Quality circle autonomy: evidence from a Japanese subsidiary and a Western subsidiary

Asserts that the concept of quality circle autonomy includes the issues of members’ development, relations with middle managers and supervisors, determining time of meetings, evaluating suggestions, selecting discussion topics, applying solutions and electing leaders. Investigates these dimensions in one Japanese and one French subsidiary in Greece. Findings show that in situations of limited autonomy, quality circle members raise no demands for more. On the other hand, when autonomy is ceded to members without their input, not only do they not demand more but, on the contrary, they may wish for the abolition of certain prerogatives requiring responsibility. Contends that quality circles possess practically insignificant bargaining power and that the satisfaction of their demands depends mostly on management benevolence, a fact likely to obstruct members’ claims for, and sustenance of, substantial autonomy. Suggests that future research focuses on the relationship of quality circle autonomy and creativity.