Exploring attempts of undue influence from sellers or buyers in the everyday sales work of real estate agents: bribes and threats Open Access

The real estate sector is particularly vulnerable to money laundering, and numerous international studies have explored this issue. Examples include research in Canada (Lokanan and Chopra, 2021; Schneider, 2004), China (Naheem, 2017), Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein, Switzerland (Teichmann, 2018), Australia (Stamp and Walker, 2007), the US (McPherson, 2017) and other countries (e.g. Alkaabi et al., 2010). The gravity of this problem has been widely recognised, prompting many countries to take action, as money laundering is linked to corruption and terrorism, posing a threat to national security (Al-Suwaidi and Nobanee, 2020). Nelen (2008) observed that the real estate market is often closed off, dominated by “old boys” “networks”, and prone to hiding irregularities. Regulations, law enforcement and both formal and informal controls are insufficient, leading to a lack of transparency compared to other markets. This creates an environment where both legitimate and illegitimate actors can meet, cooperate and exchange knowledge. Scholars worldwide have conducted research on these issues.

But other aspects of criminal behaviour related to the real estate sales process also warrant further exploration. While real estate agents are often viewed as potential perpetrators, they can also themselves be victims of various criminal activities initiated by sellers, buyers or other market participants. This area remains underexplored in the research literature. Although the day-to-day challenges faced by real estate agents may seem minor compared to the broader issue of systemic threats like money laundering, individual agents still face some personal risks related to their profession, such as bribery proposals or threats from sellers or buyers. These risks should be considered along with possibilities of earnings when reflecting on a career in real estate. For a discussion on the occupational life of real estate agents, see, for example, Ahlenius et al. (2022) or Engström et al. (2022).

Local and even national residential markets may be affected by real estate agents' experiences with bribes and threats in their everyday working environment. However, research on these aspects of the profession is scarce. Piazolo and Förster (2019) explored the role of integrity in improving performance within the real estate industry, while Nelen (2008) called for multidisciplinary empirical research on irregularities and crimes in the sector across different countries. Other studies have highlighted the occurrence of threats and physical violence in the workplace in service-related professions (Rasmussen et al., 2013), as well as the connection between work-related violence or threat of violence and mental health issues, such as depression, stress disorders (Wieclaw et al., 2006) and other symptoms (Rudkjoebing et al., 2020). Biering et al. (2018) concluded that frequent exposure to threats and violence negatively impacts workforce participation.

Consumer protection in the real estate sector has been widely discussed, particularly since the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Real estate agents play a crucial role in mediating knowledge about local housing markets, but their customers, often laypeople, may lack understanding of both the market and relevant regulations (Engström, 2022). Despite the importance of their professional role, real estate agents face implicit risks, as highlighted in a newspaper article by Dube (2008), which reported the killing of a Canadian agent by a potential seller. The article underscores the dangers of a profession that often requires agents to work alone and meet strangers in empty houses, sometimes after dark. It is therefore important for researchers, industry stakeholders and policymakers to increase academic knowledge about the conditions under which real estate agents work.

This exploratory study aims to investigate two key aspects of undue influence in the daily work environment of real estate agents in the residential market: bribery attempts and threats from residential sellers or buyers. Additionally, this study seeks to identify characteristics of real estate agents who are more frequently exposed to such attempts to manipulate the market. The need for further research into undue influence on real estate agents is driven by systemic, regulatory, business and health considerations. The ambition of this study is to present a focus that can inspire future work, influence regulation and possibly even shape industry practice.

A survey distributed in 2019 to all licensed real estate agents in Sweden included questions on the occurrence of bribes or threats from sellers or buyers. Two logistic regressions were performed to identify the characteristics of real estate agents who experience these issues more frequently than their peers. To gain deeper insights into the experiences of real estate agents, eight in-depth interviews were conducted with agents working in single-family homes in Sweden.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section two provides a description of the context of the empirical study, focusing on regulation and work practices of Sweden's real estate agencies. Section three presents a literature review on real estate agency and the issue of undue influence. Section four outlines the data and methods used for data collection and analysis. Section five presents the results of the empirical study, while sections six and seven offer discussions and concluding remarks, respectively.

The function of real estate brokerage markets varies significantly across countries. Thus, this section briefly outlines the key characteristics of Swedish real estate agency. In Sweden, buyer agents are virtually non-existent, or so few that their presence can be ignored when analysing market dynamics. The seller's agent is responsible for advertising the property and conducting an auction among interested buyers to secure the best price. Although the seller ultimately chooses the buyer, the highest bidder typically prevails. The agent then finalises the deal by preparing the necessary documentation for both parties, coordinating with their respective banks and arranging meetings for the closing (Engström, 2022).

The Swedish real estate agent serves a unique role as an independent intermediary, with a legal duty of care towards both buyers and sellers ^[1]. The agent manages the entire brokerage process, holds personal responsibility and is subject to supervision by a state supervisory authority, The Swedish Estate Agents Inspectorate (FMI). The FMI oversees the registration, evaluation and control of real estate agents and agencies, while also promoting best practices within the profession, defined by law as good estate agent practice ^[2]. Good estate agent practice is shaped primarily through the FMI's decisions in supervisory cases and the rulings of administrative courts.

FMI exercises supervision ^[3] over real estate agents and real estate agency companies that are registered in accordance with the Swedish Real Estate Act ^[4]. The FMI has the authority to revoke the registration of an agent or agency that fails to meet the required conditions, such as not paying the annual fee, breaching obligations under the Act or violating anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing laws. However, if deemed sufficient, the FMI can instead issue a warning or reminder before revoking registration.

In Latin countries, for example, formalities are typically handled by a notary public, whereas in Sweden, these tasks fall to the real estate agent (Jingryd, 2012). Internationally, real estate agents generally represent either the buyer or the seller, though in some cases, “dual agency” exists, where an agent can act for both parties. However, Engström (2022) highlighted that the Swedish model is unique in that the real estate agent carries extensive, personal responsibility throughout the mediation process. Swedish agents are required to have a university education that includes internship requirements (Engström and Persson, 2020).

The Swedish Real Estate Act mandates certain obligations, such as the duty to verify information ^[5], which includes informing consumers about ownership, mortgages, easements and other property-related matters. Additionally, agents must advise consumers ^[6] by helping them understand the need for investigation and assisting in gathering property information. However, no obligation exists to inform consumers about the agent's role in the process, leaving consumers without a clear understanding of what to expect or what demands to make of the agent.

The Swedish real estate agent, while serving both the seller and buyer, works under a contract with the seller. This situation can create pressures or temptations from both parties. Although no study has previously examined how these factors affect the role of Swedish real estate agents, such research is crucial for both legislators and industry organisations. Although bribery and kickbacks are illegal under Swedish law ^[7] exploring how these dynamics might place agents in vulnerable positions remains important.

Sweden has a robust workplace safety regulatory framework ^[8] and the employer would normally be held accountable for worker safety ^[9]. However, most agents are not employed but are working with their own companies in a franchise relationship to a larger real estate agency brand. The working conditions of Swedish agents is still unexplored and also merits further exploration.

Currently, Swedish real estate agents have no obligation or opportunity to report attempted bribes or threats to authorities, and no system has been established to collect such information. While authorities monitor the professional practices and ethics of agents to protect consumers, they do not investigate potential bribery or threats. Consequently, the prevalence of these issues remains unknown to both industry and authorities.

Morality, ethics, and regulatory compliance are fundamental to establishing trust in both individual real estate agents and the broader industry. Consumers, often under pressure and stress during housing transactions, may make irrational decisions (Salzman and Zwinkels, 2017). Real estate agents, who typically earn commission-based compensation (Engström, 2022), can also experience stress, which, according to a study by Lin et al. (2024), negatively impacts their performance for clients when they are financially stressed. Conflicts of interest are more likely to arise for real estate agents acting as independent intermediaries, as in Sweden (Engström, 2022), where agents must protect the interests of both buyers and sellers. This can lead to situations where those interests are incompatible. Levi and Terflinger (1988) highlighted the misconception that real estate agents are responsible for fulfilling the buyer's duty to investigate, a false expectation held by some buyers. To mitigate conflicts between real estate agents and clients, Marsh and Zumpano (1988) suggested clarifying the agent's role and improving market transparency. Rutherford et al. (2005) identified a clear conflict of interest when real estate agents recommend accepting an offer to push through a transaction. The nature of the agency agreement between the client and the agent, made before services are provided, also contributes to these conflicts (Creyer, 1997).

Hanson and Hawley (2023) focused on accessibility, noting that real estate agents tend to favour sellers over buyers. Izzo and Vitell (2003) found a positive correlation between an agent's moral compass and better outcomes for consumers. Turnbull et al. (2022) discovered that real estate agents with co-ownership tend to have a more long-term focus on business operations, which strengthens their brand and increases trust in the industry. Le and Supphellen (2017) emphasised the importance of trust, showing that clients are more likely to choose an agent or firm that follows sound ethical guidelines in future transactions. Chen et al. (2020) found that consumer loyalty increases when clients are aware of a company's stance on ethics, morality and social responsibility. Hoyt et al. (2002) reported low acceptance rates for unethical behaviour, such as deception and coercion, with age and experience being factors that reduced the likelihood of ethical transgressions.

Kaptein (2017) suggested that real estate agents are prone to temptations, which can be mitigated primarily through monitoring and feedback. Kelly et al. (2020) argued that while an individual's morality is static, ethics are dynamic and need constant updating, especially in response to technological advancements. Internationally, supervision and regulatory compliance are managed independently, yet the industry often struggles with issues such as a lack of ethics and self-regulation. In Sweden, state supervision exists for brokers, but such regulation is not widespread in comparable countries.

One approach to addressing ethical misconduct is to educate professionals about the importance of ethics in reducing corruption and strengthening integrity in the industry (Piazolo and Förster, 2019). Piazolo and Förster emphasises the need for increased education and suggest rewarding and protecting whistleblowers. Johnson and Loucks (1986) found that stricter educational requirements tend to lead to fewer reports to authorities. Other studies indicate that as legal requirements increase, the quality of brokerage services improves (Pancak and Sirmans, 2006). Barth et al. (2013) argued that clearer, more comprehensive regulations enhance transparency towards customers and improve internal controls. However, increased licensing requirements do not always have a positive impact. Ingram and Yelowitz (2021) found that a 10% increase in housing prices correlates with a 4% rise in the number of real estate agents. Their study also showed that higher licensing standards tend to exclude less experienced agents and women from the profession. Despite this, licensed agents tend to secure higher sales prices, as Lopez (2021) demonstrated, with licensed real estate agents achieving a 1.6% higher sales price than their non-licensed counterparts.

Duarte et al. (2015) recommended that real estate agents work to increase their clients’ understanding to avoid conflicts stemming from their contractual relationships with agents. One common issue is commission disputes, where two agents claim the commission. These disputes can have negative financial consequences for clients. In Sweden, the seller is the contracting principal in an exclusive right-to-sell agreement for a fixed period, which eliminates commission disputes between brokers. However, educating consumers about the agent's role and the transaction process remains relevant across contexts.

While we know a lot about agents' malpractice, we know little about pressures on agents. The real estate industry's struggles with money laundering have been well-documented (e.g. Alkaabi et al., 2010; Lokanan and Chopra, 2021; Naheem, 2017; Schneider, 2004; Stamp and Walker, 2007; Teichmann, 2018). The literature primarily focuses on the negative consequences of unethical and illegal behaviour among real estate agents, impacting individual customers, the industry and society. However, to the best of our knowledge, the potential problems arising from undue influence on the workforce within the industry, such as bribery or threats, are less frequently addressed. To date, the literature on undue influence in real estate agencies remains limited.

From a methodological perspective, Nelen (2008) examined the conditions that facilitate crime in Dutch real estate markets. The study applied crime analysis principles to identify vulnerabilities in the real estate sector, concluding that existing regulations and formal or informal controls were insufficient. Nelen (2008) noted that the real estate market was dominated by old-boys’ networks, with irregularities often concealed, making the market less transparent than others. This lack of transparency enabled both legitimate and illegitimate actors to interact and share knowledge. Nelen (2008) called for further empirical research into these irregularities across different countries and suggested local strategies such as self-regulation, administrative measures and a combination of public and private policing to combat crime in the sector.

In contrast, evidence supports the positive effects of integrity and professional ethics in the real estate market. Piazolo and Förster (2019) explored integrity as a performance-enhancing factor in the industry, referencing Jensen (2009), who demonstrated the performance benefits of integrity. Piazolo and Förster (2019) emphasised the role of educational institutions, trade associations and other stakeholders in promoting integrity and educating new real estate agents about its importance in the industry.

Cheung et al. (2015) explored the relationship between emotional intelligence and job insecurity, using real estate agents as a case group owing to the often unstable working conditions in the profession. The study found that emotional intelligence can reduce psychological strain by mitigating job insecurity; however, it is one of the few studies providing insight into the broader professional circumstances of real estate agents. Other literature highlights the negative health effects of threats and violence in the workplace. Rasmussen et al. (2013) investigated threats and violence faced by staff in various human service professions, finding that these issues are widespread. They also examined the relationship between the work environment and attitudes towards threats and violence, revealing that attitudes differ by profession. In some fields, such as human service work in special schools, violence is more accepted and considered part of the daily routine. However, since their study did not focus on real estate agencies, this area warrants further exploration.

Although threats may be more tolerated in certain professions, Biering et al. (2018) conducted a quantitative study on the long-term effects of workplace violence and found that frequent exposure to threats and violence negatively impacted later workforce participation. Rudkjoebing et al. (2020) conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis of work-related exposure to violence or threats, linking it to an increased risk of mental health disorders. The studies in their analysis consistently showed that workplace violence is associated with mental health issues. Similarly, Wieclaw et al. (2006) conducted a population-based, nested case-control study on Danes hospitalised for psychiatric disorders and examined their prior work experiences. They found that employment in occupations with exposure to work-related threats and violence is a risk factor for depression and stress-related disorders in both men and women. Interestingly, while men exposed to threats developed stress symptoms, women experienced symptoms of depression. These findings are crucial for workplace safety, particularly as the risk of mental health issues increases with the prevalence of violence and threats (Wieclaw et al., 2006).

This study employs two data collection methods and the main focus was exploratory. First, a survey was conducted by Kantar Sifo, an independent market research institute, from December 2018 to January 2019. The survey targeted all 7,085 ^[10] registered real estate agents in Sweden's residential housing market ^[11] (2018). A total of 1,423 individuals completed the survey, representing a 20% response rate. The survey, consisting of 56 questions, gathered information on participants' backgrounds, experience in the home sales market, attitudes towards customers and the business and attitudes towards business ethics through eight scenarios depicting unethical practices. The analysis of these business ethics scenarios is detailed in a separate study (Engström and Söderberg, 2024). In the present study, we focus on attempts of undue influence: bribery and threats by sellers or buyers. Respondents' ages ranged from 22 to 84 years, with a mean age of 44.5 years. Among the 1,423 real estate agents, 43.2% were female and 56.7% were male. The average number of years spent as a real estate agent was 12.7 (ranging from 0 to 52 years), and 91.4% worked full-time in 2018 (a minimum of 40 h per week).

Two logistic regressions were conducted to identify the effects of a model consisting of 15 independent variables on two dependent variables, which describe potential problematic situations encountered by Swedish real estate agents. In the first regression, the dependent variable was a binary variable indicating whether the respondent had been offered “a bribe” by a homebuyer (extra money outside the contracted amount) to close a deal before the auction while working as a real estate agent. Nearly 40% of brokers reported being offered compensation to close a deal in a way that was unfavourable to the seller and outside Sweden's generally accepted “good estate agent practice” code of conduct (described in section two on the study context). In the second regression, the dependent variable was a binary variable indicating whether the respondent had been threatened by a client (either a seller or a buyer) while working as a real estate agent. Thirty percent of brokers reported being threatened. The effects of ten context-specific variables and five respondent-specific independent variables were tested in each regression. The variables used in the regressions are listed in Table 1.

Interviews were conducted to further explore the experiences of real estate agents. Given the sensitive nature of the subject, interviewees were recruited through one of two trade associations for real estate agents in Sweden, the Association of Swedish Real Estate Agents. We advertised the study in the association's newsletters and invited agents to register for participation. Five agents expressed interest, but only three agreed to participate in interviews focused on the undue influence of home sellers or buyers. The remaining two declined, citing concerns over anonymity and research ethics, as they understood the information requested would be part of a published study. They considered discussions of undue influence to be uncommon among colleagues and were reluctant to risk being identified as critics of the real estate industry. In a second call, five more agents chose to participate in the study, giving in all eight interviewed agents. This is still a very small sample of self-selected participants that limits representativeness.

Notably, the eight self-registered agents were both more experienced and older than the average agent in our survey sample. The interview questions were open-ended, focusing on the respondents' personal experiences. The interviews lasted between 60 and 90 min. The content analysis of the interviews allowed for a deeper exploration of the agents' experiences with undue influence. Quotes from the three participants' stories are used to enhance understanding of their everyday work environments.

The results of the two logistic regressions are presented separately here.

Direct logistic regression was conducted to assess the impact of various factors on the likelihood of respondents reporting being offered a bribe by a buyer (extra money outside the contracted amount) to close a deal before an auction while working as a real estate broker. The model included 15 independent variables (10 context-specific and 5 respondent-specific). The full model, containing all predictors, was statistically significant, χ²(15, N = 1,386) = 126.063, p < 0.001, indicating that the model effectively distinguished between respondents who reported being offered a bribe and those who did not. The model explained 8.8% (Cox and Snell) and 11.9% (Nagelkerke) of the variance and correctly classified 64% of the cases.

As shown in Table 2, six independent variables significantly contributed to the model: TOOMWORK, COLMORESALEbin, GENDER, AGE, YEARSasBROKER and MARKETbin. The strongest predictor of reporting having been offered a bribe was the presence of colleagues providing misleading information to sellers, with an odds ratio of 2.01. This suggests that respondents with colleagues who provided misleading information were more than twice as likely to report being offered a bribe to close a deal before the auction, compared to those who did not report such behaviour among their colleagues, controlling for other factors in the model. The odds ratio for the local market was 1.868, indicating that respondents in major cities were almost 1.9 times more likely to report being offered a bribe. Gender also showed a significant effect, with an odds ratio of 1.781, meaning male respondents were approximately 1.8 times more likely to report being offered a bribe by a customer to close a deal early. The odds ratio for reporting working too much was 1.151, indicating that respondents who reported working excessively were almost 1.2 times more likely to report being offered a bribe. Years of experience as a broker also influenced the likelihood of reporting a bribe, with an odds ratio of 1.036, suggesting that more experienced brokers were almost 1.04 times more likely to report such an offer. Age had a statistically significant negative effect, with an odds ratio of 0.963, meaning older respondents were 1.02 times less likely to report being offered a bribe.

Direct logistic regression was conducted to assess the impact of various factors on the likelihood of respondents reporting being threatened by a seller or buyer while working as a real estate agent. The model included 15 independent variables: CHOICEpeople, CHOICEhouse, CHOICEmoney, LIKEWORK, TOOMWORK, WORRYWORK, CUSTTRUST, CLEARRULESbin, COLWRINFObin, COLMORESALEbin, GENDER, AGE, YEARSasBROKER, MARKETbin and REMWARbin. The full model, containing all predictors, was statistically significant, χ² (15, N = 1,386) = 83.836, p < 0.001, indicating that the model could distinguish between respondents who reported being threatened and those who did not. The model explained 5.9% (Cox and Snell) and 8.3% (Nagelkerke) of the variance and correctly classified 70% of the cases.

As shown in Table 3, seven independent variables made a statistically significant contribution to the model: TOOMWORK, WORRYWORK, CLEARRULESbin, COLWRINFObin, COLMORESALEbin, YEARSasBROKER and MARKETbin.

The strongest predictor of reporting being threatened by a client was COLWRINFObin, with an odds ratio of 1.488. This suggests that brokers with colleagues providing misleading information to buyers were almost 1.5 times more likely to report being threatened by a client. The odds ratio for MARKETbin was 1.422, indicating that brokers in major cities were 1.4 times more likely to report being threated than those working in other areas of Sweden. A similar result was found for COLMORESALEbin, with an odds ratio of 1.401, meaning that brokers whose colleagues misled sellers were 1.4 times more likely to report being threatened than those who did not experience this behaviour among colleagues.

The odds ratio for CLEARRULESbin was 0.739, indicating that brokers who did not view the rules and regulations for real estate agents as clear were 1.35 times more likely to report being threatened by a client. Another significant predictor was TOOMWORK, with an odds ratio of 1.279, suggesting that brokers who reported a heavy workload were almost 1.3 times more likely to report being threatened by a client. The odds ratio for WORRYWORK was 1.108, meaning brokers who worried about their daily work were 1.1 times more likely to report being threatened by a client. Finally, the odds ratio for YEARSasBROKER was 1.038, indicating that more experienced brokers were slightly more likely to report having been threatened by a client.

The stories of eight real estate agents who consented to participate in the study through complementary interviews are summarised under four themes. This exploratory supplementary part of the study was conducted to provide real examples of what real estate agents perceive as undue influence. While this section is not exhaustive, it is considered valuable for exploration of the potentially sensitive area of agency work giving ideas for further studies.

The following four themes (A–D) describe the stories shared during the eight interviews. Respondents were asked to recount their experiences, with follow-up questions posed when clarification was needed. A small number of quotes have been selected to illustrate the responses.

1. Suggestions from buyers to end an auction in exchange for repeated sales, formulated as a bribe.

An example of undue influence involved requests from buyers to end an auction before all bidders had the opportunity to place their bids. This practice contradicts what is considered good estate agent practice, as the agent is contracted by the seller to secure the best market price – usually through an auction. The seller, rather than the agent, has the right to accept a lower bid than what the market offers. Accepting money from a buyer to terminate the sales process before all bids are presented to the seller is illegal under Swedish law (Chapter 10, Section 5b-d, of the SFS 2012:301, 2012). Some quotes describing this situation include:

1. Threats arising from disagreements over the valuation of a seller's property

Valuing a property on behalf of a seller is a standard task for a real estate agent in Sweden. However, this process can sometimes provoke strong reactions from the sellers.

The situation described is one that probably should have been reported to the police. While nothing further occurred in this case, this respondent and more of the interviewed agents noted that such situations are not uncommon. The typical way of handling these threats is to discuss and debrief with colleagues at the real estate agency firm. Since real estate agents in Sweden are mostly self-employed or franchisees, no union exists to represent them. Although Sweden has two trade associations that support the industry's development, the respondent highlighted that these associations do not address issues like threats in the everyday working environment, which can be stressful for individual agents.

1. Physical threats of a sexual nature from sellers or buyers (with or without the intention of unduly influencing the deal)

Four respondents mentioned the risk of sexual harassment and were aware of colleagues being threatened by sellers during the intake of a new sale or by potential buyers during showings. As they did not share their own personal experiences but referred to experiences of others, this issue warrants further exploration.

The presence of a security phone number suggests that this type of threat occurs frequently. Sexual harassment is, of course, unacceptable as part of any profession. The respondents emphasised that trade associations – or a potential future union – could play a crucial role in addressing this issue. Since the survey did not specifically cover this type of threat, future studies should follow up by exploring gender perspectives and sexual harassment in more depth.

1. Long-term threats in the professional working environment

All eight respondents also expressed concerns about their working environment, including irregular working hours and three of them also highlighted the threat of being reported to the inspectorate.

These issues could also be addressed more broadly by trade associations or a potential union. One respondent noted that not all new colleagues remain in the profession owing to the demanding working conditions. While this statement requires further investigation, it is considered outside the main scope of this study. However, the fact that three of the respondents viewed inspection control as a threat to their professional work is noteworthy, as inspections are intended to ensure compliance with regulations and good estate agent practices.

This exploratory study examined two key aspects of undue influence in the daily work of real estate agents in the residential market: bribery attempts and threats from sellers or buyers. It also identified the characteristics of real estate agents who are exposed to such market manipulation. The research design is not robust enough for strong causal claims as the explanatory power is weak, but the intention of the study was exploratory and we argue that the main value is opening up a new discussion on a neglected aspect of real estate agency. As Nelen (2008) noted, the real estate market lacks full transparency, allowing illegal actors to exert undue influence on intermediaries, such as real estate agents. Money laundering is a well-documented issue in this market (e.g. Lokanan and Chopra, 2021; Naheem, 2017; Teichmann, 2018), presenting two sides to the problem: the intentional misconduct of real estate agents, which constitutes a criminal act, and the pressure agents face to withstand various forms of undue influence.

Our findings indicate that agents offered bribes (extra money or the potential for future property listings) to close deals before or during auctions tend to share certain characteristics. These include working in major cities, having colleagues who provide misleading information to sellers, being male, carrying heavy workloads, being more experienced and being younger. In contrast, agents who have been threatened by sellers or buyers typically work in major cities, have colleagues providing misleading information to both buyers and sellers, do not perceive real estate regulations as clear, experience high stress and are more experienced.

This study highlights the characteristics of real estate agents exposed to undue influence, focusing on the factors that contribute to such exposure in cases of bribery and threats. Working in a major city is one such factor, as it often involves a highly competitive market. A heavy workload emerged as a contributing factor in both scenarios, while having colleagues who provide misleading information reinforces the idea that market competition plays a significant role in increasing the risk of undue influence. Explaining why more experienced agents report experiencing undue influence is more difficult, since younger, male agents are statistically more likely to report bribery attempts. We suggest this may be related to the dynamics of large-city markets, where young, ambitious and risk-taking agents work long hours to establish themselves. As the focus of this study is exploratory, we note the results but refrain from claiming he power to explain in a more general sense.

Agents who have been threatened also report confusion about the rules and regulations for real estate agents. This finding points to a potential issue with education requirements, which should be communicated to the relevant authorities. In Sweden, from 2028, real estate agents will need a three-year bachelor's degree that includes substantial legal coursework. Prior to this change, the requirement is two years of university courses as directed by the FMI. However, some agents, particularly those with longer careers, may lack sufficient formal training.

Having a clear understanding of applicable regulations, along with holding not only a license but also a university degree, might provide agents with the professional integrity needed to resist bribery and threats from sellers or buyers, as suggested by Jensen (2009) and Piazolo and Förster (2019). This needs to investigated further as no clear recommendations on the relationship to education can be made based on this study. Also, further in-depth studies are needed to explore the effects of different markets on real estate agents' working conditions, the regulatory frameworks protecting them in various national contexts, and the role of education in shaping their ability to resist undue influence.

This study did not address how real estate agents responded to attempts of undue influence, as the primary focus was to explore their working conditions. While some agents may exhibit borderline behaviour that deviates from the idea of good estate agent practice in Swedish national regulations (as described in section two), addressing this issue falls under the responsibilities of authorities who inspect the industry's code of ethics. However, as one interviewee noted, in Sweden, no authority, industry organisation or union specifically protects real estate professionals. If sellers or buyers with unethical or criminal intentions target agents, identifying the groups or individuals that are particularly vulnerable is crucial. Although further studies are needed to validate these findings, we believe younger agents working in larger cities may be especially at risk. More studies are validated by this exploratory first step of investigating vulnerability of real estate agents. This is particularly concerning as exposure to threats has been linked to health several issues (e.g. Biering et al., 2018; Rasmussen et al., 2013; Rudkjoebing et al., 2020; Wieclaw et al., 2006).

The qualitative component of this study was limited but also uncovered additional challenges faced by Swedish real estate agents working as intermediaries in the market. The respondents' stories revealed issues beyond bribery and threats, which warrant further exploration. Problems like sexual harassment and the overall working conditions of agents were not part of the initial focus, but they are of significant concern to policymakers, companies and individuals entering the profession. These issues affect workforce diversity and the security of real estate agents. However, more research is needed to confirm these findings.

This study has several limitations that we wish to highlight: (1) The survey did not focus on the issues of undue influence in-depth, and therefore, only few questions were designed to explore these aspects. Future exploratory studies using different both qualitative and quantitative methods should investigate the specific areas of undue influence; (2) This study focused on Sweden, a country with a unique real estate agency model. Similar research should be conducted in other market models to compare results; (3) To better understand the working conditions and the pressures real estate agents face from sellers and buyers, more in-depth studies of real-life challenges are needed. This study offers only a brief glimpse into the issues faced by agents. In doings so it opens for discussion and further investigation.

In summary, this study exploring undue influence in the working environment of real estate agents in Sweden concludes that such influence does exist. Agents reported experiencing both bribery and threats during their interactions with home sellers and buyers. This study also sheds some preliminary light on the characteristics of agents who report experiencing undue influence, highlighting the importance of the working environment. Notably, the misconduct of colleagues appears to play a role, suggesting that company culture may influence how customers – home sellers or buyers – interact with the company and its agents. The potential impact of company culture on consumer behaviour warrants further investigation. Additionally, more in-depth studies are needed to examine the working conditions of real estate agents in different local markets, considering factors such as education, gender and years of experience. Since workplace regulations differ between countries, studies on workplace safety are also of further interest in understanding the professional lives of real estate agents.

The findings may also provide insight into the characteristics of agents who do not experience undue influence. However, the absence of reports could be due to various factors, including fear of being suspected of criminal involvement or concerns about the confidentiality of the survey, despite assurances of anonymity. Given that allowing undue influence is illegal for real estate agents, this is a sensitive issue that requires continued research into different real estate agency systems worldwide. The Swedish model, where agents are intermediaries contracted by the seller but with legal obligations to both parties, is rare, and further studies are needed to explore practices in various regulatory markets. While our limited qualitative study provided some examples of the types of undue influence agents experience, these are merely illustrative. The practical experiences of agents in this context require further exploration.

This study highlights the importance of examining the working conditions of real estate agents in addition to focusing on consumer protection in residential markets. Clarity and transparency are essential for reducing stress and pressure on agents, as confusion may arise about their exact role in the mediation process. Industrial organisations bear significant responsibility in addressing this issue. If the insights from this limited study can be verified by further research one possible solution could be to establish a functions within the industrial organisations to offer psychological expertise and provide support in dealing with certain issues, such as interactions with police authorities.

Another suggestion involves enhancing consumers' understanding of their roles as sellers or buyers in the residential real estate market. Currently, no requirements exist in Sweden for consumers to be aware of their responsibilities or the roles, powers and qualifications of real estate agents. The FMI and the Association of Swedish Real Estate Agents do not currently enforce any such requirements. Expanding the knowledge requirements regarding private residence transactions could be beneficial. Increasing consumer knowledge of the expectations of various actors in a sales process could lead to more predictable and secure work for real estate agents, benefiting all parties involved.

The study's findings have several implications for research, practice and society. For research, they shift attention from the well-studied issue of agent malpractice to the less explored problem of client-driven pressures. Although exploratory, the results suggest that bribery attempts and threats might not only be isolated events but structural features of real estate work, especially in competitive urban markets. This calls for studies on how such influence emerges, how it differs across institutional settings, and which organisational cultures heighten or reduce vulnerability. By treating bribery and threats as occupational risks rather than individual incidents, the study opens up for discussions on new theoretical perspectives in both real estate and occupational health research.

For practice, the exploratory findings give some indications that agencies and professional associations could address agents' working conditions alongside consumer protection. Workload, unclear rules and misleading behaviour among colleagues seems to increase susceptibility to undue influence, highlighting organisational responsibility. This opens for further investigations and discussions on different issues. Examples of such new questions to discuss are that firms could work to reduce excessive hours, strengthen codes of conduct and create safe spaces for discussing client pressure. Professional bodies could offer legal and psychological support, and educational programs may use these examples to prepare future agents for situations rarely discussed in the profession. However, more studies are needed to get a more substantiated picture of any actions needed.

The policy implications are similarly clear. Current Swedish regulation emphasises consumer protection and agent misconduct while overlooking threats and bribery targeting agents. Reports from experienced agents in major cities indicate that the regulatory framework fails to safeguard them. Policymakers could introduce anonymous reporting systems, mandate training on handling undue influence and clarify agents' duties to reduce ambiguity and client frustration – measures that would strengthen both agent protection and market integrity.

Finally, the study has societal relevance. It challenges portrayals of agents solely as opportunistic actors by showing that they also face unethical and illegal behaviour. Recognising this dual role may shift public attitudes and underline that a functioning housing market requires not only monitoring agents but also protecting them. In this way, the study contributes to a more balanced understanding of the profession and to improved wellbeing, market functioning and consumer trust.

Finally, we would like to emphasise that this is an exploratory study, the first to our knowledge that documents undue influence on Swedish real estate agents, and our goal in presenting the study is to start a discussion rather than end it. This opens up a research agenda that should investigate the mechanisms through which such undue influence arises, how it varies across institutional contexts and what forms of organisational culture make agents more or less vulnerable. By framing bribery and threats as occupational risks rather than purely individual experiences, the paper contributes to broadening the theoretical lens of both real estate research and occupational health studies.

The respondents have given their written consent to participate in the study and was given information on their rights and possibilities to withdraw their answers. The survey was constructed by the researchers, but distributed to the respondents by an independent company. The answers were communicated to the researchers as an anonymised data file and no ethical approval was therefore needed.

All respondents have given their written consent to participate in the study and also for publication of results.

We would like to thank Editage (www.editage.com) for English language editing.