Navigating the aftermath: evaluating COVID-19’s lasting effects – multiple case studies from Slovenian public administration Open Access

The outbreak of COVID-19 triggered an unprecedented global crisis, evolving from a health emergency into political, economic, and societal upheaval affecting all aspects of life (Boin et al., 2020; Nolte and Lindenmeier, 2023). This situation shifted the research focus beyond healthcare strategies, such as mitigation efforts and resource management (Ceschel et al., 2024; Manfrini and Bäckström, 2024; Noto et al., 2023), to include the comprehensive responses of public administrations, which often required transformations in business models, structures, processes, and policies (AlMazrouei, 2021; Uru et al., 2022). These changes often involved innovative approaches and adaptation of conventional management methods to the new circumstances (Tomaževič et al., 2023), sparking interest in concepts like coproduction and open innovation (Criado and Guevara-Gómez, 2021; Uster, 2024).

At the macro level, scholars explored crisis management and communication, urging for a robust administrative state and a critical rethinking of political leadership styles (Fissi et al., 2022; Jamil and Hossain, 2022; Johanson et al., 2024; Ohemeng and Christensen, 2022; Troisi and Alfano, 2022; Van Wart et al., 2022; Wong et al., 2022). At the meso level, the focus shifted to telework, digital tools, and changes in work environments (Raghavan et al., 2021), addressing specific organisational issues like the impact of the crisis on discretionary powers of public servants or the correlation between telework and job satisfaction (Hadna et al., 2022; Mousa and Abdelgaffar, 2021; Wesemann, 2023). However, these studies often missed the broader, complex interconnections within organisations (Mikusova et al., 2023; Špaček et al., 2023), including the wider impact of ICT recognised as the key asset enabling organisations to function more or less normally in abnormal times (Edelmann and Millard, 2021). Despite considerable research on digitalisation and its effects on governance, employees, and processes (Nolte and Lindenmeier, 2023; Todisco et al., 2023; Tomaževič et al., 2023; Uru et al., 2022; Edelmann and Millard, 2021), its overall impact on public administration remains poorly understood, with no clear consensus on whether the crisis has truly driven digital transformation (Moser-Plautz and Schmidthuber, 2023).

Furthermore, the long-term changes left by the crisis have been underexplored. Most research focuses on its acute phase, prioritising immediate responses to the COVID-19 crisis over its enduring effects (Edelmann and Millard, 2021; Müller et al., 2023). Understanding these long-term consequences is crucial for navigating through the turbulent times we live in. This prompts the need for greater research on the continuity and sustainability of COVID-19-induced changes within public administration (Špaček et al., 2023).

Our paper addresses these gaps by adopting a holistic approach to analysing COVID-19-induced changes within the Slovenian public administration, aiming to answer the following research questions:

The paper is structured into seven sections: a theoretical framework (Section 2), methodology and case study selection (Section 3), analysis of results (Sections 4–6), and discussion of findings and their contribution to the literature (Sections 6–7).

The dominant focus on the acute crisis was largely shaped by the crisis management perspective prevailing in the literature. Crisis management typically involves adding temporary structures and processes onto existing bureaucracies (Boin and Lodge, 2021), which naturally led to a focus on the short-term impacts of the crisis. To address this limitation, we refer to Leavitt’s diamond model (Leavitt, 1965), a comprehensive framework for understanding organisational change that helps shift the focus away from the specific, ephemeral changes induced by COVID-19.

Leavitt’s diamond model remains the most relevant theoretical basis due to its adaptability to diverse contexts (Kovačič et al., 2004; Nograšek, 2011; Nograšek and Vintar, 2014; Sarker, 2000; Shouran et al., 2019; Wigand, 2007). The model builds on four interacting components – people, tasks, technology, and structure – where a change in one inevitably triggers changes in the others (Leavitt, 1965). Our research is based on Nograšek and Vintar’s (2014) adaptation, which expanded this framework by adding a fifth element – organisational culture – and considering technology (ICT) as the central driver of organisational transformation (see Figure 1).

Although initially designed for e-government studies, this model provides a fitting starting point for investigating the primary enabler of organisational changes during COVID-19 (see RQ1), in line with literature highlighting technology as the first and key crisis response. However, crisis management literature suggests that technology deployment needs to be coupled with empowering and engaging people (Hassankhani et al., 2021), implying that the element “people”, especially aspects related to leadership (Kapucu and Ustun, 2018; Tokakis et al., 2019), may be just as important as “technology”. Thus, RQ1 opens up a discussion on potential adaptions of Leavitt’s model for crisis scenarios. Nograšek and Vintar (2014) also offer a comprehensive framework for analysing the scale and scope of organisational change (corresponding to RQ2 and RQ3, respectively). They distinguish between first- and second-level changes, defining attributes like organisational level, change frequency, implementation time, etc. (see Table 1).

Moreover, their framework aims to capture the substance of changes and their practical implications within the organisational elements “processes”, “people”, “culture”, and “structure”. Nograšek and Vintar (2014) define these changes through a detailed list of attributes, which are further grouped based on the organisational level they predominantly affect (Table 2).

Tables 1 and 2 provide the key basis for identifying and understanding the COVID-19-induced changes within the Slovenian administrative context. For detailed explanation of these attributes, we direct readers to Nograšek and Vintar (2014).

While this model does not explicitly define the attributes of the technology element, and to better understand the changes therein, we refer to Mergel et al. (2019) who define three degrees of digital change:

1. Digitisation, referring to the “transition from analogue to digital services with a 1:1 change in the delivery mode and the addition of a technological channel of delivery” (Mergel et al., 2019, p. 12).

2. Digitalisation, implying changes to organisational processes that go beyond simple digitisation.

3. Digital transformation, capturing multidimensional changes – including cultural, organisational, and relational shifts – that significantly reshape how organisations function.

Given the scale of the crisis and the existing COVID-19 literature, we expected digital transformation to have a lasting impact on most, if not all, organisational elements within the Slovenian public administration.

Slovenia represents a case of traditional public administration characterised by a hierarchical and centralised “command and control” approach (Vrbek and Kuiper, 2022). In this context, strong political support at the highest level is crucial for implementing substantial and lasting changes. However, political instability in Slovenia, including six government changes between 2012 and 2024 (two during the (post) COVID-19 period in 2020 and 2022), disrupted the continuity of the digitalisation agenda, a critical component of crisis preparedness. For instance, the new digitalisation strategy was only adopted in 2023, three years after the expiration of the previous strategy from 2016. Despite these setbacks, Slovenia improved its EU DESI ranking from 16th in 2020 to 11th in 2022, slightly surpassing the EU average score for 2022 (European Commission, 2020, 2021, 2022).

To identify the broader effects of the COVID-19 crisis on Slovenia’s public administration, this research employs a multi-case study design (Yin, 2018). Five cases were selected from central government organisations based on their status as state administration organisation or public agency and their mandate for service delivery involving communication with external or internal stakeholders (Table 3). The latter criterion assumes that the crisis severely affected the performance of these organisations, making their long-term crisis-induced changes more visible. The selected cases include various types of state administration organisations: a ministry, a body within a ministry, a government office, an administrative unit, and a public agency.

Pre-crisis preparedness and crisis management plans are crucial (Correia et al., 2020). In Slovenia, a centralised crisis management system places the responsibility for responding to complex crises like COVID-19 at the government level (GOV.SI, 2021). This largely explains the absence of crisis management instruments in most of the cases analysed. The exceptions are UKOM, responsible for crisis communication as part of critical infrastructure (Official Gazette RS, 2018), and AJPES, which adopted a business continuity plan as part of the ISO 9001 standard.

Data was gathered through semi-structured interviews conducted from September to November 2022 with representatives from top management, middle management, and operational staff (Table 4). To address concerns about the timing of the interviews potentially affecting the identification of long-term changes, the third part of the questionnaire focused on institutionalised changes widely accepted as the new normal within the organisation. Moreover, interviewers prioritised discussions of permanent changes affecting individual organisational elements.

Interviewees were selected from different organisational levels to ensure triangulation and identify potential “gatekeepers” of long-term changes. The selection criteria required employees to have at least one year of experience within the organisation before COVID-19 and stable roles during and after the crisis ^[1].

The questionnaire was structured into three sections, covering the periods before, during, and after the COVID-19 crisis. Questions were tailored to key organisational elements – technology, people, processes, culture, and structure – to trace the trajectory of change within each element. The second section specifically addressed the first intervention prompted by COVID-19 to identify the primary enabler of change (RQ1).

The responses were coded using attributes defined by Nograšek and Vintar (2014) referring to the scale (RQ2) and scope (RQ3) of change. The results are presented according to the coding outcomes, using the specific terms employed by interviewees. The interpretation highlights both unified perspectives and differences across organisational roles. Due to word count limitations, verbatim quotes were excluded. However, the methodology’s clarity, rigorous coding, and dual control of coding and interpretation ensured an accurate and comprehensive representation of participants’ responses.

To ensure uninterrupted performance and communication, UKOM proactively implemented technology-related measures even before the official onset of the crisis. This included creating a virus information webpage, launching a call centre, and initiating online press conferences. These actions affected the elements “people”, “processes”, and “culture”, necessitating staff reorganisation, new processes, and collaboration with internal and external stakeholders. Notably, many UKOM employees, particularly those from the government communication sector, had to remain physically present during the crisis and could not telework until after the crisis.

In the other cases analysed, the initial response involved staff reorganisations, as most employees stayed home due to health risks, which prompted organisations to prioritise basic functioning. For example, MPA quickly established the legal groundwork for telework and upgraded necessary technology, FURS ensured technical prerequisites for telework, and AJPES introduced telework arrangements and rotations for frontline staff. These changes swiftly affected the “technology” element, as the organisations secured equipment and remote access for their staff. The strong digital orientation of FURS, AJPES, and, to some extent, MPA, eased the transition to these new work arrangements.

While the initial impetus for change in the case of AULJ was also within the “people” element, its crisis response differed significantly. AULJ reorganised its staff and implemented a rotation system to maintain normal operations, primarily relying on analogue service delivery. This change did not directly impact “technology” as a supporting tool for service delivery, except for allowing application submissions via email and establishing an online user application for booking in-person appointments.

Contrary to initial expectations, in four out of five case studies, the primary enabler of change was identified in the element “people” (Table 5). This suggests that in most cases, the initial response to the COVID-19 crisis involved staff reorganisation – a term we use to capture actions such as telework arrangements and rotation systems. The only exception to this pattern was UKOM, where “technology” was clearly identified as the area of initial organisational changes triggering further changes in the other elements.

This chapter examines the scale of change in the five case studies, using model attributes that define first- and second-level changes.

The most significant changes at MPA reflect second-level shifts, marking a departure from previous practices. This is primarily observed in the adoption of a hybrid work model, emphasising project and team-based work over hierarchical approaches. Moreover, the crisis prompted the exploration of shared offices and the phasing out of landline phones. While technology-driven changes leveraged existing processes, their impact, like remote access and electronic communication channels, drastically altered the daily routines of non-IT professionals. However, it is premature to determine whether these changes fundamentally shifted the MPA’s understanding of its role, as it still retains a traditional organisational structure.

UKOM also experienced second-level change, largely driven by the acquisition of advanced IT equipment that enabled independence from outsourcing video production. This technological shift had a profound impact on other organisational aspects, influencing the intensity and nature of tasks and necessitating new skill development among staff. The changes brought about by COVID-19 are therefore multidimensional, affecting various aspects such as “processes” (e.g. in-house video production), “people” (e.g. acquisition of new competencies), “culture” (e.g. staff alienation due to health measures), and “structure” (e.g. formalisation of telework rules). In the case of AJPES, a limited second-level change is observed, mainly resulting from the introduction of telework. This necessitated new legal and normative frameworks, indicating some degree of formalisation at the organisational level. The adoption of MS Teams as an alternative to face-to-face communication marked another significant change. However, these changes had minimal impact on other aspects of the organisation. AJPES demonstrated significant preparedness and resilience during the crisis, largely due to its existing crisis management system based on ISO 9001 standards, and a high level of digitalisation. This allowed the organisation to adapt quickly and avoid major disruptions during and after the crisis. Like AJPES, FURS also demonstrated significant agility and capacity for effective performance during the crisis. It not only maintained uninterrupted regular services but also played a key role in implementing temporary anti-crisis measures. As a result, the crisis had a minimal impact on the organisation. Long-term changes were classified as first-level, primarily affecting “people” (limited telework, as top management preferred physical presence) and “technology” (increased use of remote access, IT equipment, and electronic communication channels like MS Teams). The latter are seen as a continuation of pre-existing strategies rather than a radical shift. The limited scope of these changes reflects the organisation’s resilience fostered by its advanced technological development and staff awareness of their critical role.

In the case of AULJ, a very limited first-level organisational change is observed. The most notable long-term change was the introduction of an online appointment booking system, which improved the workplace atmosphere by limiting the number of service users present simultaneously. More substantial changes were constrained by the organisation’s limited autonomy. MPA oversees the organisation and IT support for all administrative units, while line ministries are responsible for renewing the processes they deliver. As a result, any more substantial changes stemming from reflections on the COVID-19 crisis are still pending.

Based on this analysis, second-level changes were observed in MPA and UKOM, while AJPES experienced limited second-level changes. FURS underwent first-level changes, and AULJ exhibited only limited first-level changes (see Table 6).

This chapter explores the long-term changes resulting from the COVID-19 crisis within the case studies. The findings are structured around five organisational elements: “processes”, “structure”, “people”, “culture”, and “technology”.

In three cases – MPA, UKOM, and FURS – automation emerged as a key change at workplace level (Table 7). This included the widespread adoption of electronic signatures in daily operations or efforts to address gaps in digitalisation, as seen in the case of FURS.

At the higher organisational level, changes affecting the attribute “sourcing” were observed in two case studies ‒ AULJ and UKOM. These changes, however, had different effects within the organisations. For AULJ, they involved outsourcing the appointment booking system, whereas for UKOM it meant abandoning outsourcing in favour of in-house activities. The shift at UKOM was enabled by newly acquired IT equipment that allowed independence from outsourcing video production, a common practice before the crisis.

A notable change in MPA, FURS, and AJPES was the establishment of a clear framework of process control to monitor telework performance. While “process control” was also mentioned in the context of AULJ, the performance criteria and norms for service provision had been adopted before the crisis and served to monitor a limited number of employees working from home during acute crisis. Since this was not a direct result of the crisis and the telework arrangement was temporary and limited in scope, AULJ is not included among the organisations characterised by this change.

In MPA, the hybrid work model facilitated coordination and impacted both vertical and horizontal information flows, particularly in preparing new public sector reforms. The interviewee from top management highlighted two key reforms – the civil service system and the salary system – where horizontal communication and collaboration were enhanced by involving all relevant internal divisions. Vertical information flow was improved through the use of SharePoint and online communication channels, which enhanced communication, collaboration, and task division across hierarchical levels. These changes in process management reduced micromanagement and allowed more autonomy at lower hierarchical levels during the initial phases of preparing strategic documents, such as the HR management strategy.

Despite these changes, the crisis did not leave a substantial long-term impact on the organisations’ regular processes, which were only temporarily adapted to accommodate health protection requirements during the acute crisis.

Changes in “structure” primarily related to (de)centralisation. In the case of MPA, the formalisation of hybrid work and new leadership standards promoted greater autonomy at lower levels and encouraged team-based and intra-departmental work. This shift reduced the organisation’s high centralisation and mitigated the siloed structure. A more limited trend toward decentralisation was observed in FURS, where certain administrative decision-making powers, such as procurements and HR, were transferred from the central office to regional offices. However, these changes in MPA and FURS did not fundamentally alter their traditional public administration nature.

The opposite trend toward greater centralisation was noted in AULJ and AJPES, but it is not considered relevant for this discussion. In AULJ, centralisation was not crisis-induced but a result of pre-crisis reforms (see Table 3), while in AJPES, the stricter command-and-control approach was only temporary during the acute crisis. In addition to formalising internal rules – primarily regulating telework – at the organisational level, UKOM experienced a trend toward specialisation in video production, directly resulting from the new technology procured during the crisis. Interestingly, this specialisation did not extend to the workplace level. Due to the limited number of staff, employees still do not have strictly defined tasks and are expected to adapt to the specific needs of each situation or the directives of their superiors, just like before the crisis.

The key “people”-related changes across all case studies, except AULJ, involve reshaped ways and new quality of communication among staff and the development of new competencies and skills due to the introduction of new communication channels. In MPA, traditional communication methods are largely supplemented by electronic means. FURS and AJPES staff use electronic communication for training and participation in online/hybrid meetings, specifically when management recognises this format as optimal. The integration of electronic communication into daily activities required staff to develop new competencies and skills, leaving a significant organisational impact by building a substantial knowledge base. This is evident in the resources available on the AJPES and FURS web portals and in the updated curriculum of the Administration Academy within MPA, which now includes crisis management aspects.

In AJPES and FURS, changes related to work complexity and increased workload were temporary, occurring mainly during the acute phase of the crisis due to the implementation of anti-COVID measures. However, long-term consequences were observed in AULJ. Paradoxically, the increased work complexity in AULJ stemmed from the expanded use of electronic communications, particularly email, for submitting applications. While service users could submit applications via email, employees still had to process most applications analogously. This added email as an additional channel alongside pre-existing methods (in person and via post), but without sufficient digitalisation of backend processes, this change led to significant problems for staff, resulting in increased workload and backlogs.

A change in leadership style was noted only within MPA, primarily affecting top management, which recognised the need for a more collaborative approach to work. However, broader acceptance of this approach is hindered by resistance from middle management.

Cultural changes focused on behaviour. At AULJ, the introduction of the appointment booking system, as a key technology-related change, improved productivity and focus for staff by limiting presence of service users on the premises. However, backlogs perpetuated by limited digitalisation led to staff dissatisfaction and seeking new job opportunities. At MPA and UKOM, top-level management embraced telework and a more collaborative culture. Yet, at UKOM’s workplace level, this change led to increased alienation, as practices such as celebrating birthdays and holding regular monthly meetings for sharing best practices were abandoned.

Changes in basic underlying assumptions are also observed. On one hand, this implied greater trust in staff by management (notably in UKOM and the MPA top-management). On the other hand, it resulted in greater internalised pressure among public servants at FURS and AJPES to choose telework over taking sick leave, especially in cases of milder sickness symptoms or when caring for dependent family members.

In two case studies, changes in organisational artifacts were observed. At AJPES, physical barriers like Plexiglas were introduced between service users and public servants. At MPA, the implementation of a hybrid work model led to experimenting with shared offices in one unit and discussing the elimination of landline phones. Although limited in scope, the latter ideas could have significant implications for the entire state administration.

The crisis accelerated digitalisation efforts within MPA and UKOM. For MPA, this meant expanding IT use beyond the IT department to support a new hybrid work model. For UKOM, it involved fully equipping a second video studio. However, although significant, these changes do not constitute digital transformation. In MPA’s case, IT equipment was already available before the crisis, and the hybrid model was not universally adopted. Similarly, UKOM was already digitally focused and well-equipped prior to the crisis. Therefore, the changes brought by COVID-19 in these contexts simply continued pre-existing developments and strategic directions. Due to a “favourable” starting position, the crisis had minimal impact on digitalisation within FURS and AJPES. Both were already digitally oriented, with most processes digitalised, leaving limited room for improvements. The primary changes in “technology” involved securing suitable IT equipment for staff and introducing MS Teams as a legitimate alternative to face-to-face communication in specific situations, such as training. At most, in the case of FURS, the crisis acted as a “magnifying glass”, highlighting areas that were not fully digitalised and required minor improvements or upgrades.

In the case of AULJ, the COVID-19 crisis did not lead to any significant changes, even at the basic digitalisation level. AULJ continued to use the same outdated IT equipment as before, with most backstage processes remaining largely analogue. Technology use remained limited to what is explicitly prescribed by the legal framework for specific services, such as taking fingerprints for ID documents.

Hence, significant digitalisation developments were observed in two cases, while limited or no change occurred in the other three (see Table 8).

The findings from the five case studies reveal that the COVID-19 crisis had an uneven impact on Slovenian state administration organisations, both in terms of the scale and scope of changes. The most consistent observation across the studies is the identification of “people” as the primary enabler of change (RQ1) in four out of five cases, which subsequently triggered further changes in other organisational elements.

The answer to RQ2 – regarding the scale of COVID-19-induced changes within the Slovenian public administration – does not point to consistent or radical transformations. Even in the three case studies where second-level changes were observed, these were not profound. The fundamental nature of the organisations remained largely unchanged, with no significant shift in their roles or relationships with citizens. None of the organisations deviated from their traditional public administration nature, suggesting that public sector organisations, even during crises, tend to be bureaucratic, traditional, and slow to embrace change (Tyskbo, 2023).

Regarding RQ3 – referring to the scope of COVID-19-induced changes within the Slovenian public administration – our study observed diverse organisational changes, making it difficult to draw universal conclusions about overarching trends. The two primary changes – telework and new digital communication channels – mainly impacted the “people” element and were observed in most cases, except AULJ. These changes align with broader shifts at both global (EU) and national (Slovenian) levels, where hybrid work models are gaining popularity (Crahay et al., 2021; Ministry of Public Administration, 2022). However, in Slovenia, traditional work and communication methods persist as the norm, with hybrid models considered legitimate only in specific situations. They typically require the approval of (middle) management, who often view them with reservations. Other observed changes are less conclusive, as they seem largely influenced by the specific organisational mandates (e.g. UKOM) and levels of readiness for digitalisation (e.g. AJPES and FURS) or crisis management systems (e.g. AJPES).

Compared to their initial states (Table 3), the organisations maintained notable continuity, especially in maintaining traditional, hierarchical structures with centralised decision-making. However, organisational continuity varied based on pre-COVID digitalisation levels. Highly digitalised organisations were more adaptable and resilient, remaining largely unaffected by long-term changes. In contrast, less digitalised organisations continued to struggle with longstanding issues (e.g. high workloads or staff shortages), which were intensified during the crisis.

The crisis reinforced existing organisational practices and problems without fundamentally challenging the perception of the Slovenian public administration as rooted in command-and-control traditions. Although limited, collaborative experiences and experimentation within MPA may eventually inspire future shifts in practices and mindsets. However, these changes reflected adaptations within existing frameworks rather than a paradigm shift from the traditional public administration model.

The paper makes two key original contributions. Firstly, it stands out as one of the few studies utilising a comprehensive theoretical framework to understand organisational change during a crisis. It concludes that, while the crisis prompted some changes and experimental concepts – such as telework or shared offices, which were previously unimaginable – its overall impact on the scale and scope of organisational change remains limited. Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, the paper highlights the necessity for a new theoretical framework or an adaptation of Leavitt’s diamond model to better elucidate the dynamics of organisational change during turbulent times. Such an adaptation should emphasise the central role of “people” in driving changes within other organisational elements during crises.

The research, however, has limitations. Despite employing a multi-case study approach, the findings are limited to a single national context, which may affect their generalisability. Differences in organisation size also likely influenced crisis responses. Future research should compare long-term organisational changes across different national contexts and organisation sizes. Additionally, this study primarily focused on the changes themselves, without deeply exploring the influence of administrative tradition and institutional design. Future research should consider a historical institutionalism perspective to examine how prior institutional choices shaped crisis responses and outcomes. Finally, while COVID-19 provides valuable insights into organisational responses, future studies should revisit these findings in comparison with other crisis experiences. This will help build a stronger foundation for developing a new conceptual framework to better understand organisational change in turbulent times.

Funding: This research received funding from the Slovenian Research and Innovation Agency (Grants no. P5-0093 and J5-3105).