et al., 1999; Holma et al., 2022).
Finally, interactive interfaces are characterized by open-ended interactions (Andersen and Gadde, 2019), where buyers and suppliers jointly develop specifications through collaborative teams. These relationships emphasize joint development, requiring deep engagement and extensive mutual learning (Araujo et al., 1999). Unlike the other interfaces, where predefined roles guide the exchange, interactive interfaces involve continuous adjustments and thick interaction patterns (Araujo et al., 2016). While demanding in terms of time and resources, this interface is strongly linked to innovation (Andersen and Gadde, 2019), as it fosters co-creation and the development of novel solutions through shared problem-solving.
As the importance of using different interfaces for strategic goals becomes evident, the distinction between the public and private sectors stands out. Private organizations actively manage these interfaces to achieve various objectives (Andersen and Gadde, 2019; Lind and Melander, 2019). In contrast, public procurement relies more on standardized and specified interfaces, with less flexibility to adapt due to procurement laws. This limits the use of interactive and translative interfaces compared to the private sector (Håkansson and Axelsson, 2020). However, previous research suggests that there are possibilities within legal boundaries for enabling interactive and translation interfaces to support innovation (Eriksson et al., 2021; Holma et al., 2022; Melander and Arvidsson, 2020).
However, fostering interactions within legal boundaries to enable innovation can be challenging, as it requires changes to institutionalized relational interfaces in the public sector (Ojansivu and Hermes, 2021). Previous research shows that modifying relational interfaces to drive innovation – such as in new product development – can create significant tensions and challenges (Lind and Melander, 2019; Andersen and Gadde, 2019).
Table A1 in Appendix 1 provides an overview of the characteristics of the four relational interfaces.
Friction, coping activities and friction distribution
Using public procurement as a tool to drive professional services can be seen as an effort to transform the relational interface between public buyers and suppliers from standardized to more interactive or translation-based interfaces. In this shift, destabilizing forces or movements often occur, which we analyze through the lens of frictions. Within this research community, the focus traditionally lies on the resource dimension, where frictions emerge as a result of destabilizing forces that alter the way resources interact with other interconnected resources (Håkansson and Waluszewski, 2002b). These frictions often take place at the interfaces between resources, leading to changes and potentially even the breakdown of these interfaces (Håkansson and Waluszewski, 2002a). An example of this can be observed in digital transformation processes, where friction arises between digital and non-digital resources, highlighting how such frictions affect resource interfaces (Hauke-Lopes et al., 2023).
Recent contributions to the concept of friction have expanded to include the actor dimension as well (Prenkert et al., 2022). For instance, Mattila, (2017) describes friction as the performative tension between actors and networks during the adoption of new resources and processes. Similarly, concepts like network tension highlight the discomfort caused by ambiguity in business-to-business networks, arising from factors like contradictory communications and misalignment of actors’ objectives (Tóth et al., 2018). Just as frictions in resource interfaces arise from changes in how resources are connected, we argue that frictions at the relationship level between actors result from changes in relational interfaces, which encompass different layers of relationships through activity links, resource ties and actor bonds (Håkansson and Snehota, 1995). As a working term, we refer to these emerging tensions as relational frictions, reflecting the misalignments, resistance or adaptation struggles that occur when interaction modes shift within institutionalized systems. This abductively developed concept is further defined and formalized later in the discussion section, once grounded in the empirical analysis. This perspective aligns with the actor-focused view of friction, highlighting the dynamic tensions that emerge as actors adapt to new resources, activities and roles within their networks (Mattila, 2017).
In addition, research has focused on coping with friction (Mattila, 2017) or reducing it using lubricants – elements that mitigate friction at resource contact points (Hauke-Lopes et al., 2023). Collaborative activities among actors are often undertaken to create an environment conducive to interactions within the established standardized public procurement (Malacina et al., 2022). In this study, we use the term “coping activities” to refer to actions that address relational frictions between actors. Research also suggests that resource friction, despite its negative connotations, plays a central role in any change process and has both facilitating and hindering effects on value creation (Håkansson and Waluszewski, 2002a). The impact of this friction is contingent upon the coping activities used by actors within these relational interfaces.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that as relational interfaces between actors are interconnected, the occurrence of friction and the associated coping activities can lead to friction in other interfaces. Research indicates that friction effects can be either direct (local) or distributed across resource interfaces, influencing other resources (Hoholm and Olsen, 2012). Drawing on this concept, our research focuses on two types of friction distribution: direct frictions, which occur at the relational interfaces central to our analysis, and indirect frictions, which arise at interfaces involving other actors within the network. Understanding these categories allows us to explore how relational frictions can trigger additional frictions across the broader network. Table A2 in Appendix 2 summarizes the definitions of the key concepts used in the present study and how they relate to similar research.
Research method
This research adopts an exploratory approach through a nested case study methodology (Thomas, 2021). Case studies provide depth, detail and data richness, making them particularly valuable for examining inter-organizational networks (Halinen and Törnroos, 2005). They are especially suitable for studying contemporary phenomena that are deeply embedded in their context and have unclear boundaries (Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Easton, 2010). Process-based single-case studies allow researchers to capture the ongoing interactions among actors in the development of industrial networks (Andersen et al., 2018). Given that our study focuses on three projects within an innovative public organization, a single nested case study approach is selected, as it enables an analysis of units inherently linked to a broader organizational context (Thomas, 2021). Therefore, we selected the nested case study methodology as an appropriate for comprehending the unique practices in projects of a public organization in managing frictions within the procurement of policy research services, as discussed in this paper.
This research was initially inspired during data collection for a prior study on public procurement of professional services. While doing that study, we observed occasions when certain public organizations bypassed some procedures through creative (but still legal) ways, allowing them to engage in a more interactive and, in their view, effective procurement of professional services. This sparked our interest in delving deeper, using a systematic combining approach (Dubois and Gadde, 2002).
Systematic combining is an abductive and nonlinear process aimed at aligning theoretical insights with practical realities (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). This approach allowed us to integrate our case insights with empirical data from the nested case and its projects, helping us explore the sources and distribution of frictions in these projects. In other words, we aimed to determine in our research what constitutes the case and what it is a case of, which demonstrates the “casing” process highlighted by Ragin and Becker (1992) and used in other inter-organizational research (e.g. Andersen and Gadde, 2019; Dubois et al., 2004). Our choice of systematic combining as a research approach aligns well with our conceptual framework, particularly with our defined unit of observation (as an empirical unit) and unit of analysis (as an analytical unit) (Thomas, 2021). Through these iterative steps, we matched our framework on relational frictions, coping activities and the distribution of frictions – rooted in the IMP approach – with cases of frictions arising when interactive or relational interfaces are forced into structured routines typically involving standardized interfaces between buyers and suppliers.
Data collection and analysis
The public organization in this research – the nested case – is given the pseudonym Alpha; it is a newly established division in the Iranian public sector that functions as both a regulatory body and a creator of public services, with a specialized focus on ICT and related fields. In response to rapid technological advancements, Alpha has taken on the crucial role of formulating new regulations and policies to adapt to those changes. The organization actively engages in procuring numerous policy research services to inform its decision-making.
We have chosen to focus on outsourced projects within a defined time span to minimize contextual changes, particularly given the high frequency of political shifts. Our selection criteria target projects initiated between 2021 and 2023. By confining our analysis to this time frame, we focused on three projects that we call Projects A, B and C. Each case adopted a non-standard approach, incorporating informal agreements alongside formal procedures to facilitate essential interactions. The choice of projects was guided by recommendations from Alpha, as we asked its staff to describe projects within a specific time span. The research team chose to focus on three projects aimed at innovation through more interactive interfaces within standardized frameworks and informal procedures.
To better understand the analyzed phenomena and ensure the relevance and value of our results for further research, both sides of the Alpha-supplier relationships were explored. This approach aligns with the suggestion by Abrahamsen et al. (2017) that, in studies of interaction between actors, selecting multiple points of observation is recommended for understanding how interactions unfold from different perspectives, as is also used in similar previous research (Holma et al., 2022). Based on this, we also decided that gathering data from both the public buyer (Alpha) and suppliers in projects A, B and C was essential for investigating the generation of relational frictions and illustrating how they are distributed between buyer and supplier.
Figure 1 presents a timeline of these projects and their characteristics.
The horizontal timeline spans from the year 2020 through 2023 and includes shaded bands marking informal and formal contract periods. Project A and Project B have contract periods beginning in December 2021 and lasting for six months, while Project C begins earlier in September 2020 and spans twelve months. Project A, which uses an interactive interface, addresses the development of a digital tool for oversight concerning online safety and accessibility. Its informal agreement started in June 2021, and the project included six design meetings prior to the official contract, followed by at least four formal and four informal meetings during the contract. The final deliverable is scheduled for one year after contract conclusion. Project B, using a translation interface, focuses on online safety and accessibility. The informal agreement began in July 2021, and the project similarly included four design meetings before the official contract in December 2021. During the contract, meetings included at least two formal and four informal sessions, with final deliverables due two months post-contract. Project C, also interactive, centres on competition and innovation. It started with an informal agreement in June 2020 and transitioned into a formal contract by September 2020. Meetings occurred almost weekly from the initiation of the informal agreement and continued throughout the twelve-month contract. Its final output is scheduled for three months after the contract’s end. The visual clearly delineates informal and formal contract durations and includes a structured table aligning project timelines with topic areas, meeting frequency, and output timelines.Timeline and description of the projects
Source: Authors’ own work
The horizontal timeline spans from the year 2020 through 2023 and includes shaded bands marking informal and formal contract periods. Project A and Project B have contract periods beginning in December 2021 and lasting for six months, while Project C begins earlier in September 2020 and spans twelve months. Project A, which uses an interactive interface, addresses the development of a digital tool for oversight concerning online safety and accessibility. Its informal agreement started in June 2021, and the project included six design meetings prior to the official contract, followed by at least four formal and four informal meetings during the contract. The final deliverable is scheduled for one year after contract conclusion. Project B, using a translation interface, focuses on online safety and accessibility. The informal agreement began in July 2021, and the project similarly included four design meetings before the official contract in December 2021. During the contract, meetings included at least two formal and four informal sessions, with final deliverables due two months post-contract. Project C, also interactive, centres on competition and innovation. It started with an informal agreement in June 2020 and transitioned into a formal contract by September 2020. Meetings occurred almost weekly from the initiation of the informal agreement and continued throughout the twelve-month contract. Its final output is scheduled for three months after the contract’s end. The visual clearly delineates informal and formal contract durations and includes a structured table aligning project timelines with topic areas, meeting frequency, and output timelines.Timeline and description of the projects
Source: Authors’ own work
Key informants were selected based on their knowledge and expertise concerning the problem of interest and their active participation in the relevant relationship(s). We conducted 18 interviews between November 2023 and March 2024, and analyzed relevant documents, including project newsletters to triangulate our data analysis (Andersen et al., 2018). Table 1 shows the description of the data sources.
Description of interviews and other data sources
| Project | Interviews | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Buyer side | Supplier side | Documents* | |||||
| Interviewee role | Time of interview | Interview duration | Interviewee role | Time of interview | Interview duration | ||
| Project A | Deputy director | March 2024 March 2024 | 70 min 20 min | Team manager | February 2024 | 45 min | 3 online newsletter documents of the outcomes1 booklet outlining the project’s outcomes Recording of a panel discussion at the Governance and Public Policy (GPP) conference 2023 (in Tehran) focusing on this project |
| Consultant for digital transformation | February 2024 | 30 min | Project specialist | February 2024 | 45 min | ||
| Project specialist | November2023 | 60 min | |||||
| January 2024 | 20 min | ||||||
| February 2024-(online) | 20 min | ||||||
| Project B | Operational director | February 2024 | 45 min | Project specialist | February 2024 | 40 min | 2 newsletter documents summarizing the project outcomes |
| Alpha’s deputy of regulation | January 2024 | 45 min | Project specialist | February 2024 | 90 min | 1 motion graphic illustrating project outcomes | |
| Project C | Deputy of the research department | November 2023-(online) | 90 min | Team manager | December 2023 | 90 min | 2 newsletter articles discussing the project outcomes The regulation draft proposed by alpha stemming from this project |
| February 2024-(online) | 60 min | February 2024 | 60 min | ||||
| IT policy consultant | February 2024 | 60 min | Project specialist | March 2024-(online) | 45 min | ||
| Project | Interviews | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Buyer side | Supplier side | Documents | |||||
| Interviewee role | Time of interview | Interview duration | Interviewee role | Time of interview | Interview duration | ||
| Project A | Deputy director | March 2024 March 2024 | 70 min 20 min | Team manager | February 2024 | 45 min | 3 online newsletter documents of the outcomes1 booklet outlining the project’s outcomes Recording of a panel discussion at the Governance and Public Policy ( |
| Consultant for digital transformation | February 2024 | 30 min | Project specialist | February 2024 | 45 min | ||
| Project specialist | November2023 | 60 min | |||||
| January 2024 | 20 min | ||||||
| February 2024-(online) | 20 min | ||||||
| Project B | Operational director | February 2024 | 45 min | Project specialist | February 2024 | 40 min | 2 newsletter documents summarizing the project outcomes |
| Alpha’s deputy of regulation | January 2024 | 45 min | Project specialist | February 2024 | 90 min | 1 motion graphic illustrating project outcomes | |
| Project C | Deputy of the research department | November 2023-(online) | 90 min | Team manager | December 2023 | 90 min | 2 newsletter articles discussing the project outcomes The regulation draft proposed by alpha stemming from this project |
| February 2024-(online) | 60 min | February 2024 | 60 min | ||||
| February 2024 | 60 min | Project specialist | March 2024-(online) | 45 min | |||
*While documents are openly accessible online and we analyzed them, links are withheld to safeguard project anonymity and protect personal information
In the case analysis phase, collected data were coded to identify first-order patterns, second-order themes and aggregate dimensions (Gioia et al., 2013). After several rounds of iteration, we developed the conceptual framework through the process of matching using systematic combining (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). In the case analysis section, Figure 2 shows the data structure, which will be explained in detail.
Each column represents a hierarchical abstraction of themes, starting from specific issues on the left and progressing to broader conceptual categories on the right. The leftmost column titled first order themes lists detailed observations such as informal collaboration coexisting with bureaucratic processes, need for flexible payments, or managing tensions between suppliers and other actors. These items describe concrete issues or practices encountered in collaborative environments. The middle column titled second order codes categorises these themes into conceptual patterns. These include balancing multiple interfaces, commodifying services to fit standards, misalignment in activity links, disruption in resource ties, tension in actor bonds, managing friction through supportive activities, and managing friction through supporting resources or bonds. The rightmost column titled aggregate dimensions groups the second order codes into overarching categories. These are addressing misfits in internal interfaces, relational friction, coping activities, and distribution of relational friction. Relational friction is further divided into misalignment in activity links, disruption in resource ties, and tension in actor bonds. Coping activities are broken down into managing friction through supportive activities, supportive resources, and supporting actor bonds. Distribution of relational friction is split into direct and indirect relational friction distributions. Arrows between columns indicate thematic progression, moving from specific observations to conceptual themes, and finally to aggregate analytical categories. This structured diagram aids in visualising how detailed empirical insights are abstracted into broader theoretical concepts within a study of relational friction.Data structure based on the case analysis
Source: Authors’ own work
Each column represents a hierarchical abstraction of themes, starting from specific issues on the left and progressing to broader conceptual categories on the right. The leftmost column titled first order themes lists detailed observations such as informal collaboration coexisting with bureaucratic processes, need for flexible payments, or managing tensions between suppliers and other actors. These items describe concrete issues or practices encountered in collaborative environments. The middle column titled second order codes categorises these themes into conceptual patterns. These include balancing multiple interfaces, commodifying services to fit standards, misalignment in activity links, disruption in resource ties, tension in actor bonds, managing friction through supportive activities, and managing friction through supporting resources or bonds. The rightmost column titled aggregate dimensions groups the second order codes into overarching categories. These are addressing misfits in internal interfaces, relational friction, coping activities, and distribution of relational friction. Relational friction is further divided into misalignment in activity links, disruption in resource ties, and tension in actor bonds. Coping activities are broken down into managing friction through supportive activities, supportive resources, and supporting actor bonds. Distribution of relational friction is split into direct and indirect relational friction distributions. Arrows between columns indicate thematic progression, moving from specific observations to conceptual themes, and finally to aggregate analytical categories. This structured diagram aids in visualising how detailed empirical insights are abstracted into broader theoretical concepts within a study of relational friction.Data structure based on the case analysis
Source: Authors’ own work
Case description
Alpha’s background and vision
Alpha was established as a newly formed public organization focused on supporting digital transformation and developing innovative public service models in the ICT domain. Over three years, a manager was appointed to restructure Alpha and lead its digital transformation. Recognizing that traditional public service models were insufficient in a rapidly evolving digital environment, the manager aimed to shift Alpha toward technology-driven projects. Rapid technological shifts required new methods of coordination, cross-sector collaboration and a repositioning of Alpha as a proactive public service innovator.
However, implementing this vision was not easy. Alpha lacked the internal technological expertise and capacity needed to support these ambitious changes – an issue common in public organizations (Jooriyan et al., 2024). Most of its staff were experienced in bureaucratic procedures but had little knowledge of digital technologies. This gap made it difficult to realize the manager’s vision of knowledge-driven policymaking.
To address this, the manager sought to outsource policy research projects in areas like digital transformation and technology-based regulatory tools, bringing in external expertise. However, traditional and rigid public procurement structures proved to be a major challenge.
Innovative public procurement in Iran: progress and challenges
Over the past decade, public procurement for innovation in Iran has gained momentum, with some success, particularly in the oil industry (Jooriyan et al., 2024). However, significant challenges remain. Procurement in many Iranian public organizations follows rigid, standardized procedures that leave little room for flexibility or innovation (Taheriruh and Moshtari, 2023). In Iran, previous research demonstrates that political tensions, risk-averse cultures and a lack of competition in public bodies further complicate efforts to promote innovation through procurement (Jooriyan et al., 2024; Sepehri and Qadiri, 2018).
Recognizing the role of research and consulting services in fostering public sector innovation, the Iranian government has encouraged public organizations to outsource research. Since 2008, all public entities have been required to allocate at least 1% of their annual budget to research and consulting (IPRC, 2008). However, implementing this policy has been challenging. Many projects formally meet these requirements but fail to deliver meaningful outcomes (Sina Press, 2015). Rigid structures and risk-averse decision-making have made it difficult for public organizations to use research procurement as a tool for innovation. Moreover, many public and semi-public organizations lack the structural capacity to manage complex ICT projects effectively, leading to poor coordination and unclear responsibilities (Khansarizadeh and Shirmohammadi, 2015). As a result, professional services in Iran are often treated as routine purchases rather than strategic investments (Taheriruh and Moshtari, 2023). This made it particularly hard for Alpha to adopt innovative procurement approaches.
Alpha’s procurement approach: balancing innovation and bureaucracy
Alpha’s existing research procurement processes were highly standardized, having been inherited from a larger governmental organization of which they were previously a part before becoming a separate entity. These processes were primarily used for small-budget projects, followed rigid procedures and took a long time to complete. Typically, these projects were conducted in collaboration with universities and focused on generating basic knowledge rather than applied solutions.
However, Alpha’s manager faced several challenges in applying the traditional model to new research needs. Defining exact project specifications was difficult, as emerging technologies required flexibility rather than rigid, predefined outcomes. The urgency of policy-related research demanded faster timelines which clashed with the constraints of conventional procurement models. In addition, budget limitations made it challenging to attract top specialists in digitalization within standard procurement frameworks.
Due to these constraints, Alpha adopted a flexible approach. Instead of waiting for lengthy bureaucratic approvals, they initiated projects through informal agreements while working in parallel on the formal procurement process. This allowed them to start projects quickly while still complying with public procurement regulations.
These informal arrangements created new opportunities that were rare in public procurement. They took advantage of flexibility within Iran’s legal framework, avoiding unnecessary delays while staying within financial thresholds that did not require national competitive tendering. Such innovative procurement practices had been used before but only in rare cases, as most public managers were reluctant to take risks in uncertain environments. As the deputy director of Alpha explained:
To undertake these projects, [Alpha’s manager] had to bypass some of the slow processes within Alpha to speed things up. Normally, a project plan could take up to six months to proceed.
Both Alpha’s team and their suppliers had to invest significant effort in making this unconventional approach work while remaining within procurement regulations.
Alpha’s management understood that this approach carried risks. To succeed, they needed to allocate resources strategically and support suppliers willing to embrace innovation. Their goal was to position Alpha as a leading technology-driven public organization.
They also needed suppliers who shared this vision. On one hand, these suppliers had to be highly skilled in digital technologies, particularly tools like AI-based monitoring and real-time API interactions. On the other hand, they needed to be small and flexible enough to take risks – large, established firms were often too conservative for experimental projects.
As a result, Alpha sought newly established, tech-oriented SMEs willing to collaborate in an experimental environment. These suppliers saw the potential benefits: working with Alpha would boost their professional reputation and provide them with experience in cutting-edge regulatory projects.
This study examines three research projects where Alpha used an unconventional approach to procurement. These projects followed a dual-track model:
a formal contract ensured compliance with procurement regulations; and
an informal agreement provided the flexibility needed to explore innovative solutions.
This approach allowed Alpha to work within bureaucratic constraints while fostering innovation. It enabled them to act quickly, experiment with new technological methods and attract high-quality suppliers willing to take calculated risks.
By leveraging these strategies, Alpha was able to bypass many of the traditional hurdles in public sector procurement, creating a new model for how public organizations can support innovation while operating within regulatory frameworks. In this study, we examine three such projects where policy research outsourcing followed an interactive approach using informal agreements alongside with the formal contracting.
Project A
Project A aimed to explore advanced digital tools to support coordination and oversight mechanisms in emerging online service environments. The project was overseen by one of Alpha’s deputy departments responsible for external service development.
Supplier A was a 4-person team from a technological consulting firm with experience in digitalization solutions for organizations. However, this was their first attempt at collaborating with a public organization. Initially, the project seemed promising to them due to Alpha’s focus on innovative public services. However, their involvement was not straightforward. They were introduced by a consultant within Alpha, who had to persuade both Alpha to trust the supplier’s capabilities and the supplier to take the risk.
Since both parties were interested in AI-based monitoring solutions but lacked a clear project scope, the existing outsourcing structures for research projects were unsuitable, as they required fully defined objectives. To move forward, they decided to initiate the project informally, allowing flexibility while refining the scope. The project thus evolved in a collaborative and interactive manner.
The informal agreement had its advantages. The project began immediately, and both parties demonstrated flexibility. Alpha facilitated numerous ad hoc meetings to coordinate activities, while Supplier A adapted to uncertainties. As the supplier’s project manager noted:
We were invited to high-level organizational meetings, which facilitated coordination with internal projects across all units, a crucial factor for the success of this initiative.
As the project progressed, the design criteria became clearer. However, the informal nature of the agreement also revealed its downsides. Conflicts emerged between the project’s dynamic activities and Alpha’s rigid bureaucratic structure. The complexity of the technical aspects added further challenges, requiring Alpha’s members to develop an understanding of the technological criteria just to justify the project’s needs. While the lead team at Alpha was enthusiastic, traditional stakeholders resisted, adding extra burdens to the process.
This resistance led to unforeseen tasks beyond the original project scope. When it came time to evaluate the work, Supplier A encountered highly standardized requirements that did not align with their deliverables, leading to dissatisfaction. Supplier A felt undercompensated for the additional work, which resulted in operational issues and frustration among its team members.
Despite these challenges, the project had its successes. Significant insights were gained, and near-ready AI-based solutions were developed. In addition, Alpha’s members improved their competencies in understanding the use of AI in decision-making and oversight processes. However, the final product remained at the conceptual stage, as the solutions were too technologically advanced for Alpha to implement. Furthermore, external stakeholder organizations, which needed to adopt and participate in the resulting tools, were not yet ready.
Alpha’s internal stakeholders, including deputies and operational directors, ultimately raised concerns about the project’s practicality. Unlike the new manager, they preferred standardized, ready-to-use solutions, even at the expense of adopting new technologies. Alpha’s deputy director reflected this sentiment:
The final output of [Supplier A] in the monitoring project was still far from what we could use. There were many interesting concepts, but they needed further development before becoming operational.
Another negative side effect of the informal agreements between Alpha’s manager and Supplier A was the internal tension they created within Alpha. While the project fostered innovation and collaboration, it also highlighted the difficulties of implementing cutting-edge technology within a rigid bureaucratic structure.
Project B
Project B focused on designing a technology-supported service framework to enhance safety and accessibility for specific user groups on digital services. Although Alpha had long recognized the need for such a project, they had not found a practical internal solution before initiating it. Political discussions that year brought heightened attention to online child protection, increasing the urgency to develop a solution. Alpha’s manager decided to outsource the project to expedite results and continued the informal agreement approach from Project A.
Supplier B was a five-person team with backgrounds in digitalization and a strong passion for protecting minors online. Like in Project A, they were introduced to Alpha through a consultant connected to Alpha’s manager.
The project began with a broad understanding of the necessity, though specific solutions remained ambiguous. Alpha had some preliminary specifications, and Supplier B’s role was to translate these requirements into technical aspects for policy research. However, the lack of clarity in the solution led to evolving project requirements, mirroring the dynamics of Project A. Informal agreements facilitated collaboration but also created challenges, including conflicting expectations and additional work beyond the contract’s scope.
Due to the informal scope definition, estimating the extent of policy research proved difficult. The project evolved unpredictably, introducing new requirements and deliverables over time. This created friction, as Supplier B struggled to meet Alpha’s shifting expectations, often engaging in tasks outside their core expertise. For instance, although initially focused on developing a technical solution, Supplier B was unexpectedly tasked with creating promotional materials and conducting public outreach campaigns. As a project specialist from Supplier B stated:
We were asked to deliver tasks that weren’t in the contract, sometimes outside our expertise. All of this caused extra work, operational issues, and delays in delivering what was expected.
Another friction point arose with Alpha’s strict reporting requirements and documentation standards. Supplier B had to allocate considerable resources to meet bureaucratic demands while also adhering to the informal agreements focusing on technical development. This led to project delays and increased costs, ultimately slowing the progress of the innovative solution.
Misinterpretations and disconnects further complicated the project. Early discussions emphasized technological aspects of policy research. However, Alpha’s team expected a detailed, legally binding framework, while Supplier B viewed their role as technological development, leaving procedural implementation to Alpha. This misalignment caused delays and confusion. Supplier B invested time in crafting legal procedural frameworks beyond their expertise, diverting resources from their core technological work. As both parties pursued different objectives, valuable time and resources were wasted.
In the end, Project B was perceived as only partially successful. While it yielded valuable insights and demonstrated promising technological applications, both Alpha and Supplier B felt their expectations were only partially met. Despite attempts to anticipate challenges through informal agreements and adaptive strategies, the rigid procurement process and its standardized requirements repeatedly emerged as significant obstacles to progress.
Project C
Project C focused on developing a forward-looking framework to guide fair competition and innovation in complex digital service environments. As the authority in this field, Alpha had long recognized the need for such a framework but had struggled to develop an internal solution. Given the increasing urgency of the issue, Alpha’s management decided to seek external expertise.
Supplier C, a four-person multidisciplinary team from a think tank in Iran, had backgrounds in law, economics and political science. They had previously conducted a university-funded research project on modern technologies and tools for managing competition in markets. In a seminar, they met Alpha’s manager and convinced them on the importance of having such a project and reflected on their capability to handle the project. Following internal approval, pre-project meetings commenced to outline the general direction of the work. However, both parties soon acknowledged that the project requirements could not be fully specified in advance. Consequently, they opted for an informal agreement based on mutual trust while still maintaining the bureaucratic formalities of a standard contract. As in Projects A and B, this approach allowed for a quick start and greater flexibility but also led to various frictions throughout the project.
At the outset, the project appeared promising, with close collaboration between Alpha and Supplier C. For instance, the support of Alpha’s manager in involving team members of suppliers in various internal projects facilitated the interactive exchanges of information that were essential for creating solutions in the project. Furthermore, these interactions fostered flexibility in solution design as Alpha’s needs became clearer in the process of the projects.
However, challenges soon emerged, particularly in managing the extensive coordination and information-sharing between Alpha’s internal stakeholders and Supplier C. Despite explicit requests from Alpha’s management for full cooperation, many internal units remained attached to their established procedures, leading to bottlenecks and delays.
One significant challenge arose during the contracting phase. Alpha’s Accounting and Finance Unit, responsible for overseeing contracts, struggled to adapt to the flexible nature of the project. Unlike conventional procurement projects, Project C focused on designing solutions based on evolving needs rather than predefined deliverables. This misalignment made it difficult to specify contract terms, and while the contract was eventually approved, its rigid structure later led to further complications. Similar difficulties persisted in the project execution phase, as Alpha’s internal procedures were not fully compatible with the iterative and adaptive approach needed to develop the new policy framework.
As in the other two projects, a key point of friction was the evaluation of Supplier C’s work. While Supplier C had invested significant effort in developing an evidence-based and practical solution, Alpha’s Accounting and Finance Unit applied standardized assessment criteria that failed to acknowledge many of the project’s intangible deliverables. Supplier C’s manager reflected on this misalignment:
We worked round the clock on complex issues during the project and had numerous meetings with Alpha to design an evidence-based and practical solution. Meanwhile, we found out that another group had conducted a project with a similar scope and budget for a different Alpha department but with significantly fewer demands placed on their outputs. It seemed like none of our non-standardized deliverables were properly acknowledged by the Accounting and Finance Unit.
Both Alpha and Supplier C were initially optimistic that this project would mark the beginning of future collaborations in this domain. The project resulted in a high-quality policy research outcome, and Supplier C also delivered practical procedural processes to support the implementation of the designed competition regulations. However, despite delivering a solution, neither party was entirely satisfied with the outcome. Supplier C felt they had invested more effort than anticipated, exceeding their original scope, while Alpha’s internal team struggled to integrate the results into their daily operations due to the lack of standardization.
Similar to Projects A and B, Project C demonstrated the generation of friction between innovation and traditional procurement processes. While it produced innovative outcomes, the project also highlighted systemic challenges in Alpha’s procurement approach, particularly in balancing flexibility with organizational rigidity.
Analysis of cases
In this section, we present the case analysis, focusing on the practices used by Alpha and its suppliers. Each case adopted a non-standard approach, incorporating informal agreements, alongside with their formal procedures, to facilitate necessary interactions. By comparing the cases, we demonstrate the analysis on the process of how shifts in relational interfaces generate relational frictions, the coping activities implemented, and how these actions influenced the distribution of frictions in other relational interfaces.
Changes in relational interfaces
The public procurement structure at Alpha was primarily designed for efficiency, with a focus on procuring well-specified products and services. The combination of regulations, norms and routines has established buyer–supplier relationships in public procurement to operate within standardized or specified interfaces, as highlighted by previous research (Sepehri and Qadiri, 2018; Taheriruh and Moshtari, 2023). In the context of public procurement of services, these interfaces range from activity links (such as established processes and legal boundaries) to resource ties (routinized templates for proposals and reports). Therefore, procuring professional services – which inherently require a high level of interaction (Pemer et al., 2014) – within this routinized system proved challenging and potentially created relational friction. As Alpha aimed for innovation in all three cases, challenges were expected, and efforts were made to manage the inevitable friction.
Therefore, we found that across all cases, Alpha and its suppliers recognized the need for more flexibility to manage the complexities of their policy research projects. In certain parts of the procurement process, they adopted different relational interfaces – interactive in some cases (A, C) and translative in others (B) – deviating from the standard routines. In our analysis, we identified how attempts to shift away from standardized interfaces introduced destabilizing forces, which manifested as relational frictions – visible in how activities were coordinated, resources tied and actor relationships enacted. Table 2 summarizes some of the specifics of the relational interfaces in the usual norms and routines in Alpha and the ones that were sought in the Projects A, B and C.
Description of relational interfaces in traditional research procurement procedures and selected projects at different stages of procurement
| Procurement stage | Traditional research procurement procedures in alpha | Projects A and C (more toward interactive interfaces) | Project B (more toward Translative) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Main interface | Standardized/Specified | Interactive and translative | Interactive and translative |
| Pre-procurement and definition of needs | Standardized assortment of the defined service using formal call for proposals, strict specifications and standardized templates | Joint development between buyer and supplier, with an open-ended dialogue in informal agreements to exploit their combined resources | The buying party’s needs are based on the functionality of the policy research service, and the supplier must translate the functional needs into specific deliverables |
| Procurement process | Fixed contracts, predefined deliverables, formal communication channels | Informal collaboration alongside formal structures, with negotiation based on emergent needs | Contracts formalize initial flexible agreements, ensuring alignment with procurement rules while adapting to evolving requirements |
| Service collaboration, monitoring & evaluation | Standardized monitoring templates, predefined KPIs, structured reporting | Mix of informal and formal evaluation, ad hoc coordination, ongoing adjustments based on feedback | Performance metrics adapted to project needs, blending formalized reporting with flexible evaluation methods |
| Procurement stage | Traditional research procurement procedures in alpha | Projects A and C (more toward interactive interfaces) | Project B (more toward Translative) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Main interface | Standardized/Specified | Interactive and translative | Interactive and translative |
| Pre-procurement and definition of needs | Standardized assortment of the defined service using formal call for proposals, strict specifications and standardized templates | Joint development between buyer and supplier, with an open-ended dialogue in informal agreements to exploit their combined resources | The buying party’s needs are based on the functionality of the policy research service, and the supplier must translate the functional needs into specific deliverables |
| Procurement process | Fixed contracts, predefined deliverables, formal communication channels | Informal collaboration alongside formal structures, with negotiation based on emergent needs | Contracts formalize initial flexible agreements, ensuring alignment with procurement rules while adapting to evolving requirements |
| Service collaboration, monitoring & evaluation | Standardized monitoring templates, predefined KPIs, structured reporting | Mix of informal and formal evaluation, ad hoc coordination, ongoing adjustments based on feedback | Performance metrics adapted to project needs, blending formalized reporting with flexible evaluation methods |
Relational frictions
In this section, we categorize the observed relational frictions based on the case analysis. The frictions are analyzed as tensions resulting from changes in an environment with established relational interfaces (standardized). We examine how relational frictions – triggered by shifts in established relational interfaces – manifest in different aspects of buyer–supplier relationships. Specifically, we analyze how these frictions are expressed through misalignments in activity links, disruptions in resource ties and tensions in actor bonds. This approach allows for a better understanding of how friction arises within the innovative public procurement process:
Frictions manifested in activity link misalignment.
The first category of relational friction was manifested in tensions around coordinating new sets of activities. These frictions were triggered by shifts toward interactive or translative relational interfaces, which clashed with Alpha’s traditionally structured and institutionalized processes. These constraints hindered the flexibility needed to foster planned interactions. To establish interactive interfaces in Projects A and C and translation interfaces in Project B, different processes had to be balanced. This included allowing flexibility for informally agreed milestones while ensuring suppliers could simultaneously comply with traditional, standardized procedures. These tensions appeared in various aspects of project definition, coordination, evaluation and budget management. Supplier B highlighted the constraints imposed by formalized routines:
The informally agreed processes helped us accelerate the project start. Alpha also helped bypass some unnecessary procedures and was collaborative in coordinating the project steps. However, despite these efforts, at a certain point, we found it hard to meet the formal procedural requirements while also focusing on the milestones we had informally agreed upon. This created confusion and mistrust.
These mismatches led to friction in the implementation of ad hoc coordination and balancing informal communications. For instance, the deputy director in Project A noted how misunderstandings among Alpha’s managers, internal teams and Supplier A led to significant challenges in internal communication:
The communication gap between us and several units of Alpha widened as Project A progressed. Misunderstandings among Alpha’s managers and other units created numerous challenges in their internal agreements, affecting project coordination. At a certain point, it became difficult to get a clear picture of what was working and what wasn’t.
Frictions manifested in resource tie disruption.
Relational friction also manifested in resource tie disruptions. These disruptions were triggered by shifts in interface types that required resources – such as competencies, budgets and time allocations – that existing standardized structures were not designed to support. Our case studies show that technical and relational competencies were essential for project design, yet procedural norms in standardized structures did not support them.
The need for innovative formats to exchange deliverables also created friction. These formats often conflicted with standard research templates, leading to further misalignment. Supplier B’s specialist illustrated this challenge:
We started with informal trust. We were focused on delivering technological outcomes like web-based simulators, which we presented as the main project results. However, in the end, another unit in Alpha asked us to fill in extensive reports using “official” templates for project outcomes, which we had not anticipated.
In another example, supplier C also noted:
We learned that even innovative public organizations, in the end, tend to more easily accept the deliveries to be standardized research “products” in their “templates” over truly collaborative policy research projects that actually creates a “solution”.
Moreover, the need for additional resources – such as flexible payment structures, overtime work and extended time commitments – strained traditional resource management practices, leading to further friction in resource ties:
Frictions manifested in actor bond tension.
The final category of relational friction was manifested in tensions around actor bonds. These tensions stemmed from efforts to shift toward more collaborative interfaces, which introduced new roles and expectations that challenged the established relational structure. The coordination of Alpha’s different units had traditionally followed specific established processes. However, the push for projects to deliver implementable solutions beyond policy research required not only more flexible interactions between Alpha’s managers and suppliers but also engagement with other internal units in Alpha. Some of these units were not as enthusiastic about the new project goals.
This situation created tensions in communication and gaps in expectations. Supplier B’s specialist illustrated the friction experienced when collaborating with other units in Alpha:
At times, it felt like we were “breaking some norms”, even though Alpha’s managerial team assured us that everything was fine.
Furthermore, these projects required intensive and flexibly scheduled meetings, which clashed with the rigid structure of traditional meeting schedules.
Across all cases, destabilizing forces and challenges emerged when resources needed to be tied together, activities coordinated or new actor bonds formed. These challenges arose as actors sought to establish interactive and translative interfaces within a normatively standardized and structured context.
Coping activities for managing relational frictions
To address the relational frictions identified in these projects, Alpha and its suppliers used a range of coping activities. These practices were applied at different stages, from pre-procurement meetings to final reporting and delivery, to manage both standardized and non-standardized procedures within the public procurement framework. We categorize these practices based on their role in supporting activities, resources or actor bonds:
Managing friction through supportive activities.
The first category of coping activities involved providing supportive activities. Coordination activities were a significant source of relational friction, particularly due to the lack of flexibility in established procedures. Alpha used additional legal practices to address unprecedented tasks that did not fit within standard procurement processes. This allowed them to manage two sets of activity links for evaluation – one for formal evaluation processes and another for more adaptive, informal evaluations relied upon by both parties.
The team manager from Supplier A explained:
We constantly had to find ways to address both the project’s needs [in our informal agreements] with Alpha’s procedures and templates [for formal procedures], and it wasn’t always easy. There was a clear mismatch between the formal process and the actual project needs, which we didn’t fully understand at the time.
To support this, Alpha also incorporated internal ad hoc processes between different units to facilitate smoother coordination with suppliers. The project specialist from Supplier B mentioned:
Throughout most of the project, [Alpha’s manager] assigned some of their employees to assist us with the complexities of the procedures and to facilitate communication with the staff.
These supportive activities enabled the coexistence of informal agreements by allowing faster decision-making and more effective collaboration, which was often lacking in the traditional procurement framework:
Managing friction through supportive resources.
Another category of coping activities involved providing supportive resources to create new resource constellations that could accommodate both standardized and interactive or translative interfaces. In all projects, Alpha and its suppliers had to allocate additional resources, such as overtime work and extended commitments, to address unforeseen project needs that emerged throughout the process. As we explain in the next section, this unanticipated demand for external time and resources also became a source of new frictions in later stages of collaboration, as both sides struggled to meet their expectations.
One of the supportive resources used to manage friction was the available competencies, as the need for technical and relational expertise to design solutions exceeded the procedural competencies embedded in standardized structures. To address this, they engaged consultants, relied on training programs, facilitated informal knowledge sharing and even asked some suppliers to conduct workshops for Alpha’s internal units to help them better grasp the technical aspects. In this regard, the deputy director of Alpha noted:
We had to ask Supplier A's team to also educate Alpha’s organization about the necessity of technological changes.
Managing friction by supporting actor bonds.
Another set of coping activities focused on strengthening actor bonds by fostering coordination among stakeholders, ensuring transparent communication and aligning expectations. In all three projects, numerous informal meetings were held long before formal contracts were signed. As illustrated in Figure 2, these coordination efforts were crucial in addressing challenges related to need specification and in establishing interactive or translative interfaces that facilitated smoother collaboration.
In another coping activity, Alpha engaged consultants who had deep knowledge of both Alpha’s concerns and the technological aspects of the procurement process. These intermediaries acted as brokers, effectively translating requirements and expectations between different units within Alpha and external suppliers. Their presence facilitated smoother negotiations, ensured that technical specifications aligned with procurement constraints and ultimately improved the overall working relationship between Alpha and its suppliers.
In addition, Alpha also needed to shape its image among external actors, including other public organizations and policymakers. To achieve this, they consistently used public relations tools, project reports and events to showcase the results of their projects. These efforts were aimed at reinforcing Alpha’s legitimacy as a technologically driven public organization within the broader public sector landscape.
Distribution of relational friction
After analyzing the three case projects, we observed a distribution of relational frictions that emerged both directly within the Alpha-supplier relational interface and indirectly across other related relationships. At the start of all three projects, Alpha’s managers recognized the friction between the standard relational interface, which is structured around formalized exchanges, and the more interactive approach they deemed necessary for procuring professional services. To manage this, the primary coping strategy they used was to establish informal procedures while formally adhering to public procurement regulations. This dual approach allowed the actors to leverage their trust in each other’s competencies, thereby managing the frictions that arose from attempting to navigate a non-standardized interface. However, as the cases unfolded, it became clear that while these coping activities addressed the immediate frictions, they also triggered further relational frictions at later stages of the projects.
Direct distribution of frictions was found to happen at the project level, and within the Alpha-supplier relational interfaces. These frictions were not isolated events, but cascading outcomes of interface shifts and the coping activities that responded to them. For instance, the informal agreements on project deliverables, although effective in the early stages, introduced new frictions in subsequent phases, such as misalignments with Alpha’s internal accounting practices or clashes with standardized procurement procedures. In projects A and C, flexible needs-definition helped in early stages but later created friction in the contracting phase, as Alpha’s Accounting and Finance Unit demanded more rigid specifications. Supplier C’s team manager noted the challenges of these informal practices:
Initially, we expected smooth, informal communication throughout the process, but we frequently encountered requests for dual deliverables and had to compromise on quality.
The analysis also showed that coping with relational frictions also generates indirect relational frictions beyond the immediate relational interface between Alpha’s manager and supplier. These frictions were disctributed to various units within Alpha and to other current or potential suppliers. For example, in Project A, the experiences of flexible approach taken to mitigate early-stage frictions affected the dynamics of Project B, where Alpha and the supplier B had to deal with some new expectations based on the experiences from Project A.
Indirect frictions also emerged between Alpha and its suppliers in relation to future collaborations, as the coping activities set new precedents that influenced how suppliers might interact with other public buyers. For example, we received feedback suggesting that these informal agreement practices deterred Team B from undertaking any further projects with Alpha and affected their future collaborations with the public sector, as highlighted by Supplier B’s team manager:
After this project, I didn’t go back to working with any public organizations [using informal agreements] because they don’t know what they want, and whatever output they see related to technology and digitalization, they ask us to implement it for them.
In conclusion, the analysis revealed that the frictions triggered by coping activities not only shaped the ongoing dynamics of Alpha’s interactions with suppliers but also influenced future procurement relationships, both within the immediate project context and across the broader network of public procurement actors. This twofold distribution of frictions – direct and indirect, and across space and time – offers important insights into how public procurement can serve as a tool for innovation, while also highlighting the challenges that arise when balancing standardized and interactive interfaces.
Table A3 in Appendix 3 provides a structured overview of how relational frictions emerge, how coping activities address them and how new frictions are subsequently distributed.
Discussion
This research examines a nested case in which the intention to use public procurement as a means of fostering innovation encountered significant challenges during implementation. Our analysis reveals how incorporating non-standardized relational interfaces within traditional public procurement processes generates and distributes relational frictions. By examining insights from different actors of the interface, we illustrate how these frictions are generated through interaction, highlighting their distributed nature rather than being isolated to one actor. Analyzing these dynamics through the lens of the IMP approach allows us to position our findings within the literature, addressing our research questions and highlighting key contributions.
Relational friction in public procurement
The case analysis demonstrates that relational frictions emerge when actors attempt to introduce changes to relational interfaces that have been institutionalized. These frictions become particularly evident when actors seek to establish more interactive or translative interfaces within a routinized structure designed for standardized exchanges. Public procurement processes institutionalize specific ways of doing things (Ojansivu and Hermes, 2021), and our findings indicate that relational interfaces are also institutionalized. These interfaces include how activities are linked, how resources are tied, and how actors are bonded. Based on these findings, we conceptualize relational friction as the result of destabilizing forces that arise when actors attempt to alter established relational interfaces within a rigid system. These frictions manifested in three key forms: activity misalignments, disruptions in resource ties and tensions in actor bonds. In some cases, these frictions enabled process innovation, but they also produced significant resistance and coordination breakdowns. Our findings answer RQ1 by conceptualizing the ways relational frictions emerge when actors integrate non-standardized relational interfaces into traditional public procurement processes. The case analysis illustrates how frictions triggered by relational interface shifts are manifested in different relationship dimensions: misalignment in activity links, disruption in resource ties and tension in actor bonds. Our cases show that these frictions have served as both enablers of innovation in outcomes and processes, but they have also brought significant tensions. This aligns with previous research on the impact of frictions in developmental initiatives within organizations (Hauke-Lopes et al., 2023).
In terms of activity coordination, our analysis reveals frictions manifested in misalignments between established procedures and the need for more flexible interactions. This aspect of relational friction is particularly relevant to our research, as procuring professional services – essentially a set of activities – entails inherent complexities in coordination (Pemer and Skjolsvik, 2015). Our research highlights how attempts to coordinate activities required for interactive and translative interfaces, while still adhering to standardized exchanges, created relational frictions between different actors at Alpha and suppliers at various project stages.
Regarding frictions in resource alignment, our analysis shows that attempts to share information and create deliverables through informal channels created tension with established procurement norms and templates. This aligns with previous research on how frictions arise when resources interact with other interconnected resources (Håkansson and Waluszewski, 2002b; Prenkert et al., 2022). Furthermore, as our case analysis demonstrates, transformation is ongoing, opening possibilities for new types of resource exchanges. This is similar to what occurs in digital transformation processes, where friction emerges at the interfaces between digital and non-digital resources (Hauke-Lopes et al., 2023). What makes our study particularly notable is its focus on professional services, emphasizing the connection of intangible resources rather than tangible ones, which are more commonly addressed in IMP research (Baraldi et al., 2023).
Regarding frictions related to changes in actor bonds, different actors involved in public procurement – including internal units and experienced suppliers – are accustomed to standardized interfaces. Their expectations and competencies have been developed around coordinating activities in a routine manner (Meehan et al., 2017; Torvatn and de Boer, 2017). As a result, attempts to introduce non-standardized relational interfaces disrupt established actor bonds, creating tensions that must be managed within the procurement process.
Coping activities and their implementation
Our analysis identified and categorized the coping activities used to manage friction. Previous research has typically focused on activities aimed at avoiding friction and maintaining strictly standardized interfaces (Pemer et al., 2014). However, our cases provide more detailed insights into innovative organizations that seek to develop new approaches within traditional settings, thereby managing inevitable frictions rather than merely avoiding them.
In these practices, they sometimes had to bypass certain norms and routines while still adhering to key legal requirements. This phenomenon has been observed in previous research; for example, Waluszewski and Wagrell (2013) noted that some managers prefer to “fool the system” to achieve efficiency while still benefiting from purchasing policies. Similarly, in the context of Iranian public procurement, Taheriruh and Moshtari (2023) provided detailed examples of decoupling policy processes in the procurement of consulting services.
In this research, a key practice observed in our cases was the handling of multiple relational interfaces simultaneously. We focused on cases where actors had to manage several interfaces at once. The handling of different relational interfaces has also been discussed in other IMP research, where the need for using and managing multiple interfaces is emphasized (Holma et al., 2022; Lind and Melander, 2019).
We developed a more detailed approach to categorizing coping activities, aligning them with different aspects of relational friction. In doing so, we address RQ2 by introducing coping activities, which we classified into three main categories:
Managing friction through supportive activities;
Managing friction through supportive resources; and
Managing friction by supporting actor bonds.
Regarding coping through supportive activities, the case analysis highlighted ad hoc coordination processes and additional legal mechanisms that helped manage activity links at different interfaces. In the IMP literature, such mechanisms have been described using various terms, including “lubricants” (Hauke-Lopes et al., 2023), which reduce friction at critical interface points.
Regarding supportive resources, this was also identified as a key aspect of managing interfaces. Our findings align with previous research emphasizing the importance of allocating additional resources to enable the open-ended dialogues necessary for interactive interfaces (Araujo et al., 1999) and interaction capacities (Araujo et al., 2016). Another crucial aspect in our analysis was the need for new competencies to achieve this effectively. This aligns with prior research on the importance of enhancing interaction capabilities (Araujo et al., 2016). Specifically, in public procurement, Holma et al. (2022) acknowledge the need for different sets of relational abilities to effectively manage market dialogues in procurement processes.
Finally, coping with friction by managing new actor bonds also aligns with previous research on the role of organizational practices in handling relational interfaces (Araujo et al., 2016). One of the observed activities involved better management of ad hoc meetings to improve alignment among different actors (Kronlid and Baraldi, 2020). In particular, one of the main practices highlighted in our research – the use of intermediation – has been emphasized in numerous studies on public procurement aimed at fostering innovation. In such cases, intermediaries played a crucial role in improving communication (Holma et al., 2022).
Relational frictions are not just local: direct and indirect friction distributions
The case analysis showed that relational frictions were not merely local; instead, the cycle of friction and coping activities spread them across actor networks. We observed two forms of distribution affecting subsequent project steps, direct and indirect. These frictions influenced Alpha’s managerial team’s interactions with suppliers and extended beyond immediate project interfaces, shaping future relationships with other suppliers and public organizations. While coping activities addressed some frictions, they also created new ones across different relational interfaces, as evident in the case analysis example provided in Table A3.
Therefore, we discuss this pattern and elaborate on the concept of direct and indirect effects of frictions, drawing inspiration from Hoholm and Olsen (2012). Their work on local and distributed friction effects highlights how forces acting on one resource are never isolated but extend across interfaces. Therefore, we put forward our argument around the direct and indirect distribution of frictions and demonstrate that the relational frictions are never merely local; instead, they distribute across relational interfaces. These interdependencies can exist between different actors’ interfaces (as shown by Andersen and Gadde, (2019); Lind and Melander, (2019), and also between internal and external relational interfaces within and beyond organizations, as emphasized by Sundquist and Melander (2021).
In the context of public procurement, understanding these interdependencies is particularly critical because they are often institutionalized within and between relational interfaces across internal units – such as procurement, finance and legal departments – and external actors like suppliers or auditors. For instance, our cases showed how informal agreements initiated by project managers later encountered resistance or misalignment when reviewed by procurement officers or accounting departments, whose routines are bound by standard procedures. This reflects the broader institutionalized norms in public procurement, where engaging in projects with public organizations often requires conformity to expectations that have been shaped by regulatory and procedural legacies. Many procedures governing how different units within the public sector engage with suppliers have been shaped to operate in a standardized manner. Following Freytag et al. (2017), we argue that these interdependencies exist due to linked activities and resource bonds within these processes, creating connections between relational interfaces across organizations, units and functions. Consequently, coping strategies such as early-stage flexibility or informal agreements – although helpful in initiating collaboration – can unintentionally disrupt downstream procurement steps such as contracting, performance evaluation or future tendering. These disruptions illustrate how friction is indirectly distributed through the broader public procurement system.
Therefore, in addressing our third research question, we find that relational frictions distribute through both direct and indirect pathways, influenced by the hierarchical structure and procedural rigidity characteristic of public procurement systems. This creates a pattern that extends beyond immediate relational interfaces and influences the broader network of public procurement relationships in both temporal and spatial dimensions.
Figure 3 summarizes the framework developed in this study, illustrating how relational frictions emerge, are managed and become distributed across interfaces. It depicts the misalignment between the standardized relational interfaces that dominate public procurement processes and the interactive interfaces required for procuring professional services. The figure contrasts two alternative paths: one path aims to maintain compliance by avoiding friction and staying within established norms – often resulting in the commodification of services. The other path, which characterizes Alpha’s approach, seeks innovation while still adhering to legal requirements. In this path, friction is not avoided but actively managed by attempting to reshape the relational interface. The figure then illustrates how this coping process generates direct relational frictions within the same interface and subsequently distributes indirect frictions across other relational interfaces within the organization. These cascading effects highlight the interconnected and temporal nature of friction distribution in public procurement settings.
The image presents a flowchart exploring the themes of friction avoidance and management in service interfaces. At the top, the chart conveys two main aims: compliance without altering norms and innovation while maintaining compliance, labelled as Path of Alpha, indicated by a blue bird icon. Below these aims, left and right branches detail the concepts related to coping with service changes and relational interface changes, respectively. Key terms like standard and interactive interfaces are organized in boxes, with arrows showing connections between them. Additional notes indicate indirect and direct relational frictions in relation to other interfaces. The layout features dashed and bold box borders to distinguish categories, while arrows clearly indicate the flow of ideas from one concept to another.Illustration of the generation of relational friction, coping activities and distributed frictions
Source: Authors’ own work
The image presents a flowchart exploring the themes of friction avoidance and management in service interfaces. At the top, the chart conveys two main aims: compliance without altering norms and innovation while maintaining compliance, labelled as Path of Alpha, indicated by a blue bird icon. Below these aims, left and right branches detail the concepts related to coping with service changes and relational interface changes, respectively. Key terms like standard and interactive interfaces are organized in boxes, with arrows showing connections between them. Additional notes indicate indirect and direct relational frictions in relation to other interfaces. The layout features dashed and bold box borders to distinguish categories, while arrows clearly indicate the flow of ideas from one concept to another.Illustration of the generation of relational friction, coping activities and distributed frictions
Source: Authors’ own work
Conclusions
Theoretical implications
Our research, by conceptualizing the concept of relational frictions, its generation and coping activities, makes several contributions to the literature on public procurement and the theoretical discourse around relational interfaces and friction.
First, it contributes to the literature concerned with understanding why public procurement often struggles to capture value and faces challenges in moving beyond cost-focused approaches (Malacina et al., 2022). In particular, when it comes to innovation in public procurement, our research seeks to explain why capturing innovation remains only partially achieved (Meehan et al., 2017). We present a case study illustrating how actors in public procurement sometimes bypass standardized procedures by leveraging legal flexibilities to overcome rigid regulatory constraints for innovation. Although this phenomenon has been noted in previous research (Taheriruh and Moshtari, 2023; Waluszewski and Wagrell, 2013), it has not been thoroughly explored. Our study investigates this issue and emphasizes a relational perspective to better understand why efforts to implement innovative practices in public procurement – traditionally reliant on institutionalized methods of managing relationships (Ojansivu and Hermes, 2021) – face significant challenges. In doing so, our research builds on prior work that suggests innovation in heavily regulated environments requires navigating complex and often non-linear paths (Håkansson and Waluszewski, 2018).
Second, within the domain of innovative public procurement, we respond to calls for further investigation into how challenges emerge from relationships and interactions during the implementation of innovation (Axelsson and Torvatn, 2017; Cabral et al., 2019). Even though our findings showcase ways of achieving innovation by integrating interaction into public procurement, thereby aligning with findings such as Holma et al. (2022) and Torvatn and de Boer (2017), we also acknowledge that non-standardized interfaces present difficulties in traditional public procurement—just as scholars in the IMP community have argued, noting that the adoption of interactive and translation interfaces in public procurement contexts introduces new challenges (Håkansson and Axelsson, 2020). In this discourse, our introduction of relational friction offers a conceptual framework to explain how the adoption of interactive and translation interfaces in traditional public procurement can create tensions within networks, thereby complicating procurement objectives.
Third, we contribute to research on frictions within the IMP framework by offering a novel actor-level perspective on relational frictions, complementing the traditional resource-friction view (Prenkert et al., 2022; Hoholm and Olsen, 2012). Our work builds on recent scholarly developments that incorporate the actor dimension of friction (Prenkert et al., 2022) and aligns with Mattila’s (2017) notion of performative friction, as well as Tóth et al.’s (2018) findings on network tensions during change processes. By analyzing how relational frictions emerge, are managed, and are distributed across networks, our study provides a nuanced understanding of the interconnected dependencies among relational interfaces in public procurement. Regarding friction distribution, we demonstrate how it unfolds across both temporal dimensions (the direct and indirect propagation of friction over time) and spatial dimensions (relational frictions indirectly affecting connected relational interfaces). This extends existing research on friction distribution in business networks (Håkansson and Waluszewski, 2002b; Prenkert et al., 2022) by highlighting the temporal and spatial dynamics of relational friction within relational interfaces.
Finally, our study introduces these frameworks into contexts that have received less scholarly attention. First, we address the need to examine public procurement in developing countries, as much of the existing research focuses on developed nations (Jooriyan et al., 2024). Developing countries tend to rely more heavily on public procurement for economic development (Knack et al., 2019) and exhibit distinct characteristics that make it difficult to simply adopt best practices from developed nations (Kattel and Lember, 2010). Our research highlights the specificity of these contexts, adding depth to the discussion. In addition, we respond to calls for further research on the procurement of professional services in the public sector (Pemer et al., 2018). While much prior research on professional services procurement has focused on fostering innovation, there has been limited attention to process innovation (D’Antone and Santos, 2016). We contribute to this gap by providing insights into the procurement of professional services – an area that relies on interfaces within standardized exchanges – and explaining the underlying reasons for its challenges.
Practical implications
The findings of this research are particularly relevant for actors in developing countries who seek to foster innovation within traditional public procurement systems. In such settings, institutionalized procurement patterns shape relationships between public buyers and suppliers. Aiming for innovation in public procurement, which often relies on non-standardized interfaces, usually requires altering established structures – potentially leading to relational frictions. However, innovation cannot take place without some degree of change in existing settings. Thus, the key message is to embrace innovation while acknowledging the frictions it may generate, understanding how to manage them and considering their long-term impact on procurement structures. Based on our research, we offer the following recommendations for different stakeholders:
Public managers seeking innovation should recognize the complexities of modifying institutionalized relational interfaces. Relational frictions create both opportunities for innovation and unexpected challenges. Effectively managing these interconnections – both within and beyond the organization –demands strong coordination. The coping activities identified in this research suggest several practical strategies to address these frictions, such as investing in organizational competencies and fostering coordination with suppliers. In addition, intermediaries can play a crucial role in facilitating shared understanding between public buyers and suppliers. Finally, institutional efforts, such as maintaining ongoing dialogues with other public organizations and policymakers, can help drive regulatory changes that provide greater flexibility in structuring procurement relationships. By adopting a network perspective, public organizations can better anticipate these issues, strategically cope with them and ultimately enhance value creation through innovation in procurement. Addressing these frictions is essential to fully harness the potential of innovative procurement approaches within the public sector.
For suppliers, particularly SMEs aiming to introduce innovation in public organizations, this research highlights key considerations. Engaging in informal agreements and interactive collaborations offers flexibility in co-developing innovations but also introduces risks. These risks include unexpected demands, misinterpretations and underestimating required resources. Suppliers should be aware of these challenges and proactively engage in transparent communication and expectation management with public buyers.
The research can also provide insights for policymakers. Policies promoting innovation through public procurement can be highly beneficial, but their success depends on the institutional context in which they are applied. Procurement systems operate within established routines that shape relationships between buyers and suppliers. One way to design more effective policies is to learn from the experiences of innovative public organizations that have taken risks in modifying relational interfaces, managing frictions and integrating new procurement approaches. By recognizing these challenges and developing supportive policies, policymakers can maximize the potential of innovative procurement in the public sector.
Limitations and future research
This study is based on a single nested case study, which limits the statistical generalizability of our findings. As a result, their applicability to other countries or even other Iranian organizations remains constrained. Instead, we pursued theoretical generalizability (Dubois and Gadde, 2002) by introducing new concepts related to relational frictions in this specific context. While the study is grounded in a specific country context, we believe the insights are relevant to other developing countries with similarly institutionalized procurement systems, where legal frameworks allow for interaction but organizational routines continue to prioritize standardization. Future research could extend the study to other contexts than public procurement, where structural changes require the implementation of new relational interfaces. Examining how relational frictions emerge and distribute in industries undergoing regulatory shifts, digital transformations or sustainability transitions could provide a broader understanding of these dynamics.
In addition, further studies could explore the different layers of relational frictions with more detail, particularly their connections to disruptions in activity links, resource ties and actor bonds. Investigating how these layers interact could offer deeper insights into the mechanisms that hinder or enable innovation within structured environments.
In terms of coping activities, longitudinal studies could examine whether different coping strategies help manage immediate frictions, directly distributed frictions or more indirect, systemic frictions. This would shed light on the effectiveness of coping mechanisms over time and their impact on procurement outcomes.
Future research could examine how friction is distributed across a wider range of actors, not just buyers and suppliers but also government agencies, universities and other stakeholders. This would provide a better understanding of how relational frictions emerge and spread in different networks, offering valuable insights for both theory and practice.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the editors of this special issue for their support. Authors also express their sincere appreciation to the anonymous reviewers for their insightful and constructive feedback, which greatly contributed to the development of this paper and made the revision process a valuable learning experience. Authors are especially grateful to all of their interviewees for generously sharing their insights. Authors hope this research will contribute meaningfully to the future of that innovative public organization.
References
Appendix 1
Overview of the characteristics of the four relational interfaces
| Dimensions | Standardized | Specified | Translational | Interactive | Relevant references |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Type of relationship | Arm’s length relationship | Traditional subcontracting | Delegated design | Open ended interactions | Araujo et al. (1999), Le Dain et al. (2011) |
| Aim (innovation or efficiency) | Efficiency-focused, leveraging economies of scale | Efficiency with some customization but limited flexibility for innovation | Balanced between efficiency and innovation, allowing suppliers to contribute creatively | Innovation-driven, fostering co-creation and novel solutions | Araujo et al. (1999), Andersen and Gadde (2019), Araujo et al. (2016) |
| Type of service exchange | Standardized offerings | Customized offerings | Buyer informs its needs, and the supplier has freedom to develop the solution | Joint development | Araujo et al. (1999), Lind and Melander (2019) |
| Linking of activities in service exchange | The buyer and supplier do not need insight into the other’s contexts and resources | The buyer wants a customized solution and gives precise directions, leaving suppliers with restricted possibilities to develop the service | The buyer describes the service’s required functionality rather than giving detailed specifications; the supplier translates functional needs into a solution | The buyer and supplier jointly develop the specifications of what to exchange | Araujo et al. (1999), Holma et al. (2022), Andersen and Gadde (2019) |
| Organizing principle between actors | Ranges from simple to more advanced internal set-ups | Cooperation between several functions; cross-functional collaboration | Use of cross-functional teams; the buyer’s internal organization needs to match the supplier’s functions | Open-ended interaction in collaborative teams involving members from the buyer and the supplier | Araujo et al. (1999), Lind and Melander (2019) |
| Dimensions | Standardized | Specified | Translational | Interactive | Relevant references |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Type of relationship | Arm’s length relationship | Traditional subcontracting | Delegated design | Open ended interactions | |
| Aim (innovation or efficiency) | Efficiency-focused, leveraging economies of scale | Efficiency with some customization but limited flexibility for innovation | Balanced between efficiency and innovation, allowing suppliers to contribute creatively | Innovation-driven, fostering co-creation and novel solutions | |
| Type of service exchange | Standardized offerings | Customized offerings | Buyer informs its needs, and the supplier has freedom to develop the solution | Joint development | |
| Linking of activities in service exchange | The buyer and supplier do not need insight into the other’s contexts and resources | The buyer wants a customized solution and gives precise directions, leaving suppliers with restricted possibilities to develop the service | The buyer describes the service’s required functionality rather than giving detailed specifications; the supplier translates functional needs into a solution | The buyer and supplier jointly develop the specifications of what to exchange | |
| Organizing principle between actors | Ranges from simple to more advanced internal set-ups | Cooperation between several functions; cross-functional collaboration | Use of cross-functional teams; the buyer’s internal organization needs to match the supplier’s functions | Open-ended interaction in collaborative teams involving members from the buyer and the supplier |
Appendix 2
Summary of key concepts in this research and their connections to similar concepts in the literature
| Definition in this study | Related concepts | |
|---|---|---|
| Relational interface | Relational interfaces refer to the touchpoints through which the resource bases of buyer and supplier are connected by exchange activities (Araujo et al., 1999) | We found several studies referencing Araujo et al. (1999) with different terms like buyer-supplier interface (Holma et al., 2022), supplier interfaces (Ferreira and Lind, 2023) and organizational interface (Sundquist and Melander, 2021)Resource interface: Specific contact points between two resources defined along relevant technical, economic, and social dimensions” (Baraldi, 2003, p. 18) |
| Relational friction | Results of the destabilizing forces or movements toward heavy resource ties, activity links or actor bonds occur as a result of changes within the established relational interfaces of actors (authors’ definition), such as seeking innovative processes in standardized traditional environments like public procurement | Friction (actor–network perspective): Performative tension between actors and networks while a new resource or process is adopted in a network (Mattila, 2017)Resource friction: Result of any destabilizing force or movement of resources in relation to other interconnected resources (Håkansson and Waluszewski, 2002a, 2002b)Network tension: Discomfort generated by ambiguity that can have various sources, such as contradictory and unclear communications, the absence of communication, a lack of sufficient planning, and incongruity between actors’ aims (Tóth et al., 2018) |
| Coping activities | Activities to reduce the effects of the relational frictions between actors | Coping strategies: Approaches to resolve frictions and misalignments between actors (Mattila, 2017)Lubricants: Elements that reduce friction in resource contact points (Hauke-Lopes et al., 2023) |
| Friction distribution | Relational frictions can trigger other frictions, which we categorized by elaborating on (Hoholm and Olsen, 2012): Direct frictions: Relational frictions occurring at the buyer–seller interfaces of our focus Indirect frictions: Relational frictions that arise with interfaces involving other actors in the network | Friction effects (direct and indirect): They can be direct (local) or distributed across resource interfaces and affect other resources (Hoholm and Olsen, 2012) |
| Definition in this study | Related concepts | |
|---|---|---|
| Relational interface | Relational interfaces refer to the touchpoints through which the resource bases of buyer and supplier are connected by exchange activities ( | We found several studies referencing |
| Relational friction | Results of the destabilizing forces or movements toward heavy resource ties, activity links or actor bonds occur as a result of changes within the established relational interfaces of actors (authors’ definition), such as seeking innovative processes in standardized traditional environments like public procurement | Friction (actor–network perspective): Performative tension between actors and networks while a new resource or process is adopted in a network ( |
| Coping activities | Activities to reduce the effects of the relational frictions between actors | Coping strategies: Approaches to resolve frictions and misalignments between actors ( |
| Friction distribution | Relational frictions can trigger other frictions, which we categorized by elaborating on ( | Friction effects (direct and indirect): They can be direct (local) or distributed across resource interfaces and affect other resources ( |
Appendix 3
Case analysis for project A: Relational frictions, coping activities and distributed relational frictions (direct and indirect)
| Pre-procurement: Need articulation and supplier selection | Procurement: Contract development and interaction design | Service collaboration: service delivery, monitoring, and evaluation | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Relational frictions | FA.1 Unspecified need articulation [interactive] – specified needs [standardized] FA.2 Competence in understanding the technologies to co-create [needed for interactive] – not enough competence among alpha’s staff FA.3 Need for informal alpha–supplier a communications [interactive] – established procedures [standardized] | FA.4 Fitting joint understanding of deliverables [interactive] in the contract template [standardized] FA.5 Planning a budget for unspecified work tasks [interactive] alongside formal and standard deliverables [standardized] FA.6 Need for informal collaboration channel [interactive] alongside standardized channel [standardized] FA.7 Friction in managing the ad hoc coordination at alpha [interactive] vs. traditional and standardized coordination within alpha [standardized] | FA.8 Evaluating a service collaboration [interactive] with standardized monitoring templates [standardized] • Need to provide symbolic reports at procedural checkpoints • Additional expectations from buyers, under-expected delivery from suppliers • Financial aspects of agreeing on value of informal deliverables [interactive] and formal deliverables [standardized] FA.9 Friction in managing the ad hoc coordination at alpha [interactive] vs. traditional and standardized coordination within alpha [standardized] |
| Coping activities | CA. 1 Informal joint proposal development alongside standard bureaucratic process of proposal approval • Informal meetings for specification of needs • Informal training sessions to gain minimal competencies of technology understanding CA. 2 Creating an internal ad hoc process at alpha for internal coordination and other units’ interfaces with supplier a in alpha’s traditional and standardized coordination system • Creating informal communication channels between suppliers and internal units (involving policy research suppliers in relevant internal meetings) • Creating informal information sharing channel between alpha’s manager alongside standardized channel using informal meetings and direct communication channels that bypass formal communication procedures | CA.3 Informal agreement alongside formal contracting • Informal and unspecified deliverables vs. formal and specified contract deliverables • Agreeing on potential future deliverable needs based on trust • Assigning an internal unit to help the team connect informally to other alpha units and monitor the informally agreed deliverables • Making (internal alpha) justifications for taking this risky approach CA.4 Managing the internal ad hoc process at alpha for internal coordination and other units’ interfaces with supplier a in alpha’s traditional and standardized coordination system • Agreeing on informal communication systems • Managing informal communication channels | CA.5 Managing conflicts between two types of evaluation (formal and informal) • Conflict resolution sessions to mitigate new challenges related to possible additional expectations (particularly between supplier a and the external project monitoring team) CA.6 Using different public relation tools light project reports four events to gain legitimacy CA.7 Managing the internal ad hoc process at alpha for internal coordination and other units’ interfaces with supplier a • Agreeing on informal communication systems between supplier, internal units, and external evaluators • Managing informal communication channels • Using additional legal ways to compensate for unprecedented tasks (supplementary contracts) |
| Direct triggered frictions | (FA.1,2) + (CA.1) → FA.3 (FA.1,2) + (CA.1) → FA.4,5 (FA.1,2,3) + (CA.1,2) → FA.6,7 | (FA. 4,5) + (CA.3) → FA. 6,7 (FA. 4,5) + (CA.3) → FA.8 (FA. 5,6,7) + (CA.4) → FA.9 | (FA. 8) + (CA.5,6) → FA. 9 |
| Indirect triggered frictions | (FA.1,2,3) + (CA.1,2) affected the following interfaces: • Alpha’s managerial unit – the higher authority organization of alpha (to obtain permission) • Alpha’s managerial unit – other internal units (increase in political tensions like perception of misuse of power by alpha’s manager) | (FA. 5,6,7) + (CA.4) affected the following interfaces: • Alpha’s managerial unit – accounting and finance unit (regarding contract-related procedures) • Alpha’s managerial unit – department of licensing and regulatory affairs (about coordinating internal processes) • Alpha’s managerial unit – future potential suppliers (like project B, with the creation of templates for informal agreement procedures) | (FA.1,2,3) + (CA.1,2) affected the following interfaces: • Alpha’s managerial unit – external monitoring agent and accounting and finance unit (regarding contract monitoring) • Supplier a and national directory for tax and insurance • Alpha’s managerial unit – department of licensing and regulatory affairs (about evaluation processes) • Alpha’s managerial unit – potential future suppliers (like project B) about the possibilities of these coping activities |
| Pre-procurement: Need articulation and supplier selection | Procurement: Contract development and interaction design | Service collaboration: service delivery, monitoring, and evaluation | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Relational frictions | FA.1 Unspecified need articulation [interactive] – specified needs [standardized] | FA.4 Fitting joint understanding of deliverables [interactive] in the contract template [standardized] | FA.8 Evaluating a service collaboration [interactive] with standardized monitoring templates [standardized] |
| Coping activities | CA. 1 Informal joint proposal development alongside standard bureaucratic process of proposal approval | CA.3 Informal agreement alongside formal contracting | CA.5 Managing conflicts between two types of evaluation (formal and informal) |
| Direct triggered frictions | ( | ( | ( |
| Indirect triggered frictions | ( | ( | ( |

