Public-private partnership contracts for projects in countries facing economic crises

Public–private partnership (PPP) projects in countries facing prolonged economic crises are exposed to intensified financial and contractual risks. This study investigates how contract management functions under such conditions, with emphasis on the allocation of financial risks and responsibilities between public and private actors. Using a qualitative case-study approach, it combines systematic document analysis with network and cohort analyses, applied to Greece’s largest PPP building project at the University of Crete. The findings indicate a persistent structural bias against the public sector embedded in PPP contractual and financial frameworks. Governance is shown to be dominated by financial actors, while public authorities retain long-term accountability despite nominal risk transfer. The study demonstrates that PPP delivery entails substantial cost premiums – such as elevated financing costs and contractor profit margins – that are not compensated by meaningful risk mitigation. Moreover, asset-impairment mechanisms primarily safeguard lenders’ cash flows rather than service quality or public value. The study underscores the need for stronger public-sector oversight, clearer accountability structures, and comprehensive lifecycle financial assessments when evaluating PPPs in crisis-prone economies. Its contribution lies in integrating governance-oriented analytical tools with financial modelling to show how contractual design can systematically generate adverse fiscal outcomes for the public sector.