Navigating hybrid governance: a longitudinal comparison of university reforms in Denmark and Sweden

This remark, made during a seminar on higher education governance reforms by the Swedish and Danish ministers of higher education in early 2024, captures the different trajectories the two countries have taken in the last 2 decades. On paper, Sweden and Denmark appear remarkably similar: both are often classified within the Nordic or social democratic welfare regime, characterised by universalism, strong social equity commitments (Bleiklie and Michelsen, 2019; Rothstein, 1998). Higher education historically served as a pillar for social mobility, civic participation, and economic competitiveness in both countries (Bleiklie and Michelsen, 2019; Kallo and Välimaa, 2024). Nevertheless, important differences have emerged, particularly in how higher education governance has evolved amidst international public sector reforms, notably New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1995) and the growing emphasis on accountability in what Power refers to as the audit society (Power, 1991, 1997).

As a result of these reforms, while institutional autonomy is often emphasised rhetorically, the reality is a complex and variegated blend of autonomy and control in both Denmark and Sweden (Puaca, 2021; Brøgger et al., 2023; Wright Øberg, 2012). The influence of NPM in such reforms has been profound: managerial logics, Key Performce Indicators (KPIS), and strategic leadership dominate, with limited trust in intrinsic motivations (Ferlie et al., 2008; Puaca, 2021), leading to a decline in collegial influence in governance processes (Ahlbäck Öberg and Boberg, 2023; Carney, 2006). Consequently, universities, while often formally autonomous, are increasingly subject to performance-based funding, accreditation, and evaluation (Degn, 2015; Foss Hansen et al., 2019). What can be referred to as a growing hybridity in university governance (Ball, 2010; Gornitzka and Maasen, 2000; Hsieh, 2023).

While reforms in the Nordic countries often lead to governance models that combine managerial control with symbolic collegial traditions (Ahlbäck Öberg and Boberg, 2023; Puaca, 2021; Brøgger et al., 2023), the trajectory and pace of reforms, as illustrated in the quote, differ between the two Nordic countries. These divergent paths have resulted in markedly different governance outcomes, which scholars such as Holmén (2022) attribute to differences in political culture and constitutional safeguards.

The concept of governance is complex and multifaceted (Hsieh, 2023). Consequently, research on governance in higher education has approached this in different ways (Hsieh, 2023) and identified different governance models. The more commonly referred to are the self-regulation model and the state steering model (van Vaught, 1989) or, as referred to by Neave and van Vaught (1991), the state control model and the state supervising model. The self-regulation model describes a situation with autonomous universities, while the state control model refers to a governance model with tight governmental steering of universities. Thus, we can see how two opposite governance models are recognised in extant literature. While these models are treated as two opposing alternatives, it is not that simple in practice. On the contrary, recent studies show that these two models coexist and blend. Ahlbeck Öberg and Broberg (2023), for example, find that an increase in university autonomy does not lead to a rise in collegial steering. Instead, increased autonomy has led to more line steering and a decollegialisation of Swedish universities (Ahlbäck Öberg and Boberg, 2023). In Denmark, we can see different developments. When Danish universities were granted autonomy in 2003, this did not lead to an increase in line steering, but rather an increase in governmental steering (Brøgger et al., 2023). Self-regulation and state steering (van Vaught, 1989), while in theory depicted as two different models, are in practice not mutually exclusive but rather two opposite sides of a continuum. Along this continuum, hybrid governance models exist.

Despite these insights, several crucial research needs persist. There is a lack of analyses of how universities navigate tensions between autonomy and control over time (cf. Foss Hansen et al., 2019; Wright, 2022; Kallo and Välimaa, 2024), To further investigate this with the point of departure in the concept of hybrid governance and how universities balance the tensions between autonomy and control is therefore interesting. In addition, as identified by Vingaard Johansen et al. (2017), more longitudinal studies of governance reforms are needed to trace the evolution of reforms and outcomes (Vingaard Johansen et al., 2017). Furthermore, according to Brøgger et al. (2023), there is a need for empirical, theory-driven comparisons that examine how the balance between autonomy and control evolves in similar contexts. In other words, there is a need for more research on hybrid governance in university settings, especially with a focus on the relationship between the national government and universities. Few studies systematically compare divergences among closely related but distinct national reform paths, leaving a gap in understanding how the factors identified by Holmén (2022), including political culture, pace, and implementation strategies, affect governance outcomes.

The purpose of this study is to examine how the balance between autonomy (stewardship) and control (principal-agent) has evolved over 2 decades through a comparative longitudinal study of university governance reforms in Denmark and Sweden. In doing so, it contributes to extant research on university governance by providing a more nuanced understanding of hybrid governance and its implications for universities’ societal roles. Ultimately, this study advances the understanding of the dynamics of Nordic higher education governance reforms.

The remainder of the article is organised as follows. First, we present the analytical framework, introducing principal-agent theory and stewardship theory as complementary lenses for interpreting university governance reforms. Second, we describe the methodological approach, including case selection, data sources, and analytical strategy. Third, we provide a comparative analysis of governance reforms in Denmark and Sweden, highlighting key developments and patterns over the past 2 decades. Finally, we discuss the findings, their implications for university governance, and suggestions for future research.

The paper adopts a synthetic theoretical approach, where two theoretical stances are deployed in combination to capture the dynamic between control and autonomy or self-governance (van Vaught, 1989; Nieve and van Vaught, 1991) in academic governance. In the literature on governance, two theoretical perspectives exist that can shed light on the dynamics between autonomy and control and further our understanding of the relationship between universities and governments: principal-agent theory and stewardship theory.

Principal-agent theory is a framework used to understand the relationship between two parties: the principal who delegates authority, and the agent who carries out tasks on behalf of the principal. According to principal-agent theory, the agents are inclined to be opportunistic (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Aguilera, 2005). The combination of delegation of control, information asymmetry, and the assumption that the agent acts opportunistically leads to the so-called principal-agent problem (Aguilera, 2005). To mitigate this, principals may introduce control mechanisms such as targets, audits, and evaluations. Setting measurable objectives and following up with monitoring processes enables the principal to ensure alignment between expectations and performance (Huse, 2005). NPM inspired reforms where governments seek to increase the control over universities have been framed within the principal-agent model, where the state (principal) seeks to align university (agent) behaviour through contracts, monitoring, and incentives (Amaral and Magalhães, 2023), often neglecting intrinsic motivations (Foss Hansen et al., 2019).

Principal-agent theory has been criticised for overstating distrust and promoting instrumental governance cultures. Stewardship theory offers a contrasting view, taking the point of departure in the notion that agents are motivated by intrinsic factors such as loyalty, professionalism, and a sense of duty to the organisation (Davies et al., 1997; Slyke, 2006; Schillemans, 2013). Consequently, stewardship theory posits that agents are more likely to act in the interest of the organisation when given autonomy and trust (Shoorman et al., 2007). This is especially likely to be the case within professionalised institutions like universities (Goodall, 2023; Huisman and Currie, 2004).

Autonomy in a public sector context means that the agent operates at an arm’s length distance from the political governance (Bordeaux, 2008). This has been formulated as a social contract between the state and universities, with a widespread delegation of authority to universities, which in turn act in accordance with broader societal goals (Guston, 2000). This is corroborated in a more recent study by Voorn (2023), showing how strategic managerial autonomy increases the ability of public organisations to act in the interest of society at large.

Rather than positing one theory against the other, our starting point is that they are complementary and explain different governance positions. Therefore, we argue that the theories explain specific contextual issues in line with authors like Van Thiel (2011) and Shillemans and Bjurstrøm (2020). The implication is that there is a spectrum of trust – and control-based governance approaches. Combining these two perspectives, summarised in Table 1, can thus help us understand the tension between autonomy and control in universities, notably as the government introduced reforms to enhance accountability while maintaining institutional independence.

This study builds on a comparative analysis of the development of higher education in two Nordic countries, Denmark and Sweden. A comparative study of universities in the two countries can provide us with knowledge on the relationship between governance and managerial levels in higher education. The comparative study focuses mainly on developing the governance structure and the relationship between political governance, the Ministry of Higher Education, and the universities over the last 2 decades.

The comparative analysis builds on the results of two case studies, one on higher education in Sweden and one on higher education in Denmark. The case study approach lends itself to studies on the interplay between a phenomenon and the surrounding context (Eisenhardt, 2021). The development of higher education, especially the interdependent relationship between political governance and higher education management, is an example of such a complex phenomenon.

The case study approach allows for the use of different kinds of empirical material and data collection methods (Eisenhardt, 2021). Given how this is a longitudinal study that spans over 2 decades, we primarily have relied on secondary data, mainly policy documents, official governmental documents, existing reports and publications of political reforms in Sweden and Denmark. The secondary data has been supplemented with interviews with key actors to allow for personal accounts. In addition, the authors of this paper are highly involved in the management of higher education in Sweden and Denmark. The paper, therefore, also draws on the professional experience of both authors.

The comparative analysis of the relationship between the government and universities in Sweden and Denmark focuses on the period between 2003 and 2023. The reason for this is twofold. First, we can see how the two countries during these 2 decades have adopted different trajectories when it comes to reforming the system for higher education (see Table 2). Trajectories that have come to impact what is in focus for this article, namely, the relationship between the government and universities. Secondly, while we in existing research can find both longitudinal studies (Brøgger et al., 2023; Carney, 2006; Degn, 2015) as well as comparative studies (Bleiklie and Michelsen, 2019; Kallo and Välimaa, 2024), no studies have to the best of our knowledge compared the development in Sweden and Denmark over these 2 decades and how reforms have influenced the relationship between governments and universities.

The analysis of the empirical material has been designed as a three-step process. First, a timeline of reforms and their impact on higher education management was constructed for each of the two cases. The focus in this first step was not only on constructing a timeline but also on finding patterns in the development of university governance. As a second step, a more detailed description and analysis of the development of higher education governance was conducted for each of the two countries. The third and final step consisted of a comparative analysis of the two cases.

This section outlines the development of higher education governance in each country using a parallel structure to support cross-case comparison. The presentation of the two cases follows the same structure. However, given the magnitude of the number of reforms Danish universities have been subjected to compared to Swedish universities (see Table 2), there will be variations in regards to the length and scope of the presentations. After the cases have been presented, a comparative analysis will be conducted. The comparative analysis focuses on the most prominent reforms during the 2 decades covered by the study.

The expansion of higher education during the 1960s and 1970s across Europe was accompanied by a wave of democratising reforms. In Denmark, this trend materialised with the 1970 University Act, which introduced collegial governance through elected leadership and guaranteed significant representation for faculty and students in decision-making processes (Kampmann, 1986). A radical shift in governance occurred with the 2003 University Act (Danish Parliament, Lov om universiteter, 2003a, b), which marked a profound reconfiguration of state–university relations (Wright, 2022; Wright and Ørberg, 2012). This reform replaced elected senates with boards dominated by external stakeholders, and university rectors were no longer elected but appointed by the boards. Rectors gained significant executive authority and were tasked with appointing deans and department heads, thereby centralising decision-making authority and establishing a vertical chain of accountability (Carney, 2006; Wright, 2022). The reform redefined universities as self-owning institutions (“selvejende institutioner”), formally distanced from direct state administration yet subjected to new modes of performance-based and contractually governed steering (Brøgger et al., 2023).

This new governance model aligned with broader international trends influenced by NPM principles, which emphasised efficiency, accountability, and output control (Wright, 2022). In Denmark, the 2003 reform thus marked a shift from a collegial, internally governed model to a managerial university tightly coupled to state-defined objectives (Wright and Ørberg, 2012).

Following the 2003 reform, a series of additional governance transformations ensued (Brøgger et al., 2023, p. 13). These changes aimed to professionali se leadership, reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies, and enhance universities’ responsiveness to political and societal demands (Brøgger et al., 2023). Horst and Irwin (2018) describe this shift from considering higher education an investment to a cost. A key tool introduced in 2006 was the development contract (udviklingskontrakt), a formalised agreement between the Ministry of Higher Education and Science and each university. Although framed as instruments of institutional autonomy, they increased managerial oversight and created strong incentives for universities to align their strategic planning with national goals (Wright, 2022).

A pivotal moment in Danish higher education governance came with the 2013 “Stockholm University (SU) og Fremdriftsreformen” (Study Progress Reform), designed to accelerate students’ transition into the labour market (Aftalstekst, 2013). Institutions faced fines or budget cuts if they failed to comply, marking a decisive moment in which the state began to intervene directly in pedagogical practices (Wright, 2022). Among all reforms implemented since 2003, the “SU og Fremdriftsreformen” is the one that has had the largest impact on Danish universities and education, as one of the interviewees described it: “It changed the culture at Danish universities” (interview with a representative from the Danish university sector).

In 2014, a further intervention came through the “dimensioning” policy, which tied university admissions quotas to labour market forecasts. Programs producing graduates for oversaturated professions were downsized, particularly in the humanities and social sciences. This policy reflected a broader shift toward demand-driven education planning and reinforced the government’s emphasis on universities’ economic utility and on catering for the demands of the labour market (Brøgger et al., 2023). A new form of governance contract, the “rammekontrakt,” was introduced in 2017, replacing the earlier development contracts. This marked a continuation and intensification of the output-oriented governance logic (Wright, 2022; Brøgger et al., 2023). The politically set targets and goals of these contracts focus more on the needs of the labour market and are not aligned with the values generally ascribed to universities (Foss Hansen et al., 2019; Horst and Irwine, 2018).

The Danish Agency for Higher Education and Science (styrelsen) plays a crucial role in overseeing how universities comply with the goals set by the government and the Ministry for Higher Education and Science and steering them. The Agency was established in 2020 and is responsible for institutions within the Ministry for Higher Education and Science’s remit, hereinunder universities. The Agency meets annually with all Danish universities to discuss how they comply with the development contracts and performance targets set by the Ministry.

Quality assurance also became increasingly institutionalised. Since 2007, the Danish Accreditation Institution has overseen a national accreditation system, and in 2019, “Institutionsakkreditering 2.0” placed a stronger emphasis on institutions’ internal quality management systems. This further embedded vertical accountability mechanisms within university governance, requiring universities to set standards, but still comply with nationally defined criteria (Brøgger et al., 2023; Maassen and Stensaker, 2011).

Recent reforms aimed at decentralising education, such as the 2022 initiative to relocate educational programs to smaller towns, have introduced new governance challenges. This placed new demands on universities to integrate regional development into their strategic planning, introducing governance challenges that extended beyond the traditional focus on research and education (Brøgger et al., 2023).

The most recent example is the so-called master reform presented in January 2023 (Uddannelse og Forskningsministeriet, 2023) by the then newly elected government, supported by several other parties in the parliament. With the reform, politicians issued a decree that 30% of study places in two-year master’s programs across Danish universities should be converted into study places in one-year or part-time programs. The aim of the reform is to increase the workforce by getting students to graduate earlier. This reform is to be gradually implemented, starting in 2028.

In the historic governance model – operating until around 1990 – universities were regulated by the state in detail, both as individual universities and as parts of a national system. Universities were allotted different roles in a national plan, based on the two different ideals of access and concentration: access secured through regional locations of universities and university colleges, concentration via a focus on a small number (Uppsala, Lund, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm (KTH); Karolinska, Stockholm, Gothenburg) universities which received the bulk of research funding, and which ran the most prestigious education programs. When it came to the internal governance of each university, the state was similarly omnipresent, and every aspect of university activities, down to the composition of department boards, was regulated by the government. This does not mean that universities were mere reflections of political will. Under the surface image of political control, extensive autonomy existed in university operations at lower levels within universities. If universities complied with government regulations, their activities were largely left untouched by political interventions (Fehrman, 1987). This was followed by a significant deregulation of the Swedish higher education system in 1993, giving institutions greater freedom over curricula and budgeting.

The current model for university governance in Sweden is devolved in the sense that the government provides only a minimum of regulation of how universities should be organised. Such matters are decentralised to the university boards, which, in tandem with university leaders, are in charge of the detailed operations of universities. A reform in 2007 introduced university boards with external members and strengthened the position of rectors. Also, in 2007 the Bologna reform was implemented in Sweden. This reform marked an extensive change as it restructured the entire system of higher education in Sweden (Government Bill 2004/05:162). The reform required adjustments in curricula, degree titles, and teaching approaches. While it aligned Sweden with European standards, it also prompted debates about academic identity, national traditions, and the balance between standardisation and local autonomy.

While representatives appointed by the government dominate the university boards, the government’s insight into how universities are governed and make priorities by means of these representatives is quite limited and external representatives are not used to control the specific operations (interview: university board chair). The government does annual appraisals of university operations, but these are more general and are not followed by sanctions or other interventions (interview: Vice Chancellor).

The governance model is market-based in the sense that education funding is based on performance. Performance determines how well universities fare, based partly on how many students a university accepts and how these, in turn, succeed in their studies as measured in credits taken. However, this market-based system operates with a parallel system of cost ceilings – a university cannot expand its educational funding by productivity alone. The government sets – after an informal negotiation with the universities and based on their productivity – a ceiling for expenditure on education (SOU, 2019:5). In addition, the performance system does not operate with sanctions: even universities which underproduce can keep their cost ceiling levels over time without any sanctions (interview: government official).

In research, the government has similarly adopted a combination of devolution and intervention. Swedish research policy has been, since the early 1980s, codified in research policy bills, presented every fourth year. The bills were, until the mid-1990s, detailed exercises in government priorities and control, including professorial positions, government appropriations to universities (not only fixed as total sums but also fixed for each faculty). Since then, the bills have become far more general in orientation. Universities receive a lump sum without any specific figures for each faculty and may transfer funding between areas without government control. Government appropriations to universities have been based on performance (external funding and publication citations), but this was abandoned in 2020. However, what the government has done consistently since the mid-1990s is to channel new resources primarily through research funding agencies, and today, more than half of the resources primarily through research funding agencies, and today, more than half of the resources allocated to university research comes indirectly, via external funding agencies (SOU, 2019:6).

There have been attempts to reshape governance altogether and implement a fuller stewardship model where the universities would enjoy considerable opportunities to shape their own directions. Attempts were made in 2011 after the so-called autonomy report had been presented (SOU, 2008:104). This report proposed reforms of a fully autonomous university system that were followed by an intense debate regarding the organisational form of Swedish universities. In the end, the proposals were not implemented as intended, vetoed by the government, but also with only a lukewarm response from universities. Instead, changes were made in how universities are governed within the existing model, where universities were granted stronger legal autonomy with significant organisational freedom.

Similar attempts have been made later, with another government commission report proposing an overturn of the financial and regulatory model, based on the Danish example of contracts and devolution of financial and organisational control to universities (SOU, 2019:6). Again, neither the government nor the universities fully embraced the proposal, and the proposal was therefore discarded (interview: former government minister). Also, when it comes to the overarching model of governance, the stance is equivocal. Responsibilities, for instance, of internal organisation, are largely developed but not systematically so. Instead, the government has reserved the right to intervene on a case-by-case level, in areas in which it deems university operations to be of political interest. The most recent example is the reshuffling of education funding in 2024, based on the government’s proposed focus on science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) subjects. This priority is to be matched a punishment of universities running many smaller, individual courses (Government Bill 2024/25:1). However, the exact mechanism for this resource transition is not clearly spelt out in the government bill and universities have therefore not been able to understand how they might comply with this policy ambition. Paradoxically, one of the major losers of this new way of allocating resources is Sweden’s largest technical university, KTH, with only a few individual courses and a dominance of programs in the STEM area. Hence, the signals are diffuse and not easy to interpret or act upon (Interview: University vice chancellor).

The government’s role in Sweden has often been indirect, using regulatory bodies like the Swedish Higher Education Authority (UKÄ) to monitor performance and enforce accountability, thereby creating an administrative burden for universities. Stewardship has therefore developed in an ambiguous manner in Sweden, with unstable and erratic organisational leeway for the universities. Government officials have repeatedly stated that the reforms done since the 1990s have created a much-expanded room for universities to self-organise (interview: government official). Universities on their side argue that they continue to be constrained, not least by the organisational form as state agencies (Ekberg, 2023). While universities have more room for self-organisation and leadership, the government retains control over key areas, particularly through targeted interventions in politically sensitive domains like health education and research. This creates a situation where universities are partially autonomous but remain constrained by their status as state agencies, leading to ongoing debates about the extent of their organisational freedom. Even the latest (2025) reform initiative in university governance, to appoint a government commission tasked with the role of investigating whether Swedish universities should abandon their status as government agencies, has been stalled. It seems clear that the government wants to retain control over Swedish universities, albeit in a form which allows for local discretion when it comes to organisation, budgeting and planning of education and research. Sweden seems destined to continue along the path of conditional autonomy, where control and trust operate in a contentious yet stable interplay.

In this section, we will compare the different trajectories taken by the two countries during the last decades. A summary of the comparative analysis is found in Table 3.

Denmark’s University Act from 2003 represents a clear pivot from collegial self-governance to a more centralised and managerial model. It introduced steering tools such as performance contracts and output-based funding, exemplifying a classic principal-agent logic where the government (principal) attempts to steer universities (agents) through measurable targets and performance metrics (Carney, 2006; Brøgger et al., 2023). This restructuring reflects a profound concern with accountability and performance-based management, consistent with the NPM paradigm (Hood, 1995; Lapsley, 2009).

Autonomy in a public sector context denotes the university’s capacity to make strategic decisions at arm’s length from political control (Bordeaux, 2008). Although the reform from 2003 declared universities “self-owning institutions” (Brøgger et al., 2023), this autonomy has largely been symbolic in Denmark. Universities remain tightly coupled to the state through development contracts, accreditation systems, and a network of policy tools that channel state priorities downward into institutional strategies (Wright, 2022).

In contrast, Swedish reforms have combined elements of deregulation and decentralisation with persistent government control through indirect means such as funding ceilings, performance indicators, and steering via research councils (SOU, 2019:6). Although Swedish universities were granted legal autonomy through the Autonomy Reform (2011), they remain state agencies. This dual identity suggests a hybrid governance regime, mixing features of principal-agent and stewardship approaches. Governance reforms have given university leaders more leeway in internal organisation and budgeting. Nevertheless, the state retains the authority to intervene in politically salient domains, such as the 2024 reshuffling of education funding towards STEM at the expense of humanities and smaller courses (Government Bill 2024/25:1; Ekberg, 2023). This creates a system of conditional autonomy – a hallmark of hybrid governance (Jacobsson et al., 2015) – where delegation coexists with episodic re-centralisation.

The Danish governance model reflects the principal-agent framework, where the state mitigates information asymmetry and opportunistic behaviour through contractual mechanisms and measurable objectives (Aguilera, 2005; Huse, 2005). The 2013 Study Progress Reform (“Fremdriftsreformen”) (Uddannelse og Forskningsministeriet, 2013) is a prime example of this logic, imposing sanctions on universities that failed to reduce student time-to-degree, thus operationalising the state’s goal of labour market responsiveness. While the Danish model gives formal autonomy to institutions, its steering logic suggests a lack of trust in universities’ ability to self-govern in alignment with public interests. As a result, there is a proliferation of audits, monitoring systems, and performance assessments, which crowd out professional discretion and intrinsic motivation – a tendency well captured in the notion of the “audit society” (Power, 1991, 1997).

Sweden has historically emphasised trust and professional autonomy. Still we can see how Sweden, like Denmark, has embraced performance-based funding in education. Swedish universities are rewarded for student throughput. However, performance signals are softened by parallel cost ceilings and the absence of financial sanctions, suggesting a more flexible, negotiated form of control (SOU, 2019:5). In research, the increasing use of bibliometric indicators and external project funding has introduced a market-oriented layer of accountability but without abandoning the peer-reviewed allocation of core funds (Hammarfelt et al., 2016). We can also see how the balance between autonomy and control, with recent interventions like the shortening of university board mandates in 2023, has shifted in Sweden. This has raised concerns about political overreach and erosion of university self-governance.

Denmark’s reforms reveal a governance model where control and performance management have become the dominant logics. This trajectory reflects a strong principal-agent logic, assuming opportunistic behaviour that must be mitigated through external control (Aguilera, 2005; Huse, 2005). These findings align with earlier studies suggesting Denmark’s aggressive implementation of NPM principles in higher education (Greve et al., 2016; Hansen, 2010) but add nuance by showing how formal autonomy coexists with dense layers of contractualised accountability, effectively hollowing out institutional discretion.

Although legally autonomous since the 1990s reforms, Swedish universities remain state agencies and are thus subject to indirect but persistent forms of control through performance monitoring, funding ceilings, and targeted political interventions (SOU, 2019:6; Bjare, 2023). Our findings highlight that Sweden’s version of hybrid governance, while less overtly managerialist, creates ambiguity and inconsistent strategic conditions for universities. Furthermore, while stewardship theory posits that trust-based governance can enhance alignment with public values (Voorn, 2023; Shoorman et al., 2007), the Swedish case demonstrates that partial stewardship without stable political backing risks devolving into incoherence. Swedish universities must navigate shifting expectations without clear accountability structures (Puaca, 2021), but also exacerbate strategic uncertainty. The impact of interventions like the 2024 STEM funding reshuffle (Government Bill 2024/25:1) underscores how fragile and contingent autonomy remains, even in systems formally emphasising trust.

The purpose of this article was to examine how the balance between autonomy (stewardship) and control (principal-agent) has evolved over 2 decades through a comparative longitudinal study of university governance reforms in Denmark and Sweden. The findings show that while both countries have undergone significant governance reforms aligned with NPM ideals, they have adopted markedly different pathways in balancing autonomy and accountability. From the comparative analysis, we can thus see how two different types of hybrid governance modes have emerged during the last 2 decades.

The concept of hybrid governance helps us understand how university governance in these two Nordic countries evolves along the spectrum of autonomy and control. Denmark’s reform trajectory aligns with a strong principal-agent logic. However, it incorporates traditional academic symbols and discourses to legitimise market-oriented change – a process Wright and Ørberg (2012) describe as the “double shuffle”, where old collegial forms are repurposed to support a neoliberal vision of strategic, market-driven universities. The relationship between autonomy and control is skewed in the direction of control in Denmark, albeit with the most significant symbolic representations of autonomy preserved.

Sweden demonstrates a more flexible form of hybrid governance, where autonomy is preserved through structural reforms but diluted by episodic political interventions and indirect control through performance regimes and public expectations. This is a form of metagovernance: the state “sets the stage” rather than micro-managing decisions (as in Denmark), using organisational strategies to shape agency conditions rather than eliminate them, and where stewardship allows for local flexibility and avoids political overload.

The findings suggest that hybrid governance in both Denmark and Sweden has produced tensions and contradictions. In Denmark, strong control mechanisms lead to misalignment between political goals and academic values (Foss Hansen et al., 2019; Huisman and Currie, 2004), constraining universities’ ability to act as stewards of broader societal interests (Goodall, 2023). Although operational autonomy persists in Sweden, episodic political interventions and administrative burdens (Wright, 2022) create unstable governance conditions that hinder long-term agency within universities.

This study shows that hybrid governance is not a neutral synthesis but an evolving and contested process. As Holmén (2022) notes, political culture and institutional traditions crucially mediate how NPM principles are adopted. Our findings extend this insight by demonstrating that governance trajectories can diverge sharply even within similar welfare-state frameworks, producing different patterns of constraint, agency, and tension. Denmark has seen an overly strong reliance on control at the expense of the vital collegial culture of its universities (thus reducing academic leadership’s leeway as a mediating force between government and collegialism) while Sweden’s ambiguous policies has fostered a model of line management within universities to absorb the many political initiatives taken, which has curtailed collegialism. Hence, both countries struggle – albeit in different forms – with the adoption of hybrid governance, which – ideally – could integrate in a flexible manner the need for control and autonomy.

In sum, Denmark and Sweden offer two models of hybrid university governance situated between the poles of principal-agent control and stewardship trust. Denmark has taken a top-down, contractualised route that emphasises output measurement and central steering. In contrast, Sweden operates with softer steering mechanisms and greater formal autonomy but is increasingly entangled in strategic state priorities. In both cases, the relationship between autonomy and control is in flux, and the hybrid governance model – mixing control and trust – illustrates the struggle of universities to mitigate the effects of the political governments’ attempt to exert control over universities. Hence, autonomy and control are not mutually exclusive but rather to parts of a floating scale of university-government relations.

This article contributes to the comparative study of higher education governance by analysing the evolution of hybrid governance models in Denmark and Sweden from 2003 to 2023. Using principal-agent and stewardship theories, we show that while both countries grapple with balancing autonomy and accountability, they have adopted distinct governance logics shaped by political cultures, reform strategies, and institutional histories.

In summary, this study makes three key contributions to the literature on higher education governance. First, it provides a rare longitudinal and comparative analysis of university governance reforms in Denmark and Sweden over twenty years (2003–2023), addressing the need for more long-term and cross-national studies as emphasised by Carney (2006) and Johansen et al. (2017). Second, it advances theoretical understanding by showing that hybrid governance is not a stable compromise between autonomy and control. However, rather a dynamic and contested process shaped by political culture, reform strategies, and strategic agency, thus extending and critically engaging with previous work (Wright and Ørberg, 2012; Van Thiel, 2011), Third, it demonstrates the value of combining principal-agent and stewardship theories within a comparative case study framework to capture the evolving and complex dynamics of university–state relations, offering a methodological contribution to studies of public sector governance.

Taken together, these contributions highlight the need for a deeper and more systematic exploration of how hybrid governance models are constructed, contested, and navigated over time, both within universities and across different national higher education systems. Given that the scope of this study was limited to investigating the relationship between universities (senior management) and the political governance in a Nordic context, we suggest that future research explore how hybrid governance models evolve at operational levels within universities, particularly among faculties and frontline academic leaders, where tensions between autonomy and control are most acutely felt. Comparative research extending beyond the Nordic region could also illuminate how different political cultures shape the possibilities and limits of hybrid governance in higher education. Finally, future studies should investigate how university leaders and administrators strategically navigate hybrid governance conditions to maintain institutional missions and societal relevance in the face of intensifying demands for accountability and performance.