This paper investigates the buy online and pick up in-store cooperation (BOPSC) of online and offline retailers. Specifically, this study solves the following questions: (1) What is the impact of BOPSC on their optimal price and sales volume of products? (2) When should an online retailer and an offline retailer conduct the BOPSC strategy with each other?
The paper first establishes two game models to explore the equilibriums of online and offline retailers in non-BOPSC and BOPSC. Then the condition for online and offline retailers to implement BOPSC strategy are determined. Furthermore, the applicability of the BOPSC strategy is enhanced by incorporating numerical analysis.
The study’s findings reveal that BOPSC strategy will not always beneficial to online and offline retailers, which depends on the total cost of online shopping and the product valuation of consumers. BOPSC strategy leads to the increase of prices and online orders, and the demand of offline retailer is eroded. Moreover, BOPS cooperation between different retailers is easier to achieve than omni-channel integration strategy. When the convenience difference between offline shopping and BOPSC pick-up is moderate, the effectiveness of BOPSC strategy can be improved.
This study has the following two main contributions: Firstly, the authors investigate the effects of BOPSC strategy on the prices of online and offline retailers. The study results show that the BOPSC strategy alleviates price competition and promotes a win–win situation between online retailers and offline retailers. Secondly, this paper mainly studies the cooperative behavior between online and offline retailers and reveals the optimal conditions for online and offline retailers to adopt BOPSC strategy. It can help small- and medium-sized online and offline retailers to choose suitable products for BOPSC strategy, so as to achieve the purpose of increasing profit.
