Lessons learnt from the Montreal Protocol
Lessons learnt from the Montreal Protocol
Keywords Electronics industry, Environment. Microelectronics, Montreal protocol
IntroductionThe Montreal Protocol was the first international agreement adopted almost universally concerning any environmental matter. There is little doubt that it was a great success and is still being applied in developing nations reasonably painlessly. Being the first of its type, it is natural that some mistakes were made at various stages of its implementation. Some of these were administrative, some were technical and some were due to a simple misunderstanding of some basic facts. These mistakes should be put to profit for any future agreement. In some cases, individual governments may care to profit from them. It is easy to find the problems with hindsight and no blame is attached at their not having been seen with foresight. This paper catalogues some of the more obvious errors , as applied to the solvents sector,and how to avoid similar ones in the future.
It is emphasised that the opinions expressed in this paper are personal to the author and do not reflect on any other person or organisation.
New substances Historically, the Montreal Protocol initially named only CFC-113 as a solvent which would deplete the ozone layer. Even at this time, CFC-112 was also used but was not specifically named. Carbon tetrachloride was also omitted, even though it had a high ozone-depleting potential, because it was used principally as a feedstock and not as a solvent. 1,1,1-Trichloroethane, having a lower ozone-depleting potential, was not considered as a great threat, because of its short lifetime. However, the seriousness of ozone depletion was not fully understood at this time and it will be remembered that the initial Protocol considered that a 50 per cent reduction by 1999 would have been sufficient to redress the balance of the layer. It was soon realised, from more scientific evidence, that this view was far too optimistic and more solvents were introduced into the list of regulated substances and the reduction was increased progressively, as the application date was reduced in time. At the time of writing, the following solvents are included in the Protocol:
CFC-113;
1,1,1-trichloroethane;
all HCFC solvents;
carbon tetrachloride;
exceptionally, CFC-11 (rarely used as a solvent).
All other ozone-depleting solvents are unregulated and may be freely used, subject to national legislation. Although CFC-112 was used in small quantities as a solvent, the manufacturer had the wisdom to retract its production, thereby avoiding the need to name it specifically in the Protocol. Unfortunately, the wording of the Protocol was such that any other ozone-depleting solvents could be manufactured,and commercialised without any hindrance. The original authors did not foresee man's ingenuity in producing new solvents and exploiting them, even though they had a significant ODP. In order to introduce a new substance into the Protocol,an amendment requiring ratification by the member governments was necessary. This was a very slow and laborious process which gives unscrupulous manufacturers the possibility of exploiting ozone-depleting solvents for several years. In an attempt to overcome this problem, a decision was made at the ninth meeting of the Parties in 1997 whereby a mechanism to inform parties of the existence of these OD solvents was introduced, without it having any regulatory force. In my opinion, it would have been better had the Protocol been worded in such a way that the regulations applied to any substance whose ODP exceeded a threshold value, for example, 0.01 according to a list of values published periodically by the Scientific Assessment Panel, rather than specifically named. This would have permitted the Protocol to be applied more flexibly and would have discouraged the development of new solvents with a finite ODP. Above all,it would have avoided the embarrassment of companies investing in new solvents which could later be regulated or simply banned.
Use of solvents The Protocol did not forbid the use of regulated substances after its entry into force. The notion behind this was that a stockpile or bank could be built up to allow for maintenance of, for example, refrigeration equipment or halon fire extinguishing systems in aircraft or other similar uses. In the case of solvents, the situation was different, in that the substance was not used as a means of maintenance but as a consumable. This introduced a loophole whereby users of these solvents often stockpiled very large quantities for use after the entry into force of the regulations, sometimes amounting to several years'requirements. This was obviously against the spirit of the Protocol, but nothing could be done, in these cases, unless it was illegal according to national legislation. This problem was more severe with CFC-113 than it was for 1,1,1-trichloroethane, as the latter had a more limited shelf life.
This problem also engendered another one, in that some companies with a large stockpile suddenly discovered that it was more economical not to use the CFC-113, rather than a substitute process or material, leaving them with a vast amount of inventory which they could not legally dispose of. It is probable that some of this material was sold illicitly, possibly through the black market.
If such a problem arises again, it would be better if a differentiation between consumables and maintenance products could be made.
Illegal marketing Of course, if something as simple as a solvent disappears from the market or becomes exorbitantly expensive and it is available cheaply elsewhere, then someone will be sure to try to exploit the situation. This first problem became apparent in countries which introduced an early phase-out of OD solvents. Some companies quite legally exploited this simply by transferring their production to a country where the regulations were more liberal. Others were known to import solvents illegally. A few countries introduced swingeing taxes on the commerce of CFCs. Inevitably, a parallel market developed whereby unscrupulous importers took the risk of selling material somewhat cheaper than the official price, but still adding on a hefty profit margin. On occasion, these importers paid a high price, when they were caught. These two problems obviously were only at a national level, without any reflection on the Montreal Protocol.A more general manifestation of the same problem became apparent after the obligatory phase-out of CFCs in developed nations. Some developing nations, with their moratorium, still had considerable and continuing quantities of such materials available and some individuals in them did try to develop a black market,usually with relatively little success. However, the real problem came from some countries in internal turmoil which saw their stockpiles (and, in some cases,continuing production) as a means of helping to earn some hard currency, at any cost. It is known that large quantities of CFCs were thus illegally imported into industrialised Europe and North America after the official phase-out date. It should be possible to foresee such loopholes in any future agreement involving a phase-out of substances and to stop it.
Funding Perhaps one of the most difficult problems relating to the Montreal Protocol was the funding of aid to developing nations. In order to do this, a Multilateral Fund was set up, to be managed by an Executive Committee. It was required that a very bureaucratic administrative system was set up whereby, before a user of CFC-113 could obtain any aid, a system of approval over several steps was required. This was obviously designed as a safeguard that the money was used correctly and sensibly but, particularly in the solvents sector, the cost of doing this was greater than the aid required, in many cases. It can easily be imagined that the equipment required to convert the manufacture of refrigerator compressors from an ozone-depleting gas to a more benign one could be a one-off investment of several million dollars, in the case of a large plant. To spend $50,000 as a security in this case could easily be seen to be worthwhile. What would not be worthwhile would be to spend a similar sum to replace a small open-top vapour degreaser! The implementing agencies quickly recognised this problem and, as a result, very few solvent sector projects have been implemented in developing nations, proportionally to other sectors.
In my opinion, another problem with the funding was the fact that several implementing agencies,including the World Bank, UNIDO and the UNDP, competed against each other in order to manage the funds in specific countries. At first sight, this competition would seem to be healthy but, in practice, it did not necessarily mean that the beneficiaries obtained the best technical aid as the agencies were not able to afford sufficient expertise from the best sources. In the solvents sector for example, experts in a specific sub-sector were required to pronounce on other sub-sectors about which they had little or no knowledge, simply because they were there. This not only meant that the beneficiaries did not obtain the best overall technical advice, it frequently meant that they were lumbered with equipment that was not ideal for their requirements or was simply more costly than necessary. Many such cases, involving the electronics sub-sector, imposed cleaning when it was not necessary and vice versa.
The biggest problem facing the National Ozone Units and the implementing agencies is certainly the identification of a multitude of small ozone-depleting solvent users. This type of user may be an operator of an open-top vapour degreaser used for defluxing, a High Street dry cleaner or a bicycle repair shop degreasing parts by simply dipping them into an open bucket of carbon tetrachloride (yes, this can be seen in a number of countries!). Experience has shown that these persons do not even know they are using ozone-depleting solvents and, if they did, would rarely come forward for fear that their supplies of solvents would dry up, causing them considerable hardship. The opposite is also true on a small scale: on more than one occasion users of a non-ozone-depleting solvent have announced themselves as ready to receive aid to replace them. Assuming that it was possible to identify all the OD solvent users, the idea of funding them equitably becomes a nightmare. There is no ready solution to this problem within the framework of the current Protocol and its Multilateral Fund. It is possible to imagine a different framework to cover the requirements of the very small enterprise at a minimal cost in administration, but this would require an entirely different infrastructure than was envisaged and a great deal of co-operation and flexibility on the part of the organisations involved.
Protocol hierarchy The Montreal Protocol was conceived by a number of national governments, following the Vienna Convention, under the control of the United Nations Environment Programme which set up an Ozone Secretariat in Nairobi. At stages following the original Protocol, various amendments developed a vertical hierarchy which would seem inflexible and bureaucratic. For example, if a problem involving solvents reached the Secretariat, the latter would transmit it to the Technical and Economics Assessment Panel (TEAP), who would engage, in turn, the Solvents,Coatings and Adhesives Technical Options Committee (STOC). If the STOC decided that an action was required involving a decision by the Parties, it would pass its recommendation back to the TEAP who would, in turn, pass it forward to the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG), possibly with a request for further information from the Scientific Assessment Panel (SAP). Assuming that the OEWG agreed that action was necessary, they would advise the Secretariat which would place the matter on the agenda of the next Meeting of the Parties. Only then would a decision be taken. This process may last up to a couple of years with delays being respected and referrals made backwards and forwards, no matter how urgent the matter.
The STOC is only one of a number of Technical Options Committees, each involving a different sector. Unfortunately, there is a considerable overlap in some subjects. For example, an OD solvent may be placed in an aerosol can with an OD propellant or carbon tetrachloride may be used as a chemical feedstock, a process agent or a solvent. This generated a small number of misunderstandings which were happily quickly resolved: notwithstanding, a clearer definition would have been desirable.
The STOC itself was unique, in that it was the only such committee with a considerable number of sub-sectors. It could not be expected that an expert in metal cleaning would have much knowledge about electronics defluxing, dry film resist development,dry cleaning, using adhesives or even precision cleaning etc. As such, the members had to be drawn from a wide spectrum of industry and commerce. For reasons of simple expertise, most of the knowledgeable members in each sub-sector came from the more highly developed nations. This left considerable knowledge gaps about conditions in developing nations. Although it was attempted to find a better balance, in practice, this proved very difficult, even impossible. There was even an imbalance between the sub-sectors and it may be found that, at times, the members of a sub-sector employing little OD solvents outnumbered those from a heavy consuming sub-sector. There is no ready solution to this problem: a guideline of 50 percent membership from developed nations and 50 percent from developing is almost impossible to implement. However, it may be desirable to impose, in future committees, a limit of, say, two or three members from any single country in order to keep as representative a world-wide balance as possible.
The biggest difficulty within the Technical Options Committee was funding, and this should be addressed much more seriously for future organisations. The members consisted of:
government and government agency employees;
independent experts commissioned by their national governments;
experts from large industry;
experts from small industry;
experts who are private consultants.
In all cases, these may be from either developed or developing nations. Under the current regime,developing nation members should have their expenses paid for from the Ozone Secretariat funding. However, this is theoretical because a limit may be imposed of the number of such members attending a meeting, again not helping a good balance of members. Government and large industry employees obviously have their expenses paid by their employers. One problem arises when small industry employees or private consultants from developed countries have to attend meetings. If they are local to their home base, this is usually no problem but,if the meeting is half-way round the world, it seems manifestly unfair that they should pay this out of their own pockets, yet their presence may be essential. Closely related to this is the cost of producing an annual report. No public funds are available for this and the cost, typically about $50,000, usually falls on the benevolence of a member. This is almost indigestible. Future agreements should address these serious administrative problems so that the individual members should never be out of pocket: they already freely devote much time to the task, why should they also pay for this privilege? The cost of this present policy is evident when one sees the number of the most valid experts who have retired from the committees for purely financial reasons(including employees of large companies who have withdrawn their participation for economic reasons). I, as a member of the STOC, personally regret the loss of valuable expertise because of the retirement of several fellow-members for this reason. I know that if I was not partially funded by the Swiss Government, I could not continue.The community at large is the long-term loser.
Conclusion From this personal insight into the workings of the Montreal Protocol, it can be easily deduced that, although it is a reasonably efficient system, it is rather heavily organised. Future agreements can learn from some of the mistakes made at this first effort of an international environmental agreement. However, its success is indubitable and all the persons concerned from the top to the bottom of the scale can take comfort from the fact that their hard work has greatly contributed to it. It should not be forgotten that the Protocol is a strange mixture of international politics, economics, science and technology and it has affected all the strata of society in countries rich and poor.
Brian EllisProtonique SA(This communication is taken from a journal sponsored discussion forum which can be found at http://www.mcb.co.uk/emstgf/eee/current/millenial.htm)
