This study examines the diversity of top management teams (TMTs) in family firms operating in European Emerging Markets, with particular attention to gender composition and governance configurations defined by ownership and management structures. The study addresses limited configurational evidence on how gender diversity, embedded within family governance structures, relates to organizational characteristics and financial performance in post-transition economies.
Using firm-level data, the study analyses a large sample of family small and medium-sized enterprises operating in European Emerging Markets. A cluster analysis is employed to identify distinct ownership-management governance configurations based on family ownership, family involvement in management, gender composition of TMTs, firm age, and size. Differences in structural characteristics and financial performance across clusters are subsequently examined.
The analysis identifies five distinct clusters of family firms, reflecting different governance and leadership configurations, including male-managed and female-managed family-dominated firms, co-managed firms, co-owned and co-managed firms, and mature family firms. The results suggest that gender representation in leadership within family-owned and -managed firms follows a polarized pattern, with women either occupying central managerial roles or remaining largely absent from formal leadership structures. This pattern indicates a link between ownership structures and gendered leadership configurations. While female-managed family firms are significantly smaller in terms of employment, no statistically significant differences in financial performance are observed between male- and female-managed family-dominated firms. This suggests that gender diversity in TMTs is highly heterogeneous across firms but does not translate into systematic performance differences.
The cross-sectional design and country-level data imbalance limit causal inference, as well as the ability to capture the dynamic evolution of ownership-management configurations and gender roles over time. In addition, the use of quantitative secondary data does not allow for distinguishing between symbolic and substantive participation of women in leadership positions. These limitations suggest avenues for future longitudinal and qualitative research that could provide deeper insights into governance processes, succession dynamics, and the actual influence of women in family firm leadership.
The results suggest that policies and advisory programs targeting family firms should avoid one-size-fits-all approaches and instead account for heterogeneity in ownership–management configurations, succession dynamics, and the role of family control. In particular, managers should recognize that women's participation in leadership is often shaped by governance structures and institutional constraints. These factors may limit their strategic influence despite formal inclusion. Therefore, firms should not focus only on increasing the number of women in TMTs, but also on assigning them clear responsibilities and real decision-making authority.
The study contributes to family business research by moving beyond linear approaches and adopting a configurational perspective that integrates gender diversity with ownership structures and managerial composition. It further contributes by providing novel evidence from underexplored European Emerging Markets.
1. Introduction
Over the past 2 decades, the role of women in senior managerial positions has attracted increasing scholarly and policy attention (Jeong and Harrison, 2017). Across both developed and emerging economies, the representation of women in top management teams (TMTs) has gradually increased, supported by evolving corporate governance norms, international debates on diversity, and societal expectations regarding gender equality (Rodríguez-Ariza et al., 2017). This growing presence of women at the top has stimulated empirical research examining the effects of gender diversity (Mubarka and Kammerlander, 2023).
However, empirical evidence on the consequences of gender diversity for firm outcomes remains highly inconsistent. These heterogeneous findings suggest that the effects of gender diversity are contingent on organizational and governance contexts rather than being universal across firms (Flamini et al., 2025; Mubarka and Kammerlander, 2023; Khuong et al., 2025).
Family firms (FFs) constitute one such context, as their governance systems often merge economic and non-economic goals. Family members pursue firm continuity, socioemotional wealth, and the preservation of family control (Chrisman et al., 2012; Mubarka and Kammerlander, 2023). Consequently, management structures frequently reflect family values, succession patterns, and preferences for internal trust-based relationships (Adams and Funk, 2012; Ben-Amar et al., 2017). Within these configurations, women may hold formal or informal roles. However, their actual influence can range from substantive to symbolic, depending on family norms, ownership structures, and the degree of professionalization. Existing research shows that women in FFs may contribute relational capital, conflict-resolution skills, and stakeholder-oriented perspectives (Dewitt et al., 2023; Franco et al., 2023; Mubarka and Kammerlander, 2023; Ruigrok et al., 2007). Evidence from emerging markets further suggests that their presence in senior positions is often shaped by kinship ties, with ownership concentration allowing families to limit managerial discretion and strategic autonomy (Islam et al., 2025; Laique et al., 2025; Tran et al., 2023). Social norms and role expectations may further constrain women's participation in leadership. As a result, their contributions may become undervalued or less visible within family-controlled governance structures (Martinez-Jimenez et al., 2020; Skaf et al., 2024). Taken together, these findings indicate that gender diversity in family firms is embedded within broader ownership - management arrangements rather than operating as an isolated governance attribute.
However, gender is only one dimension of diversity within TMTs. In FFs, diversity also reflects the balance between family and non-family managers, the extent of professionalization, and the firm's ownership configuration (Bammens et al., 2011). Recent research increasingly emphasizes that governance attributes should be analysed as interrelated configurations rather than independent variables. In particular, configurational approaches highlight that combinations of leadership characteristics, governance structures, and managerial practices jointly shape organizational outcomes in FFs (Flamini et al., 2025). This perspective implies that the effects of gender diversity depend not only on women's presence in top management. They also depend on how this presence interacts with ownership structures, professionalization, and managerial composition. Such configurations constitute an important context in which female representation in TMTs emerges and may influence firm performance.
However, most prior studies treat gender diversity as an isolated governance attribute and examine its relationship with firm outcomes independently of other organizational characteristics (Khuong et al., 2025; Mubarka and Kammerlander, 2023; Muien et al., 2024; Oussii and Jeriji, 2025; Skaf et al., 2024). Despite growing global interest in diversity within top leadership, research to date has focused mainly on large listed firms in Western economies (Ali and Shabir, 2017; Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2017). Consequently, research on gender diversity in small and medium-sized FFs remains limited. This gap is particularly salient in the European Emerging Markets, such as Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In these contexts, firms operate in evolving institutional environments shaped by post-socialist transformation, changing governance norms, and persistent traditional gender perceptions (Rugina and Ahl, 2023). Institutional conditions in these countries differ substantially from those observed in more developed economies (Fan et al., 2022) and, in many respects, resemble those of emerging markets. Prior research highlights several features typical of such contexts that are also observable in CEE. These include weaker or evolving formal institutions, a greater reliance on relational ties and ownership structures, developing corporate governance systems, and persistent social norms shaped by historical legacies. This provides a rationale for conceptualizing CEE economies as European Emerging Markets (Meyer and Peng, 2005, 2016).
The rapid economic transition of the 1990s fostered the creation of thousands of private, often family-dominated SMEs across the CEE region, many of which are now entering stages of succession, generational change, or attempts at professionalization (Domańska et al., 2023). While some of these firms have progressively opened their leadership structures to external managers, others have retained highly family-centric governance models characterized by ownership concentration, informal decision-making, and limited managerial discretion (Żukowska, 2021). Such divergent ownership–management configurations shape not only strategic choices. They also influence the composition of TMTs, including the likelihood that non-family managers or women will be appointed to senior leadership roles.
To address this gap, the aim of this study is to investigate ownership–management arrangements in FFs across European Emerging Markets using a configurational perspective. Drawing on insights from Upper Echelons Theory, Resource Dependence Theory, Institutional Theory, and Social Capital Theory, we examine how ownership structures, managerial composition, and contextual embeddedness shape both the presence of women in TMTs and their potential performance implications.
This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it moves beyond traditional linear approaches by adopting a configurational view of gender diversity. Second, it integrates gender diversity with ownership–management structures in family firms. Third, it provides novel evidence from underexplored European Emerging Markets, offering insights from a post-transition institutional context.
Accordingly, we address the following research questions:
How diverse are TMTs in family firms across European Emerging Markets?
What ownership and management configurations characterize family firms with different levels of gender diversity?
Does female involvement in TMTs contribute to firm performance?
This article is structured as follows.
First, we review the relevant theoretical frameworks and prior literature on gender diversity in top management teams, with particular attention to family firms, ownership–management configurations, and institutional contexts in European Emerging Markets.
Second, we describe the data, variables, and methodological approach, including the cluster analysis used to identify distinct ownership–management configurations among family SMEs.
Third, we present the empirical results, outlining the identified clusters and examining differences in firm characteristics and financial performance.
Finally, we discuss the findings in light of existing theories and conclude by highlighting the theoretical contributions, practical implications, and limitations of the study, as well as directions for future research.
2. Literature review
2.1 TMT diversity and governance
Research on corporate governance has increasingly focused on diversity in top decision-making bodies because of its potential to shape how firms formulate strategies, allocate resources, and respond to uncertainty. A growing body of studies links heterogeneity among senior executives, those who collectively negotiate and enact strategic decisions within TMTs (Nielsen, 2009), with a wide spectrum of firm-level outcomes, including corporate social performance, CSR disclosure, sustainability, executive compensation, risk-taking, and financial performance (Huang et al., 2022; Kline et al., 2017; Ma et al., 2020; Tran et al., 2023). This interest reflects a broader recognition that strategic outcomes are not driven solely by formal governance structures or market conditions. They are also shaped by the backgrounds, experiences, and interactions of those occupying key managerial positions.
Building on Upper Echelons Theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), many studies rely on observable demographic characteristics of executives, such as age, education, nationality, and gender, as proxies for the experiences, values, and cognitive frames that influence how key organizational challenges are perceived and addressed (Nielsen, 2009; Homberg and Bui, 2013; Opstrup and Villadsen, 2015). From this perspective, diversity within the TMT broadens the range of information, perspectives, and interpretations brought into top-level decision processes. This may enhance creativity, innovation, and problem-solving quality (Dahlin et al., 2005). In turn, Resource Dependence Theory provides a complementary perspective. While Upper Echelons Theory explains how executives' cognitive frames influence strategic choices, Resource Dependence Theory posits that diversity enhances firms' access to external resources, strengthens organizational legitimacy, and expands linkages with external stakeholders. (Pfeffer, 1972; Hillman et al., 2009). In SME contexts, these governance-related benefits also extend to enhanced monitoring, risk management, and environmental performance (Muhammad et al., 2023; Kim et al., 2025). Together, these theoretical perspectives suggest that diversity in TMTs represents an important governance mechanism shaping strategic decision-making and organizational outcomes.
2.2 Gender diversity, governance, and firm performance
Recent studies applying the Upper Echelons Perspective highlight that gender represents an important cognitive and experiential attribute of top managers that may shape leadership behaviour and organizational outcomes (Muien et al., 2024; Khuong et al., 2025). Furthermore, Resource Dependence Theory emphasizes that gender diversity in leadership teams may enhance corporate governance by providing heterogeneous knowledge, perspectives, and external linkages that strengthen boards' advisory and monitoring functions (Hillman et al., 2009; Oussii and Jeriji, 2025). Taken together, these perspectives suggest that female representation in top management and governance bodies may influence organizational outcomes in two ways. First, through cognitive decision-making processes, and second, through access to diverse resources and stakeholder relationships. In turn, research devoted to gender and FFs suggests that women in senior positions often exhibit stronger relational orientation, higher sensitivity to stakeholder interests, and greater attention to cooperation and conflict resolution, which may influence decision-making processes within TMTs (Flamini et al., 2025; Martinez Jimenez, 2009; Moore et al., 2005; Skaf et al., 2024). However, most existing studies examine these mechanisms separately. They primarily focus on the direct relationship between gender diversity and firm-level outcomes. As a result, limited attention has been devoted to understanding how gender diversity interacts with broader ownership and governance structures.
Social Capital Theory provides an additional lens for understanding how such relational attributes may translate into organizational outcomes (Anderson et al., 2007; Lin, 2001). From this perspective, women's communication skills, empathy, and openness to collaboration may contribute to the development and mobilization of social capital. This occurs both within and beyond the firm, facilitating access to information, trust-based cooperation, and organizational legitimacy. In governance contexts, these relational resources may influence how TMTs interact with stakeholders, coordinate strategic decisions, and address organizational challenges. At the same time, the extent to which these attributes translate into tangible performance effects depends on whether women hold real managerial discretion. It also depends on the constraints imposed by ownership structures and governance arrangements (Martinez-Jimenez et al., 2020; Laique et al., 2025; Tran et al., 2023). This suggests that the impact of gender diversity on organizational outcomes depends not only on the presence of women in leadership positions but also on the governance structures within which they operate.
Consistent with the theoretical complexity discussed above, empirical findings on the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance remain highly heterogeneous. Recent studies focusing on SMEs further confirm this mixed evidence, showing that gender diversity may improve governance quality, risk management, and sustainability performance, while its impact on financial outcomes remains context-dependent (Kim et al., 2025; Muhammad et al., 2023; Sattar et al., 2023; Schifilliti and La Rocca, 2024). Some studies report positive associations between gender diversity and performance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Gull et al., 2018; Muien et al., 2024), while others find negative or non-significant effects (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Marinova et al., 2016; Schifilliti and La Rocca, 2024). Meta-analytical and country-specific evidence suggests that institutional frameworks, including legal regimes and cultural norms, moderate these relationships (Post and Byron, 2015; Xu et al., 2023). For instance, some studies report more favourable performance effects of women's participation in civil law or stakeholder-oriented contexts than in common law environments, where “over-monitoring” concerns may arise (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Amore et al., 2014; Gull et al., 2018). Overall, the literature converges on the notion that gender diversity does not operate in a vacuum. Instead, its implications for performance depend on ownership structures, governance mechanisms, and national institutions.
2.3 The contingent nature of gender diversity effects
Building on the mixed empirical evidence reviewed above, the literature increasingly suggests that the effects of diversity in TMTs are contingent on contextual and organizational conditions. Differences in background and perspectives may lead to interpersonal conflict, miscommunication, and slower decision-making. In some cases, the costs of diversity, coordination losses, social categorization, or status differences may offset the potential informational benefits (Estélyi and Nisar, 2016). These mixed findings have led scholars to call for more attention to the contextual and organizational conditions under which diversity becomes an asset or a liability (Bammens et al., 2011; Mubarka and Kammerlander, 2023).
Accordingly, the literature conceptualizes diversity in TMTs as a “double-edged sword”. Its effects may be beneficial or detrimental depending on the organizational context in which it is embedded (Hambrick et al., 1996). These contingencies indicate that the effects of gender diversity depend on organizational contexts, motivating closer attention to FFs where ownership and governance arrangements are likely to shape how diversity influences outcomes.
2.4 Gender and governance in family firms: the role of institutional contexts
Family firms provide a distinctive context in which the mechanisms linking gender diversity and performance may unfold differently than in non-family firms. Due to the close link between family and business, FFs often pursue not only economic but also non-economic goals, such as maintaining family control, identity, and dynasty, collectively described as socioemotional wealth (Berrone et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). These goals influence board and TMT composition, as families seek directors and managers who support their preferred strategies and governance arrangements (Adams and Funk, 2012). As a result, governance structures in FFs may shape both the opportunities for women to enter leadership roles and the extent of their influence on strategic decisions. These dynamics are particularly pronounced in small and medium-sized family enterprises, where ownership concentration, informal governance, and limited managerial layers further constrain the exercise of managerial discretion and the implementation of diversity-oriented practices.
Within this context, women may occupy roles shaped as much by family logics as by professional criteria. Research indicates that female family members often contribute loyalty, care, conflict-resolution skills, and sensitivity to stakeholders' needs, which can complement the expertise of controlling owners and support firm continuity (Dewitt et al., 2023; Franco et al., 2023; Flamini et al., 2025; Moore et al., 2005; Saidat et al., 2019). Empirical work also links gender diversity in FFs to improved CSR performance and sustainability initiatives, which may in turn be associated with financial outcomes (Domańska et al., 2024; Guedes and Grübler, 2025; Oussii and Jeriji, 2025; Skaf et al., 2024).
Institutional constraints, particularly in emerging-market contexts, may restrict the extent to which these contributions translate into actual influence. Institutional Theory highlights how formal rules, informal norms, and cultural expectations shape what roles are seen as legitimate for women in organizations.
In many economies, including CEE countries, gendered scripts of leadership remain dominant, limiting recognition of women as strategic actors and reinforcing their symbolic rather than substantive inclusion in senior roles (Alvarado-Alvarez and Euwema, 2024; Rugina and Ahl, 2023). CEE firms operate in environments marked by legacies of state socialism, rapid privatization, and evolving governance norms, producing hybrid institutional logics that differ substantially from Western market economies (Csákné Filep et al., 2024; Domańska et al., 2023). Additionally, despite the formal decline of primogeniture and the increasing presence of women in business, cultural traditions and religious norms in the region appear to continue influencing the composition of governance bodies. As a result, women's involvement in leadership across CEE emerging markets is often shaped by kinship, patriarchal norms, and expectations around caregiving or family representation (Amore et al., 2014; Laique et al., 2025; Tran et al., 2023). World Bank Enterprise Surveys illustrate that the share of firms with a female top manager varies widely across CEE, from 2.7% to over 30% (World Bank, 2022), yet these data do not distinguish between family and non-family firms nor do they account for differences in ownership structure and the balance between family and non-family managers within top management teams.
Taken together, these theoretical perspectives suggest that the implications of gender diversity cannot be understood in isolation but must be considered in relation to ownership structures, managerial composition, and institutional contexts that shape governance processes in FFs. However, existing studies typically examine these elements separately. They analyse gender diversity as an isolated governance attribute rather than as part of broader ownership–management configurations (Khuong et al., 2025; Mubarka and Kammerlander, 2023; Muien et al., 2024; Oussii and Jeriji, 2025; Skaf et al., 2024). As a result, limited attention has been devoted to understanding how these factors jointly shape governance structures and firm outcomes in FFs.
Evidence from emerging economies suggests that ownership-management configurations play a decisive role in shaping gender diversity and organizational outcomes. Studies from India, Bangladesh, Jordan, Turkey, and Vietnam find that family involvement in management is associated with particular performance patterns and may influence both the extent and the nature of gender diversity (Islam et al., 2025; Oware and Mallikarjunappa, 2021; Saidat et al., 2019; Solakoglu and Demir, 2016; Tran et al., 2023). In some cases, family management enhances firm performance but simultaneously constrains the employment or advancement of women due to social role expectations (Bandiera et al., 2018). In CEE, where institutional systems are still consolidating and business norms remain strongly influenced by family ownership, similar dynamics may occur, but empirical evidence is sparse.
These insights highlight the need for a configurational perspective. Such an approach considers how multiple governance attributes interact to shape leadership structures and organizational outcomes. Such an approach is particularly relevant in European Emerging Markets, where the interplay between post-socialist institutional legacies, evolving governance practices, and persistent gender norms creates conditions distinct from those observed in Western settings. Understanding these interactions is therefore essential for explaining the emergence of gender diversity and its potential association with firm performance in this region.
3. Methodology
Given the predominance of SMEs among FFs in CEE, the empirical analysis is restricted to family SMEs. This study employs a quantitative approach, drawing a sample dataset from the Orbis Database provided by Bureau van Dijk. The dataset includes information on the companies' (1) ownership and management structure, including gender diversity and family influence; (2) financial data, including balance sheet and profit and loss statement figures; and (3) firm demographics, such as employee numbers and firm age.
The main advantages of using the Orbis dataset are that it (1) uses data from official sources, and (2) the data provider ensures data validity and comparability, which is crucial since SMEs in different countries may follow different national accounting standards. All financial data and employee numbers refer to 2022. Companies undergoing special circumstances, such as bankruptcy proceedings, liquidation, or periods of inactivity, were excluded from the dataset. Additionally, firms from the financial and insurance sectors were not considered. The dataset contains information on 15,953 SMEs from 19 Central and Eastern European countries.
To address the paper's RQ1 and RQ2, a two-step cluster analysis was performed using variables capturing key dimensions of family firm governance and organizational structure. Management composition variables reflect heterogeneity within the TMT through (1) family involvement and (2) the share of female managers, which are central to the study's focus on leadership diversity and governance configurations. This focus is consistent with upper-echelons theory and prior family business research. The share of family ownership is included as a defining characteristic of FFs, as it shapes control, decision-making authority, and long-term orientation.
These governance-related variables were complemented by two demographic indicators: (1) firm age and (2) employee number. Firm age is used as a proxy for organizational maturity and generational development, which are salient dimensions in family businesses due to their long-term orientation and intergenerational succession logic. Employee number serves as a direct and intuitive proxy for firm size. However, the Bureau van Dijk Orbis dataset also includes alternative indicators of size (e.g. revenues, total assets, shareholders' capital, and earnings). Correlation analysis (see Table A1) highlights that, considering all proxies, four highly intercorrelated constructs emerge: (1) number of employees, (2) specific categories of earnings (e.g. cash flow, EBITDA, EBIT, etc.), (3) proxies for the accounting firm value (shareholders' capital, total assets), and (4) sales and revenues. From these, employee number was preferred due to its straightforward interpretability, comparability across countries, lower sensitivity to accounting practices and investment cycles, and its suitability for clustering without logarithmic transformation. While the some of the other proxies were analyzed when comparing the performance of firms in each cluster using ANOVA and post-hoc tests (e.g. Bonferroni, Tamhane) in relation to RQ3. At this stage, six additional variables are examined: (1) ROE using net income, (2) ROA using P/L before tax, (3) profit margin, (4) solvency ratio (liability-based), (5) solvency ratio (asset-based), and (6) current ratio. Before conducting the analyses, missing data and outliers were coded as missing for each variable. Descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in Table 1.
Descriptives of the variables
| Variable | n | Mean | 5% trimmed mean | Median | Std. deviation | Skewness | Kurtosis |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Family managers (%) | 14,072 | 74.8% | 76.5% | 88.9% | 28.2% | −0.55 | −1.17 |
| Family ownership (%) | 14,047 | 89.3% | 90.9% | 100.0% | 18.7% | −1.36 | 0.09 |
| Female managers (%) | 14,978 | 32.2% | 30.2% | 25.0% | 35.4% | 0.78 | −0.70 |
| Number of employees | 15,952 | 28.27 | 25.05 | 19.00 | 23.67 | 2.18 | 5.09 |
| Firm age (years) | 14,834 | 20.34 | 19.73 | 19.00 | 11.62 | 3.72 | 31.29 |
| P/L before tax (th EUR) | 14,683 | 182.03 | 136.94 | 67.95 | 529.22 | 48.19 | 4160.72 |
| Shareholders funds (th EUR) | 15,953 | 791.53 | 608.56 | 335.73 | 1611.62 | 3.19 | 23.43 |
| Sales (th EUR) | 15,274 | 2,163.45 | 1,942.18 | 1,428.73 | 2,125.23 | 1.50 | 1.95 |
| ROE using Net income | 13,687 | 19.91 | 22.56 | 17.67 | 72.93 | −2.15 | 58.92 |
| ROA using Profit (Loss) before tax | 14,477 | 11.41 | 11.57 | 8.72 | 22.50 | −0.22 | 3.88 |
| Profit margin | 14,438 | 7.22 | 6.63 | 4.86 | 11.74 | 1.36 | 5.54 |
| Solvency ratio (Liability based) | 5,871 | 46.97 | 46.68 | 45.15 | 27.93 | 0.15 | −1.11 |
| Solvency ratio (Asset based) | 14,664 | 50.59 | 52.53 | 54.36 | 31.26 | −0.99 | 1.71 |
| Current ratio | 14,552 | 2.78 | 2.37 | 1.78 | 2.90 | 2.65 | 8.44 |
| Variable | n | Mean | 5% trimmed mean | Median | Std. deviation | Skewness | Kurtosis |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Family managers (%) | 14,072 | 74.8% | 76.5% | 88.9% | 28.2% | −0.55 | −1.17 |
| Family ownership (%) | 14,047 | 89.3% | 90.9% | 100.0% | 18.7% | −1.36 | 0.09 |
| Female managers (%) | 14,978 | 32.2% | 30.2% | 25.0% | 35.4% | 0.78 | −0.70 |
| Number of employees | 15,952 | 28.27 | 25.05 | 19.00 | 23.67 | 2.18 | 5.09 |
| Firm age (years) | 14,834 | 20.34 | 19.73 | 19.00 | 11.62 | 3.72 | 31.29 |
| P/L before tax (th EUR) | 14,683 | 182.03 | 136.94 | 67.95 | 529.22 | 48.19 | 4160.72 |
| Shareholders funds (th EUR) | 15,953 | 791.53 | 608.56 | 335.73 | 1611.62 | 3.19 | 23.43 |
| Sales (th EUR) | 15,274 | 2,163.45 | 1,942.18 | 1,428.73 | 2,125.23 | 1.50 | 1.95 |
| ROE using Net income | 13,687 | 19.91 | 22.56 | 17.67 | 72.93 | −2.15 | 58.92 |
| ROA using Profit (Loss) before tax | 14,477 | 11.41 | 11.57 | 8.72 | 22.50 | −0.22 | 3.88 |
| Profit margin | 14,438 | 7.22 | 6.63 | 4.86 | 11.74 | 1.36 | 5.54 |
| Solvency ratio (Liability based) | 5,871 | 46.97 | 46.68 | 45.15 | 27.93 | 0.15 | −1.11 |
| Solvency ratio (Asset based) | 14,664 | 50.59 | 52.53 | 54.36 | 31.26 | −0.99 | 1.71 |
| Current ratio | 14,552 | 2.78 | 2.37 | 1.78 | 2.90 | 2.65 | 8.44 |
All statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS version 30.
4. Results
This section reports the empirical results. We begin by presenting the primary cluster solution and its interpretation, followed by an assessment of the robustness of the clustering results using alternative specifications.
4.1 Descriptive statistics of the sample and categorizing FFs based on their TMT composition
The descriptive statistics of the clustering variables indicate several clear patterns in the dataset. On average, 74.8% of the managers of the analysed family SMEs are family members, with a median of 88.9%, indicating a strong prevalence of family involvement. The distribution is moderately left-skewed (−0.55) and relatively flat (kurtosis = −1.17), suggesting fewer extreme values. Family ownership is even more concentrated, with a mean of 89.3% and a median of 100%, showing a pronounced left skew (skewness = −1.36) and near-normal kurtosis (0.09). In contrast, female managers represent 32.2% on average, with a right-skewed distribution (0.78) and light tails (kurtosis = −0.70). Firm size and age exhibit substantial heterogeneity. The number of employees shows a strong right skew (2.18) and leptokurtic distribution (5.09), indicating a concentration of small firms with a few large outliers. Firm age also displays extreme right skew (3.72) and very high kurtosis (31.29), reflecting a predominance of younger firms combined with a small group of very old family businesses.
The two-step cluster analysis resulted in five distinct clusters based on the variables described in the Methodology section. The model includes 12,051 observations, representing 75.54% of the total sample. It achieved a reasonable silhouette score of 0.5, and the ratio of the largest to the smallest cluster is 2.81, indicating an acceptable balance.
To ensure cluster heterogeneity, analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted for all five clustering variables. Since the assumption of equal variances was violated for each variable, Tamhane's T2 post-hoc tests were applied. The results show that, out of the ten possible cluster pairs per variable, only six comparisons revealed no statistically significant differences in at least one variable, as follows:
Number of employees between male-managed and co-managed firms;
Firm age between co-owned and co-managed, and co-managed family firms (FFs);
Firm age between male-managed, female-managed, and family-dominated firms;
Share of female managers between co-owned and co-managed, and co-managed firms;
Share of female managers between co-owned and co-managed, and mature firms;
Share of female managers between male-managed and mature FFs.
This corresponds to approximately 12% of all pairwise comparisons and supports the conclusion that the identified clusters are predominantly heterogeneous. Given the satisfactory model fit and interpretability, this five-cluster solution was selected for presentation (see Table 2).
Description of the clusters
| Cluster | % of FBs | Management and ownership | Firm age | Employee number |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Male-managed and family-dominated (CL1) | 26.2% | Family-owned and managed, extremely low share of female managers (2.75%) | 17.69 years | 24.29 |
| Female-managed and family-dominated (CL2) | 18.3% | Family-owned and managed, extremely high share of female managers (81.48%) | 17.42 years | 20.43 |
| Co-managed (CL3) | 25.6% | Half of the managers are non-family members (52.95%), but still family-owned The share of female managers is at the median | 19.25 years | 23.38 |
| Co-owned and co-managed (CL4) | 20.6% | Close family majority in both ownership (55.18%) and in management (55.89%). The share of female managers is at the median | 19.7 years | 22.14 |
| Mature family firm (CL5) | 9.3% | Significant family involvement in management (66.91%) and dominant family ownership (83.39%). The share of female managers is at the median | 30.2 years | 84.83 |
| Cluster | % of FBs | Management and ownership | Firm age | Employee number |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Male-managed and family-dominated (CL1) | 26.2% | Family-owned and managed, extremely low share of female managers (2.75%) | 17.69 years | 24.29 |
| Female-managed and family-dominated (CL2) | 18.3% | Family-owned and managed, extremely high share of female managers (81.48%) | 17.42 years | 20.43 |
| Co-managed (CL3) | 25.6% | Half of the managers are non-family members (52.95%), but still family-owned | 19.25 years | 23.38 |
| Co-owned and co-managed (CL4) | 20.6% | Close family majority in both ownership (55.18%) and in management (55.89%). The share of female managers is at the median | 19.7 years | 22.14 |
| Mature family firm (CL5) | 9.3% | Significant family involvement in management (66.91%) and dominant family ownership (83.39%). The share of female managers is at the median | 30.2 years | 84.83 |
The results indicate that two clusters can be characterised as strongly family-dominated, with more than 90% family involvement in both management and ownership. The key distinction between these two groups lies in the representation of female managers. While the first cluster includes virtually no female managers, the second is characterised by an exceptionally high share of female managers (approximately 80%). Accordingly, these clusters are labelled “male-managed and family-dominated” and “female-managed and family-dominated”, respectively. Together, they account for 44.5% of the family SMEs in the sample. The average firm age is similar across these two clusters, whereas employee numbers in female-managed FFs are slightly below the sample median, indicating somewhat smaller organizational size.
The third cluster, labelled co-managed FFs, is primarily distinguished by a lower share of family managers (47.05%), although family ownership, firm age, and employee numbers are comparable to those in the family-dominated clusters. The fourth cluster also exhibits similar sizes and ages, and the share of female managers aligns with the sample median. However, family involvement in both management and ownership is only slightly above the majority threshold, leading to the label co-owned and co-managed family firms.
Finally, firms in the fifth cluster differ markedly from all others in terms of organizational scale and maturity. These firms are substantially larger, measured by employee numbers, and considerably older than firms in the remaining clusters. At the same time, they retain strong family involvement in both management and ownership. This group is therefore labelled mature family firms.
To examine potential differences in financial performance across clusters, ANOVA was conducted. The assumption of equal variances was violated for all variables except the liability-based solvency ratio. For this variable, ANOVA revealed no significant differences among clusters (p = 0.725), indicating statistical equivalence. For all other variables, Tamhane's T2 post-hoc tests were applied.
Consistent with their size and age profile, mature family firms exhibited significantly higher values (p < 0.001) than all other clusters for the three firm size indicators: (1) P/L before tax, (2) shareholders' funds, and (3) sales. Male-managed and family-dominated firms showed significantly higher P/L before tax (p = 0.027) than co-managed FFs. In contrast, female-managed and family-dominated firms had significantly lower shareholders' funds and sales (both p < 0.001) than all other clusters, likely reflecting their smaller average size. This is supported by the absence of significant differences in return on equity (ROE) across clusters, whereas only mature FFs had significantly lower return on assets (ROA) (p < 0.05) compared to other clusters, excluding co-managed firms. Male-managed and family-dominated FFs had significantly higher profit margins than mature firms (p = 0.015), while no other cluster comparisons showed significant differences.
Regarding liquidity and solvency, co-managed FFs exhibited the lowest asset-based solvency ratio, which was significantly lower than that of (1) male-managed and family-dominated, and (2) co-owned and co-managed firms, while no significant differences were found among the remaining clusters. Mature firms recorded the lowest current ratio, with significant differences (p < 0.001) compared to all other clusters except co-managed FFs. Additionally, male-managed FFs had a significantly higher current ratio (p < 0.001) than co-managed family SMEs.
4.2 Validation and robustness of the cluster solution
To assess the robustness and stability of the identified governance configurations, alternative two-step clustering solutions with different numbers of clusters were examined (see Table 3 and the detailed results in Table A2). This procedure allows for evaluating whether the observed configurations are sensitive to model specification or reflect persistent underlying patterns in family firm governance.
Overview of alternative clustering solutions and their relationship to the five-cluster model
| Model | No. of clusters | Main configuration pattern | Relation to 5-cluster solution | Silhouette score |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Two-step (final) | 5 | Five distinct governance configurations | Baseline solution | ∼0.50 |
| Alternative | 2 | Family-dominated vs. mature/balanced FFs | Aggregation of clusters | ∼0.30 |
| Alternative | 3 | Separation by ownership and management dominance | Partial aggregation | ∼0.40 |
| Alternative | 4 | Similar to baseline, one cluster merged | Near-baseline | ∼0.40 |
| Alternative | 6 | Fine-grained subvariants | Over-fragmentation | ∼0.50 |
| Model | No. of clusters | Main configuration pattern | Relation to 5-cluster solution | Silhouette score |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Two-step (final) | 5 | Five distinct governance configurations | Baseline solution | ∼0.50 |
| Alternative | 2 | Family-dominated vs. mature/balanced FFs | Aggregation of clusters | ∼0.30 |
| Alternative | 3 | Separation by ownership and management dominance | Partial aggregation | ∼0.40 |
| Alternative | 4 | Similar to baseline, one cluster merged | Near-baseline | ∼0.40 |
| Alternative | 6 | Fine-grained subvariants | Over-fragmentation | ∼0.50 |
Solutions with two and three clusters primarily resulted in higher-level aggregations of the governance configurations identified in the main analysis. Specifically, these solutions merged clusters with similar ownership structures and management characteristics, most notably along the dimension of family dominance in ownership and management. While these lower-resolution models captured broad distinctions between family-dominated and more balanced governance structures, they provided a less differentiated view of heterogeneity within family firms. Increasing the number of clusters to four yielded a structure closely resembling the five-cluster solution, with one configuration becoming partially aggregated. This similarity indicates that the original model is not driven by idiosyncratic boundaries but reflects stable governance patterns that persist across alternative specifications.
By contrast, the six-cluster solution produced additional subdivisions of existing configurations, particularly within mature and co-managed family firms. These additional clusters were characterized by smaller group sizes and represented finer-grained variations in firm age and size rather than substantively distinct governance logics. As such, the six-cluster solution increased granularity without materially enhancing interpretability.
Across all alternative specifications, the core dimensions of family ownership intensity, management composition, gender representation, and organizational maturity remained consistent. The observed merge–split patterns suggest that the identified configurations are nested and hierarchically related. Based on this structural stability, the five-cluster solution provides a meaningful intermediate level of configurational complexity that balances interpretability and differentiation.
Taken together, the robustness analysis supports the conclusion that the main clustering results are not driven by specific modeling choices but reflect persistent and interpretable governance configurations among family SMEs in Central and Eastern Europe.
5. Discussion
Addressing RQ1, our findings reveal that TMT diversity in family firms across European Emerging Markets follows distinct and well-defined patterns. These clusters differ in terms of managerial composition (including the share of family members and women), ownership structure, and firm characteristics such as age and size.
As anticipated, the majority of family SMEs in the European Emerging Markets are dominantly owned and managed by family members, confirming earlier findings that family control remains a defining feature of firms operating in emerging and post-transition economies (Berrone et al., 2012; Chrisman et al., 2012; Domańska et al., 2023). Only a small fraction of FFs are co-managed, or both co-owned and co-managed, by non-family members. Such configurations are likely to constrain managerial discretion, an assumption that is central to Upper Echelons Theory, which posits that executives' demographic characteristics influence firm outcomes primarily when they possess sufficient latitude to imprint their values and cognitive frames on strategic choices (Chadwick and Dawson, 2018; Hambrick and Mason, 1984).
From the perspective of Resource Dependence Theory, the prevalence of family-dominated governance structures further implies a limited reliance on external managerial expertise, stakeholder networks, and sources of legitimacy (Pfeffer, 1972; Hillman et al., 2009). In such firms, strategic resources are largely internalized within the family, which reduces the potential performance-enhancing role typically attributed to diverse TMTs.
In terms of diversity, two clusters deserve particular attention: co-managed firms (CL3) and mature family firms (CL5). The co-managed cluster (CL3), representing 25.6% of the sampled firms, is characterized by a substantial presence of non-family managers, who occupy half of the managerial positions. In the context of CEE, where private entrepreneurship emerged only after the market transition and firms developed under rapidly evolving institutional conditions, this pattern may signal an important step toward professionalization. The growing involvement of external managers suggests a gradual shift from founder- or family-centered governance toward more hybrid organizational arrangements combining family ownership with professional managerial expertise. In contrast, the Mature family firms (CL5) cluster comprises the oldest companies in the sample, characterized by significantly higher-than-average employment levels and extensive operational experience. Although these firms exhibit heterogeneous management structures and some degree of co-ownership, family dominance remains evident in both ownership and managerial control. Notably, this cluster accounts for only 9.3% of the sample. The scarcity of such firms reflects the lasting impact of the pre-transition period, during which private entrepreneurship was largely suppressed, leaving a long-term imprint on the region's economic structure. Consequently, fewer than one-tenth of the firms can be characterized as long-established organizations with more than 2 decades of stable operation. In this sense, the firms in CL5 represent a distinct and resilient group that has successfully navigated the challenges of the transition period and maintained their position in the regional economy. From a theoretical perspective, this pattern is consistent with the notion of path dependence in transition economies, where historical institutional constraints continue to shape firms' developmental trajectories and long-term survival (Meyer and Peng, 2005).
Addressing RQ2, our results identify three distinct patterns of female representation in TMTs across the clusters, indicating that levels of gender diversity vary systematically across different ownership-management configurations in FFs.
The first pattern is observed in the Female-managed and family-dominated (CL2) cluster, where a large majority of firms (81.48%) exhibit a very high share of female managers. A second, more prevalent pattern characterizes firms in the Co-managed (CL3), Co-owned and co-managed (CL4), and Mature family firms (CL5) clusters, where the proportion of female executives corresponds to the sample median. In contrast, the Male-managed and family-dominated (CL1) cluster is marked by an almost complete absence of women in managerial positions. Taken together, these findings suggest that gender representation in leadership within family-owned and -managed FFs from CEE follows a polarized pattern, with women either occupying central managerial roles or remaining largely absent from formal leadership structures. This pattern indicate a link between ownership and gendered leadership structures. It may be explained by succession dynamics, as many firms in the region are undergoing first-generation transitions (Hnilica et al., 2019; Motylska-Kuzma et al., 2023). In cases where ownership and management remain within the family, the gender of successors is likely to shape the composition of TMTs.
This observation also resonates with earlier insights by Hollander and Bukowitz (1990), who argued that FFs may offer particularly productive environments for women, while at the same time acting as carriers of family culture and practices that may reproduce gender biases and resist cultural change, a duality that has also been highlighted in more recent studies on family firms and gender dynamics (Alvarado-Alvarez and Euwema, 2024; Dewitt et al., 2023; Franco et al., 2023). In this sense, FFs may simultaneously create opportunities for women's leadership and reinforce traditional gender roles within organizational structures, showing that FFs represent a particularly challenging context for female representation in TMTs (Rovelli and Mismetti, 2025).
In terms of prevalence, the data indicates that family-owned enterprises dominantly led by men are more frequent than those headed by women. This finding is consistent with prior research showing that CEE countries remain among the least gender-equal in the EU (López-Martínez et al., 2022). It likely reflects the region's cultural and historical context, where relatively traditional gender norms continue to shape leadership opportunities. Although socialism promoted formal gender equality in employment, leadership roles remained largely male-dominated, a pattern that persists in many FFs.
No statistically significant difference is observed regarding firm age, suggesting that the longevity of the business remains consistent regardless of the gender composition of TMT. However, a notable variation exists in firm size, as female-led businesses typically operate on a smaller scale, employing a lower number of workers compared to their male-led counterparts.
Interpreted through the lens of Upper Echelons Theory, these findings indicate that gender-based differences in leadership composition do not translate into divergent firm trajectories with respect to age or survival. This supports prior arguments that in FFs, ownership concentration and internal control mechanisms homogenize strategic behavior, thereby weakening the direct link between individual executive attributes-such as gender-and long-term organizational outcomes (Mubarka and Kammerlander, 2023; Tran et al., 2023).
The lower employee number observed in female-led enterprises may be attributed to several factors. These results align with literature documenting the positive effects of female participation on organizational efficiency and functioning (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Gull et al., 2018). However, if lower employment figures are viewed not as a sign of efficiency but as an indicator of weaker growth, it may support findings from emerging markets suggesting that women's presence in senior roles is often shaped by kinship ties and not by suitability (Islam et al., 2025; Laique et al., 2025; Tran et al., 2023). This ambiguity reflects the “double-edged sword” view of gender diversity, according to which female participation in top management may generate both benefits (e.g. efficiency, relational capital) and constraints (e.g. limited authority, symbolic inclusion), particularly in family-dominated governance contexts (Hambrick et al., 1996; Post and Byron, 2015).
Interpreted through Resource Dependence Theory, this suggests that female managers in family-dominated firms may not primarily be appointed to enhance access to external resources or to manage environmental dependencies, but rather to fulfil internal governance, continuity, or legitimacy-related roles (Kabbach de Castro et al., 2017; Mubarka and Kammerlander, 2023).
Although female managers are present in 73.8% of the surveyed enterprises (CL2, CL3, CL4, CL5), suggesting a broad acceptance of women in FFs from CEE region, their presence does not necessarily translate into significant strategic influence. Building on the previously noted role of women as guardians of family legitimacy, their participation may often serve to reinforce non-economic family goals. Consequently, the scope of their independent strategic action may be constrained by ownership structures and entrenched gender norms, which can neutralize their direct impact on firm-wide strategic change (Mubarka and Kammerlander, 2023; Rugina and Ahl, 2023).
Regarding RQ3, the presence of women in TMTs generally does not appear to have either a positive or negative effect on firm performance in the analyzed sample. Overall, the performance of female-led versus male-led FFs shows no significant difference; the observed variations are more likely rooted in the differing structural characteristics of these firms. The results are consistent with Marinova et al.'s (2016) finding that gender diversity does not cause performance differences. They are also in line with recent SME-focused studies that report context-dependent effects of gender diversity on firm performance. While some evidence suggests positive effects of female directors in private firms (Sattar et al., 2023), other studies indicate that these effects may weaken or even become negative in more dynamic or innovation-driven contexts (Schifilliti and La Rocca, 2024). At the same time, these results differ from part of the SME literature that reports a generally positive relationship between gender diversity and financial performance (Gaio et al., 2024). The discrepancy may reflect the specific characteristics of FFs, where financial outcomes are often shaped by concentrated ownership structures and the pursuit of non-economic family goals. These conditions may attenuate potential gender-based differences in managerial behaviour and decision-making. This interpretation is further supported by research showing that gender diversity may influence governance mechanisms such as risk-taking and monitoring, without necessarily translating into direct financial performance effects (Muhammad et al., 2023). Moreover, as suggested by Saeed et al. (2021), nepotistic appointment practices in FFs may weaken the potential advantages associated with women's presence in leadership roles.
From a socioemotional wealth perspective, the absence of performance differences between male- and female-managed FFs confirms that strategic behaviour in these firms is guided less by profit maximization and more by the preservation of family control, harmony, and continuity (Berrone et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). In such settings, both male and female managers, particularly when family-affiliated, are likely to align their decisions with family-centred, non-economic goals, thereby neutralizing gender-based differences in financial outcomes (Chrisman et al., 2012; Martinez Jimenez, 2009).
Social Capital Theory offers a complementary explanation for these findings. Female managers may contribute relational capital, trust-building capabilities, and conflict-resolution skills that enhance internal cohesion and support cooperation within FFs (Anderson et al., 2007; Lin, 2001). However, the value of such social capital is more likely to materialize in non-financial outcomes, such as stability, reduced conflict, and continuity, rather than in short-term accounting performance (Skaf et al., 2024). This perspective is further supported by recent studies indicating that gender-diverse boards may contribute to improved ESG performance and sustainability outcomes, suggesting that their impact may be more visible in non-financial dimensions of firm performance (Guedes and Grübler, 2025; Kim et al., 2025).
From an institutional perspective, although CEE countries predominantly follow a civil law tradition, the more favourable performance effects of women's participation reported in prior studies (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Amore et al., 2014; Gull et al., 2018) were not evident in our results. This discrepancy may reflect the specific characteristics of transition economies and emerging markets, where institutional environments remain less stable and governance systems continue to evolve. In such contexts, firm behaviour is often shaped by historical legacies, concentrated ownership structures, and informal relational ties, which may weaken the link between leadership diversity and financial outcomes. Consequently, ownership configurations and institutional legacies may act as important boundary conditions shaping the diversity-performance relationship.
However, a more detailed analysis reveals that female-led FFs perform less favourably on certain metrics. Female-managed and family-dominated firms had significantly lower shareholders' funds and sales (both p < 0.001) than all other clusters, likely reflecting their smaller average size. This can be explained by the fact that women frequently launch businesses alone and are more likely to operate in sectors with lower growth potential, such as wholesale/retail trade, business consumer services, and government/social services, while they are less represented in the high-growth ICT sector compared to men (GEM, 2025). Importantly, these size-related differences should not be interpreted as evidence of inferior managerial capability. Instead, they are consistent with research emphasizing that female leadership in FFs is often embedded in sectoral, institutional, and familial constraints that shape strategic scope rather than financial efficiency (Rugina and Ahl, 2023; Skaf et al., 2024).
6. Conclusions
Our study advances the debate at the intersection of gender diversity, corporate governance, institutional context, and family business research.
Gender representation in leadership within family-owned and -managed FFs in CEE tends to follow a polarized pattern, where women either occupy a central managerial role or remain largely absent from formal leadership structures. At the same time, male-dominated leadership remains more prevalent, as family-owned enterprises led primarily by men are more frequent than those headed by women. This pattern reflects the cultural and historical context of the region, where relatively traditional gender norms continue to shape leadership opportunities. Our findings draw on insights from Upper Echelons Theory, the Socioemotional Wealth Perspective, Resource Dependence Theory, and Social Capital Theory. They suggest that the financial effects of gender diversity in FFs depend on governance conditions. These conditions constrain managerial discretion and prioritize family-centred objectives. Although female-managed, family-dominated firms tend to be smaller than their male-managed counterparts, this difference disappears when financial performance is taken into account. Consequently, the results do not indicate systematic differences in performance between family firms managed by men and those managed by women.
From an institutional perspective, our results indicate that the favourable performance effects of women's participation reported in prior studies are not evident in the context of CEE FFs. This suggests that the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance is shaped by the characteristics of transition economies and emerging markets. In these contexts, institutional environments, historical legacies, and concentrated ownership structures act as important boundary conditions influencing organizational outcomes. By situating gender diversity within these constraints, this study responds to calls for greater contextualization in family business research and demonstrates that the performance implications of gender diversity cannot be fully understood without considering the institutional and governance environments in which family firms operate (Post and Byron, 2015; Xu et al., 2023).
Overall, these findings suggest that the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance in FFs cannot be understood independently of ownership structures, governance arrangements, and institutional context.
The study also reveals substantial heterogeneity in TMT composition across FFs in the SME sector of CEE emerging markets. Among the identified clusters, distinct groups emerge within predominantly family-owned firms: male-led and female-led enterprises, as well as long-standing, stable firms characterized by a median proportion of female managers. The five identified clusters can be categorized into three broader groups: (1) the group of firms with an extremely high proportion of female managers; (2) the group of firms where the ratio of female executives corresponds to the median value (more extensive group); (3) the group comprising firms with almost no female representation in management. Interestingly, this polarized gender representation in leadership is particularly characteristic of family-owned and managed firms. This may reflect succession dynamics. Many firms in the region are undergoing first-generation transitions. In such cases, the gender composition of TMTs is often shaped by the gender of successors within the owning family. This observation extends existing family business research by highlighting succession as a key mechanism through which gender patterns in leadership emerge, particularly in FFs operating in post-transition economies (Domańska et al., 2023; Martinez Jimenez, 2009; Rugina and Ahl, 2023).
For policymakers and practitioners, the study implies that initiatives aimed at promoting gender diversity or professionalization in FFs should be sensitive to ownership structures, succession dynamics, and the non-economic goals pursued by business families. In particular, managers should not focus solely on increasing female representation in TMTs. Instead, they should ensure that women hold substantive roles with real decision-making authority. Given the importance of succession processes in family firms, business owners should actively consider how leadership transitions shape gender representation. They should also support the development of both male and female successors through targeted leadership development and involvement in strategic decision-making. From a practical perspective, these findings indicate that gender diversity should be managed as a governance-related issue embedded in ownership and succession structures. It should not be treated as a standalone mechanism for improving short-term financial performance.
This study relies on data extracted from the Orbis database, which limits the ability to capture firm-specific narratives, motivations, and contextual factors underlying TMT formation in FFs. Future research could address this limitation by adopting qualitative approaches in European Emerging Market contexts. This would provide a more in-depth understanding of how TMT size and composition are determined. In particular, such studies could explore the criteria and values guiding the selection of TMT members, as well as the role of cultural and institutional influences in shaping these decisions. This would offer valuable insights into how socioemotional wealth considerations, relational dynamics, and external resource dependencies influence the role and impact of female managers in FFs.
7. Limitations
The limitation of this research is also the uneven distribution of items across countries, suggesting that the dataset is not fully representative of the FFs population across all European Emerging Markets. Additionally, the cross-sectional nature of the data limits causal inference; therefore, our findings should be interpreted as descriptive patterns rather than cause–effect relationships.
The operationalization of gender diversity as the share of female managers limits causal inference. It also does not allow for distinguishing between symbolic and substantive participation in TMTs. Future research employing longitudinal designs and more fine-grained measures of managerial roles could address these limitations.
A further limitation of this study is the reliance on a binary (male/female) operationalization of gender. This reflects constraints of the available dataset rather than a theoretical preference, and while this approach remains prevalent in business research, contemporary scholarship increasingly recognizes gender as a spectrum rather than a strictly binary category (Ainsworth, 2015). Future research could therefore adopt more inclusive conceptualizations of gender that account for both biological and socially constructed non-binary identities.
The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive and insightful comments, which have significantly contributed to improving the quality and clarity of this manuscript.
Annex 1
Correlations between proxies of firm size
| Number of employees | Cash flow [net income before D&A] th EUR | Operating profit (loss) [EBIT] th EUR | EBITDA th EUR | P/L for period [ = Net income] th EUR | P/L before tax th EUR | Sales th EUR | Shareholders funds th EUR | Total assets th EUR | Operating revenue (turnover) EUR | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number of employees | Pearson Correlation | – | |||||||||
| N | 15,952 | ||||||||||
| Cash flow [Net Income before D&A] th EUR | Pearson Correlation | 0.229** | – | ||||||||
| Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.000 | ||||||||||
| N | 6,981 | 6,981 | |||||||||
| Operating profit (loss) [EBIT] th EUR | Pearson Correlation | 0.169** | 0.879** | – | |||||||
| Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.000 | 0.000 | |||||||||
| N | 14,732 | 6,951 | 14,733 | ||||||||
| EBITDA th EUR | Pearson Correlation | 0.247** | 0.945** | 0.957** | – | ||||||
| Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | ||||||||
| N | 13,695 | 6,971 | 13,661 | 13,695 | |||||||
| P/L for period [ = Net income] th EUR | Pearson Correlation | 0.123** | 0.929** | 0.601** | 0.909** | – | |||||
| Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | |||||||
| N | 14,699 | 6,946 | 14,621 | 13,631 | 14,700 | ||||||
| P/L before tax th EUR | Pearson Correlation | 0.135** | 0.926** | 0.640** | 0.920** | 0.996** | – | ||||
| Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | ||||||
| N | 14,682 | 6,930 | 14,622 | 13,617 | 14,681 | 14,683 | |||||
| Sales th EUR | Pearson Correlation | 0.517** | 0.452** | 0.437** | 0.493** | 0.292** | 0.314** | – | |||
| Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | |||||
| N | 15,273 | 6,966 | 14,415 | 13,501 | 14,390 | 14,376 | 15,274 | ||||
| Shareholders funds th EUR | Pearson Correlation | 0.320** | 0.598** | 0.505** | 0.571** | 0.368** | 0.392** | 0.477** | – | ||
| Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | ||||
| N | 15,952 | 6,981 | 14,733 | 13,695 | 14,700 | 14,683 | 15,274 | 15,953 | |||
| Total assets th EUR | Pearson Correlation | 0.415** | 0.556** | 0.426** | 0.533** | 0.331** | 0.355** | 0.585** | 0.844** | – | |
| Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | |||
| N | 15,952 | 6,981 | 14,732 | 13,695 | 14,699 | 14,682 | 15,273 | 15,952 | 15,952 | ||
| Operating revenue (Turnover) EUR | Pearson Correlation | 0.508** | 0.476** | 0.454** | 0.514** | 0.306** | 0.329** | 0.992** | 0.508** | 0.617** | – |
| Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | ||
| N | 15,952 | 6,981 | 14,733 | 13,695 | 14,700 | 14,683 | 15,274 | 15,953 | 15,952 | 15,953 | |
| Number of employees | Cash flow [net income before D&A] th EUR | Operating profit (loss) [EBIT] th EUR | EBITDA th EUR | P/L for period [ = Net income] th EUR | P/L before tax th EUR | Sales th EUR | Shareholders funds th EUR | Total assets th EUR | Operating revenue (turnover) EUR | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number of employees | Pearson Correlation | – | |||||||||
| N | 15,952 | ||||||||||
| Cash flow [Net Income before D&A] th EUR | Pearson Correlation | 0.229** | – | ||||||||
| Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.000 | ||||||||||
| N | 6,981 | 6,981 | |||||||||
| Operating profit (loss) [EBIT] th EUR | Pearson Correlation | 0.169** | 0.879** | – | |||||||
| Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.000 | 0.000 | |||||||||
| N | 14,732 | 6,951 | 14,733 | ||||||||
| EBITDA th EUR | Pearson Correlation | 0.247** | 0.945** | 0.957** | – | ||||||
| Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | ||||||||
| N | 13,695 | 6,971 | 13,661 | 13,695 | |||||||
| P/L for period [ = Net income] th EUR | Pearson Correlation | 0.123** | 0.929** | 0.601** | 0.909** | – | |||||
| Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | |||||||
| N | 14,699 | 6,946 | 14,621 | 13,631 | 14,700 | ||||||
| P/L before tax th EUR | Pearson Correlation | 0.135** | 0.926** | 0.640** | 0.920** | 0.996** | – | ||||
| Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | ||||||
| N | 14,682 | 6,930 | 14,622 | 13,617 | 14,681 | 14,683 | |||||
| Sales th EUR | Pearson Correlation | 0.517** | 0.452** | 0.437** | 0.493** | 0.292** | 0.314** | – | |||
| Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | |||||
| N | 15,273 | 6,966 | 14,415 | 13,501 | 14,390 | 14,376 | 15,274 | ||||
| Shareholders funds th EUR | Pearson Correlation | 0.320** | 0.598** | 0.505** | 0.571** | 0.368** | 0.392** | 0.477** | – | ||
| Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | ||||
| N | 15,952 | 6,981 | 14,733 | 13,695 | 14,700 | 14,683 | 15,274 | 15,953 | |||
| Total assets th EUR | Pearson Correlation | 0.415** | 0.556** | 0.426** | 0.533** | 0.331** | 0.355** | 0.585** | 0.844** | – | |
| Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | |||
| N | 15,952 | 6,981 | 14,732 | 13,695 | 14,699 | 14,682 | 15,273 | 15,952 | 15,952 | ||
| Operating revenue (Turnover) EUR | Pearson Correlation | 0.508** | 0.476** | 0.454** | 0.514** | 0.306** | 0.329** | 0.992** | 0.508** | 0.617** | – |
| Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | ||
| N | 15,952 | 6,981 | 14,733 | 13,695 | 14,700 | 14,683 | 15,274 | 15,953 | 15,952 | 15,953 | |
Note(s): **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Annex 2
Detailed results of alternative cluster models
| Model | Cluster number | Cluster name | Share of items | Family manager | Family share | Employees | Female managers | Age | Silhouette score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 cluster model | 1 | Mature and balanced governance FFs | 69.5% | 57.4% | 64.5% | 40.79 | 29.5% | 23.01 | 0.3 |
| 2 | Family-dominated FFs | 30.5% | 78.7% | 99.3% | 22.78 | 33.0% | 18.14 | ||
| 3 cluster model | 1 | Mature and diversified FFs | 29.5% | 56.9% | 63.7% | 40.63 | 29.3% | 23.07 | 0.4 |
| 2 | Family-owned, mixed-managed FFs | 43.0% | 66.2% | 99.1% | 22.33 | 52.7% | 0.1863 | ||
| 3 | Family-dominated FFs | 27.5% | 97.9% | 99.3% | 0.2437 | 2.4% | 17.49 | ||
| 4 cluster model | 1 | Co-owned and co-managed FFs | 21.4% | 55.0% | 56.7% | 22.14 | 29.6% | 19.72 | 0.4 |
| 2 | Co-managed FFs | 42.0% | 66.2% | 99.2% | 21.58 | 52.8% | 18.62 | ||
| 3 | Mature FFs | 9.9% | 65.1% | 84.2% | 83.35 | 28.5% | 29.65 | ||
| 4 | Male-managed and family-dominated FFs | 26.7% | 97.9% | 99.5% | 0.2327 | 2.4% | 17.41 | ||
| 6 cluster model | 1 | Balanced co-owned and co-managed family business | 20.3% | 55.2% | 55.9% | 21.6 | 29.7% | 19.75 | 0.5 |
| 2 | Female-managed and strongly family-owned business | 18.2% | 91.0% | 99.2% | 20.23 | 81.5% | 17.39 | ||
| 3 | Family-owned, co-managed business | 25.2% | 47.1% | 98.5% | 22.66 | 29.1% | 19.28 | ||
| 4 | Large and mature family business | 9.6% | 66.2% | 83.2% | 86.32 | 28.6% | 22.63 | ||
| 5 | Very old and mature family business | 0.9% | 74.7% | 89.8% | 38.2 | 32.2% | 100.51 | ||
| 6 | Male-managed and family-dominated business | 25.8% | 98.8% | 99.5% | 22.74 | 2.7% | 17.64 |
| Model | Cluster number | Cluster name | Share of items | Family manager | Family share | Employees | Female managers | Age | Silhouette score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 cluster model | 1 | Mature and balanced governance FFs | 69.5% | 57.4% | 64.5% | 40.79 | 29.5% | 23.01 | 0.3 |
| 2 | Family-dominated FFs | 30.5% | 78.7% | 99.3% | 22.78 | 33.0% | 18.14 | ||
| 3 cluster model | 1 | Mature and diversified FFs | 29.5% | 56.9% | 63.7% | 40.63 | 29.3% | 23.07 | 0.4 |
| 2 | Family-owned, mixed-managed FFs | 43.0% | 66.2% | 99.1% | 22.33 | 52.7% | 0.1863 | ||
| 3 | Family-dominated FFs | 27.5% | 97.9% | 99.3% | 0.2437 | 2.4% | 17.49 | ||
| 4 cluster model | 1 | Co-owned and co-managed FFs | 21.4% | 55.0% | 56.7% | 22.14 | 29.6% | 19.72 | 0.4 |
| 2 | Co-managed FFs | 42.0% | 66.2% | 99.2% | 21.58 | 52.8% | 18.62 | ||
| 3 | Mature FFs | 9.9% | 65.1% | 84.2% | 83.35 | 28.5% | 29.65 | ||
| 4 | Male-managed and family-dominated FFs | 26.7% | 97.9% | 99.5% | 0.2327 | 2.4% | 17.41 | ||
| 6 cluster model | 1 | Balanced co-owned and co-managed family business | 20.3% | 55.2% | 55.9% | 21.6 | 29.7% | 19.75 | 0.5 |
| 2 | Female-managed and strongly family-owned business | 18.2% | 91.0% | 99.2% | 20.23 | 81.5% | 17.39 | ||
| 3 | Family-owned, co-managed business | 25.2% | 47.1% | 98.5% | 22.66 | 29.1% | 19.28 | ||
| 4 | Large and mature family business | 9.6% | 66.2% | 83.2% | 86.32 | 28.6% | 22.63 | ||
| 5 | Very old and mature family business | 0.9% | 74.7% | 89.8% | 38.2 | 32.2% | 100.51 | ||
| 6 | Male-managed and family-dominated business | 25.8% | 98.8% | 99.5% | 22.74 | 2.7% | 17.64 |

