Radical environmentalism and corporate environmental responsibility: does a country's GDP per capita matter for environmental justice?

Existing research on corporate responsibility (CR) initiatives (e.g. Liang and Renneboog, 2017) indicates that economies in the Global North (GN) with high gross domestic product per capita (GDP PC) tend to have greater environmental awareness than those in the Global South (GS). Nonetheless, prominent youth movements primarily active in the GN, such as Fridays for Future (FFF), argue that global climate and eco-environmental protection efforts are inadequate to safeguard the future of humankind, asserting that powerful actors, including governments and firms, are not sufficiently addressing what is viewed as their responsibility to prevent a climate or eco-environmental emergency (Fritz et al., 2023; Li et al., 2021). This situation is attracting more radical actors, who could disrupt businesses and daily life more severely than peaceful movements, such as FFF (Sovacool and Dunlap, 2022). Despite the disruptive nature of radical environmentalism (RE) and its legal and ethical implications, RE has been credited with embarrassing politicians, sparking and intensifying media coverage (Sumner and Weidman, 2013), which subsequently pressures firms (Tavakolifar et al., 2021). Moreover, RE broadens the environmentalism spectrum, thereby boosting the credibility of mainstream environmental movements (Vanderheiden, 2005). Since the most critical actors for environmental protection – namely governments and firms – are not sufficiently committed to achieving the 2030 UN SDG environmental goals, Sovacool and Dunlap (2022, p. 1) pose the question: “What options are capable of stopping actors and institutions who already realise their actions and behaviour may harm millions, degrade the biosphere, and contaminate the climate, but continue to do so, despite the scientific or moral reasons not to?”

In contrast, corporate environmental responsibility (CER), a form of corporate social responsibility (CSR) or corporate stakeholder responsibility (Sachs and Maurer, 2009), which focuses on mitigating eco-environmental impacts, is increasingly adopted by firms. However, it is often not explicitly named as such. Strategies commonly used to address CER include environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reporting or firms' focus on the eco-environmental goals of the United Nations (UN) sustainable development goals (SDGs), as illustrated by the UN SDG Wedding Cake's SDG differentiation (Sodhi and Tang, 2024).

While CER is increasing in the GN, shortcomings in CER persist in the GS (Hauser et al., 2024; Karmakar, 2024; Zhanda et al., 2021). The higher CER commitments in the GN might exist because of the GN's, aggregately seen, larger GDP PC, which allows for more resources. Furthermore, in the GN, higher GDP PC appears to be linked to greater awareness of the eco-environmental impacts of GN economies, resulting in a stronger willingness to participate in climate protests and take direct climate action. In contrast, protests and widespread extreme environmental actions are less apparent in the GS, despite the GN's heavy reliance on GS natural resources. Possible explanations may include insufficient media coverage, which affects corporate behaviour, especially among GN firms selling products in the GN; indifference towards such protests in the GS, where people face more pressing daily challenges; and comparatively less environmental impact consciousness in the GS, along with weaker government regulations in that region. Hence, limited attention has been paid to how CER efforts vary systematically across different national GDP levels and how they relate to the prevalence and severity of environmental conflict, particularly those involving radical forms of activism. Existing literature often treats ESG performance as a uniform construct, overlooking regional inequalities and societal responses to inadequate sustainability efforts.

Our article statistically addresses this research gap by combining firm-level Environmental Pillar scores (ESG E-Pillar) from the London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG) with geocoded environmental conflict data from the EJAtlas and national GDP PC data from the World Bank. By integrating these sources, we examine the associations between GDP PC, environmental performance, and RE, defined through conflict event data. This approach enables us to identify critical linkages between economic capacity, corporate environmental efforts, and environmental tensions, thereby contributing a novel empirical lens to the discourse on environmental justice and corporate accountability.

Our article makes the following contributions. First, it presents new evidence of a strong link between a country's GDP PC and the level of its corporations' environmental responsibility. We show that firms in wealthier countries (mainly in the GN) tend to display better environmental performance, whereas those in poorer countries (the GS) often fall behind. Second, we illustrate how low-income levels are also connected to increased, often more severe, environmental conflict. In countries with lower GDP PC, environmental activism is more likely to involve violence, repression, and the criminalisation of activists. This suggests that when environmental issues are not adequately addressed, especially in countries with lower GDP PC, public frustration can escalate, resulting in more radical responses. By examining both corporate efforts and societal reactions, our study highlights how economic inequality shapes the global landscape of environmental responsibility. These findings underline the importance of implementing more inclusive and supportive policies to assist low-income countries in strengthening environmental governance and reducing conflict.

Our article will be structured as follows. First, we develop a normative ethical framework that defines various globally relevant obligations for governments and businesses concerning environmental protection and climate change mitigation. We further highlight CER and the economic disparities in GS and GN. Next, we describe our research methodology, which encompasses design, data collection, and analysis techniques employed. Following this, we explore various practical implications for businesses and policy, along with social consequences. Finally, we discuss limitations and outline avenues for future research.

The ethical framework synergises the classical Brundtland sustainable development definition (WCED World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987), deep sustainability (Stockholm Resilience Centre, 2016), Rawls' maximin principle (Rawls, 1971), and Sen's power-responsibility concept (Sen, 1999, 2009) to establish multiple normative ethical responsibilities regarding environmental and intergenerational justice from current generations toward, natural ecosystems, future communities and in particular their ecosystems and the GN toward the GS.

These responsibilities of current firms and governments apply to contemporary natural ecosystems, as well as to future communities and their ecosystems. However, the framework, in particular, highlights the responsibilities of GN economies, their firms and governments toward GS communities, present and future, and to their respective natural ecosystems.

We contextualise the complex GN and GS interconnectedness using an interview conducted by the Deutsche Welle with James Mnupe, the Namibian Presidential Adviser. When asked about the European Chinese African cooperations regarding resource extraction on the African continent and related trade deals with China and Europe, Mnupe answers with an African (Kenyan) proverb: “When elephants fight, the grass gets trampled” – “I have to be careful, not to be the grass”. Mnupe is of the opinion that China's dominance in sourcing critical as well as rare minerals and earths is a “systemic necessity”, which was “created by the West” due to the West's outsourcing of industrial capabilities to China (DW, 2025). Africa, a major player in the GS, is rich in critical minerals but also in near-abundant other natural raw materials. It is caught between the raw material interests of diverse businesses located in the GN and China. While the GN depends on Chinese firms as a major part of its main supply chains (Lee and Gereffi, 2015), which in turn have secured long-term contracts for raw materials with African Governments (Alden and Alves, 2009), the Chinese industry heavily depends on African-sourced raw materials (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009; Sun, 2014). Nevertheless, these complex economic relations between African countries, China, and the GN illustrate that all players are dependent on each other. However, Africa appears to be the weakest player in this industrial trade relation due to African countries' comparatively low GDP, high poverty levels, weak economic capabilities and relatively high corruption (Transparency International, 2025), all of which contribute to inequality and injustice regarding wealth distribution.

Sen, in his book The Idea of Justice (2009, p. 251), contends that powerholders, such as individuals, firms, organisations or governments, bear moral responsibility to act when they can effect positive change. Sen demonstrates that, from a normative ethical perspective, power normatively always implies responsibility; this also applies to contexts of global justice. In his Development as Freedom (1999, p. 20), Sen suggested a “capabilities approach”, according to which development is constituted in the expansion of individuals' real freedoms to pursue and achieve the lives they value. Possessions are not of primary importance, but what individuals can be empowered to do. Sen infers that those with greater resources and more powerful agency have normative ethical obligations to address inequalities. This also applies to inequalities between the GS and the GN. Consequently, GN economies and governments with greater financial resources and power cannot neglect their responsibilities towards present and future GS communities and their respective natural ecosystems—especially given that natural resources, whether abundant or scarce, such as mineral oil, rare earths, minerals and metals, are mined in the GS for GN economies' industries.

In his Theory of Justice (1971, p. 133), Rawls suggests that social and economic changes can only be ethically justified if they maximise the benefits of the least advantaged members in a society, which also pertains to the global society. His “maximin principle”, an ethical guideline ensuring responsibility toward the less privileged, is deduced from the perspective of the veil of ignorance in the original position. The veil of ignorance in the original position presents a hypothetical scenario in which individuals must decide on principles of justice in a society without knowing their social status, class, talents, personal values, culture, religion or where and when they will be born. This hypothetical “ignorance” guarantees impartiality, because, according to Rawls, in such an ignorant situation, it is impossible for members of a society to design principles that favour their own position. Rational, non-gambling individuals behind the veil of ignorance would then choose fair and egalitarian rules, like the maximin principle, to protect themselves because they could end up among the least advantaged members of society. Therefore, the veil of ignorance secures fairness by removing bias, promoting justice as fairness. According to the maximin principle, rational individuals would choose guidelines that ensure the best possible scenario in the event of worst-case outcomes. Rawls argues this reflects fairness and moral reasoning under uncertainty. Applied to GS-GN-inequalities, the maximin principle demands, similar to Sen's argumentation, that powerful agents in the GN cannot neglect obligations toward much less powerful agents or entities in the GS, especially given the economic linkage between GN economies depending on GS resources as described above. Aligned with Sen's (2009, p. 251) normative understanding according to which “power implies responsibility”, economies with a higher GDP PC have more comprehensive responsibilities toward lower GDP PC economies, especially if their firms are within the supply chain for firms in economies with higher GDP PC.

Societies cannot sustain without the biosphere, as business operations depend on functional societies and on the existence of the biosphere. The ontological dependency of corporations on the existence of societies, and ultimately on eco-environmental sustainability, also known as “deep sustainability,” is illustrated in the so-called UN SDG “Wedding Cake” framework (Stockholm Resilience Centre, 2016). This ontological dependency on the biosphere is not only valid for present societies but also for projected future communities and business operations. The destruction of natural ecosystems today is detrimental to the existence of future societies and the businesses they will operate in. The dependency of future communities on currently existing human communities' decision-making is expressed in the classical “Brundtland Definition” in the “Our Common Future” report (WCED World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987; I.3.27): “Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” While the responsibility indicated in this definition is one toward future humans, according to the ontological sustainability dependency established above, future communities cannot exist without a future biosphere, whether terrestrial or extraterrestrial. The normative ethical implication of this definition is that neither the needs of future humans nor their ecosystems shall be compromised by current generations.

Closely related to this Brundtland definition is the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA). Both the AAAA and the Brundtland Report emphasise the integration of economic growth, social inclusion, and environmental sustainability. They share a common goal of tackling global challenges through a holistic approach that ensures long-term sustainability and equity for future generations. The AAAA, adopted at the Third International Conference on Financing for Development in July 2015, is a comprehensive framework designed to support the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations, 2015). Its aim is to align all financing flows and policies with economic, social and environmental priorities. The AAAA emphasises the importance of mobilising domestic resources, fostering international development cooperation and encouraging private sector investment to achieve the SDGs (Neher et al., 2025). Key goals include eradicating poverty and hunger, promoting inclusive economic growth, ensuring gender equality and fostering peaceful and inclusive societies. Furthermore, the agenda aims to protect the environment and advocate for a more equitable global economic system that, ideally, leaves no one behind (United Nations, 2015).

Although the SDG goals are intended for all countries to be achieved by 2030, developing economies, which constitute the GS, typically lag significantly behind developed economies in the GN, largely due to limited financial resources (Neher et al., 2025). Current GN economic systems depend on GS resources embedded in GS natural ecosystems. The fact that current GN economic systems disproportionately draw resources from the GS for GN needs and wants not only has societal and environmental impacts today but also has ecosystemic impacts in the future. There are already actors seeking to hold GN countries and firms accountable for both current and historical eco-environmental degradation, climate change and disaster vulnerability (Borghesi et al., 2025).

This ethical framework outlines multiple normative responsibilities of firms and governments concerning environmental and intergenerational justice, extending to present ecosystems, future generations and their environments. It particularly emphasises the obligations of high-GDP PC economies, including their firms and governments, toward GS communities – both current and future – and their respective ecosystems.

While there have been efforts to exercise business responsibility towards climate action and the reporting of non-financial information using ESG frameworks, the existing literature (Raimo et al., 2021) essentially treats ESG performance as a uniform construct, overlooking the effect of regional inequalities. For instance, using a global panel data set on 919 firms from multiple sectors, Raimo et al. (2021) reveal an adverse effect of ESG disclosure on the cost of debt financing. Such studies appear to overgeneralise their findings despite the normative power, GDP PC, weak institutional factors and capability differences disadvantaging the GS countries like Peru, Colombia, China, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico that Raimo et al. (2021) sampled among other GN countries. Understanding the regional inequalities in ESG outcomes and their effect helps to act towards environmental and intergenerational justice. Thus, such knowledge helps to appreciate the needed efforts for ensuring fair treatment and equitable climate action that involves all stakeholders and organisations (irrespective of their operational location or headquarters) and fosters the survival potential of future generations in both GS and GN.

Global South countries are often characterised by lower economic development, high poverty rates and inequalities in the standard of living among their citizens. Following Brandt's (1980) book titled “North-south: a program for survival” that recommended a new approach towards addressing the world's socio-economic problems, internal finance reforms, peace and alleviating human suffering, GS countries are largely located in the Southern Hemisphere below the “Brandt line” (excluding Australia and New Zealand). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank data suggest that the GDP PC of countries in these regions ranges between $2,400 and $10,000, compared to $60,320 in advanced and high-income economies (IMF International Monetary Fund, 2025; World Bank Group, 2025). Limited investments in advanced infrastructure and technological innovation, which are essential for supporting improved transportation, communication, and energy systems, are key causes of lower GDP PC in the GS, as these are crucial for economic growth. These factors are compounded by wide inequalities caused by urbanisation (Kowalski, 2021). By 2006, urbanisation had expanded to 400 cities worldwide, with 70% of these located in the GS. The growing urbanisation complicates the organisation and management of cities in a way that eliminates poverty and ensures access to health, education, safety and sustainable livelihoods. In addition, weak institutions and leadership, as well as a lack of discipline in public spending and revenue mobilisation, have led to misplaced priorities, wasting limited resources that could have been invested in economic growth ventures.

The CSR concept has been criticised for not taking eco-environmental factors seriously enough into account (DesJardins, 1998), nor GS challenges. While DesJardin has early on criticised both classical and neoclassical models of CSR for shortcomings in environmental sustainability and therefore spearheaded CER, Majumdarr et al. (2025) criticised CSR strategies by GN companies that extract oil in GS countries, such as Peru, Nigeria, Brazil, for employing CSR as a “cover-up strategy to absolve themselves” from environmental injustices committed in the GS (Majumdarr et al., 2025, p. 1). Majumdarr et al., therefore, highlighted the concept of corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) and suggested measuring CSI committed in the GS against the same firms' CSR greenwashing in the GN.

Most countries in the GS are endowed with diverse natural resources, including forests, coal, oil, hydropower, natural gas, rare earth and other mineral resources, on which GN as well as GS economies heavily depend. These natural resources attract various corporations, locally and internationally, including multinationals from the GN, who engage in extraction, refining or both. In the process of extracting natural resources, not only are farmlands and the economic livelihoods of community members destroyed, but also endemic habitats, leading to a reduction in biodiversity. Although permits are granted by relevant government and state institutions prior to operations, they often lack the capacity to properly monitor the activities of firms, ensuring that fair compensation is made to affected indigenous individuals, and that firms are environmentally responsible in their extraction process. While there are often several legal and institutional frameworks guiding their operations, firms also have an ethical responsibility to ensure that the needs of future communities are protected and secured.

This can be accomplished by minimising waste and pollution of water bodies, rehabilitation and restoration of degraded landscapes, and conservation of biodiversity. For example, AngloGold Ashanti, which operates in South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ghana, Guinea and Tanzania, including a few other GN countries like the United States and Australia, reported that 70% of their water is reused, and lands used for various mining operations are rehabilitated (AngloGold Ashanti, 2025). Nestlé has also faced severe criticism in the past for sourcing palm oil from suppliers who engage in deforestation in countries such as Indonesia. Recent progress indicates that the organisation has taken responsible actions. It now reports that 91% of its palm oil was deforestation-free and 9% from untraceable sources (Nestlé, 2021). However, not all corporations analyse the impact of their operations on the environment, especially in marginalised communities, and take responsibility for those impacts, as Nestlé and AngloGold Ashanti do. Such negligence constitutes environmental injustice.

CER is also demanded in affluent countries with high GDP PC. In 2021, for instance, several hundred UK university students from Cambridge, Oxford, and University College London launched a “career boycott” against Barclays Bank over its continuous financing of firms in the fossil fuel business (Makortoff, 2023b). The campaign also includes disrupting the bank's Annual General Meeting in May 2023 (Makortoff, 2023a). These activists were concerned about granting financial support to these major multinational organisations engaged in the extraction and other forms of fossil fuel production, including coal, oil and natural gas. According to climate campaigners, funding these organisations, which rely on their climate commitments, implies funding the climate crisis. Barclays Bank took responsibility for its failing commitment and, in response to campaigns, assured “… we have set 2030 targets to reduce the emissions we finance in five high-emitting sectors, including the energy sector, where we have achieved a 32% reduction since 2020” (Makortoff, 2023b, para. 10). They added that “… we have provided £99bn of green finance since 2018 and have a target to facilitate $1tn in sustainable and transition financing between 2023 and 2030” (Makortoff, 2023b, para. 10).

Based on these findings, we propose the following hypothesis to test the association between GDP PC and corporate environmental responsibility:

Higher national income levels typically cultivate greater sustainability awareness and stronger regulatory standards, which in turn elevate stakeholder expectations concerning corporate environmental performance. As a result, firms are more likely to allocate resources toward sustainable practices and environmental initiatives.

Environmental injustice is largely perceived to involve the exposure of minority groups, marginalised and regional communities, as well as low-income economies, to environmental pollution and damage that pose hazards to livelihoods and biodiversity (Pellow, 2000; Svarstad and Benjaminsen, 2020; Pulido and De Lara, 2018). Efforts to address it often emanate from the wider society, including majority groups, as well as both low-income and high-income economies. One of the actions taken by activists is RE (Scurr and Bowden, 2021; Svarstad and Benjaminsen, 2020). RE activists deliberately adopt disruptive and sometimes violent tactics to attract attention and advocate for environmental protection by demanding legal, social and structural reforms that address environmental challenges in society (Svarstad and Benjaminsen, 2020).

For example, RE in lower-income economies, as well as marginalised and minority communities, includes Greenpeace's campaign against Nestlé in 2010. Nestlé faced the wrath of Greenpeace International, an environmental activist group, over sourcing palm oil from suppliers who clear Indonesian forests for palm plantations, thereby destroying farmlands and habitats of wildlife, such as orangutans, and biodiversity (Hickman, 2010). The intervention by Greenpeace involved daily protests at Nestlé’s UK headquarters and an online advert dubbed “Have a Break?” The one-minute video adverts showed “an office worker biting into a KitKat containing an orangutan finger, which dripped blood onto a computer keyboard” (Hickman, 2010, para. 8). This campaign triggered a response from Nestlé, ordering an external audit of its supply chains. Critical requirements for the sustainable procurement process (see Adjei-Bamfo and Maloreh-Nyamekye, 2019) were established, and a method was developed to assess supplier compliance, aiming to eliminate the deforestation footprint from an initial 18%–50% of palm oil sourced in 2011. Today, Nestlé claims to achieve a 91% deforestation-free footprint in all palm oil sourced, as mentioned earlier (Nestlé, 2021).

Notwithstanding, in higher-income economies, groups of activists have also turned against environmental injustice through RE, as seen in the disruptions caused by organisations such as Just Stop Oil, the Tire Extinguishers, and Extinction Rebellion. RE, such as road blockades by ecoteurs, glueing themselves to major roads, vandalising cultural monuments or art galleries, and deflating SUV tyres in capital cities, can be highly inconvenient for businesses and everyday public activities. However, they rarely occur in the GS (Sovacool and Dunlap, 2022).

While the above discussion provides evidence that RE occurs in both higher-income and lower-income economies, it is unclear whether the GDP PC of economies has any relationship/association with RE. Knowledge of such findings will facilitate an understanding of whether income plays a significant role in the formation of environmental inequality (Pellow, 2000). Pellow posits that environmental inequality can be established by considering the historical context of the environmental problem, assessing the realities and relationships among multiple stakeholders, and studying the hazard through a lifecycle analysis. We aim to extend this theory by investigating whether and how income, measured by GDP PC, influences the occurrence of RE.

Accordingly, our second hypothesis tests the association between GDP PC and RE.

Higher national income levels may intensify public scrutiny of prevailing sustainability efforts, prompting some groups to perceive them as inadequate or lacking in meaningful impact. In such circumstances, radical environmental movements often emerge as a response to perceived inaction or superficial corporate and governmental environmental commitments, advocating for more urgent and transformative environmental change.

Firm-level environmental performance data is obtained from LSEG (formerly known as Refinitiv). The ESG score from LSEG has been adopted by researchers to measure a corporation's performance in relation to its ESG practices (Wong and Neher, 2024). In our study, we draw attention to the Environmental “Pillar” score to focus on the efforts of corporations in addressing environmental challenges. We first calculated the mean score for each corporation using data available from 2015 to 2024. Then we classified them into four main groups: group A has highest score (>75–100) with the best environmental efforts, followed by Group B (>50–75), Group C (>25–50) and Group D (0–25), which exhibits the lowest efforts for addressing environmental issues in the cities where these corporations are located. In total, 3,485 corporations from around the world are included in our sample for analysis. Data for environmental conflicts are obtained from the Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (EJAtlas). The detailed geospatial dataset provides a comprehensive inventory of environmental conflicts worldwide, including but not limited to events that have resulted in socio-ecological devastation and risks associated with social and economic activities such as mining, water management, energy production, conservation and land use (see Temper et al., 2018, for details). Finally, GDP PC for the corresponding countries is collected for the year 2023 from the World Bank Group (2025). The variables are combined into a final dataset by linking the location information, by country, where each corporation is headquartered, to the country where each environmental conflict occurred.

Data for the proposed hypotheses are analysed using the chi-squared test of independence that allows us to determine whether the hypothesised associations are statistically significant using the contingency table approach (Zikmund et al., 2013; Sekaran and Bougie, 2016). Specifically, the Pearson Chi-square statistic (χ²) was employed to test the statistical significance of the observed association between the variables. In addition, a z-test statistic (two-tailed) was utilised to determine if the difference between column proportions was statistically significant. This method is suitable for our study since the data for environmental conflicts from EJAtlas and Environmental Pillar grades are available as categorical variables. For GDP PC, we convert the continuous variable to five separate groups by ranking the GDP data in ascending order, where countries with the lowest GDP PC are assigned a value of 1 (lowest 20% of the sample), while countries with the highest GDP PC (largest 20%) are assigned a value of 5. This grouping procedure allows us to evaluate how the different levels of GDP PC may vary in proportions across the data columns.

To capture the effect of RE, we examine the text-based information labelled as “conflict events” by EJAtlas. To identify proxies for RE, we searched for five keywords associated with “violent”, “repression”, “displacement”, “death” and “criminalisation”. The dummy variable approach was used to assign a value of 1 whenever each of these keywords appeared in the EJAtlas report, and a value of 0 otherwise. This process is repeated for each of the five keywords to create five additional data columns, which were included in our final dataset to test our second hypothesis. Additionally, for each conflict event, we sum up the values of these columns to create an RE score, which allows us to measure the overall effect of RE. A total of 4,219 unique conflicts were included in our sample for analysis.

For H1 and H2, the null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the variables of interest for which the sample is selected. The alternative hypothesis is that a relationship exists, but it takes a general form and does not imply a causal relationship between the variables of interest (Altman and Krzywinski, 2015).

Panel A of Table 1 shows that the chi-square test statistic is highly significant at the 1% level, rejecting the null hypothesis of no association between the Environmental Pillar grade and levels of GDP PC. This suggests a strong association between the efforts of corporations in addressing environmental issues and the levels of GDP PC corresponding to where the sampled corporations are located. Across the columns, there is evidence of a significantly higher proportion of corporations with low-rated environmental performance (rated C and D) in Group 1, which contains countries with the lowest-ranked GDP PC. On the contrary, a significantly higher proportion of corporations with environmental ratings of A is found in countries where the highest GDP PC is recorded in Group 5.

Panel B of Table 1 shows the results in terms of the GN-GS divide as defined by the Brandt line. Clearly, the association between the regions and the level of GDP PC is also highly significant after controlling for environmental efforts, proxied by the Environmental Pillar performance of corporations. Again, there is a significantly larger proportion of corporations with A-grade environmental performance in the GN. In contrast, GS corporations tend to exhibit much higher proportions of corporations with low-rated environmental performance. This result suggests that there is evidence of greater efforts by corporations in the GN in addressing environmental challenges compared to those in the GS. These findings support our first hypothesis, which proposes an association between GDP PC and the environmental efforts of corporations.

In testing the association between the levels of GDP PC and RE, we also find the Chi-square test statistics to be highly significant at the 1% level, as shown in Table 2. To reduce the effect of small cell counts, we regroup the GDP PC into two main groups: Low GDP PC (including GDP PC Groups 1 and 2) and High GDP PC (including GDP PC Groups 4 and 5). In Panels A to E, we find that the null hypothesis of independence between the variables is strongly rejected at the 1% level. Analysing by types of conflict, low GDP PC countries (ranked the lowest 40%), we find a significantly higher proportion of violence, repression, displacements, deaths, and criminalisation relating to the conflict events. On the contrary, non-conflict events are more prevalent among corporations located in countries with a high GDP PC (ranked in the top 40%). These results are further supported using the RE score, which captures the overall effect of RE. Specifically, 69.4% of high GDP PC countries (top 40%) recorded the lowest score of 0 (zero conflict over the sample period), compared with 47.9% for the low GDP PC countries.

For the RE scores ranging from 1 to 5, countries with low GDP PC consistently show higher proportions of conflict events, which are significantly higher in proportion compared with those reported for high GDP PC countries. This evidence tends to support the existence of a significant relationship between levels of GDP PC and RE, as proposed in our second hypothesis. When the data are further decomposed into GN and GS, as shown in Table 3, conflicts that resulted in negative outcomes occurred predominantly in the GS. For example, in Panel A of Table 3, 21.5% of the conflicts in the GS are related to violence compared with 6.3% recorded for the GN. Similarly, in Panel D, 14.7% of conflicts related to deaths in the GS, in sharp contrast with 2.8% in the GN. Not surprisingly, 75.9% of conflicts recorded an RE score of zero for the GN, suggesting activities related to RE are less likely to occur in the GN. These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level, providing further support for our second hypothesis.

The strong link between low GDP PC and weak corporate environmental performance indicates that structural challenges hinder sustainability efforts in developing economies in the GS. Firms in these regions often operate with limited policy frameworks, have restricted access to environmental technologies, and encounter weak institutional support (Khan and Majid, 2023). To address this issue, both national governments and international development organisations should implement targeted interventions. These could include concessional green financing, improved technical capabilities and more robust cross-border collaborations across the GS and GN to facilitate knowledge and technology transfer.

Besides CER activities and ESG reporting by multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in the developing economies of the GS, additional focus could be placed on supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which comprise a significant portion of the private sector in many lower-income economies. However, they often lack the resources to meet environmental standards (Wang et al., 2023). How such tailored, context-sensitive strategies for corporate environmental assistance may address GS SME's CER strategies overall and specifically bridge the ESG performance divide across the GS and GN, fostering more equitable global sustainability outcomes, remains a major question, warranting further research. Several pro-CER mechanisms and policies may be adopted to support CER in the GS. For instance, Ghana's Environmental Protection Agency introduced the AKOBEN initiative to rate the environmental performance and disclosure of mining companies using five colours: Gold, Blue, Green, Orange and Red, indicating a performance range from excellent to poor. This makes it easy for stakeholders to identify the worst-performing mining companies after the environmental impact assessment. Environmental taxes, as part of mitigation and adaptation programs, may also be imposed to raise tax revenue and redistributed to target vulnerable and impacted populations, as well as natural resource-dependent communities (e.g. agriculture and fishing). For instance, Ghana has passed the Emissions Levy Act, 2023 (Act 1,112), to impose taxes on firms in emission-intensive sectors (EY, 2024). Other initiatives may leverage the power of blockchain to track supply chains and ensure accountability (Allena, 2020), as well as stimulate the adoption of circular economy business models among SMEs through circular public procurement policies (Kazancoglu et al., 2021).

While ESG adoption has often been seen as a cost burden in developing contexts, emerging evidence suggests that it can function as a long-term strategic asset for firms (e.g. Eccles and Klimenko, 2019; Tsang et al., 2023; Wong and Neher, 2025). The analysis shows that firms in high-GDP PC countries demonstrate superior environmental ESG performance, likely due to the influence of market incentives, stakeholder pressure and institutional norms. For corporations in lower-GDP PC economies, predominantly located in the GS, ESG integration could offer a pathway to attract international investors, enhance reputational capital and access new markets where sustainability compliance is increasingly important (Kumar, 2020; Lisin et al., 2022; Raimo et al., 2021; Wong and Neher, 2024). Thus, ESG should not be viewed solely through a regulatory compliance lens but also as a means for value creation and risk mitigation (Henisz et al., 2019). Public policy should support this by promoting ESG education, establishing credible reporting frameworks and encouraging business-to-business collaboration. In the globalised economy, ESG integration is increasingly central to firm competitiveness, and its spread into developing markets is both necessary and advantageous from a developmental perspective (Neher et al., 2025).

The disparity in CER across income levels highlights the necessity for coherent and robust environmental governance in low-income settings. Many developing economies lack the regulatory enforcement capacity and institutional infrastructure needed to effectively guide corporate environmental behaviour, resulting in a policy vacuum that discourages ESG compliance.

We recognise that demand from the stock exchange, investor-driven initiatives, and consulting firms supporting ESG compliance is a strategy currently more viable in the GN than in the GS. Therefore, in addition to a better understanding of the necessity of ESG compliance for GN firms by GS partners, there is also a crucial need for credible insights from GN partners into GS-specific environmental, social and political challenges. These obstacles not only complicate ESG compliance but also require serious consideration of how to assist firms in achieving better environmental performance, alongside life-threatening issues such as poverty, hunger, droughts, crime, war-like situations and many other severe daily challenges faced by the GS. Most investors, compliance officers, and GN politicians are only aware of these problems through secondary sources, such as media outlets, rather than from personal experience.

That GN MNCs often worsen adverse environmental external effects on GS natural ecosystems is demonstrated, for example, by their exports of e-waste and plastic rubbish from GN countries to those in the GS, which have little or no environmental regulations in place. Therefore, policy responses should prioritise establishing clear, yet more inclusive and enforceable environmental standards, aligned with international norms, such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the United Nations SDGs (Singhania et al., 2024).

Moreover, fiscal and non-fiscal incentives, such as tax breaks, green bonds, ESG-linked financing and sustainable procurement policies, can stimulate corporate engagement (Makortoff, 2023b; Hickman, 2010). Transparent and effective monitoring mechanisms must accompany these strategies to ensure successful implementation and credibility (Hujo and McClanahan, 2009). The Addis Ababa Action Agenda (United Nations, 2015) supports this by advocating for global harmonisation of financing for development with environmental sustainability, particularly through public-private partnership mechanisms (Neher et al., 2025). By creating an enabling policy environment, policymakers in developing economies can align corporate incentives with national environmental goals and international sustainability commitments, fostering compliance with environmentally friendly practices and informed environmental strategies (Khan and Majid, 2023).

Meanwhile, our normative ethical framework stresses policymakers' and, in particular, GN firms' obligations to pursue intergenerational and environmental justice, along with more effective measures to reduce CER GN-GS disparities. These obligations extend not only to current local and global ecosystems but also to future communities and their natural ecosystems.

The strong link between lower GDP PC and higher levels of RE suggests that limited institutional capacity and weak environmental governance contribute to increased social conflict. In lower-income countries, perceived corporate and government inaction on sustainability often results in confrontational resistance, especially where civil liberties are restricted and regulatory enforcement is weak (Martínez-Alier et al., 2016; Scheidel et al., 2020). Firms operating in these areas need to go beyond mere compliance and actively engage in meaningful stakeholder dialogue, particularly with local communities affected by environmental degradation. Incorporating conflict-sensitive CR practices can help firms identify early signs of dissatisfaction and prevent escalation (Bian et al., 2025). Environmental justice frameworks, participatory decision-making, and transparent reporting, as highlighted previously, are essential for restoring trust and preventing the radicalisation of environmental movements, especially in resource-stressed and politically fragile contexts.

The findings underscore the persistent environmental asymmetries between the GN and GS, reflecting deeper historical and structural inequalities. Higher ESG performance among firms in wealthier countries is closely linked to stronger institutional capacity, better infrastructure and more robust regulatory frameworks. In contrast, lower-income countries often face disadvantages due to limited access to green technologies, underdeveloped capital markets and constrained public sector resources. This inequity calls for a more redistributive and cooperative approach to global environmental governance. Mechanisms, such as climate finance (Bhandary et al., 2021) and South-South cooperation (Gray and Gills, 2016), must be scaled up to address these disparities. Bridging the environmental responsibility gap is essential not only for justice and equity but also for the effectiveness of global climate and sustainability strategies. Without this recalibration, environmental degradation and climate risks will continue to disproportionately affect the least-resourced regions.

Radical environmentalism, while often associated with disruptive activism tactics, emerges in part as a counter-response to environmental injustice and inequities. It attempts to fill the accountability vacuum left by weak regulatory enforcement and corporate self-interest. Although radical actions may disrupt social order or economic operations, they illuminate the ethical urgency of systemic reform. As Sovacool and Dunlap (2022) argue, the moral imperative to prevent environmental collapse legitimises civil disobedience when institutional responses are insufficient. This implies a need to democratise environmental governance and bridge the North-South awareness and agency gap, where representatives and corporations can serve as effective stewards.

Effective corporate environmental stewardship depends not only on policy but also on active civic engagement and transparency. In the GS, civil society and the media often lack access to reliable ESG data, which limits their capacity to hold firms accountable. Environmental literacy initiatives, supported, for example, by academic–NGO collaborations, can democratise access to ESG information, enabling community monitoring and consumer pressure. Research indicates that consumer preference for sustainability, when combined with rigorous public ESG/CR reporting, can influence corporate priorities (Tsang et al., 2023). Strengthening civic engagement thus complements regulatory mechanisms, reinforcing a multi-level governance approach to environmental responsibility.

In light of eco-environmental and climate tipping points and beyond current and prospective ESG-related efforts, a widespread, holistic eco-environmental awareness is essential for fostering a more established sustainability mindset. Ignoring current radical environmentalist movements in the context of CER may prompt more radical actors onto the scene than “Just Stop Oil”, the “Tyre Extinguishers” and Greenpeace (Wuebben et al., 2023), leading to eco-terrorist scenarios as narrated in Robinson's (2020) “Ministry for the Future”.

The higher rate of environmental conflicts in lower-GDP countries highlights the structural inequalities that drive RE. These conflicts, often involving violence, repression and displacement, reveal not only environmental mismanagement but also deeper socio-political exclusion (Temper et al., 2018). Addressing these issues requires a comprehensive approach that combines reforms in environmental governance with strengthening democratic institutions (Borras et al., 2012; Keutgen and Dodsworth, 2020). Furthermore, the criminalisation of environmental activism in low-income settings reflects broader human rights concerns and underscores the need for stronger international protection for environmental defenders (Berglund et al., 2024; Global Witness, 2023). Civil society organisations and international actors should work together to improve legal protections, promote environmental justice and support inclusive development pathways that address the root causes of RE.

Our article analyses whether a country's GDP PC matters for environmental justice by examining RE and CER. This study, while foundational, presents several limitations that offer directions for further inquiry. First, the analysis draws on secondary data from the EJAtlas, among others. These data sources may contain classification and codes that are inconsistent or susceptible to reporting biases, especially since many environmental conflicts in the GS are underreported or framed using terminology shaped by Northern perspectives. As with any quantitative analysis, potential biases and errors may arise. Future research could incorporate alternative data sources to enhance the robustness and validity of our findings.

Second, while the study establishes associations among GDP PC, RE and CER, causal relationships between the variables are not established. Further studies may involve the use of a causality model, along with other confounders, to better understand the relationship between GDP PC and RE or CER.

Finally, our research does not use panel data for our analyses, which could further enhance our work. The use of panel data in future studies can help to control for other factors that are time-invariant and unobservable. However, the use of a test of dependence is appropriate given the categorical variables available for our study.

Future research may investigate this topic to gain a deeper understanding of how our variables of interest change in response to policy interventions. This may consider the directional effect between 1) GDP PC and RE, 2) GDP PC and CER and 3) CER and RE, and how GDP PC moderates this relationship. Knowledge of these effects could inform business transformation, as well as respective national policies and mandates on climate disclosure, and reforming judicial systems to manage violent environmental activism in pursuit of climate justice. In summary, further research is necessary to understand environmental inequality better and promote a more just and inclusive global sustainability agenda.

Our study aimed to clarify the complex relationship between GDP PC, RE and CER. Using firm-level ESG Environmental Pillar scores, geocoded conflict data, and GDP per capita figures, we demonstrate that wealthier countries, mainly in the GN, tend to have better corporate environmental performance. Conversely, firms in lower-income nations of the GS often struggle due to limited regulatory capacity, institutional weaknesses, and a lack of resources. Our analysis further reveals a strong correlation between low GDP PC and the rise of RE, where perceptions of environmental neglect and poor accountability frequently lead to protests that can escalate into violence or repression. These results highlight the socio-economic roots of environmental conflict and stress the importance of context-aware and inclusive strategies for corporate sustainability and governance. Our ethical framework underscores the multiple normative responsibilities of governments and corporations regarding intergenerational and environmental justice, highlighting their obligations toward present ecosystems, future generations and their respective eco-environments. In particular, the obligations of high-GDP PC economies toward GS contemporary and future communities and their respective ecosystems need to be more consistently considered.

The implications of our research extend beyond business, illustrating how income gaps impact corporate behaviour and civic responses. Tackling global environmental issues demands more than voluntary corporate efforts; it calls for coordinated policy measures, fair climate financing, ESG support for smaller businesses and protection for environmental defenders to close the sustainability gap between the GN and GS. Ultimately, our findings suggest that ongoing structural inequalities might strengthen the legitimacy and influence of peaceful RE, especially in regions where mainstream climate policies are viewed as ineffective. To reduce environmental conflict and achieve global sustainability targets, stronger international cooperation and policies are essential to empower the GS while holding powerful actors accountable. Therefore, CER must shift from a strategic business tactic to a commitment to global environmental justice.