This instrumental case study aims to understand the role of cluster-based coopetition (collaboration with competitors) practices as a performance-enhancing resource-leveraging strategy in a highly regulated sector targeting a vulnerable population. The research setting features a regional cluster within the aged residential care (ARC) sector in New Zealand, namely, where rival organisations’ decision-makers identify and exploit opportunities associated with a vulnerable population. This investigation addresses a problem, since earlier broader-based coopetition research has provided mixed findings in respect of the performance-enhancing nature of this form of resource-leveraging behaviour, as part of owner-managers’ entrepreneurial marketing activities.
This investigation is underpinned by an institutional theoretical lens, and findings primarily arise from interviews with decision-makers of 14 smaller-sized ARC facilities in a single regional cluster. In addition, use was made of secondary data like via websites including references to institutional audits. Data collection followed a snowball sampling approach and ended when a point of theoretical saturation was reached. Interviews were recorded and transcribed, then manually coded, plus attempts were used to ensure the trustworthiness of the data was robust.
The findings outline certain ‘rules of the game’ for owner-managers in an ARC organisational field where demand outstrips supply. Institutional conditions impact decision-makers’ resource-leveraging practices, namely, to enable them to provide highly regulated care for a vulnerable population given their limited assets. The findings highlight the role of co-existing logics affecting facets of decision-makers’ coopetition activities regarding the provision of ARC. These co-existing logics refer to a need to enhance owner-managers’ respective facility’s performance, alongside that of rivals via coopetition, namely, for mutually beneficial outcomes.
In contrast to some earlier cluster-based studies in less regulated sectors (and those where demand does not outstrip supply), this investigation offers fresh insights highlighting the importance of co-existing logics that guide under-resourced decision-makers’ performance-enhancing coopetition practices. In addition, new light is shone on potential dark-side implications arising from owner-managers’ resource-leveraging activities in an institutional context involving caring for vulnerable residents within an ageing population.
