Larry Nucci, in his article “Character: A Multifaceted Developmental System,” has outlined a model of character that focuses on 4 domains of the moral system. This response focuses on 2 issues. The first is Nucci’s equation of character with moral functioning. My research has led me to propose that 3 elements are essential to any adequate theory of character, called caring, inquisitiveness, and self-control. These emerge across a number of virtue theories, as well as models of essential skills and even literary references. In particular, I suggest that inquisitiveness and self-control are indicators of character even when not used to support moral ends, so long as they are not used to support immoral ones. Second, I think the model Nucci proposes for moral character is incomplete, as it fails to outline the competing considerations that enter into moral decision-making. Character education programs should acknowledge and even emphasize how these competing considerations can lead to nonmoral decision-making when environmental factors encourage poor choices.
In his article, “Character: A Multifaceted Developmental System,” Larry Nucci is attempting something that I think is very exciting. He has clearly taken to heart Kohlberg’s (Kohlberg & Hersch, 1977) dismissal of character education as training in a “bag of virtues.” In response, Nucci seems to be rejecting the traditional approach to thinking of character as an enumeration of attributes, such as honesty or fairness. In its place, he is attempting to reconceptualize character as a relational developmental system (Lerner & Schmid Callina, 2014) consisting of four interlocking elements. These elements operate together to generate moral judgments and actions in a manner influenced by the individual’s developmental status and environmental context. Character in this framework is no longer a list, but an organization.
Why do I call this approach exciting? Historically, my research has focused on person measurement, and when I was asked to reflect on Nucci’s article, it was to be from the perspective of a personality researcher. In fact, much of my work on character has focused on its structure, some of which I will cite below. For these reasons, I have a fondness for research that attempts to identify “true” structure. That said, this approach can go only so far in terms of understanding a construct so culturally shaped as character; the process by which character affects and is affected by the person’s environment very quickly emerges as a topic of great interest.
In fact, even the field of personality research has started to come to grips with this issue, and it is striking to me the parallels I see between Nucci’s efforts to embed character in the self-system and relatively recent work on identity as a personality concept (e.g., McAdams & Manczak, 2015; McAdams & McLean, 2013). Elsewhere, I have even suggested that one of the central features distinguishing character education from other forms of education for personal growth is the focus on identity, on “who will I be?” rather than “what will I do?” (McGrath, 2017). I see a potentially fruitful marriage across research traditions, in which methodologies developed for purposes of uncovering an individual’s narrative identity are applied to moral identity as well.
Despite my enthusiasm for the potential of this approach, the remainder of this article will be devoted to two concerns about the model Nucci presents. First, there is another lesson from personality research to be learned that I think will enrich the model he is presenting. Personality researchers have been attempting to integrate their traditional taxonomic approach to understanding personality as a series of dimensions with the new perspective on narrative identity (McAdams & Pals, 2006), though it can be questioned how successful those efforts have been. I think it will be similarly important to consider structural work on character, to see what implications it might have for the model he is sculpting. In particular, my work leads me to suspect Nucci has omitted at least one essential component of character, one that requires looking further beyond the moral agent.
Second, morality is a very complicated relational developmental system. I fear the four units Nucci describes as underlying moral character does not come close to capturing the complexity of that system. That is, perhaps he also needs to look more closely within the moral agent.
The Essentials Of Character
Nucci’s equation of character with morality has a rich heritage among experts in character education (e.g., Berkowitz, Althof, & Bier, 2012), but there are alternative perspectives. In particular, the first lengthy discussion in recorded history of what we now would think of as character, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, considered it to have both moral and intellectual elements (Bartlett & Collins, 2007), while Lickona and Davidson (2005) focused on moral and productive elements. Is character simply what we decide it is in any time or place, or is there an essential element to its nature?
There are at least three reasons the answer to this question can be important. First, if character is just a cultural construct, there may be no adequate defense against Kohlberg’s “bag of virtues” objection to character education. Second, character education can be reduced to convincing people to comply with social convention. Third, a purely socially constructed list of the elements of character can expand indefinitely.
One possible solution to this problem would simply declare Aristotle and others wrong and Nucci right, and reduce character to the moral. Recently, I suggested an alternative (yes, admittedly structural) solution. I suggested three key elements of character, or key virtues, consist of caring, inquisitiveness, and self-control (McGrath, 2015). My colleagues and I have recently completed a follow-up analysis of this model (McGrath, Greenberg, & Hall-Simmonds, in press) that replicated this model across 12 samples from around the world. These samples completed several different measures of character, in different languages, and data were analyzed using several different statistical methods. I should make it clear there are real limitations to the research underlying this model. The studies used data reflecting only one model of character, though this model is particularly popular and comprehensive (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). The samples were largely Western or at least highly educated. Finally, the model was derived largely from cross-sectional self-report data, data sources Nucci justifiably criticizes in his article. That said, McGrath et al. (in press) attempted to justify these three dimensions as necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, components of a comprehensive model of character. Evidence was marshaled across educational, philosophical, and psychological literature supporting the ubiquity of these three factors in understanding successful functioning (e.g., Curren, 2008, 2013; National Research Council, 2012; Park, Tsukayama, Goodwin, Patrick, & Duckworth, 2016). My favorite piece of evidence that the model speaks to something fundamental in what makes us good people is L. Frank Baum’s (1900/2006) The Wonderful Wizard of Oz. The story chronicles a search for a heart, a brain, and courage. In the end, of course, the protagonists find that the key to all three may be found within.
Since Nucci’s model of moral character includes the concept of performance, the models do not seem that far apart. I see two key differences.
First, the omission of a component that focuses on intellectual curiosity limits his model’s capacity for capturing moral functioning at its best. Without an element of regular reappraisal, moral beliefs will become complacent. It is reminiscent of Toni Morrison’s (1987) Beloved, in which most of the White characters accept the inferior status of the Blacks without challenge. Even the siblings who appear to have rejected the status quo are oblivious to the implications of the racist figurine they have on display in their house. As Erskine (1927) said, we have a moral obligation to be intelligent. In fact, I would consider inquisitiveness a necessary precursor to the formation of the capacity for discourse Nucci references as part of his model.
Second, the school of thought that equates character with morality tends to perceive concepts such as self-control and inquisitiveness as components of character only to the extent they contribute to moral functioning. The Aristotelian view instead considers these to be elements of good character in their own right, so long as they are not used for immoral ends. I believe evidence of self-control and inquisitiveness are likely to be taken as evidence of good character even in morally neutral situations. Productivity and curiosity deserve to be considered goods in themselves, contributors to the well-being of the individual, the quality of the individual’s relationships, and the community in which the individual resides. It is not in service to morality that these attributes develop, though once developed they will serve morality as they do all other elements of the self-system. Character is something larger than morality, even if morality rests at its heart.
I will finish this section with some additional thoughts I have drawn from thinking about the model I have outlined here as it applies to character education in particular.
There is a tradition beginning with Aristotle of conceptualizing the virtues as reciprocal (Irwin, 1988), that is, they must all be present for true character to exist. Character education programs that focus on only some components of character are, I believe, inadequate to ensure a good person, and I think Dr. Nucci agrees with me here.
A comprehensive approach to teaching and encouraging development of the three key virtues of character would recognize three benefits that are likely to be important to the individual at different points in development. Virtuous behaviors benefit us personally, in that they help us flourish in a social context. As Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) said, being virtuous is the only reliable bet we have for a happy life. Second, virtuous behaviors benefit our relationships. A surprising amount of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is dedicated to friendship (Bartlett & Collins, 2007; see also Fowers, 2000). Finally, the products of our virtue contribute to the community as a whole. As a youth’s world view widens, the reasons for virtue should broaden.
Nucci makes an important point in describing character as a relational developmental system. One of the most difficult tasks we face in becoming a moral person is figuring out the best moral choice in ambiguous and uncertain circumstances. This is a complex process, and we know very little still about how to transmit this knowledge to others. This statement provides the basis for my second point.
The Complexities Of Character
This second point has to do with whether Dr. Nucci has adequately captured the moral decision-making system. The organization of that system in terms of moral cognition, moral mental health, performance, and discourse is innovative. I would like to suggest, though, that this approach overlooks one of the most important issues that should be part of any program of moral/character education. Being moral is not inherently easy. It requires coming to a decision that balances a number of potentially competing considerations: care versus justice, sentiment versus contract, principle versus consequence, social responsibility versus self-preservation. I could go on at great length about each of these dilemmas, but given constraints of space, I hope the labels are sufficient to provide the reader with a sense of the dilemma each entails.
Compounding the problems is the practical matter of efficient versus deliberative decision-making; and our capacity to interpret prosocial behavior that comes at little cost, and is driven by contextual factors, as evidence of a firm moral identity. It is fortunate we so rarely face true moral dilemmas, where different considerations of roughly equal weight lead us to very different conclusions about what to do. If we did, claims of either consistency or coherence in our moral deliberations might be far weaker.
Unfortunately, the only perspective Nucci reviews that touches on this complexity is Haidt’s (2012) moral foundations theory, which I agree with him is a very problematic model, for more reasons than he has outlined. However, the shortcomings of this model does not invalidate the importance of understanding, and of teaching students in character education programs to understand, the competing considerations that can enter into the practical process of moral decision-making. My point is that to understand how moral decision-making occurs in context, it is important not just to know what is right, it is also essential to know the methods by which we decide what is right in that context. For purposes of advancing the field of character education, this system of interlocking elements is the one that really matters.
Conclusions
To summarize, I think Dr. Nucci’s article is thought-provoking and scholarly, and raises an intriguing new approach to thinking about the character system. It is this concept, of character as a system that operates within evolving contexts, that I consider his article’s most important contribution. However, I think the system he describes could be improved in two ways.
First is its limitation to the moral. Should you consider it worthwhile to ask me, “what is virtuous character development,” my answer might be broader than that Dr. Nucci would offer. I would say it involves people caring without the expectation of reciprocation, questioning their beliefs without a crisis, and demonstrating discipline even in the absence of structure. The enactment of character is a constant interchange between person and context, but I think these elements represent what a person of character would bring to that interchange.
Second is its minimization of issues of moral complexity and moral dilemma. Fortunately, stable societies are structured in such a way that acting in a relatively moral way is generally rewarded. The question is how we ensure that morality remains the dominant consideration when the immediate contingencies of reinforcement are otherwise. We must prepare people not only to be complacent moral agents when the moral choice is easy; we must think more about how to achieve moral decision-making when the moral choice is hard.
