Although many studies show that individuals with antisocial (or “dark”) personality traits (e.g. Machiavellianism, psychopathy, narcissism) can negatively impact organizations and their members, they are nonetheless routinely found across levels of organizations (Pfeffer, 2021). In the present research, we explore a novel reason why some managers might evaluate subordinates high in dark personality traits positively: they are perceived to facilitate the achievement of managers' agentic goals. In addition, we use dual-strategies theory to identify managers who are most likely to prioritize agentic goals over communal goals (dominance-oriented managers) and managers who are equally motivated to pursue agentic and communal goals (prestige-oriented managers).
We test our hypotheses across two main studies (and two supplemental studies; total N = 1,209) wherein workplace managers evaluated job candidates who varied in dark personality traits (Study 1) and provided ratings of the dark personality traits of their favorite and least favorite subordinate (Study 2).
We find evidence that (1) positive evaluations toward subordinates high in dark personality traits emerge, in part, from managers' motivation to achieve agentic goals, and (2) dominance-oriented managers evaluate these subordinates more positively, in part, as a result of a prioritization of agentic goals.
The findings provide novel insight into why managers can evaluate subordinates with dark personality traits positively and which managers are most likely to do so.
Individuals high in dark personality traits (e.g., narcissism, Wille et al., 2019; Machiavellianism, Marbut et al., 2025; psychopathy, Ong and Lim, 2025) routinely thrive in organizations (Pfeffer, 2021). This runs contrary to much research highlighting their detrimental impact on organizations, such as greater unethical behavior (Ellen et al., 2021) and poorer colleague-rated job performance (O'Boyle et al., 2012). Given these findings, one might wonder how subordinates with dark personality traits are hired, retained, and even favored, by managers. Past research suggests this occurs because they display charm, charisma, and ambition during interviews (e.g. Paulhus et al., 2013), suggesting they conceal dark personality traits sufficiently to convince managers they are valuable. This perspective implies that managers select them due to being unaware of their true personality traits.
We consider an alternative explanation that does not involve deceiving others. Instead, we propose that some managers desire subordinates with dark personality traits because of their perceived value for agentic goals (i.e. goals that benefit managers' self-advancement; Abele and Wojciszke, 2019). However, we expect managers to simultaneously evaluate these subordinates negatively for communal goals (i.e., those that benefit others, the community, or society; Abele and Wojciszke, 2019). Thus, we hypothesize that agentic goal motivation will predict more positive evaluations, whereas communal goal motivation will predict more negative evaluations, of subordinates high in dark personality traits.
We also examine managers' stable influence strategies, which refer to enduring differences in how they influence subordinates to attain deference and achieve managers' desired aims. We focus on two tendencies from dual-strategies theory: dominance-orientation and prestige-orientation (Maner and Case, 2016). Dominance-oriented managers influence subordinates via intimidation and threats of punishment; subordinates obey dominance-oriented managers because they fear the consequences of disobedience. In contrast, prestige-orientated managers influence subordinates by eliciting their respect and admiration through demonstrating expertise. In turn, subordinates willingly follow prestige-oriented managers because they are considered valuable role models. Hence, dual-strategies theory provides a framework to identify managers who vary in agentic and communal goal motivation. A crucial aspect of dual-strategies theory relevant to our investigation is that it views managers' goal pursuit and interactions with subordinates ultimately as ways to solidify their position atop organizational hierarchies. This distinguishes it from other frameworks that view managerial behaviors as stemming from multiple motives such as ethical or performance considerations (McClanahan, 2020). Thus, dual strategies theory is well-suited for our investigation where we examine managers' evaluation of subordinates through the lens of their own agentic and communal goal motivations. It also allows us to identify not only the managerial goals that predict positive evaluations of subordinates with dark personality traits, but also the types of managers who are likely to show this tendency across time and context. Our model proposes that managers' goals are situated within their frequently deployed influence styles, and these goals underpin evaluations of subordinates high in dark personality traits.
The present research contributes to the organizational behavior, management, and leadership literatures, particularly research on the Attraction-Selection-Attrition (ASA) model (Schneider et al., 1995). The ASA model posits that organizational differences result, in part, from differences in the collective personality, attitudes, and values of members, especially those of top managers (Schneider et al., 1995). These differences are solidified and exacerbated by three processes: attraction, whereby individuals whose dispositional traits fit with the organization's character desire to join the organization, selection, whereby organizations select applicants who fit with the organization's character, and attrition, whereby subordinates who do not fit with the organization's character exit. We advance research on the ASA model in two ways. First, we demonstrate that managers might select and favor subordinates high in dark personality traits because they possess a valid understanding of their personality traits, diverging from past perspectives suggesting the selection and professional success of these individuals stems from concealing their dark personality traits (Paulhus et al., 2013). Second, the ASA model posits that individuals prefer counterparts who share similar personality traits, suggesting managers with dark personality traits would desire subordinates who share these traits. We identify compatibility between managers' goals and subordinates' personality traits as another reason why managers differ in their evaluation of subordinates' personality traits. We test our hypotheses controlling for similarity-based attraction (Schnieder et al., 1995).
Theoretical background
Dark personality traits share features of selfishness, callousness, disagreeableness, and aggressiveness (Moshagen et al., 2018), including, but not limited to, the dark triad traits of Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and narcissism (Paulhus and Williams, 2002). Meta-analytic estimates (O'Boyle et al., 2012) show the dark triad traits are significantly intercorrelated, suggesting they share a common core (Moshagen et al., 2018). All three are associated with counterproductive workplace behaviors, but these associations are mostly driven by narcissism, somewhat by Machiavellianism, and not much by psychopathy (O'Boyle et al., 2012). Additionally, whereas Machiavellianism and psychopathy are slightly predictive of poor job performance, as rated by subordinates, peers, and supervisors, narcissism is unrelated to colleague-rated job performance. Given that the studies included in this meta-analysis measured job performance via colleague-reports, an unexplored possibility is that the small relationships with job performance emerged from systematic differences in how different colleagues evaluate individuals with dark personality traits. Indeed, dark personality traits can lead to beneficial organizational outcomes under certain conditions (Belshack et al., 2015), suggesting some managers may value these traits.
We focus on dark personality traits broadly construed, defined as “the tendency to maximize one's individual utility— disregarding, accepting, or malevolently provoking disutility for others—accompanied by beliefs that serve as justifications” (Moshagen et al., 2018, p. 1). This definition reflects shared aspects of several dark personality traits. We also focus on shared aspects of dark personality traits because we are interested in managers' holistic evaluations of subordinates who showcase these common characteristics.
The ASA model posits that managers vary in the characteristics of subordinates that they value (Schneider et al., 1995). Although managers tend to value traits reflecting communal orientation (e.g., cooperativeness; Benson et al., 2024), meaningful heterogeneity exists between managers nonetheless (Schneider et al., 1995). One source of heterogeneity is the tendency to positively evaluate others who share one's own characteristics (i.e., similarity-based attraction; Schneider et al., 1995). We add to this research to suggest that managers also positively evaluate subordinates whose personalities are perceived to facilitate their own goal pursuit, above and beyond similarity. We hypothesize that managers perceive commonalities among subordinates high in dark personality traits as useful for managers' own agentic goals.
How dark personality traits can facilitate agentic goals
Leadership researchers have distinguished between motivation to achieve agentic versus communal goals (e.g. De Dreu and Nauta, 2009). Agentic goals benefit the self (Abele and Wojciszke, 2019), such as attaining promotions and raises. Managers might view subordinates high in dark personality traits as useful for these goals because they expect these subordinates to engage in morally questionable behaviors that benefit the manager. Moreover, a common feature of dark personality traits is the desire to form alliances with high-status individuals like managers (Schyns et al., 2019). As a result, managers might view these subordinates as strategic sycophants who will comply with managers' orders without question.
Managers' motivation to achieve agentic goals will predict more positive evaluations of subordinates high in dark personality traits.
In contrast to agentic goals, communal goals prioritize other-oriented outcomes and often require self-sacrifice (e.g., mentorship; Abele and Wojciszke, 2019). Dark personality traits share features of selfishness and disregard for others' welfare (Moshagen et al., 2018), so managers might expect such subordinates to hinder the achievement of communal goals. Individuals high in dark personality traits are also less trustworthy and less trusting of others (Moshagen et al., 2018). These aspects of dark personality traits might threaten managers' ability to foster cooperation and social harmony, suggesting that managers who value communal goals will evaluate subordinates high in dark personality traits more negatively.
Managers' motivation to achieve communal goals will predict more negative evaluations of subordinates high in dark personality traits.
Dominance and prestige orientation as predictors of goal prioritization
Despite the apparent incompatibility between agentic and communal goals, managers who report greater motivation to achieve agentic goals tend to also report greater motivation to achieve communal goals (e.g. De Dreu and Nauta, 2009). Given that we propose countervailing effects of agentic and communal goal motivation, we sought to incorporate a framework that distinguishes between managers based on different patterns of goal pursuit. Dual-strategies theory does so by taxonomizing leaders' influence tactics, and leaders themselves by extension, as dominance-oriented or prestige-oriented (Maner and Case, 2016).
Although both dominance-oriented and prestige-orientated managers are motivated to achieve agentic goals (Cheng et al., 2010), they differ in that dominance-oriented managers are less motivated to pursue communal goals. For example, compared to prestige-oriented managers, dominance-oriented managers are controlling and coercive, and they prioritize protecting their own power even if this compromises organizational goals (Maner and Case, 2016). Conversely, prestige-oriented managers tend to make decisions that prioritize followers' welfare and preferences (Maner and Case, 2016). We thus propose:
Dominance-orientation predicts greater agentic goal motivation and lesser communal goal motivation.
Prestige-orientation predicts greater agentic and greater communal goal motivation.
Dominance-orientation predicts more positive evaluations of subordinates high in dark personality traits.
Dominance-orientation predicts more positive evaluations of subordinates high in dark personality traits through greater agentic goal motivation and lesser communal goal motivation.
By incorporating dual-strategies theory, our studies address how managers' motivation to achieve different goals predicts their evaluation of subordinates high in dark personality traits and also identify which managers are most likely to show the pattern of goal pursuit that predicts positive evaluations. In addition, given that both dominance-oriented and prestige-oriented managers pursue agentic goals, although through different means, incorporating this framework allows us to test whether motivation to achieve agentic goals consistently translates into more positive evaluations of subordinates high in dark personality traits, or whether there may be a boundary condition regarding this association based on differences in how managers pursue agentic goals.
We expect prestige-oriented managers to pursue both agentic and communal goals at equal strength, so we did not specify hypotheses about the overall relationship between prestige-orientation and evaluations of dark personality subordinates, but we pre-registered our expectation that the findings regarding prestige-orientation will diverge from those regarding dominance-orientation (https://osf.io/7rxwy?view_only=71e1393c81114cdca974e2cd581e7f22).
The present research
We conducted two main studies plus two supplemental studies [1] (SOM1) with US managers (N = 1,209). Both studies were approved by the Behavioral Research Ethics Board at the University of British Columbia (protocol #H19-00941). The two main studies investigate how managers evaluate dark personality traits in subordinates at two stages of the manager-subordinate relationship: selection (Study 1) and their working relationships (Study 2). In both studies, we examine dark personality traits, broadly construed, but in Study 2, we also conduct exploratory analyses on three specific dark personality traits individually. We operationalize managers' evaluations of subordinates in two distinct, ecologically valid ways, such that convergence across these methods provides support for a generalizable tendency among managers across multiple contexts.
The samples were recruited via CloudResearch and Prolific. We used the Occupation qualification on CloudResearch (Litman et al., 2017) to selectively recruit managers. On Prolific Academic, we selectively recruited participants who have “supervisory responsibilities at work” and “experience being in a management position” (www.prolific.co). We describe how we determined sample size and report all exclusions, manipulations, and measures. Data, analysis code, study materials, and pre-registrations are available here: https://osf.io/b8kfx/?view_only=71e1393c81114cdca974e2cd581e7f22.
Study 1
In Study 1 (pre-registered: https://osf.io/7rxwy?view_only=71e1393c81114cdca974e2cd581e7f22; see Appendix for deviations from pre-registration), participants read multiple profiles of hypothetical job candidates and reported endorsement for hiring each candidate. We pre-registered the hypotheses that (1) dominance-orientation would predict greater desire to hire candidates high in dark personality traits, (2) this relationship would be mediated by agentic goal motivation, and (3) these results would hold controlling for participants' own dark personality traits.
Method
Study 1 was conducted in two parts over two days to minimize participant fatigue. We determined sample size using Schoemann et al.'s (2017) power analysis tool for indirect effects in mediation models (https://schoemanna.shinyapps.io/mc_power_med/). This analysis suggested 500 participants would provide 80% power to detect an indirect effect of dominance-orientation on evaluations of candidates high in dark personality traits through agentic goals of β = 0.0225. We derived this effect size by taking a conservative estimate from a pilot study. Seven hundred participants completed Part 1, and 631 of those participants completed Part 2. After excluding 16 participants for failed attention checks and 33 who reported they do not supervise subordinates, our final sample consisted of 582 managers (44% female; age range = 18–78, median = 37 years; years of managerial experience = 1 year–20 years or more, median = 6 years).
In Part 1, participants self-reported dominance-orientation (α = 0.78) and prestige-orientation (α = 0.84; Cheng et al., 2010). This scale contains eight items to measure dominance-orientation (e.g., “I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my way”) and nine items to measure prestige-orientation (e.g., “My followers seek my advice of a variety of matters”). Participants rated each item on a seven-point scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). They also reported agentic goal motivation (α = 0.73) and communal goal motivation (α = 0.79) using 12 goals developed in a pilot study (see SOM2). Participants responded to the prompt: “How important are the following goals to you when you are in a management/leadership role?” using a five-point scale from 1 (Not at all important) to 5 (Extremely important). Goals 1–6 capture agentic goal motivation, whereas goals 7–12 capture communal goal motivation.
Personal career advancement (e.g. getting a promotion or a better job somewhere else)
Being well-liked and popular with my employees
Making friends with my employees
Maintaining power over the employees and keeping them in line
Making as much money as possible
Pleasing my superiors/bosses
Being ethical and socially responsible
Promoting the career advancement of people with historically marginalized identities
Developing employees' skills for their current role
Making sure the employees are highly satisfied with their jobs
Mentoring my employees so they can advance their careers
Defending the employees when they are criticized by someone else
Participants reported their dark personality traits using the Dark Factor of Personality measure (α = 0.87; Moshagen et al., 2020). This measure consists of 16 items drawn from various measures of dark personality traits and captures the common core of dark personality traits, known as D (Moshagen et al., 2018). Participants rated each item on a seven-point scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). We included this measure to control for the influence of similarity-based attraction (Schnieder et al., 1995).
In Part 2, participants imagined they were hiring a new subordinate and evaluated five hypothetical candidates' suitability for hiring (Cleveland et al., 1988; e.g. “I would hire this candidate”; αs > 0.92 for each candidate) based on the candidates' response to the interview question: “Tell us about a recent challenge at your job and how you handled it”. Participants completed this measure using a seven-point scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). Alongside each response, we included information about education and experience that was counterbalanced across conditions (e.g., graduated from a large southeastern US university). A pilot study showed that each candidate was judged as equally qualified based on this information alone. Two responses described candidates high in dark personality traits, two described candidates low in dark personality traits (henceforth “conventionally moral candidates”), and one was a neutral response aimed to disguise the purpose of the study, which highlighted the candidate's skills and abilities rather than their personality. Participants responded to a randomly selected vignette twice to determine the reliability of their responses, which were found to be highly reliable (ICC = 0.91).
The responses from candidates high in dark personality traits highlighted the overlapping features of dark personality traits (Moshagen et al., 2018). These candidates were described as selfish, aggressive, manipulative, and callous (Moshagen et al., 2018). For example, one described relaying questionable information and using disingenuous flattery to convince a client to continue using their services. Conventionally moral candidates were described as selfless, compassionate, and sympathetic. We chose to highlight these characteristics because they reflect the opposite of the shared characteristics of dark personality traits. For example, one of these candidates dealt with a difficult client compassionately and patiently and generously offered the client a complementary service.
Our pilot study confirmed that the two candidates high in dark personality traits were perceived as above midpoint on D (Moshagen et al., 2020; Ms = 4.91, 4.20 SDs = 0.80, 0.89) and significantly higher than the conventionally moral candidates (Ms = 2.38, 2.15, SDs = 0.77, 0.76; t(167) = 27.04, d = 3.23, p < 0.001, 95% CI: [2.12, 2.46]). Although the average score for the dark personality candidates is not extremely high (4.56 out of 7), this enhances ecological validity because dark personality traits are positively skewed in the population. A score of 4.56 would be 2.86 standard deviations above the mean for participants in this study (M = 2.27, SD = 0.78).
Results and discussion
See Table 1 for descriptive statistics and correlations between variables.
Descriptive statistics and correlations among dispositional variables, study 1
| Variable | Mean | SD | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Dominance-orientation | 3.27 | 0.92 | – | |||||
| 2. Prestige-orientation | 5.58 | 0.67 | 0.12** | – | ||||
| 3. Agentic Goals | 2.99 | 0.71 | 0.36*** | 0.30*** | – | |||
| 4. Communal goals | 3.92 | 0.66 | −0.16*** | 0.43*** | 0.32*** | – | ||
| 5. Dark Personality | 2.27 | 0.78 | 0.50*** | −0.20*** | 0.16*** | −0.35*** | – | |
| 6. Hiring endorsement of dark personality candidates | 3.81 | 1.19 | 0.25*** | −0.07 | 0.22*** | −0.10* | 0.30*** | – |
| 7. Hiring endorsement of low dark personality candidates | 5.83 | 0.73 | −0.08 | 0.20*** | 0.14*** | 0.33*** | −0.17*** | −0.04 |
Note(s): *p < 0.05
**p < 0.01
***p < 0.001
Participants endorsed hiring conventionally moral candidates more than candidates high in dark personality traits, t(581) = 34.16, d = 2.05, p < 0.001, 95% CI: [1.90, 2.13]. Given that each participant rated multiple candidates, we tested our hypotheses in linear mixed-effects models using the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2015; R Core Team, 2020). We created a unique identifier for each participant. We then reformatted the data such that each participant's rating of each candidate was its own row, and we created a new variable for within-subjects experimental condition (i.e., candidate personality). This technique allows us to nest observations within participants to account for variance explained by differences between raters.
We conducted a model in which hiring ratings were predicted by agentic goals, communal goals, candidate personality (i.e., dark personality traits = 0, conventionally moral = 1), and interactions between each set of goals and candidate personality (Table 2). This model tests Hypotheses 1 and 2 without incorporating the influence of dominance-orientation and prestige-orientation to best estimate the direct relationships between managerial goals and evaluations of subordinates based on their personality traits. We also reconducted this analysis while including participants' own dark personality traits and the interaction between participants' dark personality traits and candidate personality (Yzerbyt et al., 2004).
Mixed effects models predicting hiring endorsement of hypothetical candidates, study 1
| Model 1 | Model 2 | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coefficient | β | t | p | β | t | p |
| Intercept | −0.64 | −27.21 | <0.001 | −0.64 | −29.21 | <0.001 |
| Agentic goals | 0.21 | 8.94 | <0.001 | 0.16 | 6.55 | <0.001 |
| Communal goals | −0.13 | −5.70 | <0.001 | −0.06 | −2.23 | 0.03 |
| Conventionally moral candidates | 1.29 | 45.29 | <0.001 | 1.29 | 45.84 | <0.001 |
| Agentic goals × Conventionally moral candidates interaction | −0.20 | −6.59 | <0.001 | −0.13 | −4.35 | <0.001 |
| Communal goals × Conventionally moral candidates interaction | 0.28 | 9.44 | <0.001 | 0.19 | 5.75 | <0.001 |
| Participant dark personality | 0.17 | 6.94 | <0.001 | |||
| Participant dark personality × Conventionally moral interaction | −0.21 | −6.77 | <0.001 | |||
| Conditional R2 | 0.504 | 0.516 | ||||
| Indirect effects of influence strategies through managerial goals (see Figures 1 and 2) | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| β | z | P | |
| Dark personality candidates | |||
| Dominance-orientation through agentic goals | 0.06 | 3.60 | <0.001 |
| Dominance-orientation through communal goals | 0.004 | 0.87 | 0.38 |
| Conventionally moral candidates | |||
| Dominance-orientation through agentic goals | 0.02 | 1.16 | 0.25 |
| Dominance-orientation through communal goals | −0.02 | −1.99 | 0.046 |
Supporting Hypotheses 1 and 2, significant interactions emerged between agentic goals and candidate personality and communal goals and candidate personality. Decomposing these interactions revealed that managers' agentic goal motivation was positively associated with hiring endorsement of candidates high in dark personality traits, β = 0.21, t(1,507) = 8.94, p < 0.001, whereas agentic goal motivation was unrelated to hiring endorsement of conventionally moral candidates, β = 0.01, t(1,507) = 0.53, p = 0.60. Managers' communal goal motivation was negatively associated with hiring endorsement of candidates high in dark personality traits, β = −0.13, t(1,507) = −5.70, p < 0.001, and positively related to hiring endorsement of conventionally moral candidates, β = 0.15, t(1,507) = 6.37, p < 0.001. We also observed a significant interaction between participants' dark personality traits and candidate personality. Participants' dark personality traits positively predicted hiring endorsement of candidates high in dark personality traits, β = 0.17, t(1,500) = 6.94, p < 0.001, and were unrelated to hiring endorsement of conventionally moral candidates, β = −0.04, t(1,500) = −1.68, p = 0.09. The relationships between goal motivation and hiring endorsement of different candidates held controlling for participants' dark personality traits (Table 2).
We next conducted a structural equation model using the lavaan package in R (Rosseel, 2012) to simultaneously estimate the relationships between all variables in our model (Bollen and Noble, 2011). We tested for indirect effects using path analysis (Wright, 1934). We created a new dependent variable by averaging endorsement of the two candidates high in dark personality traits. We tested a model wherein agentic and communal goal motivation were both predicted by dominance-orientation and prestige-orientation, and average hiring endorsement of candidates high in dark personality traits was predicted by both sets of goals and both dominance-orientation and prestige-orientation. As pre-registered, we included prestige-orientation to test whether it predicts different results than dominance-orientation. We also control for participants' dark personality traits (Figure 1).
The structural model diagram shows a rectangular box on the far left labeled “Dark Personality”. A diagonal single-headed arrow extends from “Dark Personality” to the right to a box labeled “Dominance-orientation”, with a coefficient of “0.50 triple asterisks”. A diagonal downward single-headed arrow extends from “Dark Personality” to a box labeled “Prestige-orientation”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.20 triple asterisks”. A diagonal upward single-headed arrow extends from “Dark Personality” to a box labeled “Agentic Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.06”. A diagonal downward single-headed arrow extends from “Dark Personality” to a box labeled “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.23 triple asterisks”. A long horizontal single-headed arrow extends from “Dark Personality” directly to the far-right box labeled “Hiring Endorsement–Dark Personality Candidates”, with a coefficient of “0.20 triple asterisks”. A box labeled “Dominance-orientation” appears in the upper middle area. A horizontal single-headed arrow extends from “Dominance-orientation” to “Agentic Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.30 triple asterisks”. A diagonal downward single-headed arrow extends from “Dominance-orientation” to “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.08 single asterisk”. A vertical double-headed arrow connects “Dominance-orientation” and “Prestige-orientation”, with a coefficient of “0.25 triple asterisks”. A rightward single-headed arrow extends from “Dominance-orientation” to “Hiring Endorsement–Dark Personality Candidates”, with a coefficient of “0.08”. A box labeled “Prestige-orientation” appears below “Dominance-orientation”. A diagonal upward single-headed arrow extends from “Prestige-orientation” to “Agentic Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.28 triple asterisks”. A horizontal single-headed arrow extends from “Prestige-orientation” to “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.39 triple asterisks”. A rightward single-headed arrow extends from “Prestige-orientation” to “Hiring Endorsement–Dark Personality Candidates”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.08”. A box labeled “Agentic Goals” appears to the right of the orientation boxes. A vertical double-headed arrow connects “Agentic Goals” and “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.35 triple asterisks”. A single-headed arrow extends from “Agentic Goals” to “Hiring Endorsement–Dark Personality Candidates”, with a coefficient of “0.20 triple asterisks”. A box labeled “Communal Goals” appears below “Agentic Goals”. A rightward single-headed arrow extends from “Communal Goals” to “Hiring Endorsement–Dark Personality Candidates”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.05”.Structural equation model testing the full theoretical model controlling for dark personality, study 1. Note(s): Path coefficients represent standardized coefficients. Bolded values indicate statistical significance, p < 0.05. *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001
The structural model diagram shows a rectangular box on the far left labeled “Dark Personality”. A diagonal single-headed arrow extends from “Dark Personality” to the right to a box labeled “Dominance-orientation”, with a coefficient of “0.50 triple asterisks”. A diagonal downward single-headed arrow extends from “Dark Personality” to a box labeled “Prestige-orientation”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.20 triple asterisks”. A diagonal upward single-headed arrow extends from “Dark Personality” to a box labeled “Agentic Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.06”. A diagonal downward single-headed arrow extends from “Dark Personality” to a box labeled “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.23 triple asterisks”. A long horizontal single-headed arrow extends from “Dark Personality” directly to the far-right box labeled “Hiring Endorsement–Dark Personality Candidates”, with a coefficient of “0.20 triple asterisks”. A box labeled “Dominance-orientation” appears in the upper middle area. A horizontal single-headed arrow extends from “Dominance-orientation” to “Agentic Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.30 triple asterisks”. A diagonal downward single-headed arrow extends from “Dominance-orientation” to “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.08 single asterisk”. A vertical double-headed arrow connects “Dominance-orientation” and “Prestige-orientation”, with a coefficient of “0.25 triple asterisks”. A rightward single-headed arrow extends from “Dominance-orientation” to “Hiring Endorsement–Dark Personality Candidates”, with a coefficient of “0.08”. A box labeled “Prestige-orientation” appears below “Dominance-orientation”. A diagonal upward single-headed arrow extends from “Prestige-orientation” to “Agentic Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.28 triple asterisks”. A horizontal single-headed arrow extends from “Prestige-orientation” to “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.39 triple asterisks”. A rightward single-headed arrow extends from “Prestige-orientation” to “Hiring Endorsement–Dark Personality Candidates”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.08”. A box labeled “Agentic Goals” appears to the right of the orientation boxes. A vertical double-headed arrow connects “Agentic Goals” and “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.35 triple asterisks”. A single-headed arrow extends from “Agentic Goals” to “Hiring Endorsement–Dark Personality Candidates”, with a coefficient of “0.20 triple asterisks”. A box labeled “Communal Goals” appears below “Agentic Goals”. A rightward single-headed arrow extends from “Communal Goals” to “Hiring Endorsement–Dark Personality Candidates”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.05”.Structural equation model testing the full theoretical model controlling for dark personality, study 1. Note(s): Path coefficients represent standardized coefficients. Bolded values indicate statistical significance, p < 0.05. *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001
This model is saturated, so all model fit indices are at their maximum value (Raykov et al., 2013). All variables were included as observed variables. As a result, these models, like the multiple regression models above, assume no measurement error (Bollen and Noble, 2011). This provides a more conservative test of our hypotheses because the model does not correct for measurement error. We found the same results with latent variables (SOM3).
Supporting Hypotheses 3 and 4, dominance-orientation predicted greater agentic goal motivation and lesser communal goal motivation, whereas prestige-orientation predicted greater agentic and communal goal motivation. We found a significant indirect effect of dominance-orientation on hiring endorsement through agentic goals (see Table 2), supporting Hypothesis 5 and partially supporting Hypothesis 6. This suggests dominance-oriented managers perceive value in subordinates high in dark personality traits for achieving agentic goals, and this might explain their relatively favorable evaluations of these candidates. Inconsistent with Hypothesis 6, we did not observe a significant indirect effect of dominance-orientation on hiring endorsement through communal goals.
We next conducted an identical model for conventionally moral candidates (Figure 2). We did not observe an indirect effect of dominance-orientation on desire to hire conventionally moral candidates through agentic goals, β = 0.02, z = 1.16, p = 0.25, suggesting that dominance-oriented managers' motivation to achieve agentic goals is a unique factor that helps explain their evaluations of candidates high in dark personality traits but not candidates low in these traits. We found a significant indirect effect of dominance-orientation on hiring endorsement through communal goals, suggesting dominance-oriented managers' lack of communal goal motivation results in lesser endorsement of conventionally moral candidates.
The structural model diagram shows a rectangular box on the far left labeled “Dark Personality”. A diagonal single-headed arrow extends from “Dark Personality” to the right to a box labeled “Dominance-orientation”, with a coefficient of “0.50 triple asterisks”. A diagonal downward single-headed arrow extends from “Dark Personality” to a box labeled “Prestige-orientation”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.20 double asterisks”. A curved single-headed arrow extends from “Dark Personality” to a box labeled “Agentic Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.06”. A curved downward single-headed arrow extends from “Dark Personality” to a box labeled “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.23 triple asterisks”. A long horizontal single-headed arrow extends from “Dark Personality” to the far-right box labeled “Hiring Endorsement–Conventionally Moral Candidates”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.06”. A box labeled “Dominance-orientation” appears in the upper middle area. A horizontal single-headed arrow extends from “Dominance-orientation” to “Agentic Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.30 triple asterisks”. A diagonal downward single-headed arrow extends from “Dominance-orientation” to “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.08 single asterisk”. A vertical double-headed arrow connects “Dominance-orientation” and “Prestige-orientation”, with a coefficient of “0.25 double asterisks”. A rightward single-headed arrow extends from “Dominance-orientation” to “Hiring Endorsement–Conventionally Moral Candidates”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.04”. A box labeled “Prestige-orientation” appears below “Dominance-orientation”. A diagonal upward single-headed arrow extends from “Prestige-orientation” to “Agentic Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.28 triple asterisks”. A horizontal single-headed arrow extends from “Prestige-orientation” to “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.39 triple asterisks”. A box labeled “Agentic Goals” appears to the right of the orientation boxes. A vertical double-headed arrow connects “Agentic Goals” and “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.35 triple asterisks”. A single-headed arrow extends from “Agentic Goals” to “Hiring Endorsement–Conventionally Moral Candidates”, with a coefficient of “0.06”. A box labeled “Communal Goals” appears below “Agentic Goals”. A rightward single-headed arrow extends from “Communal Goals” to “Hiring Endorsement–Conventionally Moral Candidates”, with a coefficient of “0.25 triple asterisks”. A rightward single-headed arrow extends from “Prestige-orientation” to “Hiring Endorsement–Conventionally Moral Candidates”, with a coefficient of “0.07”.Structural equation model testing the full theoretical model controlling for dark personality applied to conventionally moral candidates, study 1. Note(s): Path coefficients represent standardized coefficients. Bolded values indicate statistical significance, p < 0.05. *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001
The structural model diagram shows a rectangular box on the far left labeled “Dark Personality”. A diagonal single-headed arrow extends from “Dark Personality” to the right to a box labeled “Dominance-orientation”, with a coefficient of “0.50 triple asterisks”. A diagonal downward single-headed arrow extends from “Dark Personality” to a box labeled “Prestige-orientation”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.20 double asterisks”. A curved single-headed arrow extends from “Dark Personality” to a box labeled “Agentic Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.06”. A curved downward single-headed arrow extends from “Dark Personality” to a box labeled “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.23 triple asterisks”. A long horizontal single-headed arrow extends from “Dark Personality” to the far-right box labeled “Hiring Endorsement–Conventionally Moral Candidates”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.06”. A box labeled “Dominance-orientation” appears in the upper middle area. A horizontal single-headed arrow extends from “Dominance-orientation” to “Agentic Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.30 triple asterisks”. A diagonal downward single-headed arrow extends from “Dominance-orientation” to “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.08 single asterisk”. A vertical double-headed arrow connects “Dominance-orientation” and “Prestige-orientation”, with a coefficient of “0.25 double asterisks”. A rightward single-headed arrow extends from “Dominance-orientation” to “Hiring Endorsement–Conventionally Moral Candidates”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.04”. A box labeled “Prestige-orientation” appears below “Dominance-orientation”. A diagonal upward single-headed arrow extends from “Prestige-orientation” to “Agentic Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.28 triple asterisks”. A horizontal single-headed arrow extends from “Prestige-orientation” to “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.39 triple asterisks”. A box labeled “Agentic Goals” appears to the right of the orientation boxes. A vertical double-headed arrow connects “Agentic Goals” and “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.35 triple asterisks”. A single-headed arrow extends from “Agentic Goals” to “Hiring Endorsement–Conventionally Moral Candidates”, with a coefficient of “0.06”. A box labeled “Communal Goals” appears below “Agentic Goals”. A rightward single-headed arrow extends from “Communal Goals” to “Hiring Endorsement–Conventionally Moral Candidates”, with a coefficient of “0.25 triple asterisks”. A rightward single-headed arrow extends from “Prestige-orientation” to “Hiring Endorsement–Conventionally Moral Candidates”, with a coefficient of “0.07”.Structural equation model testing the full theoretical model controlling for dark personality applied to conventionally moral candidates, study 1. Note(s): Path coefficients represent standardized coefficients. Bolded values indicate statistical significance, p < 0.05. *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001
In summary, Study 1 results suggest dominance-oriented managers' prioritization of agentic goals increases their likelihood of hiring subordinates high in dark personality traits, and these effects held over-and-above similarity-based attraction. Nevertheless, a limitation of Study 1 is that managers drew inferences about the hypothetical candidates' personalities based on one example of their behavior. Although our pre-test confirmed that these vignettes provided adequate information for participants to draw intended inferences about the candidates' personalities, judgments of personality would be better informed by longer-term relationships with numerous interactions across many situations. Study 2 addresses this limitation by asking managers to evaluate the subordinates they currently supervise.
Study 2
In Study 2, participants rated their favorite and least favorite current subordinate on dark personality traits. In contrast to Study 1 where participants evaluated job candidates based on dark personality traits, here we reverse these components by having participants first bring to mind subordinates who they evaluate positively or negatively and then rating them on dark personality traits.
Method
We determined sample size based on expected correlations between ratings of one's favorite subordinate's dark personality traits and agentic and communal goals of r = 0.20 and r = −0.10, respectively. A power analysis suggested 276 participants would provide 80% power, so we recruited 300 managers from Prolific. After excluding 20 participants for failed attention checks and 27 participants who supervised fewer than two subordinates, the final sample consisted of 253 managers (48% women; age range = 18–71, median = 31 years; years of management experience: range = less than 1 year–20 years or more, median = 3 years). Despite falling short of 276 participants after exclusions, we did not recruit the additional 23 participants due to resource constraints.
Participants reported dominance-orientation and prestige-orientation (Cheng et al., 2010; αDominance-orietnation = 0.77, αPrestige-orientation = 0.82) and motivation to achieve agentic (α = 0.77) and communal goals (α = 0.75) using the same measures as Study 1. Next, participants identified their favorite and least favorite current subordinate and wrote briefly about each to increase the salience of the manipulation.
Participants then rated both subordinates on dark personality traits using the Short Dark Triad Scale (Jones and Paulhus, 2014; αMachiavellianism_favorite = 0.85; αPsychopathy_favorite = 0.85; αNarcissism_favorite = 0.60; αMachiavellianism_least_favorite = 0.84; αPsychopathy_least_favorite = 0.82; αNarcissism_least_favorite = 0.60). This measure contains nine items for each dark triad trait; participants rated each item using a five-point scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). An example item is “[Subordinate] likes to use clever manipulation to get their way” (Machiavellianism). We chose this measure instead of the measure of D used in Study 1 because D primarily emphasizes beliefs (Bader et al., 2023), which made it well-suited for self-reported dark personality. In contrast, the Short Dark Triad Scale emphasizes more observable behaviors (e.g. “[Subordinate] avoids dangerous situations” (reversed)). In addition, informant-reports using this scale converge with self-reports (Jones and Paulhus, 2014), whereas the measure of D was not validated for informant-report at this time to our knowledge (Moshagen et al., 2020). Importantly, the measure of D overlaps considerably with the Short Dark Triad measure. Specifically, Moshagen and colleagues (2020) find “D is strongly reflected in the items of all dark traits, in particular those representing Psychopathy … and Machiavellianism” (p. 189). This suggests equivalence between the measures.
As a manipulation check, participants reported their liking for each subordinate using a six-item scale (Wayne and Ferris, 1990; αfavorite = 0.82, αleast favorite = 0.90) and rated each subordinate's ability using another six-item scale (Mayer et al., 1995; αfavorite = 0.80, αleast favorite = 0.89), both reported on a five-point scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree).
Results and discussion
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics and correlations.
Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables, study 3
| Variable | Mean | SD | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Dominance-orientation | 2.16 | 1.38 | – | ||||
| 2. Prestige-orientation | 5.68 | 0.75 | −0.16** | – | |||
| 3. Agentic goals | 3.47 | 0.75 | 0.39*** | 0.20*** | – | ||
| 4. Communal goals | 4.19 | 0.53 | −0.18** | 0.40*** | 0.33*** | – | |
| 5. Favorite Subordinate's Dark Triad Traits | 0.14 | 2.48 | 0.64*** | −0.26*** | 0.50*** | −0.07 | – |
| 6. Least Favorite Subordinate's Dark Triad Traits | 0.07 | 2.52 | 0.31*** | −0.05 | 0.19*** | −0.001 | 0.31*** |
Note(s): **p < 0.01
***p < 0.001
The means and standard deviations for Dark Traid Traits are operationalized as the sum of standardized scores for Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and narcissism
The manipulation was effective. Participants liked their favorite subordinates (M = 4.48, SD = 0.51) more than their least favorite subordinates (M = 2.75, SD = 1.00, t(252) = 22.58, p < 0.001, 95% CI of mean difference: [1.58, 1.89]), and rated their ability more highly (Mfavorite = 4.46, SD = 0.50, Mleast favorite = 2.90, SD = 0.99, t(252) = 21.05, p < 0.001, 95% CI of mean difference: [1.42, 1.71]).
We conducted a regression wherein ratings of the favorite subordinate's dark personality traits were regressed onto agentic goals, communal goals, and ratings of the least favorite subordinate's dark personality traits to control for participants' general tendencies to perceive dark personality traits in subordinates (Table 4).
Regression models predicting favorite Subordinate's dark personality, study 2
| Coefficient | β | t | p |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intercept | −0.64 | −27.21 | <0.001 |
| Agentic goals | 0.54 | 9.76 | <0.001 |
| Communal goals | −0.25 | −4.65 | <0.001 |
| Least favorite subordinate's dark personality traits | 0.20 | 3.76 | <0.001 |
| Indirect effects of influence strategies through managerial goals (see Figure 3) | β | z | p |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dominance-orientation through agentic goals | 0.17 | 5.29 | <0.001 |
| Dominance-orientation through communal goals | 0.01 | 0.35 | 0.72 |
Supporting Hypothesis 1, agentic goal motivation predicted rating their favorite subordinate as higher in dark triad traits. Supporting Hypothesis 2, communal goal motivation predicted rating their favorite subordinate lower in dark triad traits. We next conducted a structural equation model to test Hypotheses 3-6 (see Figure 3 and Table 4).
The structural model diagram shows a rectangular box labeled “Dominance-orientation”, positioned at the upper left, and a rectangular box labeled “Prestige-orientation”, positioned below it. A vertical double-headed arrow connects “Dominance-orientation” and “Prestige-orientation”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.16 double asterisks”. A rectangular box labeled “Agentic Goals” appears to the right of the orientation boxes. A horizontal single-headed arrow extends from “Dominance-orientation” to “Agentic Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.44 triple asterisks”. A diagonal upward single-headed arrow extends from “Prestige-orientation” to “Agentic Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.27 triple asterisks”. A rectangular box labeled “Communal Goals” appears below “Agentic Goals”. A diagonal downward single-headed arrow extends from “Dominance-orientation” to “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.11 single asterisk”. A horizontal single-headed arrow extends from “Prestige-orientation” to “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.38 triple asterisks”. A vertical double-headed arrow connects “Agentic Goals” and “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.38 triple asterisks”. A rectangular box labeled “Favorite Employee’s Dark Personality” appears on the far right. A diagonal rightward single-headed arrow extends from “Agentic Goals” to “Favorite Employee’s Dark Personality”, with a coefficient of “0.38 triple asterisks”. A diagonal rightward single-headed arrow extends from “Communal Goals” to “Favorite Employee’s Dark Personality”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.02”. A long horizontal single-headed arrow extends from “Dominance-orientation” across the top to “Favorite Employee’s Dark Personality”, with a coefficient of “0.44 triple asterisks”. A curved bottom single-headed arrow extends from “Prestige-orientation” to “Favorite Employee’s Dark Personality”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.26 triple asterisks”.Structural equation model testing the full theoretical model, Study 2. Note(s): Path coefficients represent standardized coefficients. Bolded values indicate statistical significance, p < 0.05. *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001
The structural model diagram shows a rectangular box labeled “Dominance-orientation”, positioned at the upper left, and a rectangular box labeled “Prestige-orientation”, positioned below it. A vertical double-headed arrow connects “Dominance-orientation” and “Prestige-orientation”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.16 double asterisks”. A rectangular box labeled “Agentic Goals” appears to the right of the orientation boxes. A horizontal single-headed arrow extends from “Dominance-orientation” to “Agentic Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.44 triple asterisks”. A diagonal upward single-headed arrow extends from “Prestige-orientation” to “Agentic Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.27 triple asterisks”. A rectangular box labeled “Communal Goals” appears below “Agentic Goals”. A diagonal downward single-headed arrow extends from “Dominance-orientation” to “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.11 single asterisk”. A horizontal single-headed arrow extends from “Prestige-orientation” to “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.38 triple asterisks”. A vertical double-headed arrow connects “Agentic Goals” and “Communal Goals”, with a coefficient of “0.38 triple asterisks”. A rectangular box labeled “Favorite Employee’s Dark Personality” appears on the far right. A diagonal rightward single-headed arrow extends from “Agentic Goals” to “Favorite Employee’s Dark Personality”, with a coefficient of “0.38 triple asterisks”. A diagonal rightward single-headed arrow extends from “Communal Goals” to “Favorite Employee’s Dark Personality”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.02”. A long horizontal single-headed arrow extends from “Dominance-orientation” across the top to “Favorite Employee’s Dark Personality”, with a coefficient of “0.44 triple asterisks”. A curved bottom single-headed arrow extends from “Prestige-orientation” to “Favorite Employee’s Dark Personality”, with a coefficient of “negative 0.26 triple asterisks”.Structural equation model testing the full theoretical model, Study 2. Note(s): Path coefficients represent standardized coefficients. Bolded values indicate statistical significance, p < 0.05. *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001
Supporting Hypotheses 3 and 4, dominance-orientation predicted greater agentic goal motivation and lesser communal goal motivation, and prestige-orientation predicted greater agentic and communal goal motivation. Supporting Hypothesis 5 and partially supporting Hypothesis 6, we observed an indirect effect of dominance-orientation on one's favorite subordinate's dark personality traits through agentic goals. Inconsistent with Hypothesis 6, we did not observe a significant indirect effect through communal goals.
Exploratory analyses
We reconducted the main analysis on each dark triad trait. We replicated the relationships between both sets of goals and ratings of Machiavellianism, βAgentic = 0.48, t(249) = 8.86, p < 0.001; βCommunal = −0.16, t(249) = −3.10, p = 0.002, and psychopathy, βAgentic = 0.39, t(249) = 6.58, p < 0.001; βCommunal = −0.34, t(249) = −5.88, p < 0.001. Agentic goals also predicted evaluating one's favorite subordinate as more narcissistic, β = 0.45, t(249) = 7.44, p < 0.001, but we did not replicate the association between communal goals and aggregate dark personality traits for narcissism, though this relationship was trending in the hypothesized direction, β = −0.10, t(249) = −1.61, p = 0.11. This may be due to lower reliability of the narcissism subscale, which is a limitation of this analysis. These results suggest that the pattern of results for agentic goals is equivalent across the three dark triad traits, whereas the results for communal goals might apply slightly more to Machiavellianism and psychopathy than narcissism.
We also reran the structural equation model for each individual trait. Consistent with the main results, we found significant indirect effects of dominance-orientation through agentic goals on one's favorite subordinate's Machiavellianism, β = 0.14, z = 4.97, p < 0.001, psychopathy, β = 0.11, z = 3.90, p < 0.001, and narcissism, β = 0.16, z = 4.34, p < 0.001. We did not find significant indirect effects through communal goals for Machiavellianism, β = −0.01, z = −1.16, p = 0.25, psychopathy, β = 0.01, z = 1.17, p = 0.24, or narcissism, β = 0.004, z = 0.56, p = 0.58. These analyses suggest no meaningful differences in dominance-oriented managers' evaluation of different dark traits in subordinates due to motivation to achieve agentic goals.
General discussion
Considerable evidence suggests individuals high in dark personality traits harm organizations in several ways, including greater workplace deviance (Ellen et al., 2021), counterproductive workplace behaviors (Nguyen et al., 2021), and lower colleague-rated job performance (O'Boyle et al., 2012). This raises the question of how individuals high in these traits enter and excel in organizations. Across two main and two supplemental studies, managers' agentic goal motivation predicted relatively positive evaluations, whereas managers' communal goal motivation predicted negative evaluations of subordinates with dark personality traits. These associations held controlling for similarity-based attraction. We additionally theorized that these effects are related to dominance and prestige influence strategies. Dominance-oriented managers are more parochially motivated to achieve agentic goals relative to prestige-oriented managers, which seems to help explain their superior evaluations of job candidates (Study 1) and current employees (Study 2) high in dark personality traits.
Theoretical and practical implications
The present research integrates literatures on leadership, goal pursuit, and dark personality traits. While most managers prefer subordinates lower in dark personality traits, managers with greater agentic than communal goal motivation reported relatively positive evaluations of subordinates high in dark personality traits. Nonetheless, absolute preferences for subordinates high in dark personality traits can still emerge. In Supplemental Study S2, managers imagined a scenario where they wanted to execute a potentially extreme agentic goal, and we found a general preference for a subordinate high in dark personality traits over one lower in these traits (SOM1). Thus, managers' pursuit of agentic goals in their everyday lives does not typically lead them to prefer subordinates high in dark personality traits, but this preference can develop under certain conditions. One implication of these findings is therefore that leaders' evaluations of subordinate personality might change as their agentic or communal goal motivation changes.
Although these findings suggest managers view subordinates high in dark personality traits as instrumentally useful for their own self-advancement, we also uncovered a crucial difference between managers regarding whether this perception translates into selection and favoritism. Prestige-oriented managers consistently reported high agentic goal motivation, yet they provided more negative evaluations of subordinates high in dark personality traits. Thus, our findings present a nuanced perspective—some managers who seem to recognize the potential selfish benefits of these subordinates may still reject them.
The present research also provides novel insights regarding organizational homogeneity. Beyond similarity-based attraction, compatibility between managers' goals and subordinates' personalities is another factor that might lead to homogeneity. Homogeneity is an important consideration for organizations regardless of the specific trait that is widely shared. Although several downsides for organizational functioning are associated with dark personality traits, our studies show that some managers see more value in these traits than others, suggesting they can be useful for certain tasks, or at least perceived as such. Thus, organizations should carefully consider the benefits and drawbacks of subordinate personality. Excluding certain personality traits entirely would also be ethically questionable as a rigid selection policy.
Our research also speaks to one way organizations may develop cultures of corruption (Anand et al., 2004). Dominance-oriented managers may indirectly encourage cultures of corruption via whom they hire and favor. Favoring subordinates high in dark personality traits could lead other subordinates to exhibit greater antisocial attitudes and behaviors in an attempt to please their manager and advance themselves. Similarly, organizations with members who possess high levels of dark personality traits may suffer from detrimentally low trust, which can lead to lower commitment and greater turnover (Dirks and Ferrin, 2002). In addition to being dishonest and untrustworthy themselves, individuals high in dark personality traits tend to perceive others as dishonest and untrustworthy (Moshagen et al., 2018), suggesting these organizations could be rife with distrust.
Limitations and future directions
One limitation is that the effect of communal goals was not robust in our structural equation models that included dominance- and prestige-orientation and participants' own dark personality traits. This suggests that the effects of communal goal motivation could be driven by similarity-based attraction. Future research would benefit from testing additional mechanisms.
Furthermore, future research is needed on specific dark personality traits and the differences between them. For example, perhaps some agentic goals that require careful planning may be better served by Machiavellians, whereas others that require charisma are better served by narcissists. Other dark personality traits besides the dark triad traits, such as sadism, also warrant future investigation.
Moreover, the measure of managerial goals was developed for this study. Although we provided construct validity evidence and identified these goal domains based on distinctions that have been independently produced in past research (e.g. De Dreu and Nauta, 2009), additional validation would be beneficial. Furthermore, Study 1 may lack ecological validity because human resources (HR) departments often hire subordinates, rather than managers themselves. Future research should replicate these findings among HR professionals.
Conclusion
The present research suggests subordinates high in dark personality traits are selected and favored by managers because they are perceived to aid the pursuit of agentic goals, and thus dominance-oriented managers are more likely to evaluate these subordinates positively due to their greater pursuit of agentic goals. This research therefore helps identify why managers might explicitly seek out subordinates whose personality traits are typically deemed undesirable, and often costly, for organizations.
Appendix
Deviations from pre-registration in Study 1
| Pre-registered plan | Deviation and justification |
|---|---|
| Excluding participants who supervise zero subordinates | We specified on Prolific that we wanted to recruit managers who currently supervise at least one subordinate. We were thus surprised that several participants reported supervising zero subordinates, suggesting there was an issue with the Prolific screener. We excluded these participants |
| The labels of managerial goals | We refer to agentic and communal goals as self-benefit and developmental goals, respectively, in the pre-registration. We label them agentic and communal goals here because these terms are clearer and better reflect the relevant literature |
| The label for candidates low in dark personality traits | In the pre-registration, we call these candidates “light personality” candidates. However, we later determined that this label might be misleading because there is research on the “light triad” (e.g., Kaufman et al., 2019). We changed this label to “conventionally moral candidates” to avoid confusion with research on the light triad |
| Excluding the item “Helping my organization become a market leader in the industry” from scale of agentic goals | We removed this item from the measure of agentic goals because its dominant factor loading varied between agentic and communal goals between studies |
| Additional hypotheses that were not pre-registered for Study 1 | The pre-registration specifies hypotheses regarding the relationships between dominance-orientation, agentic goals, and evaluations of employees with dark personality traits. We did not pre-register hypotheses about prestige-orientation, although we stated that we expected to observe a different pattern of associations compared to dominance-orientation. We pre-registered hypotheses about the relationship between communal goals and evaluations of employees with antisocial personality traits for Study S1, which we reference in the Introduction. Our hypothesis regarding prestige-orientation and goal pursuit was not pre-registered |
Note
Studies S1 and S2 tested the relationship between managers' goals and their evaluation of subordinates high in dark personality traits. Study S1 showed that participants evaluated a subordinate high in dark personality traits more positively for the achievement of an agentic goal than a communal goal. Study S2 showed that participants preferred a subordinate high in dark personality traits over one low in these traits to execute a necessary evil (Molinsky and Margolis, 2005). In both studies, results held controlling for participants' own levels of dark personality traits (SOM1).
The supplementary material for this article can be found online.
